Ramona Baker v. Nakia Baker

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-CA-00522-COA
RAMONA BAKER APPELLANT
v.
NAKIA BAKER APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/04/2016
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JANE R. WEATHERSBY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WASHINGTON COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: BRANDON ISAAC DORSEY
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: WILLIAM R. STRIEBECK
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 06/19/2018
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE IRVING, P.J., WILSON AND TINDELL, JJ.
TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The Washington County Chancery Court granted Nakia and Ramona Baker an
irreconcilable-differences divorce. On appeal, Ramona challenges the chancellor’s
distribution of the marital estate and refusal to award periodic alimony. Finding no abuse of
discretion, we affirm the chancellor’s judgment.
FACTS
¶2. The parties married on December 26, 1998. They bought a house on Billings Street
(the Billings Street home), and in December 2003, they welcomed a daughter. During a
separation in 2008, Ramona testified that she moved into a separate residence. Ramona
stated that she subsequently sold that home for a profit, which she used as a down payment
to buy a lot on Princeton Street. In 2010, the parties built a second marital home (the
Princeton Street home) on the lot.
¶3. On August 29, 2012, Ramona filed a divorce complaint on the grounds of adultery and
cruel and inhuman treatment or, alternatively, irreconcilable differences. On November 20,
2012, the Washington County County Court issued a “Final Mutual Protective Order” to the
parties after finding they had been involved in multiple domestic-violence disputes and
“that[,] on multiple occasions[,] both parties were the principal aggressors[,] and neither
party acted in self-defense.” The county court gave Nakia temporary use of the Billings
Street home and Ramona temporary use of the Princeton Street home. The county court also
awarded Ramona temporary custody of the parties’ daughter, awarded Nakia temporary
visitation, and ordered Nakia to pay temporary child support. On May 27, 2014, Nakia
answered Ramona’s divorce complaint, asserted his affirmative defenses, and filed a
counterclaim for divorce.
¶4. At the start of their divorce hearing on September 30, 2014, the parties withdrew their
fault-based grounds and consented to an irreconcilable-differences divorce. The parties also
announced their agreement on the following issues: (1) shared legal custody of their
daughter; (2) sole physical custody to Ramona with reasonable visitation rights to Nakia; (3)
continued child-support payments by Nakia at fourteen percent of his monthly adjusted gross
income;1 (4) exclusive ownership of the Billings Street home and sole responsibility for the
related mortgage payments to Nakia; and (5) exclusive ownership of the Princeton Street
1
See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(1) (Rev. 2015) (providing guidelines for the
calculation of child-support payments).
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home and sole responsibility for the related mortgage payments to Ramona.2 The only
remaining issues the parties submitted for the chancellor’s determination were the
distribution of their marital estate and Ramona’s periodic-alimony request.
¶5. On March 4, 2016, the chancellor entered a judgment granting the parties an
irreconcilable-differences divorce. The chancellor determined the date of valuation for the
parties’ marital assets was November 20, 2012, the entry date of the county court’s protective
order. After considering the Ferguson3 factors, the chancellor awarded Ramona the
following marital assets valued at $110,600: the equity in the Princeton Street home
($85,000), the home’s furnishings and appliances ($20,000), and Ramona’s Toyota 4Runner
($5,600). The chancellor awarded Nakia the following marital assets valued at $110,660:
the equity in the Billings Street home ($23,000), the home’s furnishings and appliances
($4,000), Nakia’s 1999 Chevrolet truck ($4,430) and 2006 Chevrolet Corvette ($23,000), and
his retirement account ($56,230). The chancellor ordered the parties to be responsible for
any debt associated with their assigned marital assets. The chancellor also found that the
equitable distribution of the marital estate eliminated the need for an alimony award.
Aggrieved by the chancellor’s distribution of the marital estate and refusal to award periodic
alimony, Ramona appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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Since the time of the county court’s November 2012 protective order almost two
years earlier, Nakia had solely resided in and paid the mortgage on the Billings Street home,
and Ramona had solely resided in and paid the mortgage on the Princeton Street home.
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Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
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¶6. This Court applies a limited standard of review to a chancellor’s division and
distribution of marital property. Sims v. Sims, 169 So. 3d 937, 940 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.
2014). We will affirm the chancellor’s distribution of marital assets “as long as ‘it is
supported by substantial credible evidence.’” Id. (quoting Bowen v. Bowen, 982 So. 2d 385,
394 (¶32) (Miss. 2008)). We also decline to reverse the chancellor’s determination regarding
an award of alimony absent manifest error or an abuse of discretion. Id. However, we
review questions of law de novo. Williams v. Williams, 224 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (¶5) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2017).
DISCUSSION
I. Equitable Distribution
¶7. “When dividing marital property, chancellors are directed to (1) classify the parties’
assets as marital or separate; (2) determine the value of those assets; (3) divide the marital
estate equitably based upon the factors set forth in Ferguson; and (4) consider the
appropriateness of alimony if either party is left with a deficiency.” Ewing v. Ewing, 203 So.
3d 707, 711-12 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[F]airness
is the prevailing guideline in marital division.” Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929.
¶8. Ramona asserts no challenge to the chancellor’s classification and valuation of the
parties’ marital assets. In fact, Ramona acknowledges the chancellor evenly divided the
parties’ marital assets by awarding Ramona assets worth $110,600 and Nakia assets worth
$110,660. However, Ramona challenges the chancellor’s analysis of the Ferguson factors
and her refusal to award periodic alimony. According to Ramona, the chancellor abused her
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discretion by “assigning [Ramona] a substantial portion of the marital debt” and insufficient
marital assets to cover that debt. Ramona further argues the chancellor failed to consider her
lack of income-earning capacity when distributing the marital estate.
¶9. As discussed, following classification and valuation, a chancellor must equitably
divide the parties’ marital property based on the Ferguson factors. Ewing, 203 So. 3d at 713
(¶17). These factors include the following:
(1) Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors
to be considered in determining contribution are as follows: (a) direct
or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property; (b)
contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family
relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family
duties[,] and duration of the marriage; and (c) contribution to the
education, training, or other accomplishment bearing on the earning
power of the spouse accumulating the assets;
(2) The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn, or
otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such
assets by agreement, decree, or otherwise;
(3) The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to
distribution;
(4) The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the
contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the
marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter
vivos gift by or to an individual spouse;
(5) Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal
consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution;
(6) The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties,
be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources
of future friction between the parties;
(7) The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the
combination of assets, income, and earning capacity; and
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(8) Any other factor which in equity should be considered.
Id. (quoting Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928).
¶10. In considering the Ferguson factors, the chancellor determined that the parties
possessed no assets apart from their marital property. While the chancellor acknowledged
both parties’ contributions to the accumulation of marital property, she concluded that
Nakia’s contributions were greater. With regard to expenditures, withdrawals, or dissipation
of marital assets, the chancellor noted Nakia’s claim that Ramona transferred $24,370 from
their joint checking account. During cross-examination, Ramona stated she was unsure of
the exact amount she transferred, but she admitted “it was a significant amount of money.”
In addition, the chancellor noted that, on another occasion, Ramona transferred $2,900 from
an account titled only in Nakia’s name to her own account.
¶11. As to the remaining Ferguson factors, the chancellor found the parties offered no
testimony about the emotional value of any assets and provided no proof about the proposed
distribution’s tax consequences or legal consequences to third parties. The chancellor also
found no credible testimony was offered as to the needs of each spouse. Ramona testified
that she became disabled in 2005 from emotional distress caused by an injury to the parties’
daughter in 2004. Even though she never received a diagnosis for her claimed illness,
Ramona stopped working in 2005 and began receiving Social Security disability benefits.
Although she “could not see any signs of [Ramona’s] disability,” the chancellor
acknowledged Nakia’s corroborating testimony about the onset of Ramona’s illness in 2005.
¶12. While the chancellor found that Ramona’s illness hampered her earning potential, the
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chancellor also noted that Ramona received $2,712.20 a month in disability benefits for
herself and the parties’ daughter and would “continue to receive this amount plus any [cost-
of-living allowance] benefits associated with her [Public Employees’ Retirement System
(PERS)] account annually.” The chancellor found that the PERS cost-of-living allowance
benefits for 2015 amounted to $2,000 a year, which broke down to $166.67 a month. In
concluding her Ferguson analysis, the chancellor determined that the division of the parties’
marital property would eliminate the need for alimony. The chancellor therefore distributed
the marital property and refused Ramona’s periodic-alimony request.
¶13. “In reviewing a chancellor’s judgment, this Court does not conduct a Ferguson
analysis anew, but [we] review[] the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the
appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion.” Phillips v. Phillips, 904 So. 2d 999,
1001 (¶8) (Miss. 2004). The record here reflects the chancellor properly analyzed all the
Ferguson factors and then equitably divided the marital estate. Because the record contains
substantial credible evidence to support the chancellor’s division and distribution of the
marital estate, we find no abuse of discretion. See Sims, 169 So. 3d at 940 (¶10).
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
II. Alimony
¶14. Ramona also challenges the chancellor’s refusal to award periodic alimony. The
Mississippi Supreme Court has long acknowledged that equitable distribution and alimony
are intertwined and should be considered together to prevent inequity. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d
at 929. However, a chancellor should only consider a periodic-alimony award where he or
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she “determines that a spouse has suffered a disparity of income and standard of living
following the equitable division of the marital assets.” Ewing, 203 So. 3d at 715 (¶26)
(quoting George v. George, 22 So. 3d 424, 428 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)).
¶15. Following the equitable distribution of Ramona and Nakia’s marital estate, the
chancellor determined that sufficient assets existed to adequately provide for both parties and
that Ramona suffered no deficit. The chancellor therefore denied Ramona’s alimony request.
In reaching this determination, the chancellor found Nakia’s monthly adjusted gross income
amounted to $3,240.26 and that Ramona’s monthly disposable income amounted to slightly
more at $3,332.51. As previously discussed, the chancellor found that Ramona received:
(1) $2,712.20 a month in disability benefits for herself and the parties’ daughter, and (2) a
cost-of-living allowance benefit from her PERS account, which amounted to $166.67 a
month in 2015. In addition, pursuant to the chancellor’s divorce judgment, Ramona received
$453.64 a month in child support. Because substantial credible evidence supports the
chancellor’s findings on this issue, we conclude no abuse of discretion occurred from the
denial of Ramona’s periodic-alimony request. We therefore find this assignment of error
lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
¶16. Because substantial credible evidence supports the chancellor’s determination, we find
no abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the chancellor’s judgment.
¶17. AFFIRMED.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR,
WILSON, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.
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