DocketNumber: No. SC 97018
Citation Numbers: 563 S.W.3d 111
Judges: Fischer
Filed Date: 12/18/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/21/2022
Easter Seals Midwest and Charity Twine appeal the circuit court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to § 435.440.1.
Factual and Procedural History
Easter Seals Midwest (ESM), a charitable organization, presents each new, at-will employee with a standalone arbitration agreement ("Agreement") to be signed as a necessary condition of initial employment with the organization. The Agreement provides in relevant part:
As consideration for employment with Easter Seals-Midwest, I hereby knowingly agree and consent to submit any disputes, claims, or controversies that may arise out of my application for employment, employment, and/or termination of employment with Easter Seals-Midwest to binding arbitration in any such claims against Easter Seals-Midwest and/or its current or former employees.
In return for the signee's acceptance, ESM "agrees to submit any disputes, claims, or controversies that may arise out of my application for employment, hiring, employment, and/or termination of employment with Easter Seals-Midwest to binding arbitration."
Additionally, the Agreement includes a delegation clause, identical to the one upheld in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson ,
The Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.
The Agreement also prescribes the selection of a neutral arbitrator and the arbitration itself is to be in accordance with the American Arbitration Association's National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes.
Lewis Soars signed the Agreement as a condition of his employment in October 2015, during his pre-employment orientation. Soars was made aware his employment with ESM was conditioned upon him signing the Agreement.
In January 2016, Soars was terminated from ESM after he refused to participate in an internal investigation involving accusations against him of abuse or neglect of ESM's clients. In response, he filed suit against ESM in circuit court for wrongful discharge, and against ESM and ESM employee Charity Twine for race discrimination. ESM and Twine jointly filed a motion to compel arbitration.
Analysis
The denial of a motion to compel arbitration is reviewed de novo.
*114Ruhl v. Lee's Summit Honda ,
"Generally any silence or ambiguity concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Pinkerton ,
Here, the Agreement's delegation clause was clear in evincing a manifest intention to delegate threshold questions of arbitrability to a neutral arbitrator, and is identical to the provision at issue in Rent-A-Center . The parties expressly agreed to give an arbitrator "exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation," and the question now is whether the Agreement was validly reached.
Invalidation of an arbitration agreement requires a specific challenge to the arbitration agreement, not to the contract as a whole. Ellis v. JF Enters., LLC ,
*115Pinkerton ,
Soars' arguments against the delegation provision in circuit court were expressly identical to his arguments against the Agreement as a whole.
In Pinkerton , this Court dealt with similar arguments leveled against a facially valid delegation provision. Pinkerton had raised one specific claim against the delegation provision - that it was unconscionable to delegate threshold determinations to an arbitrator. The Court found that argument to be without merit. Though Pinkerton claimed he had raised other challenges specific to the delegation provision, the Court found his arguments, in effect, were challenges to the Agreement as a whole, regardless of how he had worded them.
*116Just as the relator did in Pinkerton , Soars has attempted to circumvent this Court's and the United State Supreme Court's holding that a party must specifically challenge a delegation provision to avoid its application.
He also contended in the circuit court that both the delegation provision and the Agreement lack mutual obligations because ESM reserves for itself the right to bring its most likely claims in Court against Soars. Not only was this challenge not specific to the delegation provision, it also does not apply to it. The delegation clause is clear it applies to "any dispute" regarding "the interpretation, applicability, enforceability[,] or formation" of the Agreement, and the wording does not indicate any party- or claim-specific application of the delegation provision.
Lastly, and most notably, Soars contended in the circuit court there was no consideration for either the Agreement or the delegation provision. Whether this could be construed as a challenge specific to the delegation clause is for another day. Assuming, arguendo , it was a specific challenge, the argument fails. The delegation provision is supported by adequate consideration because the provision, severed from the rest of the Agreement and considered by itself, is a bilateral contract supported by consideration.
A contract consisting of mutual promises to undertake some legal duty or liability between parties is a bilateral contract. Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc. ,
Whether the Agreement as a whole contains illusory provisions is for the arbitrator to determine so long as the delegation provision, standing alone, is valid. Through the delegation provision, both parties have mutually agreed to arbitrate all threshold questions of arbitrability. It is a mutual promise to arbitrate any threshold questions of arbitrability which may arise. Because neither ESM nor Soars retains any unilateral right to amend the delegation clause nor avoid its obligations, the delegation clause is bilateral in nature and consideration is present.
Though most, if not all, of Soars' arguments were directed at the Agreement as a whole and not at the delegation clause specifically, his only arguably specific challenge to the clause - that it lacked consideration - is without merit. Therefore, the Court must treat the clause as valid under
Conclusion
The circuit court's order overruling ESM's motion to compel arbitration is reversed, and the circuit court shall stay the case and order the parties to proceed to arbitration to determine threshold issues of arbitrability.
Wilson Russell, Powell and Breckenridge, JJ., concur; Draper, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; Stith, J., concurs in opinion of Draper, J.
DISSENTING OPINION
George W. Draper III, Judge
I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion. I would affirm the circuit court's denial of Easter Seals Midwest and Charity Twine's (hereinafter, and collectively, "Easter Seals") joint motion to compel arbitration. Further, I find it disturbing the principal opinion's position fundamentally changes Missouri law without discussion of the myriad of arbitration cases discussing agreements to arbitrate in an at-will employment context.
"The issue of whether a dispute is subject to arbitration is subject to de novo review." Ruhl v. Lee's Summit Honda ,
"[A]rbitration is a matter of contract, and parties will be compelled to arbitrate their claims only if the arbitration agreement satisfies the essential elements of a valid contract." Jimenez v. Cintas Corp. ,
*118Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc. ,
There must be a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate before arbitration can be imposed upon a party. Dunn Indus. Gp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek ,
"[A]t-will employment, by its very moment-by-moment nature, is not a legally enforceable contract of employment." Morrow ,
The principal opinion circumvents addressing the underlying issue of whether there was an employment contract to support the arbitration agreement by assuming, without discussion or analysis, the underlying arbitration agreement was formed validly under Missouri law. However, for more than a decade, Missouri courts have determined consistently a promise of "continued" at-will employment is insufficient to support consideration to create a valid employment contract because there is no offer of continuing employment for an at-will employee. Morrow ,
The principal opinion openly acknowledges it believes all prior Missouri case law regarding at-will employment should be disregarded because this arbitration agreement was merely a delegation provision, which should be delegated to an arbitrator pursuant to *119State ex rel. Pinkerton v. Fahnestock ,
The student submitted his application and then signed an enrollment agreement, with the school which, among other things, detailed the school's program, graduation requirements, tuition, fees, policies regarding cancellation and termination, and an arbitration provision.
Whether there is a delegation provision within the arbitration provision is a matter of contract interpretation.
Lewis Soars (hereinafter, "Soars") was offered at-will employment with Easter Seals upon the condition he sign the arbitration agreement. Because Soars was an at-will employee, there was no employment contract. "The 'fundamental component of the at-will employment relationship--the ability to quit or be fired at any[ ]time for any reason' does not create a legally sufficient obligation on either party to the at-will employment relationship to create consideration." Wilder ,
I believe the arbitration agreement in this case is not enforceable because it lacked legal consideration due to Soars' at-will employment status. Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court's order, which upholds more than decade of Missouri case law.
All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, unless otherwise noted.
According to § 435.355, the correct designation of this action is an "application" to compel arbitration. Here, the parties filed it as a "Joint Motion to Dismiss, or, In the Alternative, Motion to Stay Action and Compel Arbitration." When denying said motion, the court's order expressly referred to it by the name given to it by Twine and ESM, and this Court will refer to it by the name reflected in the pleadings.
The dissent fails to recognize this critical step in analyzing the validity of delegation provisions - focusing instead on the validity of the arbitration agreement as a whole. However, the question of an arbitration agreement's validity as a whole is not for this Court to decide when the delegation provision is valid and enforceable. There would be no purpose behind a delegation provision if the opposite were true. This Court has held formation issues may be delegated to arbitration if a valid delegation provision exists. Pinkerton ,
Nonetheless, the present case is entirely distinguishable from this Court's holding in Baker that continued at-will employment does not provide consideration to form a valid arbitration agreement. Id. at 777. Though the dissent cites court of appeals opinions finding initial at-will employment does not provide consideration, this Court has never decided whether initial at-will employment is consideration for an arbitration agreement.
Whether consideration exists to support a contract's validity is a question of formation. Baker v. Bristol Care ,
When continued at-will employment is offered in exchange for a signed arbitration agreement, at the time of the offer the employee already enjoys the rights and expectations that come with the employer-employee relationship. However, before the employee was hired, an employer-employee relationship did not exist. At the point of hiring, the employer confers the benefit of employment upon the employee, and it is axiomatic that with the benefit of employment comes a bundle of legal rights and expectations to which the employee was not entitled prior to the handshake. The dissent is mistaken in suggesting the two situations should be compared, because both present wholly distinct questions of law and fact.
The dissent is also mistaken in suggesting this Court has denied four applications for transfer which would have presented and resolved the issue of whether providing initial at-will employment is consideration for an arbitration agreement. Only the denial of transfer in Jimenez v. Cintas Corp. ,
Specifically, Soars pointed out the "disputed agreement and the disputed delegation clause fail for the same reasons : they lack consideration, lack mutuality of obligation, and are unconscionable." Plaintiff's Opposition, p. 2, (emphasis added).
"The dissenting opinion contends the record clearly shows Mr. Pinkerton specifically challenged the delegation provision and points to a motion he filed stating in capital letters that he 'disputes the existence and enforceability of any agreement to delegate issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator.' What the dissenting opinion ignores is that Mr. Pinkerton then proceeded to challenge the arbitration agreement as a whole." Pinkerton ,
While the principal opinion correctly states this Court has never decided explicitly whether initial at-will employment is consideration which would support an arbitration agreement, the court of appeals has ruled on this issue multiple times. Further, this issue has been presented to this Court by way of applications for transfer by parties in four of the court of appeals' cases. Rather than accepting transfer to make an explicit statement or overruling these cases, this Court has declined to accept transfer, which results in the court of appeals' opinions remaining as valid precedent.