DocketNumber: No. ED 104969
Citation Numbers: 541 S.W.3d 644
Filed Date: 12/19/2017
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/21/2022
Sprinkel went through the Safe Sanctuaries program after he was hired by the Shelbina Church. His information was submitted to the Safe Sanctuaries program, and a background check was obtained by the Conference which disclosed: no criminal history or sex offender registration information on file with the Missouri State Highway Patrol; no employee disqualification list information on file with the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services; no employee disqualification registry on file with the Missouri Department of Mental Health; and no child abuse or neglect information on file with the Missouri Department of Social Services. Sprinkel was also required to submit three reference forms to the Conference, including one from his employer and two additional references. Sprinkel submitted reference forms completed by Pastor Clow, who was his supervisor at the time he underwent the screening, as well as Allen Hickerson and Shawn Burnley. Each form submitted to the Conference rated Sprinkel as "excellent" or "good" in character, morality, ability to relate to youths, and ability to relate to children.
In November 2004, the Shelbina Church adopted its own Safe Sanctuary policy ("the Policy"). Among other guidelines, the Policy included a provision that two adults should always be present during activities where youth or children were present. Pastor Clow took steps to enforce this Policy, such as checking on youth activities and questioning volunteers to ensure they were never alone with the children or youth. Sprinkel was aware of this Policy.
3. Appellant's Interactions with Sprinkel and the Incident Giving Rise to Appellant's Claims
Sometime in the fall of 2005, Appellant began attending the Shelbina Church's after-school youth program, where Appellant would see Sprinkel approximately one or two times per week. Appellant, who was twelve years old at the time, attended the after-school program because his friends went, it was fun, and he could play video games and basketball.
On the afternoon of January 6, 2006, Appellant's school was released early that day, so Sprinkel invited Appellant to come to his house to play video games until it was time to go to the Church's after-school program. Although Sprinkel's wife was present when Appellant first arrived, she left shortly thereafter to run an errand. During the time Sprinkel was alone with Appellant, Sprinkel showed Appellant pornography on the computer and touched Appellant's genitals. Immediately after, Appellant left Sprinkel's house, went home, and reported the incident to his father. Based on Sprinkel's actions against Appellant on January 6, 2006, Sprinkel was convicted by a jury of first-degree child molestation.
4. Information Discovered after Sprinkel's Molestation of Appellant
After the allegations against Sprinkel came to light, Pastor Clow's wife, who also served as the Shelbina Church's secretary, conducted an internet search about Sprinkel. Ms. Clow found articles written before Sprinkel was hired by the Church that were about a prior criminal case filed against Sprinkel in the Circuit Court of Logan County, Illinois. Although Sprinkel was acquitted in the case, it involved an incident of sexual molestation of a child.
After the incident involving Appellant occurred, Pastor Clow held meetings with some of the parents of children attending the Church's youth programs. As a result, Pastor Clow learned that in August 2005, Sprinkel invited at least two other boys from the Church's after-school program to his house and showed them pornography.
B. Relevant Procedural Posture
Appellant filed his original petition alleging various claims against Respondents on January 7, 2013. During the course of the litigation, however, Appellant was twice granted leave of the court to file amended petitions. On December 10, 2015, Appellant filed his Second Amended Petition asserting the following ten claims: (I) child sexual abuse; (II) battery; (III) breach of fiduciary/confidential relationship; (IV) failure to supervise children; (V) negligent supervision of Sprinkel; (VI) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (VII) intentional failure to supervise Sprinkel; (VIII) breach of duty to adopt and implement preventative measures/failure to warn; (IX) fraud/misrepresentation;
*650and (X) Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 324(A) (1965).
Subsequently, Respondents each filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court ultimately granted and entered summary judgment in favor of Respondents on all of Appellant's remaining claims. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant raises six points on appeal, which we will discuss in the following order. In his third and sixth points on appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to Counts III through VIII and Count X on First Amendment grounds.
A. Standard of Review
A trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is an issue of law this Court reviews de novo. Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis ,
If the movant succeeds in establishing its right to judgment as a matter of law, the non-moving party must show that at least one of the material facts asserted by the moving party as undisputed is, in fact, genuinely disputed.
We will affirm the grant of summary judgment on any legal theory supported by the record, whether or not it was the basis relied upon by the trial court. Owners Insurance Company v. Parkison ,
B. The Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment as to Counts III-VIII and Count X
We begin our analysis with Appellant's third and sixth points on appeal, which challenge the trial court's finding that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution ("the Establishment Clause") precluded the court from entertaining a number of Appellant's claims. Specifically, the court granted summary judgment as to Counts III-VIII and Count X on First Amendment grounds. Before we proceed to the merits of Appellant's claims on appeal, we must first consider the implications of the First Amendment in this case.
1. A Threshold Issue-The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
The Establishment Clause provides in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...." U.S. Const., Amend. I. The Establishment Clause, as part of the First Amendment, applies to the states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. Gibson v. Brewer ,
a. The Seminal Case: Gibson v. Brewer
In Gibson v. Brewer , the Missouri Supreme Court grappled with the implications of the Establishment Clause in a case involving allegations of sexual abuse by a priest.
The plaintiff filed an action against the Diocese in tort, alleging both claims of negligence and intentional acts.
*652In its analysis on this issue, the Gibson Court reviewed United States Supreme Court and Missouri court precedent and explained:
Questions of hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy [ ] necessarily involve interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, and administration. Such excessive entanglement between church and state has the effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment.
By the same token, judicial inquiry into hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy.
...
Adjudicating the reasonableness of a church's supervision of a cleric-what the church 'should know'-requires inquiry into religious doctrine. ... [T]his would create an excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement of one model of supervision.
...
Whether negligence exists in a particular situation depends on whether or not a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated danger and provided against it. In order to determine how a 'reasonably prudent Diocese' would act, a court would have to excessively entangle itself in religious doctrine, policy, and administration.
Based on the foregoing, our Missouri Supreme Court issued two significant holdings. First, the Gibson Court held a court may not entertain claims against a religious organization if analysis of the issues involved would require a determination on ecclesiastical matters, such as "questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice." See
Second, the Gibson Court found "liability for intentional torts can be imposed *653without excessively delving into religious doctrine, polity, and practice."
b. Subsequent Treatment of Gibson
Following the Gibson decision, Missouri appellate courts have on several occasions upheld and expanded upon its First Amendment principles.
In D.T. , a parishioner of the Catholic Diocese of Kansas City-St. Joseph was sexually assaulted by a priest as a child and later filed suit against the Diocese.
In Doe I , our Court reviewed the dismissal of a plaintiff's claim for negligent failure to warn against the Roman Catholic Diocese of St. Louis.
In sum, Gibson and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts may not decide tort claims involving negligent acts if analysis of such claims would require the court to interfere with or interpret church doctrine, policy, polity, practice, or administration.
c. Whether Gibson Applies to the Present Case
In his briefs on appeal, Appellant argues at length that Gibson and its progeny are not applicable in this case. He first argues Gibson has been subsequently overruled by United States Supreme Court precedent or was improperly decided. To this point, the majority of Appellant's reply briefs relate to a recent United States Supreme Court decision of Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer , --- U.S. ----,
First, Appellant's reliance on Comer is misplaced, because in that case, the Supreme Court held a government entity's actions in denying a church a generally available benefit solely because it is a church violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
Appellant also cites numerous lower federal court decisions and appellate decisions from other states to support his assertion that Gibson was wrongly decided. However, these decisions are not binding on this Court. See Doe I , 311 S.W.3d at 823. Instead, "we are constitutionally bound to follow the most recent controlling decision of the Missouri Supreme Court[.]" Id. at 822 (quotations omitted). Because Appellant has failed to cite any binding precedent requiring us to ignore our Supreme Court's holding in Gibson , the case remains controlling law in Missouri and we are bound to follow it. See Doe I , 311 S.W.3d at 824 ; see also John Doe B.P. ,
Next, we turn to Appellant's contention that the First Amendment has no bearing on this case because Sprinkel was not designated "clergy" by the United Methodist Church's guidelines, which Appellant asserts should determine whether his claims against Respondents implicate the First Amendment. In contrast, the Conference maintains it is the nature of the dispute which triggers First Amendment scrutiny. Still yet, the Shelbina Church argues we should examine whether Sprinkel's position authorized him to conduct religious services and perform other religious duties *655to determine whether the First Amendment applies to this case.
Broadly stated, the First Amendment prohibits the government from involving itself in ecclesiastical matters, including but not limited to, church doctrine and the hiring, firing, and retention of church employees performing ecclesiastical tasks or rituals of a religious nature and/or ministers. See Gibson ,
In this case, there is no question Sprinkel was assigned duties of a religious nature such as educating children on the religious doctrine of the United Methodist Church, planning literature for the youth to study, praying with the children, reading scripture from the Bible, and giving the sermon to the full congregation on "Youth Sundays." These religious components of Sprinkel's position are sufficient to implicate the First Amendment because a judicial decision on matters involving the Church's relationship with Sprinkel would interfere with ecclesiastical matters such as the Church's retention of and its control over who will personify its beliefs. See generally Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C. ,
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's claims related to Sprinkel cannot be resolved without a court impermissibly involving itself in ecclesiastical matters and questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. See Gibson ,
2. Application of the First Amendment to Appellant's Claims
With the preceding case law in mind, we now turn to Appellant's third and sixth points on appeal in which he argues the trial court erred in relying on Gibson to find the First Amendment bars his claims enumerated in Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and X. For ease of reading, we will address each of Appellant's claims that are affected by the First Amendment in this section.
a. Negligence-Based Claims (Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, and X)
Appellant asserted five negligence-based claims against the Respondents: failure to supervise children against the Shelbina Church (Count IV); negligent supervision of Sprinkel against the Shelbina Church (Count V); negligent infliction of emotional distress against the Shelbina Church (Count VI); breach of duty to adopt and implement preventative measures/failure to warn against the Shelbina Church (Count VIII); and a negligence claim under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324(A) against the Conference (Count X). Pursuant to Gibson and its progeny, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents on these claims on First Amendment grounds.
Gibson specifically held claims for negligent supervision of clergy (Count V) and negligent infliction of emotional distress *656(Count VI) are precluded by the First Amendment.
Gibson also explicitly bars Appellant's independent negligence claims against Respondents. See
Furthermore, subsequent cases from this Court and the Western District also prevent Appellant from pursuing his claim of negligent supervision of children against the Church (Count IV). See Ratigan ,
*657b. Breach of Fiduciary/Confidential Relationship (Count III)
Appellant's Count III alleged Respondents entered into fiduciary and confidential relationships with him and breached their fiduciary duties and confidential relationships by, inter alia , failing to provide a safe environment for children, misrepresenting the safety of the Church for the children, failing to warn Appellant about Sprinkel, and establishing an environment where Sprinkel could sexually abuse Appellant. The trial court granted Respondents' motions for summary judgment on this claim, finding an inquiry into the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship between a religious organization and its parishioners violates the First Amendment. We agree.
In H.R.B. , this Court considered whether Missouri recognizes a cause of action against religious organizations for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to sexual misconduct of clergy.
Appellant has failed to point us to, and our research has revealed, no case compelling us to disregard this Court's decision in H.R.B . Accordingly, we find Appellant's claim for breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship against Respondents was not actionable, see
c. Conclusion as to Appellant's Third and Sixth Points on Appeal
In conclusion, we are guided by authority from Missouri Courts in finding the trial court could not have entertained Appellant's negligence-based claims and his breach of fiduciary/confidential relationship claim without interfering with and interpreting the doctrine, policy, polity, practice, and administration of the Respondents. Therefore, the First Amendment bars Counts III, IV, V, VI, VIII, and X. Point six and point three as to all claims except Appellant's claim for intentional failure to supervise Sprinkel (Count VII)
3. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on Appellant's Claim for Intentional Failure to Supervise Sprinkel (Count VII)
In Appellant's fifth point on appeal, he maintains the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Count VII alleging intentional failure to supervise Sprinkel against the Shelbina Church. We need not recount the parties' specific arguments or the trial court's judgment on this point *658because we find Appellant has failed to satisfy an element of his claim-that Sprinkel abused Appellant while on Church property. See Owners ,
a. Relevant Law
The elements of a cause of action for intentional failure to supervise clergy, as stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in Gibson , are: (1) a supervisor exists; (2) the supervisor knew harm was certain or substantially certain to result; (3) the supervisor disregarded the known risk; (4) the supervisor's failure to act caused damage; and (5) the other requirements of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 317 are met. Doe II ,
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if:
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, ... and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
Doe II ,
As part of the "premises" requirement of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 317(a)(i), the plaintiff must show the master owned, controlled, had a right to occupy or control the premises where the abuse occurred, or had a right to control the activity that occurred thereon. Doe II ,
b. Analysis
In this case, Sprinkel's sole act of sexual molestation against Appellant occurred while they were at Sprinkel's home. It is undisputed Sprinkel did not commit any acts of sexual abuse against Appellant while on the Shelbina Church's property.
*659Appellant testified that prior to the incident on January 6, 2006, Sprinkel had never done anything he felt was sexually inappropriate. Further, Appellant testified he was at Sprinkel's house that afternoon for personal reasons, i.e., to play video games, and not for religious purposes.
Additionally, the Shelbina Church did not have any right to possess the home as the undisputed facts fail to establish the Church owned, controlled, or had a right to occupy or control the home or anything that happened there. See
Nevertheless, Appellant argues the Shelbina Church should be held liable for Sprinkel's misconduct even though it did not occur on property possessed by the Church because the "grooming" activities, whereby Sprinkel befriended Appellant and obtained his trust prior to molesting him, was conducted primarily on Church property. This precise argument has been rejected by this Court and the Western District on at least three occasions. See John Doe B.P. ,
Appellant also argues Sprinkel's house should be considered property under the Shelbina Church's control because Appellant was only present at Sprinkel's home because he trusted Sprinkel as the Church's youth director. However, we find this argument has also been rejected by the Western District on three separate occasions. See Ratigan ,
In light of the foregoing, Appellant failed to establish the premises requirement of his claim for intentional failure to supervise clergy and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Count VII. See Doe II ,
C. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment as to Appellant's Claims for Child Sexual Abuse and Battery (Counts I and II)
Finally, we address Appellant's first point on appeal, in which he contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Church on Counts I and II for the intentional torts of child sexual abuse and battery, respectively. Appellant advances four main arguments in support of this contention. First, Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding the Church was not liable for Sprinkel's acts because his misconduct was completely outside the course and scope of his employment with the Church. Second, he asserts the court erred in not imposing liability on the Church based on its employee, Dee Ide's failure to act on information given to her. Third, Appellant maintains the trial court erroneously found the Church could not be held liable for aiding and abetting Sprinkel's intentional torts under section 562.056.1 RSMo 2000.
1. Appellant's Argument about the Course and Scope of Sprinkel's Employment
Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding the Church was not liable because Sprinkel's misconduct was completely outside the course and scope of his employment with the Church. We agree with the trial court's finding without further explanation because the Missouri Supreme Court has specifically declared, "intentional sexual misconduct ... [is] not within the scope of employment of a [church employee], and [is] in fact forbidden." Gibson ,
2. Appellant's Argument Relating to Dee Ide
Appellant also maintains the trial court erred in not imposing liability on the Shelbina Church based on its employee, Dee Ide's failure to act on information given to her. Appellant argues the Church should *661be held liable for aiding and abetting Sprinkel's child sexual abuse and battery because Ide "had information concerning young boys being at Sprinkel's house, but she did nothing with that information."
Essentially, Appellant's true complaint is that Ide failed to act in a reasonable manner after hearing Sprinkel was inviting members of the Church youth to his house and if she had acted reasonably to report this information, Appellant would not have been molested. This argument does not describe an intentional act as alleged in Counts I and II but rather "is nothing more than a reconstituted claim of negligence, the lack of cognizability of which we have already addressed and need not repeat." See Ratigan ,
3. Appellant's Argument with Respect to Section 562.056.1
Appellant additionally contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the grounds Appellant could not establish the Shelbina Church was liable for aiding and abetting under section 562.056.1. This is the criminal statute under which Appellant pled his claims for Counts I and II,
A. It failed to discharge the specific duty owed to [Appellant] to protect [Appellant] from harm while [Appellant] was a minor and in the custody and/or under the supervision of the Shelbina Church; and
B. The childhood sexual abuse committed by Sprinkel was committed while he was an agent of the Shelbina Church and acting within the course and scope of his employment/agency relationship and on behalf of the Shelbina Church, and his offense was at least a misdemeanor under Missouri law.
Based on the uncontroverted facts before the trial court, it found the Shelbina Church could not be held civilly liable under this section.
On appeal, Appellant maintains the court erred in citing and relying on section 562.056.1 in granting summary judgment. However, we find that by framing his Counts I and II based on this statute, Appellant invited the error of which he now complains. See Pierson v. Kirkpatrick ,
4. Appellant's Argument as to Section 537.046
Lastly, Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding the Shelbina Church was not liable for aiding and abetting under section 537.046, which authorizes a civil action for damages related to injury or illness caused by a defendant's conduct of "childhood sexual abuse." Section 537.046 ; see also Ratigan,
In Ratigan , the Western District was faced with a similar claim under section 537.046, in which a church parishioner alleged the Diocese was liable for aiding and abetting, or ratifying, a priest's violation of the statute.
A 'nonperpetrator' defendant could not cause injury or illness by 'childhood sexual abuse,' as that term is defined, because such a defendant has not committed one of the enumerated acts. While Missouri law does hold an aider and abettor criminally liable to the same extent as the principal offender, section 537.046 does not enumerate the statute criminalizing aiding and abetting, [ section 562.041 RSMo 2000 ], as one of the acts that constitutes 'childhood sexual abuse.' Accordingly, we conclude that the Missouri legislature did not intend to subject nonperpetrator defendants to liability under section 537.046.
Ratigan ,
5. Conclusion as to Point One
In sum, Appellant's arguments in support of his first point on appeal are without merit. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Counts I and II. Point one is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents is affirmed.
Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., P.J., Angela T. Quigless, J., concur.
The parties have extensively discussed the reference form completed by Shawn Burnley, as there is a factual dispute regarding a question Burnley testified he did not answer on the form. However, for this Court to delve into this issue, as it involves the reasonableness of the Conference's screening of Sprinkel, would run afoul of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Gibson v. Brewer ,
All further references to the Restatement (Second) of Torts are to the 1965 version.
Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII were brought solely against the Shelbina Church. Count X was asserted only against the Conference. Counts III and IX were pursued against both Respondents. During the course of litigation, however, Appellant voluntarily dismissed Count IX and this claim is not at issue in this appeal.
Appellant's second and fourth points on appeal challenge the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to Counts III and V, respectively, asserting summary judgment was improper on grounds other than the First Amendment. However, because we conclude below that the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment as to Counts III and V on First Amendment grounds, and because we will affirm a grant of summary judgment on any legal theory supported by the record, we need not address Appellant's second and fourth points concerning these counts. See Owners Insurance Company v. Parkison ,
We need not discuss the religion clauses of the Missouri Constitution (Article I, sections 5-7) because the parties did not raise these provisions on appeal and the Missouri Supreme Court has found they "are not only more explicit but more restrictive" than the First Amendment. See Gibson ,
In explaining what types of claims involving neutral principles of law that could be brought against a religious organization, the Missouri Supreme Court cited the specific examples of a vicarious liability claim for negligent operation of a motor vehicle for an employee acting within the scope of employment or a claim for negligence against a church where a person slipped and fell on church premises. Gibson ,
See also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C. ,
Accordingly, the First Amendment did not compel the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Shelbina Church as to Count VII (intentional failure to supervise Sprinkel). See
This rule has been applied to preclude claims of negligent hiring/ordination/retention, negligent supervision of clergy, negligent supervision of children, negligent failure to warn, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and other independent claims of negligence against a church if they cannot be resolved based on neutral principles of law. See
Appellant's sixth point relied on actually contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to Count X because the trial court misapplied the requirements of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324(A) to the facts of this case. Although Appellant's point relied on relating to this claim does not raise the trial court's First Amendment finding, the argument portion of his brief does address the issue. Moreover, the Conference argued in its motion that it was entitled to summary judgment on these grounds and reiterates this argument on appeal. Because we can affirm the grant of summary judgment on any legal theory supported by the record, Owners , 517 S.W.3d at 612 ; Ratigan ,
But see Section II.B.3. in which we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to Count VII on other grounds.
This fact distinguishes the present case from the case relied on by Appellant, Hutchison v. Luddy ,
As relevant to Appellant's Counts I and II, section 562.056.1 RSMo 2000 states a corporation is guilty of an offense if:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation, and the offense is a misdemeanor or an infraction, or the offense is one defined by a statute that clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability on a corporation ....
All further statutory references to section 562.056 are to RSMo 2000, which was the version of the statute in effect at the time the events giving rise to Appellant's claims occurred.
All further statutory references to section 537.046 are to RSMo Supp. 2005, which incorporates legislative amendments through 2004, is the latest version of the statute, and was the version of the statute in effect at the time the events giving rise to Appellant's claims occurred.
The relevant allegations relating to section 562.056.1 are identical for Counts I and II.