DocketNumber: No. ED 105133
Citation Numbers: 550 S.W.3d 565
Judges: Dowd
Filed Date: 5/22/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/21/2022
Appellant Shatondi Rice pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree felony murder and one count of armed criminal action. Rice filed a Rule 24.035
In Rice's sole point on appeal, he argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Rice alleges that plea counsel's failure to advise him of the possibility of a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter rendered his guilty plea involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent. Because the motion court did not clearly err in finding that Rice's ineffective assistance *568of counsel claim did not entitle him to relief, or to an evidentiary hearing, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Shatondi Rice was indicted as a prior and persistent felony offender on charges of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State filed an amended information reducing the first-degree murder charge to second-degree felony murder, and Rice pleaded guilty to second-degree felony murder and armed criminal action. At his plea hearing, the State detailed the evidence that would have supported the charges at trial, including the testimony of Doriana Jefferson, the victim's daughter. Specifically, the State related that Jefferson would have testified she was in her home with Rice and the victim; witnessed the two arguing; and then heard a loud noise. Additionally, the State would have shown that Rice was in possession of a firearm, which he used to shoot and kill the victim. Rice acknowledged that this evidence was "basically correct."
The plea court found that Rice's pleas were made voluntarily and intelligently with a full understanding that by pleading guilty, he was giving up his right to a jury trial. Rice was sentenced to concurrent life sentences with the possibility of parole.
Rice timely filed his pro se Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief alleging that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the chance that the jury could have been instructed on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Counsel then entered his appearance for Rice and filed an amended motion which the motion court denied without an evidentiary hearing. Rice appealed, and this Court found that his amended motion was untimely filed. Rice v. State ,
Standard of Review
We review the denial of a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief only to determine whether the motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k); Dorsey v. State ,
Moreover, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted for every Rule 24.035 motion. Rule 24.035(h); see Whitehead v. State ,
*569Discussion
The Strickland Test
We apply the two-part Strickland test to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for post-conviction relief. Johnson ,
Where there is a guilty plea, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial "except to the extent that the conduct affected the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea was made." Wiggins v. State ,
Counsel's Failure to Advise Rice of the Lesser Included Offense of Involuntary Manslaughter
In his sole point on appeal, Rice claims the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion because plea counsel was ineffective when she failed to advise Rice of the possibilities that the jury could have been instructed on and that he could have been convicted of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. We disagree.
A person commits second-degree felony murder when he commits or attempts to commit any felony, and, in the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of such felony, another person is killed. § 565.021.1 (2)
Here, the record shows that Rice admitted the veracity of the facts supporting his guilty plea to the State's charge of second-degree felony murder-namely, that as a prior and persistent offender, he committed a felony by possessing a handgun, see § 571.070
Nevertheless, Rice contends that by failing to advise him with respect to the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, counsel denied him the opportunity to show that he did not intentionally fire the gun, but only that he accidentally fired it as he removed it from his waistband, and therefore, was guilty only of involuntary manslaughter. But accepting that argument would require us to ignore that second-degree felony murder does not require any intent to kill. State v. Cole ,
The motion court also did not clearly err in concluding that Rice failed to make allegations of prejudice meriting an evidentiary hearing. To sufficiently allege prejudice, Rice had to cite facts not refuted by the record that, if true, would show that if he had been informed of the possibilities of an instruction on and conviction of involuntary manslaughter, he would have forgone the State's plea offer and would have proceeded to trial. See Wiggins ,
Here, Rice was indicted for first-degree murder and could have faced a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Rice pleaded guilty to second-degree felony murder with the understanding that he would receive a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Moreover, Rice admitted the facts supporting his commission of second-degree felony murder. In light of these facts, the motion court could reasonably have concluded that the record refutes Rice's allegation that in the absence of the alleged error of counsel, he would have gone to trial risking not only an increased sentence on the second-degree murder charge, but also the possibility of being convicted of first-degree murder.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the motion court.
Lawrence E. Mooney, J., and Anthony R. Gabbert, Sp. J., concur.
All rules references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2016).
All statutory references are to the Missouri Revised Statutes (2000) unless otherwise indicated.
RSMo (2010).