DocketNumber: No. 40954.
Citation Numbers: 214 S.W.2d 19, 358 Mo. 269
Judges: Barrett, Bohling, Jillison, Leedy, Tipton, Westimes
Filed Date: 10/11/1948
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Howard Cooper appeals from a judgment imposing a sentence of five years' imprisonment for a felonious assault upon Sadie Cooper. Counsel for appellant, among other things, contends the conviction may not stand because the State failed to establish the corpus delicti by competent evidence. The material facts may be stated briefly.
Sadie Cooper is the mother of Howard Cooper. They were the only eye witnesses to the occurrence, which happened between 1 and 2 a.m. July 29, 1947, in Fulton, Callaway County, Missouri. The case was taken to Boone County on change of venue. Appellant and his family lived with his mother. Appellant was described as being "awfully drunk." He was in the back or "junk" room. The mother testified: "He said he was getting his things, — and he was throwing things around." There was no light in the house. She walked into the room and, taking her second step, *Page 271 something struck her on the side of the head, causing a severe injury. She called her daughter-in-law. She did not see her son strike her and did not know what struck her "because it was in the dark." Her description was: "He was throwing things around and I guess I happened to run into it."
The officers were called and arrested defendant. They testified defendant told them he had hit his mother with a chair; that he never would hit her again, and also that she owed him $200 and that he did not care.
[1] Our rulings are to the effect that the corpus delicti consists of the act or fact or result forming the basis of the charge and, also, that someone is criminally responsible therefor. State v. Joy,
[2] The information, under the habitual criminal act (Sec. 4854), charged defendant with a felonious assault, on purpose and of malice aforethought, under Sec. 4408, carrying a punishment of not less than two years' imprisonment. (Statutory references are to R.S. 1939 and identical section numbers in Mo. R.S.A.) The jury, under the instructions, found defendant guilty of a lesser offense (Secs. 4844, 4845), i.e., a felonious assault without malice under Sec. 4409, assessing the maximum punishment therefor. A distinguishing element between the higher (Sec. 4408) and the lower (Sec. 4409) grades of felonious assault with intent to kill et cetera is the presence or absence of malice aforethought. State ex rel. Dutton v. Sevier,
[3] With the statements attributed to defendant by the officers deleted, speculation and conjecture are required to sustain the verdict of guilty, for instance: There is no substantial evidence of any criminal intent on the part of defendant at the time his mother was injured. Her testimony indicates an accident rather than a criminal assault occurred. There is no showing that appellant knew she was in this dark room, or of any bad feelings between defendant and his mother, or of any occasion for him to injure her, or of any intentional act toward her. Injuries result from accidents or negligence as well as from intentional acts accompanied by a specific criminal intent. The criminality of the corpus delicti under Sec. 4409 was not established by competent evidence.
[4] Perhaps one other matter should be noticed. When the State called appellant's wife, the court, upon objection, excused her as a witness. Sec. 4081. Appellant, however, complains of evidence by the officers that, in response to questions asked after they arrived at appellant's home, his wife pointed out to them a kitchen chair and, upon this identification, the admission of the chair as an exhibit. The State claims the evidence competent as part of the res gestae, citing State v. Deviney (Mo.), 278 S.W. 727, 729[6]. That case, and the cases there cited, are readily distinguishable in that they involved acts and statements of coprincipals occurring contemporaneously with the offense. In the instant case, appellant's act was a thing of the past. His wife did not participate therein. There is no showing how she acquired her information. Her statement was not a spontaneous exclamation but was a mere narration of a past event and prompted by questions. It follows that the [22] statement of appellant's wife was not part of the res gestae; that the testimony concerning it was hearsay; and that the State sought to *Page 273
identify the chair indirectly through her hearsay statement when Sec. 4081 precluded its identification by her direct testimony over objection. Consult: State v. Arnold,
Following the Fair, Martin, Kester and other cases, supra, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. Westhues andBarrett, CC., concur.
State Ex Rel. Dutton v. Sevier , 336 Mo. 1236 ( 1935 )
State v. Capotelli , 316 Mo. 256 ( 1926 )
State v. Martin. , 342 Mo. 1089 ( 1938 )
State v. Joy , 315 Mo. 7 ( 1926 )
State v. Watson , 356 Mo. 590 ( 1947 )
State v. Gillespie , 336 S.W.2d 677 ( 1960 )
State v. Friesen , 725 S.W.2d 638 ( 1987 )
State v. Johnston , 670 S.W.2d 552 ( 1984 )
State v. Gardner , 522 S.W.2d 323 ( 1975 )
State v. Summers , 362 S.W.2d 537 ( 1962 )
State v. Humphrey , 358 Mo. 904 ( 1949 )
State v. Charity , 587 S.W.2d 350 ( 1979 )
Merriweather v. Grandison , 904 S.W.2d 485 ( 1995 )
State v. Chevlin , 284 S.W.2d 563 ( 1955 )
State v. Price , 238 S.W.2d 397 ( 1951 )
State v. Hagerman , 244 S.W.2d 49 ( 1951 )
State v. Bolden , 494 S.W.2d 61 ( 1973 )