Rupert v. Berghuis

(2008)

James Lee RUPERT, Petitioner,
v.
Mary K. BERGHUIS, Respondent.

Case No. 1:08-cv-924.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

November 14, 2008.

OPINION

ROBERT HOLMES BELL, District Judge.

This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 26 Ohio Misc. 149, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir.1970) (district court has the duty to "screen out" petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir.1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.

Factual Allegations

Petitioner presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections and housed at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility. He currently is serving a prison term of 210 months to 50 years, imposed by the Allegan County Circuit Court on September 29, 2006, after Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a person under 13 years of age, in violation of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(a).

Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals raising two issues: (1) he was deprived of due process when the sentencing court erroneously scored certain offense variables, resulting in Petitioner receiving a higher sentence; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when his attorney failed to challenge the scoring of certain offense variables found by the trial judge in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In an order dated October 2, 2007, the court of appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented. Petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court raising the same two issues raised in the court of appeals. However, apparently due to a delay in the mail, Petitioner's application for leave to appeal was not received until December 3, 2007, beyond the 56-day period for filing such application. See MICH. CT. R. 7.302(C)(2). The supreme court rejected the application as untimely. Petitioner now raises in his habeas petition the same two claims presented in the Michigan Court of Appeals.

Discussion

I. Lack of Exhaustion

Before the Court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). Exhaustion requires a petitioner to "fairly present" federal claims so that state courts have a "fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon a petitioner's constitutional claim. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 842, 119 S.Ct. 1728; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-77, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971), cited in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995), and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982). To fulfill the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must have fairly presented his federal claims to all levels of the state appellate system, including the state's highest court. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. 887; Silverburg v. Evitts, 993 F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir.1993); Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir.1990). "[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728. The district court can and must raise the exhaustion issue sua sponte when it clearly appears that habeas claims have not been presented to the state courts. See Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir.1987); Allen, 424 F.2d at 138-39.

Petitioner bears the burden of showing exhaustion. See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir.1994). Petitioner alleges that he attempted to exhaust his remedies through the Michigan Supreme Court but that he was prevented from doing so by an unreasonable delay in the delivery of the mail. Petitioner was advised by the clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court that Michigan Court Rule 7.302(C)(2) categorically states that late applications will not be accepted and provides no exceptions to the time limitation. It therefore advised Plaintiff that it could accept no further filings in the matter. Because Petitioner's application was rejected and never considered on the merits, Petitioner's claims were not fairly presented to Michigan's highest court and are therefore not exhausted. See Black v. Ashley, No. 95-6184, 1996 WL 266421, at *1-2 (6th Cir. May 17, 1996) ("The fair presentation requirement is not satisfied when a claim is presented in a state court in a procedurally inappropriate manner that renders consideration of its merits unlikely.") (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989)); see also Long v. Sparkman, No. 95-5827, 1996 WL 196263, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996); Fuller v. McAninch, No. 95-4312, 1996 WL 469156, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 1996).

An applicant has not exhausted available state remedies if he has the right under state law to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). Petitioner has at least one available procedure by which to raise the issues he has presented in this application. He may file a motion for relief from judgment under MICH. CT. R. 6.500 et seq. Under Michigan law, one such motion may be filed after August 1, 1995. MICH. CT. R. 6.502(G)(1). Petitioner has not yet filed his one allotted motion. Therefore, the Court concludes that he has at least one available state remedy and his claims are not exhausted.

However, "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Because Petitioner fails to raise a meritorious federal claim, the Court will dismiss the petition notwithstanding Petitioner's failure to exhaust.

II. Merits

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PUB. L. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214 (AEDPA). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). The AEDPA "prevents federal habeas ``retrials'" and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). The AEDPA has "drastically changed" the nature of habeas review. Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir.2001). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court may consider only the "clearly established" holdings, and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655. In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655; Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir.2000). "Yet, while the principles of ``clearly established law' are to be determined solely by resort to Supreme Court rulings, the decisions of lower federal courts may be instructive in assessing the reasonableness of a state court's resolution of an issue." Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.2007). The inquiry is "limited to an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in light of Supreme Court precedent at the time [the petitioner's] conviction became final." Onifer v. Tyszkiewicz, 255 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir.2001).

A decision of the state court may only be overturned if (1) it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by the Supreme Court, (2) it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different result; (3) it identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme Court precedent but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the case; or (4) it either unreasonably extends a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend a principle to a context where it should apply. Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843; Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir.2003).

A federal habeas court may not find a state adjudication to be "unreasonable" "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495; accord Bell, 535 U.S. at 699, 122 S.Ct. 1843. Rather, the issue is whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is "objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

Where the state court has not articulated its reasoning, the federal courts are obligated to conduct an independent review to determine if the state court's result is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See Harris, 212 F.3d at 943; McKenzie v. Smith, 326 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir.2003). Where the circumstances suggest that the state court actually considered the issue, the review is not de novo. Onifer, 255 F.3d at 316. The review remains deferential because the court cannot grant relief unless the state court's result is not in keeping with the strictures of the AEDPA. Harris, 212 F.3d at 943.

The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir.1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lancaster, 324 F.3d at 429; Bailey, 271 F.3d at 656. This presumption of correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981); Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n. 4 (6th Cir.1989). Applying the foregoing standards under the AEDPA, I find that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

A. Sentencing guidelines

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court erred in scoring offense variables (OV) 3, 4, 8, 9, 10 and 13 under the Michigan sentencing guidelines, resulting in the calculation of a higher sentencing range. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's claim for lack of merit in the grounds presented.

Claims concerning the improper scoring of sentencing guidelines are statelaw claims and typically are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373-74, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (federal courts normally do not review a sentence for a term of years that falls within the limits prescribed by the state legislature); Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 301-02 (6th Cir.2000) (alleged violation of state law with respect to sentencing is not subject to federal habeas relief); Cheatham v. Hosey, No. 93-1319, 1993 WL 478854, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 1993) (departure from sentencing guidelines is an issue of state law, and, thus, not cognizable in federal habeas review); Cook v. Stegall, 56 F.Supp.2d 788, 797 (E.D.Mich.1999) (the sentencing guidelines establish only rules of state law). There is no constitutional right to individualized sentencing. United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir.1995). Moreover, a criminal defendant has "no federal constitutional right to be sentenced within Michigan's guideline minimum sentence recommendations." Doyle v. Scutt, 347 F.Supp.2d 474, 485 (E.D.Mich.2004); accord Lovely v. Jackson, 337 F.Supp.2d 969, 977 (E.D.Mich.2004); Thomas v. Foltz, 654 F.Supp. 105, 106-07 (E.D.Mich.1987).

Although state law errors generally are not reviewable in a federal habeas proceeding, an alleged violation of state law "could, potentially, ``be sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Koras v. Robinson, 123 Fed.Appx. 207, 213 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 521 (6th Cir.2003)). See also Doyle, 347 F.Supp.2d at 485 (a habeas court could set aside, "on allegations of unfairness or an abuse of discretion, terms of a sentence that is within state statutory limits unless the sentence is so disproportionate to the crime as to be completely arbitrary and shocking.") (citation omitted). A sentence may violate due process if it is based upon material "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." Koras, 123 Fed.Appx. at 213 (quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980)); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948). To prevail on such a claim, the petitioner must show (1) that the information before the sentencing court was materially false, and (2) that the court relied on the false information in imposing the sentence. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447, 92 S.Ct. 589; United States v. Polselli, 747 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir.1984). Koras, 123 Fed.Appx. at 213 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 851 F.2d 140, 143 (6th Cir.1988)). A sentencing court demonstrates actual reliance on misinformation when the court gives "explicit attention" to it, "found[s]" its sentence "at least in part" on it, or gives "specific consideration" to the information before imposing sentence. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 444, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589.

Petitioner's sentence clearly is not so disproportionate to the crime as to be arbitrary or shocking. Doyle, 347 F.Supp.2d at 485. Further, Petitioner does not even argue that the facts found by the court at sentencing were either materially false or based on false information. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447, 92 S.Ct. 589. Instead, Petitioner argues only that the court's sentencing findings were not sufficiently supported. Such claims clearly fall far short of the sort of egregious circumstances implicating due process. The state-court's rejection of Petitioner's claim was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts and was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Sixth Amendment

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to judicial factfinding in sentence scoring, ostensibly in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-prong test by which to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must prove: (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome. A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

In support of Petitioner's allegations that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated, he relies upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) line of cases including Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Although not cited by Petitioner, this line of cases also includes Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Apprendi enunciated a new rule of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. In the subsequent case of Blakely, the Court applied the rule of Apprendi to a state sentencing guideline scheme, under which the maximum penalty could be increased by judicial fact-finding. The Blakely Court held that the state guideline scheme violated Sixth Amendment rights, and reiterated the rule that any fact that increased the maximum sentence must be "admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232, 125 S.Ct. 738 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531). Petitioner invokes this line of authority in challenging his sentence of 60 to 90 months as violative of Sixth Amendment rights.

Petitioner's challenge to his sentence is frivolous because the Apprendi line of cases does not apply to Michigan's indeterminate sentencing scheme. In Michigan, the maximum sentence is established by statute and cannot be varied by the sentencing judge; the judge's only discretion is in setting the minimum sentence. Both this Court and the Eastern District of Michigan have examined Michigan's indeterminate sentencing scheme and have found no possible Sixth Amendment violation. See, e.g., McNall v. McKee, No. 1:06-cv-760, 2006 WL 3456677, at *2 (W.D.Mich. Nov. 30, 2006); Mays v. Trombley, No. 2:06-cv-140043, 2006 WL 3104656, at *3 (E.D.Mich. Oct. 31, 2006). These decisions are in accord with the well-reasoned opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 715 N.W.2d 778 (2006). Consequently, Petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim lacks merit.

Because Petitioner was not entitled to relief under Apprendi and Blakely, counsel's failure to object to judicial factfinding was objectively reasonable. An attorney's failure to make a frivolous or meritless motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Chegwidden v. Kapture, 92 Fed.Appx. 309, 311 (6th Cir. 2004); A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 795 (7th Cir. 2004); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Wright, 573 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir.1978). The state court's rejection of Petitioner's claim constituted a reasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner's application pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.

Certificate of Appealability

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court's dismissal of Petitioner's action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.1991) (it is "somewhat anomalous" for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Commissioner of Correction of the State of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir.1989) (it was "intrinsically contradictory" to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n. 1 (2d Cir.1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must "engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim" to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner's claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, to warrant a grant of the certificate, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Id. "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner's claims. Id.

The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court's dismissal of Petitioner's claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.