Willie Earl Riley v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-CP-01595-COA
WILLIE EARL RILEY A/K/A WILLIE RILEY APPELLANT
A/K/A WILLIE E. RILEY
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/23/2013
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JANNIE M. LEWIS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HOLMES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WILLIE EARL RILEY (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISMISSED
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/28/2014
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., ISHEE, ROBERTS AND JAMES, JJ.
ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Willie Earl Riley appeals the Holmes County Circuit Court’s judgment dismissing his
sixth motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). Riley claims that the circuit court erred by
finding that his most recent PCR motion is untimely and barred as a successive writ. Riley
also claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and the circuit court erred when
it accepted his guilty plea to murder. Finding that Riley’s sixth PCR motion is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. During 1999, Riley was charged with murdering his girlfriend, Ann Weatherall. He
confessed that he shot her in the head after she told him that she did not want to be with him
anymore. Later, Riley pled guilty to murder. Since then, he has repeatedly attempted to
obtain post-conviction relief.
¶3. Riley filed his first PCR motion during 2000. Riley v. State, 90 So. 3d 112, 114 (¶3)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2011). The circuit court dismissed it, and Riley did not appeal. In July 2001,
Riley filed his second PCR motion. He claimed that his guilty plea was involuntary, his
sentence was illegal, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at (¶4). The
circuit court dismissed Riley’s second PCR motion, and this Court affirmed the circuit
court’s judgment in Riley v. State, 848 So. 2d 888, 889 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
¶4. The circuit court summarily dismissed Riley’s third and fourth PCR motions. There
is no indication that he appealed the circuit court’s decisions. During late 2009, Riley filed
his fifth PCR motion. Riley, 90 So. 3d at 114 (¶8). After the circuit court summarily
dismissed it because it was barred as a successive writ, Riley appealed to this Court. Id.
That appeal culminated in this Court’s second reported opinion regarding Riley’s attempts
to obtain post-conviction relief. Id. We noted that we had previously addressed Riley’s
claims that he did not plead guilty voluntarily, and he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 115 (¶12). Ultimately, this Court found that Riley’s fifth PCR motion was
barred as a successive writ. Id. at (¶11). We also found no merit to Riley’s claims that the
indictment against him was fatally flawed, and newly discovered evidence exempted his PCR
motion from all procedural bars. Id. at 116 (¶14). Finally, we noted that Riley’s fifth PCR
motion was untimely. Id. at (¶15).
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¶5. Undeterred, on July 19, 2013, Riley filed his sixth PCR motion. Within his sixth PCR
motion, Riley raised a myriad of claims that primarily focused on the concept that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Riley also briefly claimed that the circuit court
did not inform him that he was waiving a number of his rights during the guilty-plea hearing.
Following the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his sixth PCR motion, Riley appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6. We will not reverse a circuit court’s decision to dismiss a PCR motion unless the
circuit court was clearly erroneous. Riley, 90 So. 3d at 114 (¶9). We review questions of law
de novo. Id.
ANALYSIS
I. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
¶7. Riley again repeats his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. This
is at least the third time he has raised this issue. Riley, 848 So. 2d at 891 (¶8); Riley, 90 So.
3d at 115 (¶12). Under Mississippi’s Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act
(UPCCRA), any order denying or dismissing a PCR motion is a bar to a second or successive
PCR motion. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Supp. 2014). But Riley claims that he has a
fundamental constitutional right to effective counsel. Accordingly, Riley reasons that he is
entitled to raise this issue repeatedly and perpetually based on the Mississippi Supreme
Court’s decision in Rowland v. State, 42 So. 3d 503, 506 (¶9) (Miss. 2010), in which the
supreme court stated that “errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted
from the procedural bars of the UPCCRA.” In other words, Riley argues that neither the
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time-bar1 nor the successive-writ bar applies to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
¶8. The supreme court has not held that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
invokes a “fundamental right” that circumvents all procedural bars that apply to PCR
motions. But it is not necessary for us to decide the question, because the supreme court has
held that the principle of res judicata applies in the context of PCR motions. Jones v. State,
119 So. 3d 323, 326 (¶9) (Miss. 2013). Res judicata prevents the litigation of claims that
“were made or should have been made” during previous litigation. Hill v. Carroll Cnty., 17
So. 3d 1081, 1084 (¶8) (Miss. 2009). Because Riley already raised his claim that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, he is precluded from relitigating it here. Therefore, the
circuit court did not err when it summarily dismissed Riley’s sixth PCR motion.2
II. INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA
¶9. Riley also repeats his claim that the circuit court erred when it accepted his guilty
plea. According to Riley, the circuit court did not inform him that by pleading guilty, he was
waiving his rights to be tried by a jury, confront adverse witnesses, and avoid self-
incrimination. In Riley, 848 So. 2d at 890 (¶4), we found “that [during Riley’s guilty-plea
1
Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 2014), a PCR motion
challenging a guilty plea must be filed within three years of the entry of the judgment of
conviction.
2
Because Riley pled guilty to murder and he was sentenced to life, he is not eligible
for earned-time allowance. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-139(1)(a) (Rev. 2011). Accordingly,
there is no reason to discuss sanctioning Riley by ordering the forfeiture of meritorious
earned time under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-5-138(3) (Supp. 2014). However,
we caution Riley that an inmate who repeatedly files objectively frivolous PCR motions may
face other sanctions. See Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-76(1) (Rev. 2011); Ivy v. State, 688 So.
2d 223, 224 (Miss. 1997); Reed v. State, 70 So. 3d 1174, 1175-76 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App.
2011).
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hearing, he] was thoroughly questioned on the record by the trial judge regarding [his]
understanding of the crime charged, the applicable sentencing, and the waiver of his
constitutional rights.” Consequently, this issue is also barred by res judicata.
¶10. Moreover, Riley’s claim is patently false. The transcript of Riley’s guilty-plea hearing
is in the record. Before the circuit court accepted Riley’s guilty plea, the circuit court told
him:
[Y]ou have a right to a public trial by jury. In that trial, you have a right to
cross-examine all witnesses that will be called to testify against you. You have
a right to subpoena witnesses to testify in your own behalf. You have a right
to testify or not testify as you so desire. Should you decide not to testify, this
[c]ourt would instruct the jury that they could not hold the fact that you did not
testify against you. This [c]ourt will also instruct the jury that they must
presume that you are innocent until the State proves your guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The circuit court then asked Riley whether he wanted to give up those constitutional rights
and plead guilty. Riley answered, “Yes, ma’am.” Therefore, this issue is barred and it has
no merit.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HOLMES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HOLMES COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND
JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., AND BARNES, J., CONCUR IN PART AND
IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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