Charles H. Griner, Jr. v. Melanie Griner

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-CA-01903-COA
CHARLES H. GRINER, JR. APPELLANT
v.
MELANIE GRINER APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/28/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHNNY LEE WILLIAMS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MARION COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: S. CHRISTOPHER FARRIS
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: RICHARD ANTHONY FILCE
ERIK M. LOWREY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: AWARDED WIFE SEVENTY PERCENT OF
MARITAL ESTATE AND LUMP-SUM
ALIMONY
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED – 06/27/2017
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE IRVING, P.J., BARNES AND WESTBROOKS, JJ.
IRVING, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The Marion County Chancery Court granted Charles Griner (Chip) and Melanie
Griner an irreconcilable-differences divorce and, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, resolved
the issues that they were not able to resolve. Chip, being dissatisfied with the chancellor’s
resolution of those issues, appeals and specifically asserts that the chancellor erred with
respect to the following issues: (1) the division of the marital estate, (2) the assignment of
responsibility for the marital debts, (3) the award of lump-sum alimony to Melanie, (4) and
(5) other awards which exceed the scope of the issues that he and Melanie requested the court
to address. Finding error in the chancellor’s evaluation of the marital estate, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
¶2. Melanie and Chip married on August 11, 1990, and later had two children, Natalie and
Charlie.1 During the course of the marriage, Chip obtained a business degree from the
University of Mississippi, while Melanie, with Chip’s consent, chose to stay home and care
for the couple’s two children. Melanie never worked outside of the home, apart from briefly
helping her mother with a drapery business. Chip provided the family’s primary source of
income through his position as a bank director and his participation in the “family business.”2
As part of his involvement in one of the family-owned companies, Griner Energy, Chip came
to own a twenty-five-percent interest in a condominium3 in Destin, Florida, and the
remaining seventy-five-percent interest was owned by Chip’s mother and two siblings.
Additionally, Chip held a sizeable estate in the form of stocks. He contends that many were
gifted to him by his grandparents prior to the marriage, while others were purchased in both
Melanie and his names during the marriage.
1
At the time the judgment of divorce was entered, Natalie was twenty-one years old
and Charlie was eighteen years old.
2
The “family business,” as it is referenced throughout the record, appears to
encompass numerous family-owned business interests, including Griner Drilling Services,
Inc.; Griner Family Limited Partnership; Griner Oil and Gas Company, Inc.; Griner Real
Estate, LLC; and Griner Energy.
3
Chip asserts that the family used the condominium “once[,] maybe twice a year”
during the course of the marriage, while Melanie argues that they used the condominium “at
least twice per year, every year, during the marriage.”
2
¶3. Melanie and Chip separated on or about September 30, 2010. On September 22,
2011, the chancery court entered a temporary order, requiring Chip to pay $7,000 per month
as support and private-school tuition for Charlie. Shortly thereafter, Chip filed a motion for
relief from the temporary order, claiming that the $7,000-per-month figure had been
erroneously calculated to include “‘phantom income’ in the form of dividends from bank
stocks, capital gain year[-]end [income] and rental income,” which resulted in “a skewed
monthly income” for him. The chancellor denied Chip’s motion.
¶4. On February 3, 2012, Melanie filed a motion for appointment of a financial expert due
to Chip’s “substantial [and] extremely complex” assets. Melanie asserted in the motion that
she had no assets in her own name, as they were all titled in Chip’s name. The court granted
Melanie’s motion and appointed Jim Koerber of The Koerber Company, P.A., “to determine
valuation of assets of the parties, specifically the corporations of [Chip] and the cash flow
derived therefrom,” and “to prepare a report for the [c]ourt.”
¶5. On April 14, 2015, the parties filed a written consent, wherein they agreed to a divorce
on the ground of irreconcilable differences, but asked the chancellor to decide the following
issues: (1) child support and related school issues and costs; (2) alimony; (3) equitable
distribution of the marital assets; and (4) equitable distribution of the parties’ debts and
liabilities.4 The court conducted a one-day trial on November 13, 2014, during which
Koerber testified as to Chip’s finances. During his testimony, Koerber classified stocks as
4
Melanie and Chip also requested that the chancellor decide the following: (a) legal
and physical custody of Charlie; (b) tax deductions as they pertain to Natalie and Charlie;
and (c) attorneys’ fees. However, as these issues are not being contested on appeal, we do
not address them in our discussion.
3
either marital or nonmarital; Koerber also calculated Chip’s gross income to be $354,044
annually.5 At the end of the trial, the chancellor entered a final judgment, the contents of
which we summarize as follows:
1. Child support and related school issues and costs: The court held that,
based on the past twelve years, Chip earned an average adjusted gross
income of somewhere between $275,000 and $325,000, annually.
Based on this amount of income, the court instructed Chip to pay
Melanie $1,500 per month in child support for Charlie. The court also
required Chip to continue to provide health insurance for Charlie until
he is emancipated. The court held that Chip and Melanie would divide
equally all of Charlie’s non-covered medical expenses.
2. Alimony: The court applied the Armstrong6 factors and required Chip
to pay Melanie periodic alimony in the amount of $3,000 per month
until her death or remarriage. The court also ordered Chip to pay
Melanie an additional $4,000 per month for ten years, or a lump sum in
the amount of $480,000. The court further required Chip to provide
Melanie with health insurance benefits for the next eighteen years.
3. Equitable distribution of the marital assets: The court conducted a
Ferguson7 analysis of the marital assets and, based on the stipulations
of the parties and Koerber’s testimony, determined that the following
property was marital and awarded Melanie seventy percent of it: the
home and the land surrounding it; the Florida condo, described as Unit
1401 at Emerald Towers; “any business holdings;” Citizens Bank stock;
First Federal Bank stock; Griner Drilling 401(k); and the AG Edwards
IRA. The court also awarded Melanie a 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe and all
the household furnishings and personal property, but awarded Chip the
exclusive use and possession of the marital home until he purchased
Melanie’s interest in it. The court held that Melanie and Chip would
keep their own checking accounts, including the balances therein. The
5
Chip asserts here, as he did in his motion for relief from the temporary order, that
this figure is inaccurate because it accounts for “phantom income.” Chip reiterates this
argument throughout his appeal.
6
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).
7
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
4
court concluded by asserting that, in rendering its decision, it took into
account Chip’s nonmarital assets, which totaled over $7,000,000 and
left Chip in a “far superb” position than Melanie.
The final judgment did not specifically address equitable distribution of the parties’ debts and
liabilities.
¶6. Both Chip and Melanie filed motions for a new trial or for reconsideration of the
court’s final judgment. In response, the court entered a modified order, which we summarize
as follows:
1. Child support and related school issues and costs: The court denied
Chip’s request to reduce the amount of child support he was required
to pay for Charlie. The court additionally required Chip to pay for the
“maintenance, upkeep, tags, and insurance” costs for Charlie’s vehicle
until Charlie reached twenty-one years of age.
2. Alimony: The court denied Chip’s request to reduce the lump-sum
alimony-award he was ordered to pay to Melanie, as well as his request
to modify the provision of the final-judgment requirement that he
provide Melanie with health insurance for the next eighteen years.
Additionally, the court required Chip to make Melanie the beneficiary
of a $1 million life-insurance policy.
3. Equitable distribution of the marital assets: The court clarified that
Melanie would receive seventy percent of the following marital assets:
the house and surrounding land (except for some acreage nearby which
the court found to be nonmarital and belonging to Chip), with a
combined total value of $762,500; Chip’s twenty-five-percent interest
in the Florida condominium, valued at $231,250; and the retirement
accounts—being the AG Edwards IRA, valued at $48,517.96; Griner
Drilling Services 401(k), valued at $215,068; and the AG Edwards
investment account, valued at $978. The court clarified that Chip’s
interest in the corporations and business holdings, listed on the Hemsley
report were nonmarital; as such, that interest and the tax benefits would
belong to Chip. The court, relying on Koerber’s report, also held that
the following shares of stock in each corporation would be considered
marital property and therefore subject to distribution: forty-four shares
of Citizens Bank Corporation at $65 per share, with a value of $2,860;
5
and 6505 shares of First Federal Bancorp at $35 per share, with a value
of $227,675. The court found that Melanie was entitled to seventy
percent of those shares of stock. The court found that the following
shares of stock were nonmarital and would, therefore, belong to Chip:
11,496 shares of Citizens Bank Corporation at $65 per share, with a
value of $747,240; and 31,401 shares of First Federal Bancorp at $35
per share, with a value of $1,099,035.
Additionally, the court held that Chip would be liable for all of the debts of the marriage as
set out in the Hemsley report, pursuant to Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 914 (Miss.
1994), and the 8.05 financial statements of the parties. The court noted that a large amount
of the debt reflected by Chip had to do with his corporate debt and was outside the scope of
the court’s jurisdiction, as Chip was awarded one hundred percent of the interest in his
business; thus, the debts of those corporations were nonmarital and not subject to the court’s
division. The court did, however, order Melanie to pay the interest on a family Citibank
credit card with a balance of $23,000; the court ordered Chip to pay Melanie $18,000 for the
purpose of alleviating that debt (as the card had a balance of $18,000 at the time of the
temporary order). The court also assessed the debt of the home and surrounding acreage to
Chip, and extended the period of time that Melanie had to secure a new home. Chip appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶7. “Our scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited under the familiar rule
that this Court will not disturb a chancellor’s findings unless [they are] manifestly wrong [or]
clearly erroneous, or . . . the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard.” Johnson v.
Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Miss. 1994). The chancellor’s division and distribution of
property “will be upheld if it is supported by substantial credible evidence.” Carrow v.
6
Carrow, 642 So. 2d 901, 904 (Miss. 1994). This Court has previously reiterated the well-
settled premise that
[a]ll property division, lump[-]sum or periodic alimony payment, and mutual
obligations for child support should be considered together. Alimony and
equitable distribution are distinct concepts, but together they command the
entire field of financial settlement of divorce. Therefore, where one expands,
the other must recede.
Clark v. Clark, 43 So. 3d 496, 502 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted).
(1) Property Distribution
¶8. Chip argues that the chancellor erred in his distribution of the couple’s property in
several ways. First, Chip asserts that the chancellor’s distribution of seventy percent of the
marital assets—in the form of the marital home and marital stock—was erroneous because
the chancellor failed to discount the assets for outstanding loan balances. Next, Chip argues
that the chancellor erred in failing to equitably divide the substantial marital debts of the
parties. Finally, Chip argues that the chancellor erred in awarding Melanie seventy percent
of Chip’s twenty-five-percent interest in the Florida condominium, because the condominium
was not marital property.
¶9. Mississippi law requires equitable distribution of the marital estate during divorce
proceedings. Owen v. Owen, 798 So. 2d 394, 399 (¶14) (Miss. 2001). “In determining
equitable distribution of marital assets and debts, the chancellor must first classify each asset
as marital or non-marital.” Walker v. Walker, 36 So. 3d 483, 487 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)
(citing Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 915). In Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 914, the court defined
“marital property” as “[a]ssets acquired or accumulated during the course of a marriage.”
7
Such marital property is subject to equitable division “unless it can be shown by proof that
such assets are attributable to one of the parties’ separate estates prior to the marriage or
outside the marriage.” Id. “Property division should be based upon a determination of fair
market value of the assets, and these valuations should be the initial step before determining
division.” Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929. “[I]n defining and distributing marital assets, the
couple’s net assets should be considered; that is, the indebtedness owed against such asset
should ordinarily be deducted from its fair market value.” Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 920
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶10. “Whether a debt is classified as marital or separate depends on who benefitted from
the debt.” Walker, 36 So. 3d at 487 (¶12) (citing Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 914 So. 2d 193,
197 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). “The courts in this state have consistently held that
expenses incurred for the family, or due to the actions of a family member, are marital debt
and should be treated as such upon dissolution of the marriage.” Shoffner v. Shoffner, 909
So. 2d 1245, 1251 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted).
¶11. Once property is classified as marital or nonmarital, “the chancellor must evaluate the
equitable division of all marital property pursuant to the guidelines listed in Ferguson,”
which are:
1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to
be considered in determining contribution are as follows: a. Direct or
indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property; b.
Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family
relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family
duties and duration of the marriage; and c. Contribution to the
education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning
power of the spouse accumulating the assets[;]
8
2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or
otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such
assets by agreement, decree or otherwise[;]
3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to
distribution[;]
4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the
contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the
marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter
vivos gift by or to an individual spouse;
5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal
consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution;
6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties,
be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources
of future friction between the parties;
7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the
combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and,
8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered.
Walker, 36 So. 3d at 487 (¶12); Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928. “Marital debt lies within the
factors set forth in Ferguson, as it may be defined as an ‘economic consequence’ or as ‘any
other factor which in equity should be considered.’” Cuccia v. Cuccia, 90 So. 3d 1228, 1233
(¶12) (Miss. 2012) (citation omitted).
¶12. In addition to applying the Ferguson factors, “[c]ontributions and fault should be
considered by the chancellor in determining equitable distribution of a marital estate.”
Singley v. Singley, 846 So. 2d 1004, 1008 (¶10) (Miss. 2002). “[A]n equitable division of
property does not necessarily mean an equal division of property.” Chamblee v. Chamblee,
637 So. 2d 850, 863-64 (Miss. 1994). “When the facts and circumstances warrant an
9
equitable division of the marital estate of one-half or greater and such a division complies
with the Ferguson principles, then we are duty bound to let such a distribution stand.”
Phillips v. Phillips, 904 So. 2d 999, 1003 (¶13) (Miss. 2004).
a. Marital Assets
¶13. Chip first argues that the chancellor erred in failing to make specific findings as to the
marital estate and which assets were marital or nonmarital. We find this argument without
merit. As noted above, the chancellor provided in his final judgment and further clarified in
the modified order which assets were marital and which would go to Chip or Melanie as
separate property.
¶14. Next, Chip argues that the chancellor’s award of seventy percent of the marital assets
to Melanie was erroneous because the chancellor failed to discount those marital assets for
outstanding personal-loan balances8 prior to making the award. In other words, the
chancellor erroneously awarded Melanie seventy percent of the gross value of the marital
assets rather than seventy percent of the net value. Melanie, in response, argues that the
chancellor’s award was justifiable, given the fact that Chip possessed a sizeable nonmarital
estate and ultimately caused the dissolution of the marriage because of his alcohol addiction.
¶15. In the final judgment, the chancellor properly discussed each Ferguson factor and
methodically explained why he decided to award Melanie seventy percent of the marital
8
Chip maintains that the loans from Griner Drilling Service were taken out for
personal reasons, not business reasons, as they were for payment to the rehabilitation center,
treatment for alcoholism, and investment loans and losses.
10
assets.9 The chancellor further reiterated his reasoning for his decision in the modified order.
Unfortunately, however, the chancellor included incorrect figures in his calculations. While
the Hemsley report, included in the record as exhibit 8, assesses the value of the marital home
and fifteen acres, plus the adjacent twenty-five acres, at $762,500, it also shows that the
marital home is encumbered by a $328,000 mortgage, leaving only $372,000 in equity. This
figure, combined with the $62,500 value of the adjacent twenty-five acres, results in a figure
of $434,500 for purposes of marital division.
¶16. The chancellor, in the final judgment and again in the modified order, valued the
marital home at $700,000. In the modified order, the chancellor remarked additionally that
the adjacent twenty-five acres were valued at $62,500, and valued the combined properties
at $762,500. However, these figures were erroneous; the chancellor should have awarded
Melanie seventy percent of $434,500, which was the amount of equity in the properties,
rather than seventy percent of $762,500. Thus, we reverse and remand on this issue, so the
chancery court may reconsider the division of the marital estate based on a proper evaluation
of it.
¶17. Chip also argues that chancellor erred in awarding Melanie seventy percent of the
value of the shares of First Federal Bancorp stock, because he failed to consider the
outstanding loan of $87,600 used to purchase the stock. Thus, Chip asserts that the net value
9
In sum, the chancellor made his determination on the basis that Chip held
nonmarital assets which put him in a better position than Melanie, even after an award of
seventy percent of the marital assets. Additionally, the chancellor noted that Melanie had
never developed skills to suddenly be forced into the workplace, and that Chip’s alcoholism
had ultimately led to the downfall of the marriage.
11
of the stock is $140,075, and Melanie should have been awarded only seventy percent of that
figure, rather than seventy percent of $227,675.
¶18. At trial, Koerber, while testifying about the marital stock, physically wrote on the
Hemsley report that the marital shares of First Federal Bancorp stock totaled $227,675. He
did not mention, nor was he questioned about, this purported purchase-money loan of
$87,600. Interestingly, Chip’s 8.05 financial statement does not show such a loan. The only
evidence in the record indicating that Chip took out any sort of loan for purchasing marital
stocks is found in his 8.05 financial statement, wherein he listed a liability to First Southern
Bank for “personal reasons” in the amount of $187,790, and another liability to First
Southern Bank for Citizens Bank stock in the amount of $84,224. There is insufficient
evidence in the record to show that the distribution of marital stock was in error; thus, we
find this issue without merit.
b. Marital Debts
¶19. Next, Chip argues that the chancellor erred in failing to equitably divide the
substantial marital debts of the parties. Specifically, Chip asserts that the chancellor erred
in requiring him to pay one-hundred percent of the marital debts, in addition to paying
Melanie seventy percent of the gross value of the marital home and the marital stocks without
deducting the outstanding indebtedness as to each. Chip also argues that the chancellor
failed to make specific findings about the marital debts, other than simply requiring him to
pay all of them.
¶20. As stated, the chancellor in the modified order provided that Chip was liable for all
12
marital debts set forth in the Hemsley report and 8.05 financial statements, in addition to the
corporate debts on his personal, nonmarital assets.10 As the modified order specifically
referenced the marital debts listed in those documents and commented on the status of those
debts as either marital or corporate and thus belonging to Chip, we do not find that the
chancellor failed to make specific findings about the debts. Therefore, we also find no error
in the chancellor’s assigning responsibility for payment of the debts to Chip in light of Chip’s
substantial separate income and earning potential. This issue is without merit.
c. Condominium
¶21. Chip argues that the chancellor erred in awarding Melanie seventy percent of his
twenty-five-percent interest in the Florida condominium because, in his view, this asset was
clearly nonmarital property. However, Chip received the deed to the condominium during
his marriage to Melanie. Both he and Melanie assert that it was used by their family at least
once a year. Based upon these facts, we find no error with the chancellor’s finding that the
condominium was marital property.
(2) Alimony
¶22. Chip asserts that the chancellor abused his discretion in awarding Melanie lump-sum
alimony, because Melanie did not suffer a deficit after distribution of the marital estate.
Additionally, Chip asserts that the court erroneously found that his nonmarital assets totaled
over $7,000,000.
¶23. “Alimony awards are within the discretion of the chancellor . . . and his discretion will
10
In his appeal, Chip states that Griner Energy had to borrow money to sustain itself
before it finally failed, and that he and his siblings are now repaying that debt obligation.
13
not be reversed on appeal unless the chancellor was manifestly in error in his finding of fact
and abused his discretion.” Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280. “Alimony is considered only
after the marital property has been equitably divided and the chancellor determines one
spouse has suffered a deficit.” Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So. 2d 843, 848 (¶13) (Miss. 2003).
¶24. Since we are reversing because of the chancellor’s error in valuing the marital home,
the chancellor will have to take a new look at the alimony award because alimony cannot be
considered until after the marital estate has been properly valued and equitably divided.
However, we note that the error in valuing the marital home results in a reduction in the
value of the marital estate, and we already have found no issue with the chancellor awarding
Melanie seventy percent of the marital estate based on an erroneous, but higher, valuation
figure for the marital estate.
(3) Health Insurance, Life Insurance, and Automobile Tag, Insurance, and
Maintenance
¶25. Finally, Chip asserts that the chancellor erred in addressing issues which were not
authorized by both parties’ consent. Specifically, Chip argues that the chancellor had no
authority to award Melanie health-insurance coverage for eighteen years; to require him to
obtain life-insurance coverage; and to require him to pay for the insurance, tag, and
maintenance on his son’s vehicle. In response, Melanie argues that these issues were subsets
of those presented for decision by the chancellor.
¶26. As noted in the facts portion of the opinion, Melanie and Chip submitted, among other
issues, the issues of child support and related school issues/costs, and the equitable
distribution of the parties’ debts/liabilities.
14
a. Health Insurance
¶27. The chancellor did not exceed the authority granted by Chip and Melanie when he
addressed Melanie’s health insurance. “Medical insurance is an award in the nature of
alimony.” Moore v. Moore, 803 So. 2d 1214, 1220 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). The parties
submitted the issue of alimony to the chancellor for resolution. However, we note that the
chancellor’s final judgment and the modified order clarifying the final judgment contain
conflicting provisions with respect to the period of time that Chip would be required to
maintain health insurance for Melanie. First, in the final judgment in section III, the
chancellor ordered Chip to provide Melanie with health-insurance benefits for the next
eighteen years, but in the conclusion portion of the judgment, the chancellor stated that Chip
was required to provide Melanie with health-insurance benefits for the next eighteen months.
Later, in the modified order, the chancellor stated that Chip was required to provide Melanie
with health-insurance benefits for the next eighteen years. It is obvious that the chancellor
made a scrivener’s error somewhere, but we cannot be certain where, although it appears
likely that the scrivener’s error lies in the eighteen-year wording. Nevertheless, prudence
requires us to reverse and remand this issue for clarification.
b. Life Insurance
¶28. We also find that the chancellor operated within the authority granted to him by the
parties’ submission of the issue of alimony when he ordered Chip to maintain a life-insurance
policy with Melanie designated as the beneficiary. Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-
23 (Rev. 2013) provides that, when granting a divorce, a chancellor
15
may, in [his] discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the parties and
the nature of the case, as may seem equitable and just, make all orders . . .
touching the maintenance and alimony of the wife or the husband, or any
allowance to be made to her or him, and shall, if need be, require bond,
sureties or other guarantee for the payment of the sum so allowed.
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-23. This Court has held that “[a]n alimony payor may be required
to maintain life insurance in an amount sufficient to satisfy payment of alimony obligations
that survive the payor’s death.” Coggins v. Coggins, 132 So. 3d 636, 644 (¶35) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2014) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Recognizing the possibility that an
alimony payor may fall behind in periodic-alimony payments and then die leaving those
vested payments unsatisfied, this court has acknowledged the chancellor’s authority to
require the alimony payor to maintain a life-insurance policy to protect the recipient spouse
against such a contingency.” Id. at 645 (¶37); see also Johnson v. Pogue, 716 So. 2d 1123,
1134 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998); Beezley v. Beezley, 917 So. 2d 803, 808 (¶17) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2005).
¶29. While we find that the chancellor was within the authority granted him by the parties
when he ordered Chip to maintain a life-insurance policy with Melanie named as the
beneficiary, we also find that the amount that Chip was required to maintain—$1,000,000—
was unreasonable and excessive. The purpose of requiring an alimony payor to maintain a
life-insurance policy with the alimony payee designated as the beneficiary is to protect the
vested but unpaid amount of alimony in case of the payor’s death.
¶30. In Coggins, we held that the chancellor erred in his requirement that the husband
designate his former wife as the beneficiary to a $175,000 life-insurance policy “to protect
16
against [the husband] defaulting on his $504-per-month alimony payments and then dying
before curing the default.” Coggins, 132 So. 3d at 645 (¶38). We reasoned that “[t]his
amount of insurance—the equivalent of thirty years worth of alimony payments—assumes
not only that [the husband] may fall behind for three decades but also that [his former wife]
will experience no material change of circumstances altering or terminating her need for
alimony.” Id.
¶31. Here, with respect to the protection of the alimony awarded to Melanie, the chancellor
stated in the modified order:
The [c]ourt failed [in its final judgment] to ensure that the amount of alimony
awarded to Melanie [was] covered by insurance and hereby directs Chip to
change the beneficiary on his $1,000,000.00 life insurance policy to make the
same payable to Melanie for the performance of the [j]udgment of the [c]ourt
in case of Chip’s death.
As noted earlier in this opinion, the chancellor awarded Melanie periodic alimony of $3,000
a month, as well as lump-sum alimony of $480,000, or $4,000 a month for ten years.
Although Chip was allowed to pay the lump-sum alimony in installment payments, the full
amount vested immediately. Only a $480,000 policy would be required to guarantee
payment of the lump-sum alimony. If Chip immediately paid his lump-sum-alimony
obligation in a single payment, he would have to fail making his monthly periodic-alimony
payments for more than twenty-seven years to accumulate a $1,000,000 arrearage. And if
Chip chose to pay his lump-sum-alimony obligation in installment payments, along with his
periodic-alimony payments, and failed to make any payments for ten years, he would be in
arrears by only $840,000, not counting any accrued interest. It is unreasonable to assume that
17
Melanie would allow the payments to get that far behind before seeking judicial redress.
Moreover, it is not unreasonable that Melanie may remarry, at which time Chip’s periodic-
alimony obligation would cease. Since we are already reversing on other grounds, we direct
that on remand the chancellor take a new look at the amount of life insurance that will be
required to protect Melanie’s alimony interest.
c. Charlie’s Automobile Tag, Maintenance, and Insurance
¶32. Like awards of alimony, “the court may, in its discretion, . . . make all orders touching
the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the marriage.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-
23. “Child support can include life and health insurance, college tuition, and other related
needs. A party need not specifically request each form of child support ultimately awarded
by a chancellor if child support in general is requested.” Massey v. Huggins, 799 So. 2d 902,
910 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (internal citation omitted). However, this does not give the
chancellor full reign to consider any and every issue that might possibly fall under the
category of child support. Here, the parties expressly consented to the court’s disposition of
the issue of “child support and related school issues/costs.”
¶33. The record is devoid of any discussion regarding Charlie’s car other than that Chip
purchased the car for Charlie and that it was titled in Chip’s name. Under Mississippi law,
it is illegal to operate a vehicle upon the roadways of this state without a tag and liability
insurance. So when Chip purchased the vehicle for Charlie, he knew that it had to be tagged
and insured. While maintenance on the vehicle is not required by state law, Charlie also
knew that if he wanted the vehicle to remain usable, it would from time to time require some
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maintenance. Without more information in the record as to why Chip purchased the car for
Charlie, we cannot say with confidence that the chancellor was authorized to assess
responsibility for the tags, insurance, and maintenance of Charlie’s vehicle to Chip under the
issue of “child support and related school issues/costs.” However, the parties also submitted
the issue of debts and liabilities to the chancellor for resolution. Clearly, the state-law
requirement that the vehicle not be driven upon the roadways without a tag and liability
insurance implicates the liabilities issue submitted to the chancellor for resolution.
Consequently, we cannot find that the chancellor exceeded the authority given him by
assigning responsibility for the expenses associated with Charlie’s car. This issue is without
merit.
¶34. For the reasons discussed, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
¶35. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MARION COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
LEE, C.J., BARNES, ISHEE, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ.,
CONCUR. WILSON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION. GRIFFIS, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN
PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. CARLTON AND FAIR, JJ.,
NOT PARTICIPATING.
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