Lauren Roberts v. Tyler Eads

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-CA-01242-COA
LAUREN ROBERTS APPELLANT
v.
TYLER EADS APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/19/2016
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. M. RONALD DOLEAC
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: GAY L. POLK-PAYTON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: BARBARA BOND PARKER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CUSTODY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/10/2017
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND GREENLEE, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The Forrest County Chancery Court awarded Lauren Roberts and Tyler Eads joint
legal and physical custody of their eight-year-old son, Thomas.1 In appealing the
chancellor’s denial of her request for primary physical custody, Lauren asserts that the
chancellor (1) erred in his application of the Albright2 factors and (2) misapplied Mississippi
statutory law and caselaw. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
1
To protect the privacy of the parties’ minor son, we use a pseudonym in place of his
actual name.
2
See Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).
¶2. Tyler and Lauren cohabited in 2008. Following their son’s birth in 2009, the parties
ended their relationship and eventually married other people. Tyler married Jenny Eads
around December 2009, and the couple later had two children together. Lauren married
Harry Martinolich in May 2012, and they had one child together. Lauren and Harry later
divorced, and in May 2015, Lauren married Daniel Roberts. At the time of the hearing on
this matter, Lauren and Daniel were expecting a child.
¶3. On May 22, 2015, Lauren filed a petition seeking sole legal and physical custody of
Thomas. On June 29, 2015, Tyler filed a response, a counterclaim for custody, and a motion
for temporary relief. The same day the chancellor entered a temporary order awarding
Lauren temporary legal and physical custody of Thomas and granting Tyler visitation rights.
The chancellor also appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for Thomas.
¶4. On March 1, 2016, the GAL submitted her initial report. The GAL found that Lauren,
age twenty-six, worked as a nurse with the Hattiesburg School District. The GAL further
found that Tyler, age twenty-seven, had worked for numerous companies as a truck driver
and was currently employed by Ross Trucking. The GAL found no concerns with the
parties’ spouses and determined that both spouses were involved in Thomas’s life and cared
for him very much. Although Thomas enjoyed spending time with his father, stepmother,
and half-brothers, the GAL found that he had lived his entire life with his mother. As a
result, the GAL concluded that Thomas was closer to Lauren and was more comfortable in
a living environment with her.
¶5. Taking into consideration the Albright factors, the GAL found the following factors
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favored Lauren: (1) continuity of care; (2) employment and responsibilities of that
employment; (3) emotional ties with the child; (4) stability of the home environment; and (5)
stability of employment. Due to Thomas’s age, the GAL deemed inapplicable the factor
regarding his preference.3 She further concluded that all the remaining Albright factors were
neutral. Based on her findings, the GAL initially recommended that Lauren retain primary
physical custody of Thomas, Tyler receive standard visitation rights, and the parties share
legal custody. At the end of her initial report, the GAL wrote that she reserved the right to
change her opinion based upon pending testimony and the receipt of additional information.
¶6. After filing her original report, the GAL followed up with the parties and reviewed
Thomas’s school records. In addition, the GAL interviewed Tyler’s parents (Thomas’s
paternal grandparents) and the paternal grandmother of Lauren’s son from her marriage with
Harry. The additional information gathered by the GAL led her to change her custody
recommendation. As a result, the GAL submitted a supplemental report on June 17, 2016.
¶7. In her supplemental report, the GAL explained that she originally recommended
Lauren retain primary physical custody of Thomas because she believed Lauren had
continuity of care and that neither Tyler nor his parents were active in Thomas’s life.
However, the GAL stated she had received new information that showed both Tyler and his
parents had actively participated in Thomas’s life prior to the custody filing but that Lauren
had not allowed them to see Thomas since she filed for sole custody. In addition, the GAL
reported that Tyler had initially refrained from refuting Lauren’s allegations or speaking
3
See Mixon v. Sharp, 853 So. 2d 834, 840 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing
that a child under age twelve is too young to have his preference considered).
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negatively about her because he was afraid Lauren “would continue to withhold [Thomas]
from his life.” The GAL found that Lauren had twice previously withheld visitation from
Tyler, with each occasion lasting from several weeks to several months. After taking into
account the additional information she had received, the GAL recommended that Lauren and
Tyler share legal and physical custody of Thomas.
¶8. On June 28, 2016, the chancellor held a hearing on the parties’ custody dispute. On
July 19, 2016, the chancellor entered his final judgment. In applying the Albright factors, the
chancellor agreed with the GAL’s analysis that the following factors were neutral: (1)
Thomas’s age, health, and sex; (2) the parties’ parenting skills; (3) the parents’ willingness
and capacity to provide primary child care; (4) the parents’ age, physical health, and mental
health; (5) Thomas’s home, school, and community record; and (6) the parents’ relative
financial situations. Although noting the GAL’s initial conclusion that consideration of the
parents’ emotional ties favored Lauren, the chancellor determined this factor was also
neutral.
¶9. As to the remaining factors, the chancellor agreed with the GAL that Thomas’s
preference was inapplicable due to his age. Furthermore, the chancellor agreed with the
GAL that the following three factors weighed in Lauren’s favor: (1) continuity of care prior
to the parties’ separation; (2) the parents’ employment and the responsibilities of their
employment; and (3) the stability of the parents’ employment. However, unlike the
conclusion reached by the GAL’s initial report, the chancellor found that three factors also
weighed in Tyler’s favor. These factors included: (1) the parents’ moral fitness; (2) the
4
stability of the parents’ home environments; and (3) the differences in the parents’ religion,
personal values, and lifestyles.
¶10. After determining that Tyler and Lauren both had three Albright factors weighing in
their favor, the chancellor concluded that joint legal and physical custody would be in
Thomas’s best interest. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s judgment, Lauren appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11. “This Court’s standard of review in domestic[-]relations matters is extremely limited.”
Phillips v. Phillips, 45 So. 3d 684, 692 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Appellate courts cannot
“reevaluate the evidence, retest the credibility of witnesses, nor otherwise act as a second
factfinder.” Bower v. Bower, 758 So. 2d 405, 412 (¶31) (Miss. 2000) (citing Wright v.
Stanley, 700 So. 2d 274, 280 (Miss. 1997)). We will not disturb a chancellor’s findings of
fact unless the findings were manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous or unless the chancellor
applied an erroneous legal standard. Phillips, 45 So. 3d at 692 (¶23). Furthermore, we will
not reverse the chancellor’s decision where substantial record evidence supports his factual
findings. Id. However, we review questions of law de novo. Smith v. Wilson, 90 So. 3d 51,
56 (¶13) (Miss. 2012).
DISCUSSION
I. Application of the Albright Factors
¶12. “The best interest of the child is paramount in any child-custody case.” Smith v.
Smith, 97 So. 3d 43, 46 (¶8) (Miss. 2012). In determining a child’s best interest, the
chancellor considers the following factors: (1) the child’s age, health, and sex; (2) the parent
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with the continuity of care prior to the separation; (3) the parent with the best parenting skills
and the willingness and capacity to provide primary child care; (4) the parents’ employment
and the responsibilities of that employment; (5) the parents’ physical and mental health and
age; (6) the emotional ties of the parent and child; (7) the parents’ moral fitness; (8) the
child’s home, school, and community record; (9) the child’s preference at the age sufficient
to express a preference by law; (10) the stability of the parents’ home environments and
employment; and (11) other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship. Albright v.
Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).
¶13. “An Albright analysis is not a mathematical equation.” Hall v. Hall, 134 So. 3d 822,
827 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). “[T]his Court cannot reweigh the evidence and must defer
to the chancellor’s [factual] findings . . . so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence.” Id. at 828 (¶21). The Mississippi Supreme Court “has held that ‘all the Albright
factors are important, but the chancellor has the ultimate discretion to weigh the evidence the
way he sees fit.’” Id. at 827 (¶19) (quoting Johnson v. Gray, 859 So. 2d 1006, 1013-14 (¶36)
(Miss. 2003)).
¶14. In challenging the chancellor’s award of joint physical custody of the parties’ son,
Lauren argues that the chancellor misapplied several Albright factors. Specifically, she
contends the chancellor erroneously found that Thomas’s age, health, and sex; the parents’
relative financial situations; and the parents’ emotional ties with Thomas were all neutral
factors. Lauren further asserts the chancellor erred by finding that consideration of the
parties’ moral fitness and the stability of their home environments weighed in Tyler’s favor.
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a. Thomas’s Age, Health, and Sex
¶15. The chancellor found that, at the time of the hearing, Thomas was a seven-year-old
boy who received speech therapy and had been diagnosed with ADHD. The chancellor also
noted that concerns had been raised that Thomas might have dyslexia. While finding that
Tyler had been less involved than Lauren in Thomas’s ADHD evaluation and treatment, the
chancellor determined this was due to Lauren’s failure to inform Tyler about Thomas’s
medical issues. The GAL’s supplemental report reached the same conclusion. The
chancellor further noted the GAL’s findings that, while Tyler felt alienated due to the lack
of information and wished to be kept up to date, he had no problem with Thomas receiving
continued treatment for his diagnosis. Based on the information before him, the chancellor
agreed with the GAL’s finding that this factor was neutral. Upon review, we find nothing
in the record to contradict the chancellor’s determination that this factor favored neither
parent. See Hall, 134 So. 3d at 828 (¶21).
b. The Parents’ Relative Financial Situations
¶16. Although not actually listed as an Albright factor, the chancellor included a discussion
of the parties’ relative financial situations and found that this “factor” was neutral. In so
finding, the chancellor determined that Tyler’s income had remained almost the same at his
last two jobs and that Lauren had been employed at her current position for about a year and
a half. The chancellor also noted Tyler’s testimony that he was considering returning to
school to receive training as a lineman or electrician. Finally, the chancellor concluded that
both parties’ expenses exceeded their incomes. Based on this evidence, the chancellor found
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that consideration of the parties’ relative financial situations favored neither party. After
reviewing the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the chancellor’s finding
on this issue. See id.c. The Emotional Ties of the Parents and Child
¶17. In discussing this factor, the chancellor acknowledged that the GAL’s initial report
concluded this factor favored Lauren. According to the GAL’s testimony, however, her
supplemental findings revealed that both Tyler and his parents were more involved in
Thomas’s life than she initially believed. Furthermore, the evidence showed, and the GAL
found, that Thomas enjoyed spending time at his father’s home with his stepmother and his
half-brothers.
¶18. After considering the testimony and evidence presented, the chancellor found that
both parties loved their son very much and were emotionally connected to him.4 As a result,
the chancellor concluded this factor was neutral. Because the record contains substantial
evidence to support the chancellor’s finding, we find no error. See id.d. The Parents’ Moral Fitness
¶19. With regard to the parents’ moral fitness, the chancellor noted that Tyler had been in
a stable marriage for the last six years that had produced two children. The chancellor further
noted that Lauren began cohabiting with her first husband, Harry, two months after meeting
him and had begun dating and living with her current husband, Daniel, while still married
4
See Sumrall v. Sumrall, 970 So. 2d 254, 258 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (finding
no error in the chancellor’s factual determination that the emotional ties between the parents
and child constituted a neutral factor since both parents loved their child and the child loved
his parents).
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to, but separated from, Harry. At the time of the hearing, Lauren and Daniel were expecting
a child.
¶20. Although the GAL found the parties’ moral fitness neutral, the chancellor concluded
that the factor weighed in Tyler’s favor “in view of Lauren’s promiscuous behavior with
Daniel while still married to Harry.” See Brumfield v. Brumfield, 49 So. 3d 138, 149 (¶¶43-
44) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (finding no error in the chancellor’s consideration of the wife’s
adulteries, as well as other circumstances, and her determination that the moral-fitness factor
favored the husband). On appeal, Lauren argues the chancellor “erred by holding [her] past
against her in determining her moral fitness and awarding [the parties] joint physical custody
of the[ir] minor child.” Despite Lauren’s assertions, however, the record fails to show that
the chancellor placed undue emphasis on Lauren’s marital and extramarital relationships.
Instead, the record reflects that the chancellor conducted an appropriate Albright analysis and
considered all the relevant factors applicable to the case in reaching his determination. See
Bruenderman v. Bruenderman, 220 So. 3d 204, 208 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (finding no
error in the chancellor’s Albright analysis where the chancellor discussed but did not
overemphasize the husband’s adultery). We therefore find no error with respect to the
chancellor’s findings on this factor. See Hall, 134 So. 3d at 828 (¶21).
e. The Stability of the Parents’ Home Environments
¶21. As to the stability of the parents’ home environments, the chancellor again observed
that Tyler had been in a stable marriage for over six years while Lauren had been in multiple
relationships and marriages. The chancellor also found that Tyler appeared to have more
9
family to support him than Lauren did. As the GAL’s supplemental report noted, Tyler’s
parents were much more involved in Thomas’s life than she initially believed. The
chancellor therefore disagreed with the GAL’s finding that this factor favored Lauren, and
he instead concluded that the factor weighed in Tyler’s favor.5 Because substantial evidence
supports the chancellor’s determination, we find no error. See id.II. Application of Mississippi Statutory Law and Caselaw
¶22. In addition to challenging the chancellor’s application of the Albright factors, Lauren
claims that the chancellor’s award of joint physical custody violates Easley v. Easley, 91 So.
3d 639 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), and Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-24(2) (Rev.
2013).
¶23. In Easley, the chancellor granted the parties an irreconcilable-differences divorce.
Easley, 91 So. 3d at 640 (¶1). Section 93-5-24(2) provides that joint custody may be
awarded in an irreconcilable-differences divorce “in the discretion of the court, upon
application of both parents.” Following a trial in Easley, “the chancellor determined that
joint physical custody was in the children’s best interest, but he erroneously concluded that
the statute did not allow it to be awarded unless both parties expressly presented joint custody
for consideration.” Easley, 91 So. 3d at 640 (¶1). The chancellor therefore awarded sole
custody of the parties’ children to the father while granting the mother visitation. Id. On
appeal, this Court concluded that, “after finding joint custody to be in the children’s best
5
Compare In re N.B., 135 So. 3d 220, 228 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (recognizing
a chancellor’s authority to reject the findings of a statutorily required GAL but providing
that the chancellor’s reasons for doing so must be stated in his factual findings and legal
conclusions).
10
interest, the chancellor’s award of custody to one parent was an error of law.” Id. at (¶2).
We therefore reversed the chancellor’s judgment and remanded the case so the chancellor
could apply the proper legal standard. Id.
¶24. Upon review of the present case, we find no merit to Lauren’s claim that the
chancellor’s award of joint physical custody violated either section 93-5-24(2) or our holding
in Easley. As stated, section 93-5-24(2) provides a chancellor with the discretion to grant
joint custody in an irreconcilable-differences divorce. However, the present case involves
no such divorce since the parties were never married. We further note that section 93-5-
24(3) provides a chancellor with the discretion to award joint custody “[i]n other cases . . .
upon application of one or both parents.” As the record here reflects, in responding to
Lauren’s custody petition, Tyler requested sole custody or, in the alternative, joint custody.
Furthermore, after considering the Albright factors, the chancellor determined that joint legal
and physical custody served Thomas’s best interest.6 As Easley recognized, a chancellor may
grant joint custody, even where both parties do not present the issue, if such an arrangement
is in the child’s best interest. See Easley, 91 So. 3d at 640 (¶1). We therefore find no merit
to Lauren’s assertion that the chancellor’s judgment violated Mississippi statutory law and
caselaw.
¶25. The chancellor’s judgment is affirmed.
6
See also Smith v. Smith, 206 So. 3d 502, 514 (¶33) (Miss. 2016) (discussing a
chancellor’s duty to weigh conflicting testimony and determine witness credibility); Reed
v. Weathers Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Inc., 759 So. 2d 521, 524 (¶10) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2000) (“Even if this Court disagreed with the lower court on the finding of fact and
might have arrived at a different conclusion, we are still bound by the chancellor’s findings
unless manifestly wrong.” (quoting Richardson v. Riley, 355 So. 2d 667, 668 (Miss. 1978))).
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¶26. AFFIRMED.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, FAIR, WILSON,
GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.
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