Sedrick Buchanan and Armand Jones a/k/a Armond Jones a/k/a A.J. Jones v. State of Mississippi;

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-KA-01082-COA
SEDRICK BUCHANAN AND ARMAND JONES APPELLANTS
A/K/A ARMOND JONES A/K/A A.J. JONES
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/15/2017
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W. ASHLEY HINES
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED LEFLORE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS DANIEL HINCHCLIFF
KEVIN HORAN
BRADLEY D. DAIGNEAULT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: WILLIE DEWAYNE RICHARDSON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/03/2019
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., AND C. WILSON, J.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A shooting occurred on Highway 82 West outside of Itta Bena, Mississippi, late on
a Saturday evening in August 2015. A group of men in a light-colored Tahoe pulled up next
to a red Pontiac and one or more of the men began shooting as both vehicles were traveling
west on Highway 82. Shortly after the shooting, Jacarius Keys, accompanied by counsel,
gave a statement to the chief investigator on the case. In his statement, Keys said that he was
driving the Tahoe, and he also implicated four other men, namely Armand Jones, Sedrick
Buchanan, Michael Holland, and James Earl McClung Jr. In July 2016, all five men, Keys,
Jones, Buchanan, Holland, and McClung, were co-indicted for the murder of one man in the
red Pontiac and for the attempted murders of the three other men in the Pontiac.
¶2. Keys was killed on December 28, 2016—a year and a half after the shooting and from
when Keys gave his statement, and approximately five months after the joint indictment was
returned. The remaining four co-indictees were subsequently tried together in the Leflore
County Circuit Court in May 2017. Keys’s videotaped statement was admitted into evidence
and played at the defendants’ trial.
¶3. This appeal concerns only Jones and Buchanan. After a four-day trial, the jury found
Jones guilty of first-degree murder with respect to the victim who was killed, and guilty of
three counts of attempted first-degree murder with respect to the other three surviving
victims. Jones was sentenced to serve life in prison for his first-degree murder conviction,
and three terms of thirty years for his other convictions, all to run consecutively. Buchanan
was found guilty of three counts of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. He was
sentenced to serve three consecutive terms of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections.1 Jones and Buchanan appeal. Finding no error, we affirm
Buchanan’s and Jones’s convictions and sentences.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
Co-defendants McClung and Holland were also found guilty and appealed their
convictions and sentences. The appeals filed by McClung, Jones, and Buchanan were
initially docketed by the Mississippi Supreme Court Clerk under one docket number,
2017-KA-01053-COA. This Court subsequently entered an order keeping McClung’s
appeal under the original docket number and assigning a new docket number to Buchanan’s
and Jones’s appeals. Holland’s separate appeal is pending in this Court under docket
number 2018-KA-00872-COA.
2
¶4. The record reflects that D’Alandis Love, Perez Love, Kelsey Jennings, and
Ken-Norris Stigler were traveling west on Highway 82 about 11:00 pm on August 15, 2015.2
They were in “Munchie” Brown’s red Pontiac and were going to a club in Itta Bena called
the Moroccan Lounge. As they were driving, a light-colored Tahoe sped past them, spraying
bullets as it went by. D’Alandis Love was killed, and Perez Love, Jennings, and Stigler were
seriously injured.
¶5. Shortly after the shooting, Keys, accompanied by his lawyer, went to the Leflore
County Sheriff’s office to give a statement. He was interviewed by the chief investigator on
the case, Bill Staten, on September 2, 2015. When Investigator Staten learned the video
equipment had failed during that interview, he re-interviewed Keys, with his lawyer present,
on September 3.
¶6. In his interview, Keys said that he was driving the Tahoe, and he also provided
information that implicated Jones, Buchanan, McClung, and Holland. After Keys gave his
incriminating statement to law enforcement, he went to Attorney Kevin Horan, who
represented Jones at trial, and told him that he had done so. To avoid repetition, the details
of Keys’s statement are addressed below.
¶7. In July 2016, the Grand Jury of Leflore County indicted Jones, Buchanan, Keys,
Holland, and McClung for “acting alone or in concert with each other or others” on one
count of deliberate-design murder of D’Alandis Love in violation of Mississippi Code
Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2014); and three separate counts of attempted murder
2
Jennings and Stigler were D’Alandis and Perez Love’s cousins. For ease of
reference we will sometimes collectively refer to these four men as the Loves.
3
of Perez Love, Jennings, and Stigler in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section
97-1-7 (Rev. 2014) and section 97-3-19(1)(a).
¶8. On December 28, 2016, a year and a half after the shooting and when Keys gave his
statement, and approximately five months after Jones, Keys, Holland, Buchanan, and
McClung were indicted, Keys was killed. To avoid repetition, the details of Keys’s murder
will be addressed during the Court’s discussion of Buchanan’s and Jones’s Confrontation
Clause assignment of error, below.
¶9. Jones, Buchanan, McClung, and Holland were tried together before a jury in Leflore
County Circuit Court in May 2017. Each were represented by their own counsel.
¶10. Pretrial the defendants moved to exclude Keys’s videotaped statement. The trial court
denied the defendants’ motions. The trial court’s ruling will be discussed below when the
Court addresses Jones and Buchanan’s Confrontation Clause assignment of error. After the
trial court denied defendants’ motions to exclude Keys’s videotaped statement, each
defendant moved pretrial to sever their case from the others. The trial court also denied those
motions. The trial court’s ruling on the severance issue will also be discussed below.
¶11. Buchanan also moved pre-trial to exclude testimony and evidence related to his post-
shooting arrest that occurred in Carroll County six months after the shooting when Buchanan
was out on bond. Buchanan was a passenger in the vehicle that was stopped. In the course
of the arrest, the Carroll County deputies recovered a .40-caliber pistol from the console
between the driver’s seat and front-passenger seat of the vehicle. Buchanan argued that the
gun should be excluded at trial on relevancy grounds and that such evidence was prejudicial
4
because Buchanan did not own the gun, nor was it tied to the Love shooting. The trial court
ruled that Buchanan’s motion was premature and that the issue should be raised at trial
outside the presence of the jury if the State sought to introduce the recovered gun.
¶12. The gun was admitted into evidence at trial, and the trial court allowed limited
testimony about the gun’s recovery. Jones and Buchanan both assert on appeal that the trial
court erred in doing so. The Court will discuss this issue in further detail below.
¶13. Trial began on May 16, 2017. The State’s witness, Matthew Brown, a deputy with
the Leflore County Sheriff’s Office, testified that he was on regular patrol on the night of
August 15, 2015, and spotted a fire in a field off of Highway 82. Deputy Brown pulled over
and approached the scene. He testified that he could see that one person was already out of
the vehicle, but others were still inside, with one person trying to climb out of the driver’s-
side window. Deputy Brown testified that there were no bystanders or other officers at the
scene. Jennings was identified as the person outside the vehicle. Deputy Brown helped
Perez Love get out of the car through the window and pulled two other unconscious men out
of the backseat, Stigler and D’Alandis Love. D’Alandis Love was later pronounced dead at
the scene. Deputy Brown testified that he radioed for medical help and the fire department.
He also testified that once he realized that it was “not just a car wreck,” he called in for the
sheriff and the investigator.
¶14. Bill Staten, an investigator with the Leflore County Sheriff’s Office, testified that he
responded to the scene at approximately 12:20 a.m. He testified that after he parked his
vehicle, he walked to the scene and approached a smoldering vehicle, which he identified as
5
a red Pontiac resting nose up in a deep drainage ditch. Investigator Staten testified that he
looked at D’Alandis’s body and observed what he believed were gunshot wounds. The other
three victims had already been transported to the hospital. Investigator Staten also testified
that he examined the red Pontiac and found that the rear-passenger window had been shot
out and that there were bullet holes along that side of the vehicle. He took photographs and
collected evidence, including a number of 7.62 mm shell casings and one .40-caliber shell
casing. These items were recovered within the immediate area of where the vehicle had
traveled on (and left) the highway.
¶15. When Investigator Staten was re-called as a witness later in the trial, he testified that
he retrieved a pistol from the red Pontiac the next morning after they had the vehicle towed
to a secure location to let it cool off. Mark Steed, an investigator with the Mississippi Bureau
of Investigation (MBI) also testified for the State, explaining that he assisted with the
investigation and helped collect evidence. Investigator Steed also identified the handgun at
trial that Investigator Staten recovered from the red Pontiac.
¶16. Investigator Staten further testified that Jasmine Cage was at the scene and told one
of the deputies that she knew the people in the car and had witnessed the shooting. One of
the deputies placed Cage in a patrol car to isolate her while Investigator Staten finished
processing the scene. Investigator Staten testified that he then had her transported to the
Sheriff’s Office so that he could take her statement.
¶17. After Investigator Staten processed the scene, he testified that he had the Loves’
vehicle sent to a secure location to be processed as well. The State’s witness, Amber Conn,
6
a crime scene analyst with the MBI, was accepted as an expert in crime-scene investigation.
She testified that she had examined the red Pontiac, and she opined that the car was shot from
the back toward the front. During her investigation of the victims’ vehicle, Conn recovered
another handgun. This weapon was recovered from the front passenger floorboard that was
identified as a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol. Conn testified that it was fully loaded
(one bullet was in the chamber) and its safety was locked when she found it.
¶18. Lisa Funte, a medical examiner for the State, testified that D’Alandis Love, who had
been seated in the back of the red Pontiac on the driver’s side, died as a result of multiple
gunshot wounds. His manner of death was homicide.
¶19. The State’s witness, Starks Hathcock, was accepted as an expert in firearms and tool-
marks identification. Hathcock testified that he examined both .40-caliber pistols that were
recovered from the red Pontiac and compared them to the .40-caliber bullet that was
recovered from Perez Love’s head. He was able to confirm that this bullet was not fired by
either of the two guns recovered from the red Pontiac.
¶20. Hathcock also examined the .40-caliber pistol recovered when Buchanan was stopped
after his arrest in this case, when he was out on bond. Hathcock could not positively
determine whether the gun fired the recovered shell casing, but the gun could not be excluded
as having done so.
¶21. Hathcock also testified that the 7.62 mm shell casings that were recovered from the
highway could have been fired from an AK-47 or SKS, which Hathcock explained is some
sort of semiautomatic assault rifle or a weapon designed for war. As addressed in more
7
detail below, one of the surviving victims, Perez Love, testified that he saw Jones in the
Tahoe with a “baby assault rifle.” Hathcock testified, however, that he could not compare
the 7.62 mm shell casings that were recovered to a specific weapon because Jones’s AK-47
was never recovered. Hathcock did testify that the projectile jackets that were recovered
from the red Pontiac bore similar characteristics to the bullet that was recovered from
D’Alandis Love’s right chest and the bullet that was recovered from his right leg.
¶22. The State called a number of lay witnesses as well. Bentravious “Munchie” Brown
testified that on the night of the incident, he had loaned his red Pontiac Grand Prix to Perez
Love, Stigler, Jennings, and D’Alandis Love. He testified that Perez drove the vehicle, and
the group headed to a club at around 11:00 p.m. Brown testified that he did not know which
club they were going to.
¶23. Jasmine Cage, who was Perez Love’s girlfriend at the time of the incident, testified
that on the night of the shooting, she followed Perez and the others in Brown’s car to “make
sure Perez was not going to the club.” Cage testified that she saw the red Pontiac that Perez
and the others were in on Highway 82 ahead of her; and after she saw the red Pontiac, she
saw a Tahoe or Yukon that passed her on the right. Cage initially testified that she could not
see who was in the Tahoe/Yukon and did not know the color of the vehicle. When the
prosecutor reminded Cage about the statement she had given to Investigator Staten shortly
after the incident, she then testified that she had told Investigator Staten that she thought the
vehicle was gold and that she saw Jones, as well as Keys, David Reedy, and Holland in the
vehicle. She testified that she thought Jones was in the front-passenger seat and Holland was
8
seated in the back on the passenger side. Cage also testified that when she talked to
Investigator Staten after the incident, she told him that Reedy had been driving the
Tahoe/Yukon and that Keys was in the backseat on the driver’s side.
¶24. Cage testified that, after the Yukon passed her, she saw “sparks like fire” a far
distance in front of her. Cage called Perez’s friend to ask him whether gunfire looks like fire
at night time, and he said that it did. Cage testified that she then drove straight to the
Moroccan Lounge. She testified that when she did not see that the red Pontiac was at the
club, she turned around and headed back to Greenwood. On her way back, she testified that
she saw the red Pontiac on fire in the field. She stopped her car, got out, and approached the
scene. She began crying because she knew Perez Love was in the vehicle.
¶25. On cross-examination, Cage confirmed that she knew Buchanan and that she did not
see him in the vehicle that night.
¶26. Two of the surviving victims of the shooting, Stigler and Perez Love, testified that
Jones and Holland had been the ones who fired bullets at Perez Love, D’Alandis Love,
Stigler, and Jennings as they were traveling on Highway 82 in the red Pontiac. Jennings, the
other surviving victim, testified that he knew that a vehicle had pulled up beside them and
that someone opened fire on them in the red Pontiac, but he could not identify either the
vehicle or anyone in it.
¶27. Stigler and Perez Love both testified that the shooters were traveling in a beige or gold
Tahoe-type vehicle. Perez Love testified that he saw Jones in the Tahoe with a “baby assault
rifle.” He explained that it was sometimes called “a mini-Draco.” Stigler testified that he
9
saw Holland shooting a pistol from the vehicle, and Perez Love also said that he saw Holland
with a pistol through the window of the Tahoe as the Tahoe passed them. Stigler also
testified that he saw Jones shoot Perez Love in the top of the head.
¶28. On cross-examination, Stigler confirmed that he did not see Buchanan in the vehicle
that night.
¶29. Perez Love testified at trial that he could not positively identify anyone besides
Holland and Jones in the vehicle. He admitted, however, that he had given a statement after
the incident, while he was hospitalized, and identified other people in the vehicle, including
Reedy and Keys.3 Perez testified that he identified the people in the Tahoe because he saw
“all of them” riding in the vehicle every day, and he thought they were in the vehicle that
night. Later in his testimony Perez Love said that after he thought about it more, he realized
that he never really saw anyone except Jones and Holland. On cross-examination, Perez
Love also testified that he thought Reedy was in the Tahoe that night because Reedy used to
own the Tahoe.
¶30. As noted above, Keys gave a videotaped statement to Investigator Staten a few weeks
after the incident. He was indicted along with Jones, Buchanan, McClung, and Holland, but
he was not available at trial because he had been killed months earlier.4 Keys’s videotaped
3
Investigator Staten testified that he thought Perez Love had also identified
Buchanan, but Investigator Staten was not sure. Defense counsel specifically questioned
Perez Love about whether he had identified Buchanan, but at trial Perez Love said he never
saw Buchanan and, other than Jones and Holland, he could not recall who he had previously
identified.
4
The jury was not told that Keys had been killed.
10
statement was admitted into evidence as the State’s exhibit S-6 and was played for the jury.
It was not transcribed.
¶31. In his statement Keys said that, on the night of the shooting, he was driving the gold
Tahoe. He said that Michael Holland and Armand Jones were on the passenger side, James
McClung was in the rear seat on the driver’s side, and Sedrick Buchanan was sitting in the
third-row seat.5 According to Keys, he, Holland, Jones, Buchanan, and McClung had been
at Holland’s house on the night of the shooting. At around 11:00 p.m., they all got in Keys’s
car to go to the Moroccan Lounge in Itta Bena.
¶32. Keys said that Jones brought his AK-47 with him, which Keys described as being
“short with a long magazine.” Keys said he did not know that Jones had it with him when
they got in his car. He said that he did not know Jones had it until “he first upped it”
(meaning until Jones began shooting it later that night). Keys also said at the end of his
statement that Jones had the AK-47 that night because “he always had it.” At one point in
his statement Keys said that he was unsure whether anyone else had a weapon. At the end
of his statement, Keys said that no one had a gun except Jones.
¶33. Keys said that there had not been any previous discussion among the group of gunning
down the Loves or of retaliation against them. However, when questioned specifically about
Jones, Keys said that Jones had said “days earlier” that he needed to get one of them (the
Loves) because they (the Loves) “had got some of their friends.”
5
In comparison, Jasmine Cage and Perez identified David Reedy as the person
driving the vehicle, while Keys was in the backseat. In his statement Keys said that he was
driving and Reedy was not with them.
11
¶34. Keys said that, as they drove down Highway 82 toward Itta Bena, they approached a
car and Jones called out that it looked like the Loves in that car.6 As they passed the vehicle,
according to Keys, Jones rolled down the window, leaned out the window, and opened fire
with his AK-47. Keys said that, as soon as Jones started shooting, Jones said, “Go, go, go,”
and Keys sped up to get away.
¶35. As they drove away, Keys said that Holland made a call to someone to get rid of the
car because of the shooting. Keys said that there was no discussion about this until after
Holland got off of the phone, and then Holland said that they needed to get rid of the car.
Keys said he drove to Moorhead, Mississippi, and a mechanic that Holland knew met them
in a grey Nissan. The mechanic took Keys’s Tahoe, and Keys, Jones, Buchanan, and
McClung drove off in the Nissan. Keys said that the mechanic was going to store his Tahoe
at his shop. At the time of trial, the Tahoe had not been recovered.
¶36. Keys said that after they switched cars, they went to a Best Western hotel in
Greenwood. When asked who got the room, Keys responded, “McClung.” Keys said that
when they got to the hotel, Jones brought his gun in with him. Later, Holland and Jones left
together. According to Keys, Jones returned at around 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. and when he
returned, he no longer had his gun. Keys said that he, Jones, Buchanan, and McClung spent
the night at the Best Western. The next morning, Jones arranged for his own ride home, and
6
Keys said that he did not recognize the car. Perez Love, however, said in his pretrial
statement that Keys was standing outside before he (Perez) and the others had left for the
club. When questioned about that statement at trial, Perez Love testified that his statement
was wrong. He said that he meant to say that it was “Munchie” (Bentravius Brown),
standing outside, not Keys.
12
Keys, Buchanan, and McClung got a ride together. Keys was dropped off first. Keys said
that he stayed with his mother for several days after the shooting until he got a lawyer and
turned himself in. While he was at his mother’s home in Tennessee, Keys said that Jones
contacted him from a phone number Keys did not recognize and told him that he was in
Chicago. At the time Keys gave his statement on September 3, 2015, Keys had not spoken
with anyone else who had been involved in the incident. However, as noted above, after
Keys gave his statement to law enforcement, Keys approached Jones’s lawyer and told the
lawyer at that time that he had given an incriminating statement.
¶37. Buchanan turned himself in on September 18, 2015, and Holland was arrested shortly
after the incident. Although Reedy was a suspect who was arrested and jailed for these
crimes, the Grand Jury did not indict him.7
¶38. The State rested, and Jones, Buchanan, McClung, and Holland moved for directed
verdicts, which the trial court denied. No defendant testified or presented any other
testimony or evidence.
¶39. After considering the evidence and the instructions that were given, the jury found
each of the defendants guilty of various offenses. Relevant to this appeal, the jury found
Jones guilty of first-degree murder with respect to D’Alandis Love and guilty of three counts
of attempted first-degree murder with respect to Perez Love, Jennings, and Stigler. Jones
was sentenced to serve life in prison for his first-degree murder conviction, and three terms
of thirty years for his other convictions, all to run consecutively, and the court ordered Jones
7
The record reflects that surveillance footage was recovered during the investigation
that appeared to show Reedy at a Batesville gas station forty minutes prior to the incident.
13
to pay court costs and fees. The jury acquitted Buchanan on Count I (deliberate-design
murder of D’Alandis Love) and found Buchanan guilty of aggravated assault with respect
to Perez Love, Jennings, and Stigler. The trial court sentenced Buchanan to serve three
consecutive terms of twenty years for each aggravated-assault conviction and ordered
Buchanan to pay court costs and fees. Jones and Buchanan each filed motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Jones and
Buchanan appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Admissibility of Keys’s Statement Against Buchanan and Jones8
A. The Confrontation Clause and Exceptions to the Rule
Against Hearsay
¶40. Buchanan and Jones assert that the trial court erred in allowing Keys’s statement into
evidence against them, alleging that it violated their right to confront the witness as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution9 and Article 3, Section
26 of the Mississippi Constitution,10 which both provide a defendant the right to confront a
witness against him. McClung also asserted that the statement was inadmissible hearsay.11
8
See Jones’s Appellant’s Brief (Issue 1); Buchanan’s Appellant’s Brief (Issue 1).
9
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
10
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . . .” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26.
11
Hearsay, as defined in Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801, is inadmissible unless the
law provides otherwise, including the exceptions in Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804. See
M.R.E. 802.
14
In general, the standard of review “regarding admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of
discretion.” Jenkins v. State, 102 So. 3d 1063, 1065 (¶7) (Miss. 2012). However, we review
a Confrontation Clause objection de novo . Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 296 (¶18) (Miss.
2008). For the reasons addressed below, we find no error in the trial court allowing Keys’s
statement against Buchanan and Jones to be admitted at trial.
¶41. Before trial, Buchanan and Jones, as well as the other defendants, moved to exclude
Keys’s statement given to Investigator Staten based upon the Sixth Amendment and hearsay
grounds. The State argued in response that Keys’s statement was admissible against each
defendant under Rule 804(b)(3) (the statement-against-interest exception) and the exception
under Rule 804(b)(5) (the catch-all exception) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The
State also argued that Keys’s statement was admissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
theory as embodied in Rule 804(b)(6) and caselaw recognizing a similar exception under the
Confrontation Clause.12
¶42. At the admissibility hearing, the defendants presented one witness, Attorney Kevin
Horan, who represented Jones at trial. He testified that Keys had come to his office, told him
he was out on bond, and that Keys had told him “the only reason he gave a statement was
because he got a lower bond.” Horan testified that at that point, he stopped Keys
immediately and told him if was going to “change his story” then he needed to do it through
counsel. Horan testified that Keys did not “tell me what he said or anything.” According to
Horan, Keys just “made some other comments and then he left.” Horan did not testify
12
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
15
whether he told anyone else about Keys’s visit to his office. However, the record reflects
that Keys’s statement was provided to all the co-defendants through discovery at the
beginning of the case.
¶43. The State presented two witnesses. The first witness the State called was Sergeant
Jeri Bankston, a detective with the Greenwood Police Department, who investigated the Keys
shooting that occurred on December 28, 2016. She obtained the video-surveillance footage
from the Chevron Station near where the shooting occurred. The video-camera footage was
played at the hearing. The footage showed Keys running across the Chevron parking lot with
Holland running behind him. Buchanan and other men, including Anthony Flowers,
Ladarius Lemock, and Danarius Jackson, were in the parking lot at the same time. The
footage also showed Holland with a gun in his hand. Sergeant Bankston testified that she
developed five suspects in the Keys case: Holland, Buchanan, Lemock, Jackson, and
Flowers.
¶44. On cross-examination, Sergeant Bankston testified that Jones was in jail at the time
of Keys’s death. Sergeant Bankston further testified that Buchanan was arrested on
December 29, 2016, for Keys’s shooting, and that Holland received a text message from
Buchanan when Buchanan was in jail. The caller-ID showed the text message was from
“A.J.,” whom she believed was Armand Jones. She said that the text message read
something to the effect of “Hey, this is Sed.” She did not recall what was in the rest of the
text message. Sergeant Bankston confirmed that Jones and Buchanan were in jail at the same
time when the text message was sent from Jones’s phone.
16
¶45. The State’s second witness was Investigator Staten, the chief investigator in the Love
shooting case. He testified that shortly after the August 15, 2015 shooting, Keys, with his
lawyer, came to the Leflore County Sheriff’s Office and said that he wanted to give a
statement. Investigator Staten was called in to take the statement. He testified that he
initially interviewed Keys, with his lawyer present, on September 2, 2015. Due to equipment
failure, however, Investigator Staten had to re-interview Keys on September 3, 2015. Keys’s
lawyer was also present at that interview. The interview was videotaped, but not transcribed.
The videotaped interview was played for the trial court at the admissibility hearing.
¶46. During cross-examination, Investigator Staten acknowledged that there were
inconsistencies in Keys’s statement as compared to statements given by other witnesses
regarding the people in the Tahoe and where they were sitting.
¶47. After argument of counsel, the trial court denied the defendants’ motions to exclude
Keys’s statement and stated that it would enter a written order stating the reasons supporting
its decision to allow the videotaped interview to be admitted into evidence at trial. In its
written order, the trial court concluded that Keys’s statement was admissible under three
exceptions to the hearsay rule: Rule 804(b)(3) (statement against a person’s interest); Rule
804(b)(5) (the catch-all hearsay exception); and Rule 804(b)(6) (the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing exception).13 We address the trial court’s rulings below.
13
The trial court primarily relied upon United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950 (7th
Cir. 2002), in determining that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception applied. The court
summarized Thompson as follows: “According to the Seventh Circuit, the
waiver-by-misconduct of the right to confront witnesses by one conspirator, resulting from
misconduct by that conspirator which causes the witness’s unavailability, may be imputed
to another conspirator if the misconduct was within the scope and in furtherance of the
17
¶48. Relevant evidence, as defined in Rule 401, is generally admissible subject to certain
laws regarding exclusions and exceptions. See M.R.E. 402. Rules regarding hearsay address
concerns with admitting evidence that, albeit relevant, is not sufficiently reliable. See M.R.E.
801 & advisory committee note. The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized that
“[n]ontestimonial hearsay is subject to evidentiary rules concerning reliability rather than
being subject to scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause. However, testimonial hearsay must
be filtered by the Confrontation Clause.” Smith, 986 So. 2d at 296-97 (¶20) (emphasis
added) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36, 53)). Statements given in the course of a police
interrogation are testimonial “when the circumstances objectively indicate that . . . the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 297 (¶21) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
¶49. Under this test, we conclude that Keys’s statement was testimonial in that Investigator
Staten interrogated Keys to establish events concerning the shooting—events potentially
relevant to future criminal prosecution.
¶50. Accordingly, even if Keys’s statement meets the evidentiary reliability rules set forth
in Rule 804(b)(3) or Rule 804(b)(5), these rules do not circumvent a defendant’s rights under
the Confrontation Clause. Smith, 986 So. 2d at 298 (¶26) (recognizing that “Crawford holds
that when dealing with testimonial evidence, a finding of reliability does not create an
exception to the Confrontation Clause”) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61); see Sanders v.
State, 228 So. 3d 888, 891-92 (¶¶12-16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that the circuit court
conspiracy, and was reasonably foreseeable to him.” (Citing Thompson, 286 F.3d at 965).
18
erred when it admitted witness’s testimonial statement in violation of the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but finding error harmless under the circumstances of that
case).
¶51. A party, however, “who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the
constitutional right to confrontation.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 833; see also Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 62 (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . extinguishes confrontation claims on
essentially equitable grounds . . . .”). Likewise, under Rule 804(b)(6), a party forfeits his
rights to object to a prior testimonial statement on hearsay grounds if the party “wrongfully
caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness,
and did so intending that result.” M.R.E. 804(b)(6) & advisory committee note.
¶52. The trial court in this case found that Keys’s statement was admissible against
Buchanan and Jones under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine as embodied in Rule
804(b)(6). Like the trial court, we find no Mississippi law interpreting Mississippi Rule
804(b)(6), and thus we electively look for guidance from federal cases analyzing the identical
Rule 804(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and related Confrontation Clause
principles.14
¶53. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, federal Rule 804(b)(6) codifies
the equitable doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, Davis, 547 U.S. at 833, “which applies
only when the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
14
“In interpreting the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, it is appropriate to look to
federal law interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence for guidance.” Portis v. State, 245
So. 3d 457, 470 (¶31) (Miss. 2018).
19
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353,
367 (2008) (internal quotation mark omitted). In order for Keys’s statement to be admissible
against Buchanan and Jones, the State, as the party offering the evidence, was required to
prove the facts meeting these requirements as to Jones and Buchanan by a preponderance of
the evidence. United States v. Gurrola, 898 F.3d 524, 534 (5th Cir. 2018).
1. Buchanan
¶54. With respect to Buchanan, based upon our review of the record and the applicable
law, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence at the admissibility hearing to show
that Buchanan engaged in or acquiesced in the wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure Keys’s unavailability. Giles, 554 U.S. at 367. Hence, the trial court did not err in
admitting the statement. As detailed above, the video-camera footage played at the hearing
showed Keys running across the parking lot with Holland running behind him. Holland was
shown on the video with a gun. Keys was shot moments later. Buchanan was there and
appeared to be looking around the area of the parking lot. We find that the trial court could
reasonably infer from Buchanan’s location and his mannerisms that Buchanan was acting as
a lookout.
¶55. Additionally, Sergeant Bankston, the investigator on the Keys murder, testified that
Flowers, who was in the group with Buchanan at the Chevron parking lot on the night Keys
was shot, stated that Keys “got what he deserved because he turned State’s evidence.”
Sergeant Bankston also testified that she developed both Holland and Buchanan, as well as
Flowers and others, as suspects in Keys’s murder. Finally, Sergeant Bankston testified that
20
Holland received a text message from Buchanan on Jones’s cell phone after Buchanan was
arrested and in jail for Keys’s murder.
¶56. We find that the trial court could reasonably infer, based on the totality of these
circumstances, that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Holland, with Buchanan’s
assistance, killed Keys to prevent him from testifying. Gurrola, 898 F.3d at 534 (The party
seeking to have a declarant’s statements admitted against another party under the forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing exception must prove this exception “by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
¶57. In particular, at least a preponderance of the evidence showed that Buchanan
participated (or “engaged”) in Keys’s murder by acting as lookout on the night of Keys’s
murder. Regarding their intent to prevent Keys from testifying, Jones’s attorney, Kevin
Horan, testified at the admissibility hearing that Keys came to him and told Horan that he had
given a statement, and the record reflects that Keys’s statement was provided to defendants
early in the case. This, coupled with Flowers’s presence in the group with Buchanan at the
Chevron parking lot the night of Holland’s shooting, and his subsequent statement that Keys
“got what he deserved because he turned State's evidence,” creates at least an inference that
Holland and Buchanan were motivated and intended to prevent Keys from testifying at trial.
Gurrola, 898 F.3d at 534.
¶58. At the very least, these circumstances support the trial court’s determination that
Buchanan “acquiesced in” Keys’s murder. United States v. Rivera, 412 F.3d 562 (4th Cir.
2005), supports our “acquiescence” determination. In Rivera, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed the term “acquiescence,” recognizing that it “consists of ‘the act or
21
condition of acquiescing or giving tacit assent; agreement or consent by silence or without
objection.’” Id. at 567 (quoting Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 18 (Random House, 2d ed.
2001)). The court further observed that “the plain language of [Rule 804(b)(6)] supports the
district court’s holding that a defendant need only tacitly assent to wrongdoing in order to
trigger the Rule’s applicability . . . the personal commission of the crime[] is not required.”
Id.
¶59. In sum, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err in finding that the
State met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Buchanan “engaged
in” or “acquiesced in” Keys’s murder for the purpose of preventing him from testifying.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in allowing Keys’s statement to be used
against Buchanan at trial.
2. Jones
¶60. With respect to Jones, the State asserts that it presented sufficient evidence at the
admissibility hearing to allow the trial court to infer that Holland, with Buchanan’s
assistance, killed Keys for the purpose of preventing him from testifying at trial and that
Jones is liable for “acquiescing” in procuring Keys’s unavailability under the conspiratorial
responsibility theory announced in United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2000).
Jones, on the other hand, asserts that he was incarcerated at the time of Keys’s death, and
there was no evidence presented at the admissibility hearing that he had anything to do with
Keys’s death. He therefore asserts that the trial court impermissibly allowed Keys’s
statement to be used against him at trial. For the reasons set forth below, we find that
22
Holland and Buchanan’s waiver-by-misconduct can be imputed to Jones under the Cherry
conspiratorial responsibility theory. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in
allowing Keys’s statement to be used against Jones at trial.
¶61. Cherry involved five defendants charged with involvement in a drug conspiracy. Id.
at 813. Much of the State’s evidence was from a cooperating witness named Lurks. Id.Prior to trial, one of the alleged drug co-conspirators, Price, murdered Lurks. Id. The trial
court granted the other co-conspirators’ motion to suppress Lurks’s statement against them,
finding that there was insufficient evidence as to one defendant that she “procured Lurks’s
absence”; and finding as to the other three defendants that there was no evidence that these
defendants “had actual knowledge of, agreed to[,] or participated in [Lurks’s] murder.” Id.
at 814.
¶62. In relevant part, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court for
findings on the following issue: “[W]as . . . Price’s murder of Lurks within the scope, in
furtherance, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence, of an ongoing
drug distribution conspiracy involving the defendants?” Id. at 822. Elaborating on this issue,
the Tenth Circuit held:
[T]oday we hold that participation in an ongoing drug conspiracy may
constitute a waiver of constitutional confrontation rights if the following
additional circumstances are present: the wrongdoing leading to the
unavailability of the witness was in furtherance of and within the scope of the
drug conspiracy, and such wrongdoing was reasonably foreseeable as a
“necessary or natural” consequence of the conspiracy.
Id. at 821 (emphasis omitted). In sum, under Cherry, “[a] defendant may be deemed to have
waived his or her Confrontation Clause rights (and, a fortiori, hearsay objections) if a
23
preponderance of the evidence establishes [that] . . . the wrongful procurement was in
furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural
consequence of an ongoing conspiracy.” Id. at 820.
¶63. The Tenth Circuit also clarified in Cherry that “the scope of the conspiracy is not
necessarily limited to a primary goal—such as bank robbery—but can also include secondary
goals relevant to the evasion of apprehension and prosecution for that goal—such as escape,
or, by analogy, obstruction of justice.” Id. Two years later, in Thompson, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the Cherry conspiratorial responsibility test and likewise
recognized that “acts taken to prevent apprehension . . . [including] [w]itness tampering . . .
can constitute waiver-by-misconduct.” United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 964 (7th
Cir. 2002). As noted above, no Mississippi appellate court has addressed this issue.
¶64. Based upon our de novo review of the record from the admissibility hearing and the
applicable law, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence at the hearing that would
allow the trial court to reasonably infer that Jones conspired with Holland, at a minimum,15
to kill the Loves, and that Keys’s murder was within the scope of that conspiracy and
reasonably foreseeable to Jones. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820-21.
¶65. Keys’s video statement, which was played at the admissibility hearing, supports this
determination. In his statement, Keys said that Jones was with Keys, Holland, McClung and
Buchanan at Holland’s house the night of the shooting. According to Keys, a few days
15
We separately discuss Buchanan’s involvement in the conspiracy to kill or harm
the Loves based upon the trial record and proceedings in addressing Buchanan’s sufficiency
or weight-of-the-evidence assignment of error below.
24
earlier Jones had said that he needed to get one of the Loves because they (the Loves) had
“got some of their friends.” Keys said that on the night of the shooting, the group decided
to go to the Moroccan Lounge in Itta Bena, and all five men got in Keys’s Tahoe. Keys
stated that Jones brought his “short” AK-47 with him when they left Holland’s house. Keys
further stated that on their way to the club, while traveling on Highway 82, Jones called out
that it looked like the Loves in a car (the red Pontiac) ahead of them and that it was Jones
who then opened fire on the Love vehicle as they passed it.
¶66. After the shooting, according to Keys, Holland made a call and arranged for them to
swap cars. Later that evening, after they swapped cars, they went to a Best Western hotel in
Greenwood and got a room. Keys said that Jones brought his gun in with him into the hotel
room. Later, Holland and Jones left together. According to Keys, Jones returned about 3:00
or 4:00 a.m. When Jones returned, he no longer had his gun.
¶67. Additionally, at the admissibility hearing, Jones’s lawyer testified that Keys had come
to him and told him he had given a statement to law enforcement, and it was further brought
out at the admissibility hearing that the defendants had received a copy of Keys’s statement
in discovery early in the case. Finally, Sergeant Bankston testified at the admissibility
hearing that Buchanan was arrested and in jail for Keys’s murder and that Buchanan was in
jail with Jones. She further testified about a connection among the three men—Holland
received a text message from Buchanan on Jones’s cell phone after Keys’s murder.
¶68. We find that under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court had sufficient
evidence before it to reasonably infer a conspiracy at least between Jones and Holland to kill
25
or harm the Loves and that Keys’s murder was in furtherance and within the scope of that
conspiracy. Thompson, 286 F.3d at 964; Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. We further find that
evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Keys’s murder was foreseeable
to Jones, particularly in the light of the violent conduct Jones had already engaged in with
respect to his actions on the night of the Love shooting. Cf. Thompson, 286 F.3d at 966
(finding that co-conspirator informant’s murder was not reasonably foreseeable where there
was no evidence that defendants, as part of their drug conspiracy, had previously engaged
in murder or attempted murder). We therefore find no error in the trial court’s decision to
allow Keys’s statement against Jones at trial.
B. Exclusion of Keys’s Statement as Self-Serving
¶69. Jones asserts that Keys’s statement should also have been excluded because it was
self-serving. We find no merit in this argument. In support of his argument, Jones relies on
Simmons v. State, 805 So. 2d 452 (Miss. 2001), a case in which the defendant sought to
introduce a videotape of himself after he murdered the victim as mitigating evidence of his
remorse. Id. at 488 (¶¶93-94). The State did not offer the tape into evidence. Id. at 488
(¶94).
¶70. Under these circumstances, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the trial court
correctly disallowed the videotape, recognizing that “[o]ur caselaw states that the defendant
is barred from introducing a statement made by the defendant immediately after the crime,
if it is self-serving, and if the State refuses to use any of it.” Id. at 489 (¶95) (emphasis
added). The supreme court elaborated on this principle, observing that “[a] declaration made
26
by a defendant in his own favor, unless part of the res gestae or of a confession offered by
the prosecution, is not admissible for the defense.” Id. (emphasis added). In this case, the
State offered Keys’s statement, not any defendant’s statement, and thus the rule prohibiting
admission of self-serving statements does not apply.
II. Jones’s Motion for Severance
¶71. Jones asserts that after the trial court erred in allowing the Keys’s statement to be
admitted against him, it further erred in failing to sever his trial from the other defendants
because it resulted in Jones “being subjected to evidence [contained in Keys’s statement] that
at best might only properly be admitted against co-defendant Michael Holland.” We find no
merit in this assignment of error for the reasons addressed below.
¶72. Regarding severance of trials, Uniform County and Circuit Court Rule 9.03, which
applied when Jones and the other co-defendants were tried in May 2017,16 provides as
follows:
The granting or refusing of severance of defendants in cases not involving the
death penalty shall be in the discretion of the trial judge. The court may, on
motion of the state or defendant, grant a severance of offenses whenever:
1. If before trial, it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair
determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of
each offense . . . .
As the Rule provides, we review the trial court’s refusal to grant a motion for severance for
an abuse of discretion. King v. State, 857 So. 2d 702, 716 (¶19) (Miss. 2003).
¶73. In reviewing the denial of a motion for severance, we consider two criteria: “(1)
16
The supplanting Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure did not become effective
until July 1, 2017.
27
whether the testimony of one co-defendant tends to exculpate that defendant at the expense
of the other defendant and (2) whether the balance of the evidence introduced at trial tends
to go more to the guilt of one defendant rather than the other.” Hayes v. State, 168 So. 3d
1065, 1074 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hawkins
v State, 538 So. 2d 1204, 1207 (Miss. 1989)). Because this test was first articulated in
Duckworth v. State, 477 So. 2d 935, 937 (Miss. 1985), we will refer to these factors as the
“Duckworth factors.” Under Duckworth, Jones must also show that he was prejudiced by the
trial court’s refusal to grant his motion for severance in order for this Court to reverse and
remand his case for a new trial. Duckworth, 477 So. 2d at 937.
¶74. In applying this test, we also recognize that “[d]efendants jointly indicted for a felony
are not entitled to separate trials as a matter of right.” Sanders v. State, 942 So. 2d 156, 158
(¶11) (Miss. 2006). The Mississippi appellate courts, as well as the United States Supreme
Court, have recognized the appropriateness and importance of joint trials, as follows: “Joint
trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling
more accurate assessment of relative culpability-advantages which sometimes operate to the
defendant’s benefit.” Cavett v. State, 717 So. 2d 722, 727 (¶30) (Miss. 1998) (quoting
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987)); Sneed v. State, 31 So. 3d 33, 38 (¶11)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (same).
¶75. Regarding the first Duckworth factor, Jones does not argue, nor do we find, that
Keys’s statement was exculpatory, and the record reflects that no defendant testified at trial
in his own defense. As such, one defendant’s testimony could not be used to exculpate
28
himself at the expense of the other co-defendants. The first factor, therefore, weighs in favor
of a joint trial. Sneed, 31 So. 3d at 39 (¶14).
¶76. As to the second factor, we find that the balance of the evidence introduced at trial did
not weigh far heavier in support of Holland’s guilt over that of Jones, as Jones argues.
Indeed, both Jones and Holland were identified at trial as shooters. Further, the defendants
were charged with acting in concert with respect to the Love shooting. Keys’s statement was
one piece of evidence relaying the events of that evening. Thus, the second factor also
weighs in favor of a joint trial.
¶77. Upon review of the record and applying controlling law, we conclude that Jones failed
to show that either Duckworth factor was met or that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s
refusal to grant his motion for severance. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s motion for severance.
III. Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial
¶78. The record reflects that on the first day of trial, during voir dire, law enforcement
officers learned of a threat to the security at trial. In particular, weapons were confiscated
from two vehicles that day, and members of the general public, as well as informants,
provided information that there was going to be a shooting at the courthouse. The Sheriff
implemented additional security measures and decided to limit access to the courtroom to
“the direct family of both parties.” The measures were not implemented by the trial court.
¶79. On the second day of trial, the defendants moved for a mistrial, asserting that the
media coverage surrounding the trial-required security measures, and the fact that jurors had
29
to identify themselves upon entering the building, might have tainted the jury. The
defendants also amended that motion to add a request for a transfer of venue. At the hearing
on these motions, Sheriff Ricky Banks testified about the circumstances described above.
At no time did any defendant assert that his right to a public trial had been violated by the
Sheriff limiting access to the courtroom to “the direct family of both parties.”
¶80. On appeal, however, Jones asserts that these actions violated his Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”). Jones cites Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S.
39 (1984), and Pierce v. State, 250 So. 3d 493 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), in support of his
argument that the trial court erred by failing to consider certain prerequisites under Waller,
such as reasonable alternatives, before placing a limitation on courtroom access. Waller, 467
U.S. at 48; Pierce, 250 So. 3d at 496 (¶8). In both cases, however, the defendants had
preserved their public-trial objection at trial. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 42; Pierce, 250 So. 3d
at 495 (¶4). In contrast, Jones failed to assert a Sixth Amendment public-trial violation at
trial. We find, therefore, that he has waived this issue. United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146,
155 (5th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Reagan, 725 F.3d 471, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2013).
¶81. In Hitt, 473 F.3d at 155, defendants made the same argument as Jones makes here,
contending that because the district court failed to satisfy Waller’s prerequisites to courtroom
closure, this affected their fundamental rights to a public trial, and thus their convictions
should be reversed. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that the defendants’ argument
“overlooks the fact that, regardless of whether the Waller prerequisites are met, defendants
30
can waive their right to a public trial. That is what happened here. Where a defendant, with
knowledge of the closure of the courtroom, fails to object, that defendant waives his right to
a public trial.” Id. Similarly, the defendants in Reagan asserted that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010), in which it held that a criminal
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to an open courtroom during voir dire, supported
their argument that the district court in that case had violated their public trial rights in
closing the courtroom during voir dire and during a motion to suppress. Reagan, 725 F.3d
at 488. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument on the basis of waiver, just as it did in Hitt,
concluding that nothing in Presley “excuses the appellants’ waiver of this issue.” Id. at 489.
¶82. Additionally, Jones does not argue that plain error requires reversal on appeal, and we
find no basis for reversal under that standard. “The defendant who fails to make a
contemporaneous objection must rely on plain error to raise the assignment on appeal.”
Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1289 (Miss. 1994). As this Court has recognized, “while
this exception exists, it is to be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a
miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” Stokes v. State, 141 So. 3d 421, 428 (¶26)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting United States v Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)); see
Gray v. State, 549 So. 2d 1316, 1321 (Miss. 1989).
¶83. Under long-established precedent, “[t]he purpose of the requirement of a public trial
[under the Sixth Amendment] was to guarantee that the accused would be fairly dealt with
and not unjustly condemned. History had proven that secret tribunals were effective
instruments of oppression.” Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965). In this case,
31
although courtroom access was limited due to safety concerns, family members of all parties
were allowed throughout the proceedings. Defendants were not tried in secret, and Jones has
simply shown no basis for determining that “a manifest miscarriage of justice” occurred due
to this limitation. We find Jones’s public-trial assignment of error without merit.
IV. Admission of Pistol from Buchanan’s Post-Shooting Arrest and
Related Testimony
¶84. Buchanan and Jones assert that the trial court erred when it admitted testimony at trial
regarding a .40-caliber pistol recovered during Buchanan’s post-shooting arrest that
happened when he was out on bond. For the reasons addressed below, we find the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the pistol and related testimony into evidence.
¶85. As addressed above, a .40-caliber shell casing was recovered from the scene of the
shooting, and a .40-caliber bullet was recovered from Perez Love’s head. Two .40-caliber
pistols were also recovered from the red Pontiac in which the Loves were traveling. The
State’s firearms expert, Starks Hathcock, testified at trial that he was able to confirm that the
.40-caliber bullet recovered from Perez Love’s head did not come from either of these two
pistols.
¶86. There was also testimony at trial regarding a .40-caliber pistol that was recovered after
the Love shooting, but when Buchanan was out on bond, when Buchanan and Denarius
Jackson were stopped by Carroll County deputies six months after the shooting. Buchanan
was a passenger in the vehicle that was stopped. Testimony from Investigator Staten, as well
as one of the Carroll County deputies at the stop, Rashaun Daniels, established that in the
course of the arrest, the Carroll County deputies recovered a .40-caliber pistol from the
32
console between the driver’s seat and the front-passenger seat of the vehicle. The pistol was
admitted into evidence over a relevancy objection made by Buchanan’s lawyer. Testimony
from Deputy Daniels also established that the owner of the gun was the driver of the vehicle,
Jackson, and that Buchanan was not arraigned on a gun charge.
¶87. Later at trial, Starks Hathcock testified that due to “insufficient reproducible
characteristics,” the .40-caliber bullet recovered from Perez Love’s head could not be
“positively included or excluded as having been fired from [the] gun [recovered by the
Carroll County deputies during Jackson and Buchanan’s post-shooting stop].”
¶88. Buchanan asserts three grounds in support of his argument that this evidence should
not have been admitted: (A) it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial;17 (B) the testimony
surrounding this evidence contained hearsay; and (C) admission of this testimony violated
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). We address each assertion in turn under an abuse of
discretion standard. Anderson v. State, 154 So. 3d 42, 53 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)
(Recognizing that a trial court’s decision regarding the relevancy and admissibility of
evidence should only be reversed based on an abuse of discretion.)
A. Inadmissibility under Rule 401 and Rule 402 (Relevancy)
and Exclusion under Rule 403 as Unduly Prejudicial
¶89. Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
17
As part of Issue 4 in his brief, Jones asserts that the evidence and testimony should
not have been admitted because it is irrelevant, and its admission was unduly prejudicial
under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403. Jones makes essentially the same arguments as
Buchanan does on these issues.
33
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” M.R.E. 401. Under
Rule 402 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, “irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”
“The definition [of relevancy] is a broad one, favoring admissibility. If the evidence has any
probative value at all, the rule favors its admission.” Foster v. State, 508 So. 2d 1111, 1117
(Miss. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Powell v. State, 806 So. 2d 1069 (Miss. 2001).
¶90. When a gun cannot be excluded as having been involved in a shooting, then evidence
relating to a weapon recovered from a person suspected of being involved in that shooting
is relevant. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 682 So. 2d 340, 350 (Miss. 1996) (citing Foster, 508
So. 2d at 1118)), disagreed with on other grounds in Portis v. State, 245 So. 3d 457, 470 n.10
(¶30) (Miss. 2018); Jackson v. State, 969 So. 2d 124, 131 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)
(finding that evidence that the defendant possessed a gun “similar” to the one described by
the victims of an armed carjacking was relevant evidence). Buchanan asserts that the gun
and related testimony should not have been admitted because it was Jackson’s gun, and there
was no proof that Buchanan “constructively possessed” the gun when it was recovered.
Buchanan further asserts that there was no connection between the gun and the Love
shooting because he was not identified as one of the shooters and also because the gun was
found six months after the shooting in another county, thus concluding it was also too remote
in time and proximity. Jones likewise asserts that this testimony was not relevant, describing
it as testimony relating to “the alleged possession of an unrelated firearm, in an unrelated
county, at an unrelated time.”
¶91. We find no merit in these arguments in light of the broad discretion afforded the trial
34
court in determining the admissibility of evidence. Under Rule 401’s lenient relevancy test,
the State was certainly not obligated to prove Buchanan constructively possessed the gun, nor
do we find that the fact that Buchanan was not identified as one of the shooters makes the
evidence irrelevant. The State showed that Buchanan had access to the .40-caliber pistol;
Buchanan was accused of being a willing participant and an accomplice in the Love shooting
where .40-caliber shell casings were found at the scene; a .40-caliber bullet was recovered
from one victim’s head; and the gun that Holland used during the shooting, identified by two
surviving victims as a pistol, was never recovered. The fact that Buchanan had access to one
of the guns that might have been used in the shooting, when he was already linked to the
crime, is additional evidence that he was involved.18 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
¶92. We also find no merit in Buchanan and Jones’s assertion that the trial court abused
its discretion when it did not exclude this evidence under Rule 403.19 No Rule 403 objection
to this evidence was made at trial; thus, it was waived. Stevens v. State, 458 So. 2d 726, 730
18
We also find no merit in Buchanan’s timing and proximity assertions. We do not
find that timing is a concern given that neither Holland nor Jones’s weapons were recovered
in this case, and that Buchanan had been in jail for at least a portion of the time following
the shooting and before his arrest in Carroll County. As to proximity, the gun was found in
a vehicle, not a fixed location, and thus we have no “proximity” concerns.
19
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 provides as follows:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
M.R.E. 403.
35
(Miss. 1984) (“The general rule is that a failure to object with specificity in the trial court . . .
results in a waiver of review by this Court.”). Further, neither Buchanan nor Jones assert
plain error, nor do we find any support for reversal on that basis. Foster, 639 So. 2d at 1289
(failure to object at trial requires that appellant rely on plain error to raise issue on appeal).
We observe that the defense established in cross examination that Buchanan was not the
owner of the gun and that he was not charged with its possession. As such, we find no error
in the trial court allowing the jury to consider all the evidence, as it is the jury that
“determines the weight and credibility to give witness testimony and other evidence.” Gillett
v. State, 56 So. 3d 469, 505 (¶102) (Miss. 2010).
¶93. Further, the fact that the State’s firearms expert could not positively include or
exclude the bullet found in Perez Love’s head as having been fired from the subject pistol
does not render the testimony and evidence about this weapon inadmissible under Rule 403.
See Flowers v. State, 240 So. 3d 1082, 1108-09 (¶¶52-55) (Miss. 2017) (finding that expert
testimony that the evidence “did not unequivocally prove that [defendant] had fired a gun”
was admissible under Rule 403 because the expert “clearly explained” the basis for his
opinion), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 451 (2018), and rev’d and remanded on other
grounds, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019). Hathcock’s testimony was clear, and he explained why he
could not reach a definitive conclusion with respect to the subject pistol in this case.
¶94. In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court overruling defense counsel’s
relevancy objection; nor do we find plain error in any failure to exclude this evidence under
Rule 403. Gray, 549 So. 2d at 1321.
36
B. Hearsay
¶95. Buchanan also asserts that the following testimony from Bill Staten, relating to the
course of his investigation and how his investigation led to the recovery of the weapon,
contained inadmissible “hearsay within hearsay,” as follows:
[BY STATEN]: It is, sir, a semiautomatic .40 caliber Glock pistol model
23.
[BY COUNSEL]: And do you have knowledge of where that .40 caliber
Glock came from?
[BY STATEN]: Yes, sir.
[BY COUNSEL]: And where did you obtain this .40 caliber pistol, and not
specific details, but from whom and about when, whose
possession and about when?
[BY STATEN]: I obtained this from Chief Adam Eubanks of the Carroll
County Sheriff's Department on February the 23rd of
2016.
[BY COUNSEL]: All right. But where did it come from, I mean, whose
possession was it taken from? If you don’t know you
don’t know.
[BY STATEN] I know.
[BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor, relevance.
BY THE COURT: It’s overruled.
[BY STATEN]: It was found in the possession of Sedrick Buchanan
when he was arrested.
[BY COUNSEL]: That was when he was a suspect and after he was a
suspect in this shooting?
[BY STATEN]: Yes, sir.
37
¶96. Although defense counsel objected to this testimony, she did not raise a hearsay
objection. Any hearsay objection therefore was waived. Stevens, 458 So. 2d at 730; Birkley
v. State, 203 So. 3d 689, 696 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that “the failure to
object to testimony at trial waives any assignment of error on appeal” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Even if counsel had raised a hearsay objection, the testimony was
admissible because it does not contain hearsay. This is so because Investigator Staten
testified about what he learned through the course of his investigation. “Statements do not
constitute hearsay when admitted to explain an officer’s course of investigation or motivation
for the next investigatory step by that officer.” Smith v. State, 258 So. 3d 292, 309 (¶52)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Fullilove v. State, 101 So. 3d 669, 675 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App.
2012)). Accordingly, we find no merit in Buchanan’s reliance on an unasserted hearsay
objection.
C. Admission of Testimony Regarding Buchanan’s Subsequent
Arrest and his Possession of the Weapon
¶97. For the first time on appeal, Buchanan asserts that testimony that the gun was
recovered “when he was arrested” impermissibly injected “other bad acts” at trial, in
violation of Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. These arguments were never presented to the trial
court and are, therefore, waived. Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 761 (¶90) (Miss. 2006)
(“An established principle of appellate review is that issues not brought before the trial court
are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Buchanan does not
assert that allowing the jury to hear this testimony amounted to plain error, nor do we find
that a vague reference to an undefined “arrest” amounted to a “manifest miscarriage of
38
justice” with respect to Buchanan in this case. Gray, 549 So. 2d at 1321. This issue is
without merit.
V. Admission of Keys’s Statements Regarding Jones’s Pre-Shooting
Gun Possession
¶98. Jones asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting Keys’s video
statement without removing the information that Keys provided about Jones’s pre-shooting
gun possession.20 Jones asserts that these portions of the video constitute hearsay and were
evidence of “prior bad acts” in violation of Rule 404(b).
¶99. With respect to Jones’s hearsay assertion, we have already addressed above that
Keys’s statement was properly admitted against Jones as an exception to the hearsay rule
under Rule 804(b)(6) and that its admission did not violate Jones’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause. We find no merit in this issue.
¶100. Regarding Jones’s Rule 404(b) assertion, the record reflects that Jones made no
objection at trial on Rule 404(b) grounds.21 That objection is therefore waived due to lack
of specificity. Stevens, 458 So. 2d at 730. Jones does not assert plain error, nor do we find
any grounds for finding the trial court in error on that basis. Under Rule 404(b) evidence of
other acts is not admissible to prove the character of a defendant, or that he acted in
20
In his brief, Jones describes this information as Keys’s responses to Investigator
Staten’s questions about Keys’s “knowledge of Armand Jones’s guns,” including questions
about whether Jones owned any weapons, and where Jones got them.
21
Before Keys’s videotaped statement was played, Jones’s counsel asked the trial
court “to submit to the jury the tape, only those portions that incriminated Mr. Holland and
not Mr. Jones. I’m asking that the tape be redacted for that purpose and to only incriminate
the individual they claimed creating an absence of the witness.” Defense counsel made no
Rule 404(b) objection with respect to Keys’s statement.
39
conformity therewith. M.R.E. 404(b). The Rule also provides, however, that the evidence
may be admissible if it is used for other purposes “such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id.
¶101. In this case, we find that the fact that weapons were accessible to Jones, including an
AK-47, was admissible to prove Jones’s identity and opportunity. These are acceptable
purposes. See Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1252 (Miss. 1995). We find that the trial
court’s decision to allow Keys’s statement to be played without removing information about
Jones’s pre-shooting gun possession and access to guns was not an abuse of discretion and
certainly did not amount to a “manifest miscarriage of justice” with respect to Jones in this
case. Gray, 549 So. 2d at 1321.
VI. The Sufficiency or Weight of the Evidence with Respect to
Buchanan
¶102. Buchanan asserts that his convictions and sentences for aggravated assault should be
reversed and rendered because the State failed to present sufficient proof to support the three
convictions against him. Alternatively, Buchanan asserts that the jury’s verdict was against
the overwhelming weight of the evidence and should be reversed. For the reasons addressed
below, we find no merit in either assertion and affirm Buchanan’s convictions and sentences
in this case.
A. The Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶103. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Smith v.
40
State, 275 So. 3d 100, 109 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). In this regard, this Court “may only
reverse a denial of a JNOV motion when, with respect to one or more of the elements of the
offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors
could only find the accused not guilty.” Id.
¶104. The jurors were instructed in this case that they could convict Buchanan of aggravated
assault if they found that he willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly and feloniously, acting
alone or in concert, attempted to cause or purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury with
a deadly weapon. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7 (Rev. 2014). Buchanan argues that the
evidence presented by the State did no more than show he was present on the night of the
shooting, and thus it was unreasonable for the jury to find him guilty of aggravated assault.
We disagree.
¶105. The record reflects that the State showed that on the night of the shooting, Buchanan
was at Holland’s house with Holland, Jones, Keys, and McClung, and that the Loves had
recently “gotten” one of their friends. According to Keys’s statement, Jones had stated a few
days earlier that he needed to get one of the Loves because of this incident. The group left
Holland’s house in Keys’s Tahoe to go to a club. Keys said in his statement that Jones was
armed, but that he (Keys) did not know it at the time. However, Keys also said in his
statement that it was not unusual for Jones to have his gun because Jones “always”carried his
short AK-47. At trial, two of the surviving victims testified that Holland was also armed that
evening.
¶106. The proof established at trial that as the group was traveling on Highway 82, they
41
encountered the Loves. In his statement Keys said that Jones spotted the Loves in the red
Pontiac, and Jones called out that it looked like the Loves in that car. According to Keys,
Jones then opened fire on the Love vehicle as they passed by. Testimony from two of the
surviving victims at trial also elaborated on the circumstances surrounding the shooting.
Stigler and Perez Love both testified that the Tahoe pulled up beside them (the Loves in the
red Pontiac) and that both Jones and Holland began shooting. Stigler also testified that
“[t]hey bumped us into the ditch. . . . They hit the back end of our car . . . so once they
bumped the car we couldn’t do nothing but go over in the field and roll.”
¶107. Both Perez Love and Stigler testified that Holland had a pistol—and the State
established that .40-caliber shell casings were found in the vicinity of the scene and a .40-
caliber bullet was recovered from Perez Love’s head. The pistol that Holland used during
the shooting was never recovered.
¶108. As addressed above, it was also brought out at trial that six months after the shooting
Buchanan and Denarius Jackson were stopped by Carroll County deputies and a .40-caliber
pistol was recovered from the vehicle in which Buchanan was a passenger. The defense
established on cross-examination that Buchanan was not the owner of the pistol, nor was he
charged with its possession in connection with the stop. Nevertheless, the State established
that Buchanan had access to a pistol that the State’s firearms expert could not exclude as a
weapon used in the Love shooting.
¶109. The evidence at trial also showed that after the shooting, Buchanan made no attempt
to leave the group. Holland made arrangements to swap the Tahoe out for another vehicle,
42
he told the group that he had done so, and the group traveled to Moorhead, Mississippi where
they swapped vehicles. The group then took backroads to a Best Western hotel in
Greenwood and Keys, Buchanan, Jones, and McClung spent the night together in a room
rented by McClung. Holland and Jones left for a few hours, and Jones returned without his
AK-47. Buchanan turned himself in to law enforcement on September 18, 2015.
¶110. Under Mississippi law, “a person who acts in ‘confederation’ with others to violate
a law is liable as a principal under either the theory of conspiracy or the theory of aiding and
abetting.” Adams v. State, 726 So. 2d 1275, 1279 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
Shedd v. State, 228 Miss. 381, 87 So. 2d 898, 899 (1956)). As such, Buchanan need not be
identified as a shooter to be found liable. It is for the jury to determine the weight and the
credibility of the evidence. Pruitt v. State, 122 So. 3d 806, 809 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
In this case, the jury reviewed the evidence presented at trial in its entirety and determined
which facts were to be accepted as true or rejected as false. “This Court may not pass upon
the credibility of witnesses and, where the evidence justifies a verdict, it must be accepted
as having been found worthy of belief.” Id.; Smith, 275 So. 3d at 110 (¶34). Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must, we find that reasonable
jurors could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Buchanan was guilty of aggravated
assault. We therefore find that the trial court did not err in denying Buchanan’s JNOV
motion.
B. The Weight of the Evidence
¶111. In reviewing the same evidence and testimony addressed above, we also reject
43
Buchanan’s alternative argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a
new trial because the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
“Appellate courts review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial utilizing an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Smith, 275 So. 3d at 110 (¶35). In this regard,
“[w]hen considering a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the verdict will only be
disturbed when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it
to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Id. (quoting Pruitt, 122 So. 3d at 809(¶6)). Relevant to this analysis is the principle that it is the jury’s role to assess the weight
and credibility of the evidence. Pruitt, 122 So. 3d at 809 (¶8). Taking the evidence that
supports the jury’s verdict as true as outlined above and reviewing it in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we find that allowing the verdict to stand with respect to Buchanan
would not sanction an “unconscionable injustice.” Id. at 809 (¶¶6-8).
VII. Jones’s Cumulative-Errors Assignment of Error
¶112. Jones asserts that the cumulative effect of certain other issues and “improprieties” that
occurred at trial are grounds for reversal of his convictions and sentences. In particular,
Jones asserts that, in combination, the prejudicial effect of the following are grounds for
reversal: (A) communication with witnesses while they were under oath and were on the
stand; (B) allowing the State’s expert, Amber Conn, to testify outside the scope of her expert
reports; and (C) comments made by the prosecutor in his closing argument. For the reasons
addressed below, we find no merit in this assignment of error.
A. Communications with Witnesses on the Stand
44
¶113. Jones asserts there were two occurrences at trial where the “shadow of witness
tampering [was cast] over the proceedings.” In support of this assertion, Jones cites
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-9-115 (Rev. 2014), which provides:
(1) A person commits the crime of tampering with a witness if he intentionally
or knowingly attempts to induce a witness or a person he believes will be
called as a witness in any official proceeding to:
(a) Testify falsely or unlawfully withhold testimony; or
(b) Absent himself from any official proceeding to which he has
been legally summoned.
¶114. In general, we review the way in which the trial court conducts the trial for abuse of
discretion. Mixon v. State, 794 So. 2d 1007, 1014 (¶24) (Miss. 2001). As the supreme court
recognized in Mixon, “the trial judge is the person best situated to decide upon the course of
conduct necessary to elicit the truth and yet safeguard the rights of the accused, and unless
we can say, from the whole record, he abused his discretion, we should not reverse.” Id.
¶115. The first incident Jones asserts was improper was when the prosecutor approached
witness Cage when she was testifying out of the presence of the jury. The second incident
occurred when Sheriff Ricky Banks spoke to witness Jertavious Williams when he was
testifying.
¶116. With respect to Jones’s first alleged impropriety, the following exchange occurred out
of the presence of the jury:
BY THE COURT: All right. Well, let’s have the jury in. Apparently, the
woman has difficulty testifying. I have no idea why.
BY [COUNSEL
FOR JONES]: I don’t either, your Honor.
45
BY THE COURT: I don’t know if she’s scared, I don’t know if she’s
nervous, I don’t know if she is lying and she’s scared
about lying, I have no idea, but I’m gonna try to let her
get a little relaxed which is the point of this exercise, but
we’re ready for the jury now. Ma’am, you’re gonna have
to speak loudly and you’re gonna have to sit up straight.
You’re gonna have to look at the courtroom. You can’t
look down at whatever you’ve got in your hand.
BY [THE STATE]: May I approach her, Judge? I think she was –
BY [COUNSEL
FOR HOLLAND]: Your Honor, I would like to hear whatever he’s saying to
her. Could you stop until I get there? I would like to hear.
What did you say to her? You can’t talk to a witness in
the middle of their testimony. Your Honor, I would like
to state for the record that [the prosecutor] talked to the
witness about her testimony during her testimony.
¶117. The second incident occurred later in the trial when Williams was testifying:
BY [COUNSEL
FOR HOLLAND]: Your Honor, I’m sure it’s unintentional, but the sheriff is
talking to the witness on the stand.
BY THE COURT: I beg your pardon?
BY [COUNSEL
FOR HOLLAND]: I said, I would imagine it’s unintentional, but the sheriff
is conversating [sic] with the witness as he’s testifying.
He should not be conversation with the witness while
he’s testifying.
BY THE COURT: I haven’t observed that.
BY
THE SHERIFF: I thought he said he would kill Bill, and I asked him if he said he
would kill Bill and he said no.
BY THE COURT: You may proceed.
¶118. As we note above, the trial judge is the person in the best position to decide the way
46
in which the trial should be conducted. Mixon, 794 So. 2d at 1014 (¶24). We find no abuse
discretion in the trial court allowing the witnesses to continue testifying under these
circumstances. Indeed, Jones cites no authority for the proposition that these instances
constitute witness tampering as defined under section 97-9-115, nor does he cite any
authority for his assertion that “it is explicitly known that it is improper for a sworn witness
on the stand to be spoken to during the course of their testimony.” See M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7)
(“The argument [section of Appellant’s Brief] shall contain the contentions of appellant with
respect to the issues presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.”). We find no error with respect to
these incidents.
B. Expert’s Testimony Purportedly Outside the Scope of Her
Reports
¶119. Jones asserts that Amber Conn was allowed to testify outside the scope of her expert
reports. We apply an abuse of discretion standard “[w]hen reviewing evidentiary rulings
made by the trial court.” Brown v. State, 965 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (¶10) (Miss. 2007).
¶120. The record reflects that Conn was accepted as an expert in crime scene investigation.
She testified that she examined the Pontiac Grand Prix that the victims had been traveling
in, and that she observed that their vehicle sustained multiple projectile defects. She
explained that she used trajectory rods to determine the angle at which the bullets were fired.
Based on the angle of the bullets, Conn opined that the shooting began at the back of the
vehicle, and that the shots were fired from back to front. No objection was raised regarding
this testimony.
47
¶121. Conn also began to offer her opinion that, based on the fact that the trajectory of the
bullet holes was mostly in downward angles, it was likely that the shooter was in a taller
vehicle. Before she finished her sentence, however, defense counsel objected, and there was
a bench conference, as reflected in the following transcript excerpt:
[BY THE
STATE]: Okay. And from your determination of the trajectories
that you’ve testified about, the moving vehicle, do you
have an opinion as to the size and height from which the
bullet came?
[BY CONN]: The trajectories were mostly downward angles. So that
tells me that the vehicle that the shooter was in was most
likely a larger--
BY [COUNSEL
FOR JONES]: Objection, your Honor. May we approach briefly?
BY [COUNSEL
FOR JONES]: Your Honor, I’ve been given the expert’s report. It makes
reference to angles but not reference to any vehicle
angles or anything like that. This is outside the scope of
the expert report that we’ve been given. I don’t have a
problem with the angles, but as far as seeing the vehicle
and things of that nature, I think she’s got to be limited
to the report that has been provided in discovery and not
going outside of that. . . .
BY [COUNSEL
FOR JONES]: I’m complaining about the fact she’s talking about a
vehicle passing, that this other shot came from the
vehicle. I don’t have a problem with the angles and
trajectory, but for her to make those assumptions outside
the report. It’s not in the report, the angles and
trajectories, the shooter was moving. I think it’s outside
the scope of her report, that’s my objection.
BY THE COURT: Your objection is overruled.
48
¶122. Conn continued her testimony on direct examination, but the record reflects that she
did not offer an opinion regarding the size of the vehicle that the shooters traveled in or the
angle from which they shot.
¶123. In addressing Jones’s contention that Conn was allowed to testify outside her reports,
we first observe that as an appellate court, we “cannot consider that which is not in the
record.” Hampton v. State, 148 So. 3d 992, 995 (¶7) (Miss. 2014). The record in this case
contains only Conn’s “Report of Crime Scene Findings” (Trial Exhibit D-3). This report
provides that “[r]esults of evidence examinations and reports thereof will be the subject of
separate reports available through the Mississippi Crime Laboratory.” These “separate
reports” are not in the appellate record. We therefore decline to consider Jones’s assertions
due to the lack of a complete record on this issue. Hampton, 148 So. 3d at 995 (¶7).
¶124. We further observe that Jones’s assertion on appeal appears to be, at least in part, that
the trial court erred in permitting Conn to testify about the size of the shooters’ vehicle. As
the transcript passage quoted above reflects, however, Conn did not testify about the size of
the shooters’ vehicle. Defense counsel cut her off before she did so. For this additional
reason, we reject Jones’s assertion on this point.
C. Prosecutor’s Comments During Closing Argument
¶125. Jones also asserts that the prosecutor inappropriately referred to the defendants as
“bad guys” and referred to their conduct as “vicious and dangerous” during his summation.
Jones acknowledges that defense counsel did not object to these statements at trial, but he
asserts that the comments were so inflammatory that the trial court should have objected on
49
its own motion. Jones relies upon White v. State, 228 So. 3d 893 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), for
this proposition, a case in which this Court, applying plain error review, found reversible
error based upon the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s “litany of prejudicial comments
during closing.” Id. at 907-08 (¶¶40-41). These included comments on evidence excluded
by the Court; comments on defendant’s future danger to society; improper comments on the
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimony; and improper comments vilifying
the defendant. Id. at 908-11 (¶¶41-56). The Court found that “the cumulative effect of these
comments combined with the copious amount of other instances of misconduct creates
reversible error.” Id. at 911 (¶56). Under these circumstances, the Court found that reversal
based upon plain error was warranted because “the State’s comments resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice and a violation of White’s constitutional rights of due process and fair
trial by an impartial jury.” Id. at 908 (¶41).
¶126. We find no such circumstances in this case. Reviewing the State’s closing argument
in context, although the prosecutor referred to the defendants as “bad guys,” it also admitted
that nobody “is a choirboy in this case.” Further, the two references made by the prosecutor
in this case are nowhere near as prejudicial as the “litany” of comments made by the
prosecutor in White, who made “glaring arguments” about the defendant’s propensity to
repeat his offenses, and repeatedly made remarks vilifying the defendant. Id. at 909-11
(¶¶46-56).
¶127. We find that reversal based upon plain error is not warranted based upon the
prosecutor’s comments in this case. The supreme court’s determinations in Hobson v. State,
50
730 So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1998), and Edwards v. State, 737 So. 2d 275 (Miss. 1999), support our
determination in this case. In Hobson, the supreme court recognized that “[s]o long as
counsel in his address to the jury keeps fairly within the evidence and the issues involved,
wide latitude of discussion is allowed.” Hobson, 730 So. 2d at 27 (¶25). With this rule in
mind, the court held that the State’s reference to the defendant as “cold-blooded, evil, and
unfeeling” was not so overly inflammatory or outside the evidence presented that reversal
was required. Id. Similarly, in Edwards, the supreme court found that the prosecutor’s use
of the word “evil” to describe the defendant in opening statements did not warrant reversal.
Edwards, 737 So. 2d at 298 (¶48).
¶128. We likewise find that given the facts presented at trial, the State’s reference to the
defendants as “bad guys” and their behavior as “vicious and dangerous” does not constitute
reversible error under a plain error standard of review. In short, we find nothing in the
State’s comments in closing that “resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice and a violation
of [Jones’s] constitutional rights of due process and fair trial by an impartial jury.” White,
228 So. 3d at 908 (¶41). We accordingly find no basis for reversal.
¶129. In sum, we find that none of Jones’s assertions of purported “improprieties” at trial
warrant reversal. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized, “where there was no
reversible error in any part, so there is no reversible error to the whole.” Manning v. State,
735 So. 2d 323, 352 (¶74) (Miss. 1999). We therefore reject Jones’s “cumulative error”
argument in toto.
¶130. AFFIRMED.
51
BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE, TINDELL, LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ.,
CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN
THE RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY
WESTBROOKS, J. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. J. WILSON, P.J., CONCURS IN
PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED
BY WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ.
McCARTY, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT:
¶131. Because I believe that the multiple tests implemented today regarding forfeiture by
wrongdoing are unnecessarily complex, I respectfully concur in part and in result. We should
strive to provide clarity to the Bench and Bar in how to implement the Mississippi Rules of
Evidence. This is especially so because “[t]rials are often chaotic and sometimes intensely
adversarial,” and we need the Rules “to bring order and fair play to the trial process.”
Richards v. State, No. 2017-KA-00809-COA, 2019 WL 1771923, at *4 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App.
Apr. 23, 2019). We need tests and rules that can be applied in the chaotic arena of trial.
Because I have concerns that the approach we take today cannot easily be applied, I write
separately for the same reasons I dissented in part in McClung v. State, No. 2017-KA-01053-
COA (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2019).
WESTBROOKS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
J. WILSON, P.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
¶132. I concur that Jones’s convictions should be affirmed. However, I would reverse and
render a judgment of acquittal on the three remaining counts against Buchanan because the
evidence presented was insufficient to convict him of aggravated assault.
¶133. When we address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, all credible evidence
52
of guilt must be taken as true, and the State is entitled to all reasonable inferences that may
be drawn therefrom. Haynes v. State, 250 So. 3d 1241, 1244 (¶6) (Miss. 2018). We consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, although we also keep in mind that the
State must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. This burden must be
satisfied with evidence, not speculation or conjecture. Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 69-
70 (Miss. 1985); Sisk v. State, 294 So. 2d 472, 475 (Miss. 1974). We will reverse and render
if the facts and inferences point in favor of the defendant with such force that reasonable
jurors could not find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Haynes, 250 So. 3d at 1244 (¶6).
But we will affirm the conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Shelton v. State, 214 So. 3d
205, 256 (¶29) (Miss. 2017)).
¶134. There is no evidence that Buchanan fired a gun into the red Pontiac, but the State
argues that he aided and abetted Jones and Holland. “One who aids and abets another in the
commission of a crime is guilty as a principal.” Hughes v. State, 983 So. 2d 270, 276 (¶14)
(Miss. 2008). “To aid and abet the commission of a felony, one must do something that will
incite, encourage, or assist the actual perpetrator in the commission of the crime or
participate in the design of the felony.” Id. (quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted).
We do “not recognize guilt by association.” Id. “Mere presence, even with the intent of
assisting in the crime, is insufficient unless the intention to assist was in some way
communicated to the principal.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Likewise, mere
presence “at the commission of a crime without taking any steps to prevent it does not alone
53
indicate such participation or combination in the wrong done as to show criminal liability.”
Id. This is true even if the defendant approves of the criminal act. Id.
¶135. None of the eyewitnesses identified Buchanan as a passenger in the Tahoe. The only
evidence against him was Keys’s statement.22 However, during his approximately forty-
three-minute recorded statement, Keys said little about Buchanan and nothing to implicate
him as an aider and abettor in the shooting. Keys stated only that Buchanan was sitting in
the third- row seat of the Tahoe when the shooting occurred. Keys stated that there was no
discussion about shooting or seeking revenge against the Loves before the group left
Holland’s house that night en route to a lingerie party. Keys denied that he knew about any
plan to find the Loves or knew the Loves would be on the highway in the Pontiac. Keys
claimed that he was shocked when Jones raised his gun and began shooting at the Pontiac.
According to Keys, “days prior” to the shooting Jones had said that he needed to get the
Loves because they had shot a friend of Keys and Jones. The majority relies on this prior
conversation as evidence against Buchanan. Ante at ¶105. But there is no evidence that
Buchanan was a party to that conversation or knew anything about Jones’s or Holland’s
intentions. Keys stated that immediately after the shooting, Holland made arrangements to
switch cars in Moorhead. And after the group arrived at the hotel in Greenwood, Holland
and Jones left alone, apparently to get rid of their guns. Keys, McClung, and Buchanan spent
22
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a reviewing court may consider erroneously
admitted evidence when ruling on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Lockhart
v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 (1988); accord Hillard v. State, 950 So. 2d 224, 230 (¶28) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2007). Because I would hold that the evidence against Buchanan, including Keys’s
statement, was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions, I do not address Buchanan’s
challenge to the admission of Keys’s statement.
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the night at the hotel and called a friend to pick them up in the morning. At the time of his
interview, Keys had not spoken to Buchanan or McClung since the morning after the
shooting.
¶136. Even with Keys’s statement, see supra n.22, the evidence is insufficient to sustain
Buchanan’s conviction because it establishes only his presence at the scene of the crime.
There is nothing in Keys’s statement to show that Buchanan participated in or knew about
any plan to attack the Loves. Nor is there any evidence that he encouraged or assisted Jones
or Holland in the shooting. To find Buchanan guilty as an aider and abettor in the shooting,
the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Buchanan actually aided, counseled, or
encouraged Jones or Holland in the commission of the crime. Jones v. State, 710 So. 2d 870,
874 (¶15) (Miss. 1998). There is no evidence to support such a finding. Keys’s statement
proves only that Buchanan was present in the Tahoe, which is insufficient to sustain the
convictions. Hughes, 983 So. at 276 (¶14).
¶137. The majority also argues that Buchanan’s convictions are supported by (1) his physical
proximity to a .40-caliber pistol six months after the shooting, ante at ¶108, and (2) the fact
that he “made no attempt to leave the group” after the shooting, ante at ¶109. However,
neither of these facts supports a reasonable inference that Buchanan aided and abetted the
shooting.
¶138. First, the pistol was owned by and registered to Danarius Jackson and was found in
the center console of Jackson’s car six months after the shooting. The State’s ballistics
expert could only testify that “due to insufficient reproducible characteristics the [.40 caliber]
55
cartridge casing [found at the crime scene] could not be positively included or excluded as
having been fired from [Jackson’s] gun.” The only tenuous connection between the gun and
anyone or anything in this case is that Buchanan happened to be in Jackson’s car when he
was arrested on unrelated charges in Carroll County—six months after the shooting and five
months after Buchanan had turned himself in on the charges in this case.23 Moreover, there
is no suggestion that Buchanan was one of the shooters in this case, nor is there any evidence
that Buchanan ever possessed the pistol that Holland used. In short, there is no evidence that
Jackson’s gun was used in the shooting or that Buchanan ever had possession of it. All we
know is that six months after the shooting Buchanan was sitting in a car with a man who had
a .40-caliber handgun. A jury would have to pile speculation upon conjecture to find that
Buchanan provided Jackson’s gun to Jones to shoot at the Loves. That is not a conclusion
that can be reached beyond a reasonable doubt based on inferences reasonably drawn from
the evidence.
¶139. Second, the mere fact that Buchanan “made no attempt to leave the group” after the
shooting, ante at ¶109, is insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he
encouraged or assisted Jones or Holland prior to or during the shooting. As noted above,
mere presence at a crime does not support a conviction for aiding and abetting—even if the
defendant took no steps to prevent the crime and actually approved of the crime. Hughes,
983 So. 2d at 276 (¶14). It follows that Buchanan cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting
just because he did not quickly disassociate himself from Jones and Holland after he
23
Buchanan turned himself in on September 18, 2015, and later bonded out. He was
arrested in Carroll County in February 2016.
56
witnessed them open fire on the Loves. An “attempt to leave” a murderous group can be a
risky proposition. It would be speculation and conjecture to say that Buchanan must have
somehow encouraged or assisted in the crime just because he “made no attempt to leave”
afterward.
¶140. Tellingly, the majority opinion does not even hazard a guess as to what type of
assistance or encouragement Buchanan might have provided to Jones or Holland. The
majority simply holds that there is sufficient evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Buchanan aided and abetted them in some unknown and unspecified way. Such
a conclusion requires far too much speculation to support a criminal conviction. Therefore,
as to Buchanan’s convictions, I respectfully dissent.
WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
57