Antwaine Liddell v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-KA-01656-COA
ANTWAINE LIDDELL A/K/A ANTWAINE APPELLANT
MAURICE LIDDELL
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/14/2016
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. M. JAMES CHANEY JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SHARKEY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: ERIN ELIZABETH BRIGGS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALICIA MARIE AINSWORTH
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: RICHARD EARL SMITH JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/08/2019
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Following a jury trial, Antwaine Liddell was convicted in the Sharkey County Circuit
Court on seven counts: one count of deliberate design murder, one count of burglary of a
dwelling, one count of armed robbery, three counts of kidnaping, and one count of
conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Subsequently, he was sentenced to life plus fifty years
in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Aggrieved, Liddell
filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a
new trial. The circuit court denied Liddell’s motion. He now appeals. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. In March 2014, Eric Williams Sr. was killed at his home during a burglary. Liddell
and five others were indicted in Sharkey County for the crime. In August 2016, Liddell’s
motion for a change of venue was granted,1 and venue was transferred to the Forrest County
Circuit Court. After a jury trial in October 2016, Liddell was convicted on seven counts: (1)
deliberate design murder, (2) burglary of a dwelling, (3) armed robbery, (4 -6) kidnaping, and
(7) conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Liddell was sentenced to life on count I, fifteen
years on count 2, twenty years on count 3, ten years on count 4, ten years on count 5, ten
years on count 6, and five years on count 7. The circuit court ordered that counts 4, 5, and
6 be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to counts 1, 2, 3, and 7, which
are to be served consecutively to each other, totaling a life sentence plus fifty years.
¶3. Liddell filed a motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial. The circuit court
denied his motion, and he timely appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4. In reviewing a motion for JNOV or a motion for a new trial, this Court has held that:
A motion for JNOV challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the
jury. The critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under
such circumstances that every element of the offense existed. This Court’s
standard of review is to analyze the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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Frank Finley, a co-conspirator, was granted a change of venue after voir dire
because there were not enough impartial jurors to comprise a jury. The circuit court granted
Liddell’s motion anticipating the same issue due to the “common knowledge, family
connections and employment issue in [the] small rural community.”
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prosecution, and decide if any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellee
receives the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn
from the evidence. Furthermore, all credible evidence supporting the verdict
will be accepted as true. This Court will reverse on the issue of legal
sufficiency of the evidence when the facts favor the appellant to such an extent
that reasonable men could not have found appellant guilty. However, this
Court is required to affirm the judgment of the trial court on the sufficiency of
the evidence where substantial evidence of such quality and weight exists to
support the verdict and where reasonable and fair minded jurors may have
found appellant guilty.
Sacus v. State, 956 So. 2d 329, 334 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Alternatively, unlike a motion for JNOV, a motion for a new trial challenges
the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. This Court will review the
trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion
standard. This Court will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction
an unconscionable injustice. The evidence will be analyzed in the light most
favorable to the verdict.
Id. at (¶13) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the trial court erred in overruling Liddell’s hearsay objections.
¶5. Liddell asserts that the circuit court erred in allowing three witnesses to introduce
inadmissible hearsay testimony. “The standard of review regarding admission or exclusion
of evidence is abuse of discretion.” Tillis v. State, 176 So. 3d 37, 45 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App.
2014). “Where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court will not
reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party.” Id. “Unless the trial
court has so abused this discretion as to prejudice the defendant’s case, we will not reverse
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the ruling of the trial court.” Id. “We employ a de novo standard of review when presented
with constitutional issues.” Id.A. Lacarius Oliver and Rusty Clark
¶6. Liddell asserts that the circuit court erred in allowing Investigators Lacarius Oliver’s
and Rusty Clark’s testimonies because certain statements were hearsay and did not meet any
exception. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement made by the declarant that is offered into
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See M.R.E. 801. This Court has held that:
An officer’s testimony being offered to explain why he or she acted as he or
she did, and not for the truth of the matter asserted, is not hearsay and is
admissible. Information obtained in the course of an investigation is
admissible when it is for providing the basis of the investigation and ultimate
arrest of the defendant.
Jefferson v. State, 214 So. 3d 1071, 1078 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted).
¶7. The statements of Investigators Oliver and Clark are not hearsay. Liddell’s
assignments of error stem from three statements made by Oliver about receiving information
from another investigator, a lead sheet from an anonymous phone call, and an interview of
Brandon Gilmore’s wife. In the first statement, Oliver responded, “I want to say the other
investigator told me that, but it was . . .” after being asked how information about residents
from Copiah County were involved in the incident. We find that this statement was properly
admitted because Oliver was describing why he turned his attention to residents in Copiah
County next in his investigation and it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
¶8. The second assignment of error arose from the line of questioning about the lead
sheet. Once again, we find that Oliver’s testimony was properly admitted because it was a
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part of his investigation and was not offered to assert the veracity of the contents of the lead
sheet.
¶9. Lastly, the State asked Oliver if there were any discrepancies in the information given
by Gilmore in his interview and the information that Gilmore’s wife gave in hers. We also
note that Oliver’s response of “[n]o” was given in describing the next steps of his
investigation and not to testify to the content of Gilmore’s or his wife’s interviews.
¶10. Additionally, Liddell asserts that Clark’s testimony was also admitted in error. During
trial the State asked Clark, “[a]fter speaking to Mr. Washington, did you look for any
individuals with any height and weight characteristics?” Liddell objected stating that the
State was attempting to get Clark to testify about what Washington said. The State countered
that Clark was only testifying to his investigation process; we agree. As previously stated,
“[i]nformation obtained in the course of an investigation is admissible when it is for
providing the basis of the investigation and ultimate arrest of the defendant.” Jefferson, 214
So. 3d at 1078 (¶19); see also Lawrence v. State, 116 So. 3d 156, 160 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App.
2007) (quoting Smith v. State, 984 So. 2d 295, 300 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)). Clark’s
statement was made about the description of the course of action he had taken when
investigating the crime, not for the truth of the matter asserted, and the circuit court properly
allowed the testimony. Accordingly, we find these issues lack merit.
B. Allison Patrick
¶11. Liddell also asserts that Patrick’s testimony was hearsay. The State argued that
Patrick’s testimony fell under a hearsay exemption as an opposing party statement.
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“Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) exempts from the definition of hearsay any
out-of-court statement which is offered against a party only if that statement was made by
a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Johnson
v. State, 956 So. 2d 358, 367 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Here, Patrick was indicted for the same crimes as Liddell, and although they were not tried
together as co-defendants, it was undisputed that they were co-conspirators in the crime.
What was in dispute during the trial was Patrick’s testimony to events that happened outside
of Liddell’s presence. After review of the record, we find that the circuit court properly
restrained Patrick’s testimony to events that happened only while Liddell was present.
¶12. In contrast, we find that the court allowed Patrick to testify outside of that perimeter
in error, but we find that it was harmless error. In defining harmless error, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has stated that:
The United States Supreme Court has explained that a defendant is entitled to
a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials. While there are
some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error, most constitutional errors can be harmless. The
Supreme Court has recognized a limited class of fundamental constitutional
errors, structural errors, that are not subject to harmless-error analysis and
require automatic reversal. However, for all other constitutional errors,
reviewing courts must apply harmless-error analysis in order to determine
whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. An otherwise
valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently
say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 300 (¶31) (Miss. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶13. Here, Patrick testified to events that happened between her and Frank Finley after
Liddell exited the vehicle. Patrick testified that Finley showed her the additional drugs he
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had stolen unknown to the others, that she and Finley traveled alone to a motel, and that they
eventually traveled to Texas. We find the admission of this testimony to be error. However,
in considering that none of the testimony given went to prove the elements of any of the
seven charges Liddell was convicted of, we find Patrick’s testimony to be harmless. The
record reflects that evidence supporting Liddell’s convictions was sufficient to support the
jury’s verdict. Therefore, we find that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Liddell’s motion for mistrial.
¶14. Liddell asserts that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s allowance of Jimmy
Washington’s testimony. Liddell states that Washington was left off of the prosecution’s
witness list and he did not have time to prepare for his testimony. “Whether to grant a
motion for a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Smith v. State, 158 So.
3d 1182, 1185 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). “The standard of review for denial of a motion
for a mistrial is abuse of discretion.” Id.
¶15. Moreover, “[a] trial judge possesses the authority to declare a mistrial where
prosecutorial conduct substantially deflects the attention of the jury from the issues that it has
been called upon to decide or appeals to bias, passion, or prejudice, and, therefore,
significantly impairs a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Williams v. State, 919 So. 2d 250,
253 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). “The trial judge is permitted considerable discretion in
determining whether a mistrial is warranted since the judge is best positioned for measuring
the prejudicial effect.” Id. Here, although Washington was not on the final witness list for
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the prosecution, we do not find that the circuit court erred in allowing him to testify. The
State had included Washington in discovery, as well as provided his prior felony convictions
in their list of witnesses to defense counsel. More importantly, the circuit court allowed
Liddell time to interview the witness before he took the stand, which he took. Accordingly,
we find this issue lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
¶16. Because we do not find that the circuit court erred in allowing Oliver, Clark, or
Washington to testify and part of Patrick’s testimony was harmless error, we affirm Liddell’s
conviction.
¶17. AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIS, C.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, P.JJ., GREENLEE AND TINDELL,
JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND
McCARTY, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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