Sam Bradford, Sr. v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-CP-01976-COA
SAM BRADFORD, SR. A/K/A SAM BRADFORD APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/2013
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAMAR PICKARD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: SAM BRADFORD SR. (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION
COLLATERAL RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 02/10/2015
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND JAMES, JJ.
GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Sam Bradford Sr. appeals the Jefferson County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion
for post-conviction collateral relief (PCCR) for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. After a jury trial, Bradford was convicted of murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). He
then filed a direct appeal arguing the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence because no reasonable jury could have convicted him of anything other than
manslaughter. This Court affirmed his conviction. See Bradford v. State, 910 So. 2d 1232,
1234 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
¶3. Thereafter, Bradford filed an application for leave to proceed in the circuit court with
the Mississippi Supreme Court. On February 22, 2007, the supreme court denied his request.
The supreme court found that the issues raised by Bradford either were raised on direct
appeal or could have been raised. As a result, those issues were procedurally barred. The
supreme court further found that Bradford's claim that his sentence was illegal was without
merit. A second application for leave to proceed in the trial court was also denied by the
supreme court on March 3, 2011.
¶4. Nevertheless, on December 5, 2011, Bradford filed a motion to vacate and set aside
his murder conviction and to resentence him for manslaughter in the circuit court. The court
treated his motion as a request for post-conviction collateral relief. On December 29, 2011,
the circuit court found Bradford's motion was time-barred and barred as a successive writ;
thus, his motion was dismissed. In addition, the circuit court sanctioned Bradford $250 and
prohibited him from filing any additional PCCR motions until he either paid the $250 or was
granted permission from the supreme court to file an additional PCCR motion.
¶5. On January 13, 2012, Bradford filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant
to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). The circuit court again treated the motion
as one for post-conviction collateral relief. The court denied this motion as time-barred and
as a successive writ. Bradford appealed arguing his murder conviction should be vacated,
and he should be resentenced for manslaughter. This Court affirmed the circuit court's
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dismissal of Bradford's PCCR motion because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Bradford
v. State, 116 So. 3d 164, 166 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
¶6. Then, on October 7, 2013, Bradford filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings
in the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Bradford appeals
this decision and argues that the dismissal violates his state and federal constitutional rights.
He also argues again that his murder conviction should be vacated and that he should be
resentenced for manslaughter.
DISCUSSION
¶7. In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a motion for post-conviction relief, the
standard of review is clear. “The trial court's denial will not be reversed absent a finding that
the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.” Smith v. State, 806 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (¶3)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2002). When issues of law are raised, the proper standard of review is de
novo. Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999). Further, this Court will affirm
the summary dismissal of a PCCR motion if the movant fails to demonstrate “a claim
procedurally alive substantially showing the denial of a state or federal right.” Robinson v.
State, 19 So. 3d 140, 142 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
¶8. Article 3, Section 21 of the Mississippi Constitution states: “The privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in the case of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it, nor ever without the authority of the legislature.” The
Mississippi Legislature addressed habeas corpus in the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction
Collateral Relief Act. This Court has explained:
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The Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act “repealed
post-conviction use of habeas corpus and implemented a motion framework
specifically for post-conviction collateral review of challenges to convictions
or sentences, as opposed to pre-conviction challenges.” A petition for habeas
corpus is still a viable option in limited circumstances, such as a challenge of
the denial of bail pending an appeal, but “purely collateral post-conviction
remedies attacking a judgment of conviction or sentence should be sought
under authority of the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act since that Act, in
the pure post-conviction collateral relief sense, is arguably ‘post-conviction
habeas corpus renamed.’”
Putnam v. Epps, 963 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations
omitted). Therefore, motions for post-conviction relief must satisfy the confines of the
Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act.
¶9. Permission from the Mississippi Supreme Court must be obtained in order to seek
post-conviction relief in the circuit court when a case is affirmed on direct appeal. Miss.
Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Supp. 2014). Also, the dismissal or denial by the supreme court of an
application for leave to proceed in the trial court is a final judgment and bars successive
applications under the statute. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Supp. 2014). Here, Bradford
filed his motion for a judgment on the pleadings without permission of the supreme court.
Therefore, we affirm the chancellor's decision that it lacked jurisdiction.
¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JEFFERSON
COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON,
MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.
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