Leslie Seaton v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
LESLIE SEATON, ) Opinion issued June 4, 2019
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) No. SC97511
)
SHELTER MUTUAL )
INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SAINT LOUIS COUNTY
The Honorable Joseph L. Walsh, III, Judge
Shelter Insurance Company (hereinafter, “Shelter”) appeals from the circuit
court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of its policy holder, Leslie Seaton
(hereinafter, “Seaton”). The circuit court found Seaton was entitled to underinsured
motorist (hereinafter, “UIM”) coverage under three insurance policies Seaton maintained
with Shelter after the death of her daughter, Chelsea Seaton (hereinafter, “Decedent”).
Because the plain language of two of the insurance policies at issue unambiguously
provides Decedent was not an insured entitled to UIM coverage, the circuit court’s
judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
Factual and Procedural History
When Megan Deaton (hereinafter, “Driver”) lost control of the vehicle she was
driving and crashed, her passenger, Decedent, sustained fatal injuries. Following
Decedent’s death, Seaton asserted a wrongful death claim against Driver. Driver settled
the claim for her insurance policy’s limits.
Seaton then sought UIM coverage from Shelter under the three automobile
policies she maintained. Shelter provided UIM coverage pursuant to one of the insurance
policies. However, Shelter denied UIM coverage under the other two insurance policies,
asserting Decedent was not a defined insured for UIM coverage.
Seaton filed a declaratory judgment action against Shelter, seeking a declaration
that UIM coverage existed for Decedent and alleging breach of contract. Seaton and
Shelter filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court entered summary
judgment in Seaton’s favor. After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted
transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. Shelter appeals, challenging the circuit court’s
determination Decedent was an insured and the insurance policies were internally
inconsistent. 1
1
The Missouri Organization of Defense Lawyers filed an amicus brief in support of
Shelter. The Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys filed an amicus brief in support of
Seaton.
2
Standard of Review
Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v.
Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). This Court
reviews “the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was
entered.” Id. The party against whom summary judgment was entered is accorded the
benefit of every doubt. Korando v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 239 S.W.3d 647, 648-49 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2007).
Analysis
Shelter sets forth two reasons it believes the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment in Seaton’s favor. First, Shelter asserts the circuit court erred because
Decedent is not an “insured” under the insurance policies’ unambiguous language.
Second, Shelter asserts the circuit court erred in finding the insurance policies were
internally inconsistent.
Decedent was not an Insured
Shelter argues the circuit court erred in entering judgment in Seaton’s favor
because Decedent does not qualify as an insured under Seaton’s UIM insurance policies.
Shelter contends Decedent does not meet any of the three definitions of “insured” set
forth by the insurance policies.
The “interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that this Court also
determines de novo.” Owners Ins. Co. v. Craig, 514 S.W.3d 614, 616 (Mo. banc 2017)
(quoting Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. banc 2007)). “When
interpreting an insurance policy, this Court gives the policy language its plain meaning,
3
or the meaning that would be attached by an ordinary purchaser of insurance.” Doe Run
Res. Corp. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins., 531 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Mo. banc 2017).
“Definitions, exclusions, conditions and endorsements are necessary provisions in
insurance policies.” Piatt v. Ind. Lumbermen’s Mut. Ins. Co., 461 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Mo.
banc 2015) (quoting Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 163 (Mo.
banc 2007)). A policy must be enforced as written when its language is clear and
unambiguous. Taylor v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo. banc 2015).
“An ambiguity exists when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the
meaning of the language in the policy.” Id.
The endorsements on Shelter’s UIM insurance policies provide Shelter will pay
uncompensated damages, subject to stated limitations, when “an insured sustains bodily
injury as a result of an accident involving the use of an underinsured motor vehicle ….”
(Emphasis added). Immediately thereafter, the endorsements in the UIM insurance
policy set forth “additional and replacement definitions.” The insurance policy defined
“insured” to be:
(a) You;
(b) any relative; and
(c) any individual occupying the described auto who is listed in the
Declarations as an ‘additional listed insured’, if:
(i) that individual does not own a motor vehicle; and
(ii) that individual’s spouse does not own a motor vehicle.
(Emphasis in original).
Shelter’s insurance policies state, “You means any person listed as a named
insured in the Declarations ….” Further, Shelter defines a “named insured” as “any
person listed in the Declarations under the heading ‘Named Insured’. It does not
4
include persons listed under other headings unless they are also listed under the heading
‘Named Insured’.” (Emphasis in original).
Decedent fails to meet the definition of an insured to be entitled to UIM coverage.
First, Decedent does not meet the definition of “you” when applying the plain language
of the insurance policies’ terms. Decedent was not listed as a named insured on either
insurance policy for which Shelter denied coverage. While Decedent was listed as an
“Additional Listed Insured,” the insurance policies’ plain language indicates an
“additional listed insured” is not the same as a “named insured.” Because Decedent was
not listed as a named insured, she did not meet the policies’ definition of “you.” 2 See
Carter v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 516 S.W.3d 370, 374 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).
Second, Shelter’s insurance policies provide UIM coverage for a “relative.”
Seaton argues an average layperson would believe Decedent was an insured because she
was Seaton’s daughter. Further, Seaton claims even if the insurance policies’ definition
of “relative” were applied, Decedent was not the sole owner of a motor vehicle and
should still be considered a relative for insurance purposes. Based upon these assertions,
Seaton believes the insurance policies were ambiguous.
Throughout the insurance policies, the term “relative” is in bold letters. Insurance
policy holders are instructed the words appearing in bold typeface have specific, defined
meanings within the terms of the insurance policy. Conversely, any words not appearing
in bold typeface have their common dictionary meaning.
2
Decedent was listed as the named insured in one of the Shelter insurance policies.
Shelter provided UIM coverage pursuant to that policy.
5
“Relative” appears in bold typeface, indicating it has a specific, defined meaning
under the insurance policies. The term “relative” is defined as “an individual related to
you by blood, marriage, or adoption, who is primarily a resident of, and actually living in,
your household…. Relative does not mean any individual who owns a motor vehicle ….”
The insurance policy further defines the term “owns” to mean “the person referred to
holds the legally recognized title to, or is a leaseholder of, an item of real or personal
property, even if there are other owners.”
To “own” a motor vehicle the person only has to hold title to it and may do so in
conjunction with other owners. Seaton admitted in her response to Shelter’s statement of
uncontroverted material facts Decedent was listed as a title owner on the certificate of
title to a motor vehicle.
Terms within an insurance policy do not become ambiguous merely due to the
presence of an exclusion. Maxam v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 504 S.W.3d 124, 129
(Mo. App. W.D. 2016). The insurance policies’ plain language indicates UIM coverage
will not be provided for a relative who owns a motor vehicle. Seaton admitted Decedent
was an owner of a motor vehicle. Based upon the insurance policies’ plain language, it is
clear Decedent did not meet the definition of a “relative” to receive UIM coverage
because she owned a motor vehicle. See Lair v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 789 S.W.2d
30, 32 (Mo. banc 1990) (excluding son from uninsured motorist coverage based upon the
insurance policy excluding coverage from any relative who “owns a car” when son
owned a car jointly with his father).
6
Finally, Decedent does not meet the final definition of “insured,” which provides
coverage for an “individual occupying the described auto ….” In this case, it is
undisputed Decedent was a passenger in Driver’s vehicle at the time her injuries
occurred. She was not an occupant of either vehicle insured by Shelter’s insurance
policies. Pursuant to the plain language of Shelter’s policies, Decedent was not an
insured and was not entitled to UIM coverage.
Policies’ Internal Inconsistencies
Shelter argues the circuit court erred in entering judgment in Seaton’s favor
because it found the insurance policies to be internally inconsistent. The circuit court
determined the insurance policies were ambiguous because there were provisions which
promised coverage and later provisions which denied that coverage.
This Court need not determine whether the limits of liability or other insurance
provisions render the policies ambiguous because the insurance policies only extend
coverage to insured individuals. Decedent does not meet the definition of an insured.
Hence, the insurance policies are not internally inconsistent merely because they restrict
UIM coverage to insured persons only. Swadley v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 513 S.W.3d
355, 357 (Mo. banc 2017).
Conclusion
The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
_________________________
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE
All concur.
7