State of Missouri v. Phillip Lamont Ransburg

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Opinion issued December 20, 2016
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) No. SC95629
)
PHILLIP LAMONT RANSBURG, )
)
Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY
The Honorable James K. Journey, Judge
Phillip Lamont Ransburg was found guilty in a court-tried case of second-degree
assault and armed criminal action. On appeal, Ransburg argues the circuit court erred in
overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence and entering
judgment against him because the State did not present sufficient evidence that he
attempted to cause physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument. The circuit court's
judgment is affirmed.
Standard of Review
"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a court-tried criminal case, the
appellate court's role is limited to a determination of whether the [S]tate presented
sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could have reasonably found the defendant
guilty." State v. Vandevere, 175 S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. banc 2005). "The evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,
disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict." State v. Belton, 153
S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005).
Facts
One evening, Ransburg went to his ex-girlfriend's trailer, which was occupied by
his ex-girlfriend, another man (the ex-girlfriend's new fiancé), and the ex-girlfriend's
daughter. At the time, Ransburg carried a long stick with him that was similar to a broom
stick. Finding the trailer locked, he kicked in the door and, once inside, charged at the
other man "like a football player would to hit another attacker" while holding the stick in
both hands with his clenched fists facing the other man. The man, however, escaped by
running into the bedroom, and Ransburg turned his attention to his ex-girlfriend, grabbing
her wrist and attempting to pull her out of the trailer. When she resisted, he punched her
in the face before running out of the trailer with his stick.
Among other charges, the State charged Ransburg with second-degree assault and
armed criminal action for his actions taken against the man. 1 Ransburg waived his right to
a jury trial. After overruling Ransburg's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of
the State's evidence and again at the close of all evidence, the circuit court found Ransburg
guilty of all charges. The court sentenced Ransburg to concurrent terms of seven-years'
imprisonment for second-degree assault and five-years' imprisonment for armed criminal
1
Ransburg was also charged with and found guilty of first-degree burglary, second-degree
domestic assault, and a violation of an order of protection. He does not challenge those convictions
on appeal.
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action. Ransburg appealed, and, after an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court
transferred the case pursuant to article V, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution.
Analysis
In his first point on appeal, Ransburg argues the circuit court erred in overruling his
motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence and entering judgment against
him because the State did not present sufficient evidence that he attempted to cause
physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument for purposes of second-degree assault.
Predicated on his argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove second-degree
assault, Ransburg argues in his second point on appeal that there likewise was insufficient
evidence to find him guilty of the related charge for armed criminal action.
"A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if he . . . [a]ttempts to
cause or knowingly causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument[.]" Section 565.060.1(2). 2 "Dangerous instrument" is defined as
"any instrument, article or substance, which, under the circumstances in which it is used,
is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury." Section 556.061(9).
Additionally, "[s]ection 564.011 governs all attempt crimes . . . including attempt-based
assault as defined by section 565.060.1(2)." State v. Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Mo.
banc 2004). "Attempt, under sec. 564.011, has only two elements: (1) the defendant has
the purpose to commit the underlying offense, and (2) the doing of an act which is a
substantial step toward the commission of that offense." State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75,
2
Statutory citations are to RSMo 2000.
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78 (Mo. banc 1999). "A person 'acts purposely', or with purpose, with respect to his
conduct or to a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in that conduct or
to cause that result." Section 562.016.2.
Here, Ransburg was charged with attempt-based second-degree assault based on
his act of charging at the man while holding the long stick. On appeal, Ransburg challenges
the first element of attempt, arguing the State failed to present sufficient evidence that it
was his conscious object to use the stick as a dangerous instrument. He relies on several
cases where the court of appeals held ordinary household objects to be dangerous
instruments based on the manner in which they were used on the victim, 3 and he points to
the lack of evidence concerning the manner in which he used the stick because he did not
swing or jab the stick at the man. This argument is without merit.
Because Ransburg never reached the man due to the man's escape, he never had an
opportunity to use the stick on the man in any particular manner. But "[i]ntent is rarely
susceptible to proof by direct evidence and is most often inferred circumstantially." State
v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Mo. banc 2016). "The defendant's mental state may be
determined from evidence of the defendant's conduct before the act, from the act itself, and
from the defendant's subsequent conduct." State v. Hineman, 14 S.W.3d 924, 927–28 (Mo.
banc 1999). Here, the evidence established that Ransburg, after forcibly breaking into the
trailer of his ex-girlfriend, charged at the man "like a football player would to hit another
3
See State v. Reese, 436 S.W.3d 738 (Mo. App. 2014) (pencil); State v. Rousselo, 386 S.W.3d
919 (Mo. App. 2012) (ceramic bowl); State v. Coram, 231 S.W.3d 865 (Mo. App. 2007)
(telephone); State v. Arnold, 216 S.W.3d 203 (Mo. App. 2007) (ink pen); State v. Eoff, 193 S.W.3d
366 (Mo. App. 2006) (piece of wood).
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attacker" while holding the stick with both hands across his body. After the man escaped,
Ransburg attacked his ex-girlfriend. A reasonable inference drawn from these
circumstances is that Ransburg's conscious object was, if he reached the man, to cause
physical injury to the man by using the stick under circumstances in which it was readily
capable of causing serious physical injury. Any inference to the contrary is disregarded on
review. Belton, 153 S.W.3d at 309. As such, there was evidence from which a trier of fact
could have reasonably found Ransburg guilty of second-degree assault. Ransburg's first
point on appeal, therefore, is denied. Because Ransburg's second point on appeal is
predicated on the success of his first point, it is also denied.
Conclusion
The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.
Zel M. Fischer, Judge
Breckenridge, C.J., Stith, Draper, Wilson and Russell, JJ., concur.
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