Christopher Orlando Hobson v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2014-KA-01116-COA
CHRISTOPHER ORLANDO HOBSON A/K/A APPELLANT
CHRISTOPHER HOBSON A/K/A
CHRISTOPHER L. HOBSON A/K/A
CHRISTOPHER O. HOBSON
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/07/2014
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: MICHAEL GUEST
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, FELONY
EVASION, COUNT II, MISDEMEANOR
RESISTING ARREST AS A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SIMPLE
ASSAULT ON A POLICE OFFICER, AND
COUNTS III AND IV, POSSESSION OF A
FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON, AND
SENTENCED AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER
TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR
PROBATION FOR COUNTS I, III, AND IV,
AND SIX MONTHS IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE RANKIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT FOR COUNT II, WITH ALL
SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/15/2015
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND JAMES, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. At approximately 10 p.m. on February 5, 2013, Officer William Lindley of the Pearl
Police Department observed a Honda Accord driven by Christopher Hobson cross the center
line on Old Whitfield Road. Officer Lindley testified that Hobson “was slumped towards the
middle in between the driver and passenger’s side” and “was not wearing a seatbelt.” When
Officer Lindley activated his police cruiser’s blue lights and dashboard video camera,
Hobson slowed down, as if to stop. However, he then sped off with Officer Lindley giving
chase. The car chase lasted approximately four minutes and covered approximately two
miles through a residential area. Hobson sped through three stop signs during the chase, and
the officer stated that Hobson’s speed was “no higher than 70 miles per hour” (mph) in a 20
mph zone.
¶2. Hobson was eventually forced onto a dead-end road. He drove off the road into a
sparsely wooded area, stopped his vehicle, and exited the car. When the officer got out of
the cruiser and ran towards Hobson, he turned away to run but was quickly tackled by Officer
Lindley. Hobson escaped the officer’s grasp by elbowing the officer in the chest and ran
towards some nearby apartments. Officer Lindley continued his pursuit of Hobson and gave
numerous verbal commands for him to stop, but Hobson failed to comply. Running through
the parking lot of the apartment complex, Officer Lindley observed Hobson throw down a
black handgun between some cars. The officer discharged a taser into Hobson’s back, and
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Hobson eventually surrendered and was taken into custody. Another officer arriving on the
scene retrieved the dropped handgun. Reports later confirmed the pistol had been reported
stolen in January 2013.
¶3. On June 6, 2013, a Rankin County grand jury indicted Hobson on four counts: Count
I, fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer in a motor vehicle in violation of Mississippi
Code Annotated section 97-9-72(2) (Rev. 2006); Count II, simple assault of a police officer
in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-71(1) (Rev. 2006); Count III,
possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon in violation of Mississippi Code
Annotated section 97-37-5 (Rev. 2006);1 and Count IV, possession of a stolen firearm in
violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-35 (Rev. 2006). The indictment was
later amended to charge Hobson as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated
99-19-83 (Rev. 2007).2
¶4. A jury trial was held in Rankin County Circuit Court on October 30-31, 2013. Officer
Lindley stated that after Hobson fled the vehicle, Hobson elbowed him to escape the officer’s
restraint, and he dropped the firearm between cars in the parking lot before being
apprehended. However, Hobson’s wife, Sherry, and three of her relatives, who claimed to
be eyewitnesses to the incident, testified that Hobson did not hit the officer or drop a weapon
in the parking lot. They said the officer tackled Hobson immediately upon exiting the car
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It was stipulated at trial that Hobson was a convicted felon prior to the incident.
2
Hobson was convicted of manslaughter on January 23, 1998, and served one year
and seven months in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Hobson also
had a federal conviction for distribution of cocaine and was sentenced to a term of seventy-
four months, for which he served one year, ten months, and twenty-two days in custody.
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and that the officer hit Hobson multiple times. Sherry’s sister, Terri Alexander, testified that
she had hidden a gun underneath one of the cars in the parking lot because she was worried
the police would find it on her person. On rebuttal, Officer Lindley stated he only observed
four to five males standing in a nearby parking lot; he did not see anyone else in the area
where the incident occurred. It was also noted that Officer Lindley recovered the pistol from
the precise area where he saw Hobson drop it.
¶5. The jury convicted Hobson on all counts, but as to Count II, Hobson was convicted
of misdemeanor resisting arrest as a lesser included offense of simple assault of a police
officer. For Counts I, III, and IV, the trial court sentenced Hobson to life imprisonment in
the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, as a habitual offender without
eligibility for parole or probation, with the sentences to run concurrently. For Count II,
Hobson was sentenced to six months in the custody of Rankin County jail, with the sentence
to run concurrently with the sentences imposed in the other counts.
¶6. Hobson filed a pro se motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and
a motion for a JNOV was also made by defense counsel. After a hearing on July 28, 2014,
both motions were denied by the trial court. Hobson now appeals, alleging several errors.
Finding no error, we affirm.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the evidence of felony flight was sufficient to support the
verdict.
¶7. Section 97-9-72 provides:
(1) The driver of a motor vehicle who is given a visible or audible signal
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by a law enforcement officer by hand, voice, emergency light or siren
directing the driver to bring his motor vehicle to a stop when such
signal is given by a law enforcement officer acting in the lawful
performance of duty who has a reasonable suspicion to believe that the
driver in question has committed a crime, and who willfully fails to
obey such direction shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction shall be punished by a fine not to exceed One Thousand
Dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the county jail for a term not to
exceed six (6) months, or both.
(2) Any person who is guilty of violating subsection (1) of this
section by operating a motor vehicle in such a manner as to
indicate a reckless or willful disregard for the safety of persons
or property, or who so operates a motor vehicle in a manner
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,
shall be guilty of a felony[.]
Hobson argues that the evidence does not support his conviction for felony evasion under
subsection (2) but merely supports a conviction for a misdemeanor under subsection (1). He
argues Officer Lindley’s claim that he was driving more than 70 mph in a 20 mph zone was
“an exaggeration[,] and his driving did not appear to be reckless or in extreme disregard for
human life.” He also notes there were no pedestrians or other vehicles nearby, and he
maintained control of the car throughout the chase. Hobson acknowledges that he failed to
stop at three stop signs, but claims that behavior was only negligent, not reckless.
¶8. At trial, defense counsel made a motion for a directed verdict, claiming there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that Hobson was guilty of felony evasion. The trial
judge concluded that the State met its prima facie burden, stating:
At that point in time, in additional to the blue lights, the officer activated his
siren, his audible signal; and, thereafter, the Defendant, according to testimony
and according to the video, accelerated and took off from the officer’s attempt
to stop him. It showed him going through a residential area exceeding the
posted speed limit. I don’t believe the law requires that there be anyone on the
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road. It just is the fact he was operating the vehicle in this manner where
people could be, whether they were there or not, especially in a subdivision,
where anyone could have stepped from a yard or from between vehicles, or
any of that area; and when he was operating the vehicle in the way that it was
being operated both pursuant to the officer’s testimony and the video that was
shown. I believe that the jury can find the necessary elements of felony
evasion as it relates to Count I.
¶9. We find the trial court’s findings supported by the evidence. In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bush v. State, 895 So.
2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005). However,
[s]hould the facts and inferences considered in a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence “point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense
with sufficient force that reasonable [jurors] could not have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,” the proper remedy is for the
appellate court to reverse and render.
Id. (quoting Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985)). Officer Lindley observed
Hobson cross the center line on the road and operate the vehicle without wearing his seatbelt.
Hobson failed to stop when the officer activated his blue lights, ran three stop signs, and
exceeded the posted speed limit in a residential area. This testimony was corroborated by the
dashboard camera video evidence, which additionally showed that Hobson drove on the
wrong side of the road throughout much of the chase. Although Hobson characterizes the
area as a “sparsely populated wooded residential area,” this claim is belied by the video
evidence showing several cars parked on the side of the road and homes located close to the
road. Hobson made several wide turns during the chase and could have easily been involved
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in a head-on collision, had another car been coming the other direction. We find the
evidence demonstrated that Hobson was driving in a manner “as to indicate a reckless or
willful disregard for the safety of persons or property.” The mere fact that no one was
injured by his reckless driving is irrelevant to the conviction. See Betts v. State, 10 So. 3d
519, 524 (¶¶15, 17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (evidence defendant failed to heed police officer’s
order to stop, drove on wrong side of road, and drove in excess of posted speed limit
sufficient to support trial court’s denial of motion for directed verdict, as “reasonable jurors
could have reached different conclusions with regard to every element of the offense” of
“felony eluding of a police officer”).
¶10. As the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Hobson was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of feloniously fleeing from a law enforcement officer, the trial court did not
err in denying his motion for a JNOV.
II. Whether the jury instruction regarding flight compromised
Hobson’s right to due process.
¶11. The trial court gave Jury Instruction S-5 over Hobson’s objection. The instruction
stated:
The Court instructs the Jury that unexplained flight is a circumstance from
which guilty knowledge may be inferred. If you believe from the evidence in
this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Christopher Orlando
Hobson, did flee, such unexplained flight or hiding is to be considered in
connection with all other evidence in this case. You may determine from all
the facts whether such unexplained flight was a conscious sense of guilt or
whether it was caused by other things and give it the weight as you think it is
entitled to in determining the guilt or innocence of the Defendant.
During deliberations on the jury instructions, the trial court noted:
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The unexplained flight . . . it could be argued that even the felony evasion was
a result that he was knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon or that
he was knowingly possessing a stolen firearm, so the unexplained flight of this
flight instruction would be appropriate for the firearm charge, so it’ll be given.
¶12. The giving of a jury instruction will only be overturned on appeal if the trial court
abused its discretion. Drummer v. State, 167 So. 3d 1180, 1186 (¶19) (Miss. 2015) (citing
Higgins v. State, 725 So. 2d 220, 223 (¶15) (Miss. 1998)). Jury instructions given by the trial
court are reviewed “as a whole to determine whether the refusal of a particular instruction
was in error.” Sheriff v. State, 156 So. 3d 924, 925 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Taylor
v. State, 763 So. 2d 913, 915 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)). “Evidence of flight is admissible
to show an accused’s consciousness of guilt.” Id. at (¶5) (citing Fuselier v. State, 702 So.
2d 388, 390 (¶4) (Miss. 1997)). “Prosecutors may obtain a flight instruction only if that
flight is unexplained and somehow probative of guilt or guilty knowledge. Flight is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn and considered along with all
the other facts and circumstances connected with the case.” Drummer, 167 So. 3d at 1188
(¶24) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
¶13. Hobson ran from the officer, and no explanation for the flight was provided. Officer
Lindley observed Hobson, a previously convicted felon, drop a firearm, which was later
determined to be stolen. Thus, the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence of Hobson’s
unexplained flight was relevant to the two charges involving the firearm and probative of
guilt, is supported by the record, and we find the giving of the jury instruction, when viewed
as a whole, was not in error.
III. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Hobson
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possessed a stolen firearm and was aware the firearm was stolen.
¶14. Count IV of the indictment charged Hobson with possessing a stolen firearm in
violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-35. The pertinent portion of the
statute is subsection (1), which provides:
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess, receive,
retain, acquire or obtain possession or dispose of a stolen firearm or attempt
to possess, receive, retain, acquire or obtain possession or dispose of a stolen
firearm.
Hobson claims that the State failed to prove that he knowingly possessed a stolen firearm;
therefore, his conviction for Count IV should be reversed and rendered.
¶15. “For the State to prove guilty knowledge, it must prove that [the defendant] received
the property under circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that it was
stolen.” Long v. State, 933 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Ellett v.
State, 364 So. 2d 669, 670 (Miss. 1978)). However, “[t]he prosecution is to be given all
favorable inferences from the evidence that was presented at trial.” Riley v. State, 1 So. 3d
877, 883 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Smith v. State, 839 So. 2d 489, 495 (¶12) (Miss.
2003)). “The unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance from
which culpability of a crime may be inferred.” Jones v. State, 819 So. 2d 558, 561 (¶13)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Brooks v. State, 695 So. 2d 593, 595 (Miss. 1997)). Four
factors are used to evaluate that inference:
1. The temporal proximity of the possession to the crime to be inferred;
2. The number or percentage of the fruits of the crime possessed;
3. The nature of the possession in terms of whether there is an attempt at
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concealment or any other evidence of guilty knowledge;
4. Whether an explanation is given and whether that explanation is
plausible or demonstrably false.
Id.
¶16. After the State rested, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, specifically
arguing that the State had not proven Hobson knew the gun was stolen. In response to
Hobson’s motion for a directed verdict, the State argued:
[T]his Defendant is a convicted felon and there’s no way that he could
purchase a handgun at any reputable dealership, that he could not go to a gun
show and purchase one. I think that in and of itself brings credibility to the
fact that he knew it was stolen.
The owner of the pistol testified that it had been discovered stolen less than a month prior to
Hobson’s arrest. The owner presumed that his son, who had drug problems, had sold it to
acquire drugs or money. Citing the factors outlined in Jones, the trial judge concluded that
Hobson possessed the gun, which was the only item stolen; he discarded the gun while
running from the officer, evincing guilty knowledge; and no explanation was given as to how
he possessed the weapon. The trial court summarized: “[T]he fact that there is evidence
there, that regardless of possession of recently stolen property, the fact that the Defendant
discarded the weapon, those are circumstances from which a jury could infer guilty
knowledge in the fact that he had a stolen firearm.”
¶17. We find no merit to Hobson’s argument, as the circumstances surrounding the incident
and Hobson’s actions were sufficient for the jury to infer that he knowingly and intentionally
possessed a stolen firearm.
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IV. Whether the trial court’s denial of Hobson’s motion for a mistrial
was an abuse of discretion.
¶18. After the defense rested, the State presented rebuttal testimony through several
witnesses. Hobson’s wife, Sherry, was called to testify regarding a phone conversation she
had with Hobson three days prior to trial. During the phone call, Hobson asked Sherry if
anyone had seen the officer punch him. When the State asked her about the conversation,
Sherry replied: “We’re going through two different cases, so, I mean, both of them
[involved] an incident with the police punching him,” referring to a second upcoming case
involving Hobson. Defense counsel immediately requested that the jury be excused and, out
of the jury’s presence, asked the trial court to direct the State to restrict its questions to the
incident at issue in the trial. The trial court directed the witness that all testimony should
relate to the February 5 incident, not the other case involving Hobson that occurred on March
8. Although defense counsel said that the trial court’s direction to the witness was sufficient,
counsel moved for a mistrial “out of an abundance of caution,” which the court denied,
noting that Sherry said case, not “charge.” The trial court did offer to issue a limiting
instruction to the jury, but defense counsel rejected the offer.
¶19. Hobson now argues that the testimony concerning the other pending charges resulted
in prejudice, and the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial. “The decision
to declare a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Robinson v. State, 2
So. 3d 708, 716 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Brent v. State, 632 So. 2d 936, 941
(Miss. 1994)). Unless the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial,
this Court will not overturn the court’s decision on appeal. Id.
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¶20. We do not find the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the witness’s
vague remarks regarding the other case did not result in prejudice to Hobson. “Where the
witness refers briefly to another crime, and the testimony was not purposely elicited by the
district attorney to prove the defendant’s character, no reversible error occurs.” Hancock v.
State, 964 So. 2d 1167, 1179 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Hobson v. State, 730 So.
2d 20, 24 (¶10) (Miss. 1998)). Furthermore, defense counsel specifically requested that the
trial judge not admonish the jury to disregard the remark. Defense counsel also stated: “And
I think when she has to say there were two cases and she has to differentiate, I think from this
point forward it is prejudicial to the – to the Defendant knowing that there’s another case
pending against the Defendant.” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, we find no merit to this
issue.
¶21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF COUNT I, FELONY EVASION, COUNT II, MISDEMEANOR
RESISTING ARREST AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SIMPLE ASSAULT
ON A POLICE OFFICER, AND COUNTS III AND IV, POSSESSION OF A
FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON, AND SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL
OFFENDER OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR
PROBATION FOR COUNTS I, III, AND IV, AND SIX MONTHS IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE RANKIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT FOR COUNT II, WITH
ALL SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF
THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO RANKIN COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND
WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., CONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION. IRVING, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN
PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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