DocketNumber: No. ED 105980
Citation Numbers: 558 S.W.3d 528
Judges: Quigless
Filed Date: 6/19/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/21/2022
*531Christopher Chatman ("Movant") appeals pro se from the motion court's denial of his Rule 29.15
Factual and Procedural History
Following a jury trial, Movant was convicted of first-degree assault, in violation of Section 565.050;
On January 26, 2005, Movant filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief.
Undersigned counsel has reviewed the record in St. Louis City Cause Number 021-2396, including the transcript and legal file, as well as information supplied by Movant;
Undersigned counsel has investigated all allegations raised by Movant, in addition to those in Movant's pro se motion, and concluded, prior to the date that Movant's amended motion would be due, that there are no additional cognizable grounds to raise before this Court;
Undersigned counsel has consulted Movant, and Movant wishes to proceed on his pro se motion[.]
The statement included Movant's signature. Thereafter, the motion court granted post-conviction counsel's request for an evidentiary hearing on the following claims: failure to call Movant's girlfriend as an alibi witness, failure to obtain discovery of prior convictions of witnesses for the State, and a purported conflict of interest regarding defense counsel and Movant's girlfriend. The motion court denied an evidentiary hearing as to Movant's remaining claims.
On the day of the evidentiary hearing, post-conviction counsel filed a memorandum *532waiving the three claims for which the motion court granted the evidentiary hearing and submitting the Movant's remaining claims as pled in his pro se motion for post-conviction relief. Thereafter, the motion court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, denying Movant's post-conviction relief motion. This Court affirmed the motion court's judgment on appeal. Chatman v. State ,
On August 8, 2017, Movant filed a motion for post-conviction relief due to abandonment pursuant to Rule 29.15 based on an actual conflict of interest in which abandonment resulted. Movant alleged post-conviction counsel, "without movant's knowledge and voluntary consent filed a motion with this court waiving the exact claims that movant was subsequently granted a hearing on." Thus, Movant was abandoned by post-conviction counsel because he was deprived of a meaningful review of his claims. Movant alleged post-conviction counsel's actions were motivated by "[m]aybe hatred of movant, numerous disagreements, the fact that [post-conviction counsel] didn't want to be on movant's case anymore, and even counsel's desire to leave the state." Additionally, Movant filed a motion for change of judge, arguing there was an "[inherent] conflict of interest and meeting of the minds" between post-conviction counsel and the motion court judge because the judge allowed post-conviction counsel to waive the claims without questioning counsel's actions or inquiring into Movant's knowledge of the waiver.
The motion court subsequently entered the following judgment and order: "Movant-defendant's successive motion for relief under Rule 29.15 on the ground of abandonment is denied and dismissed with prejudice. The Court file conclusively refutes the claim of abandonment based on counsel's submitting pro se claims without evidentiary hearing." The motion court also ordered:
Movant Chatman has filed a motion to recuse the Court, apparently by way of attacking the statement in lieu of amended motion and waiver of evidentiary hearing on Chatman's motion under Rule 29.15, filed in 2005, heard and disposed by this Court in 2006, with affirmance by the Court of Appeals in 2008. There are no grounds whatever for recusal and movant is not entitled to an automatic change of judge. The Court's file reflects no abandonment by PCR counsel. The motion to recuse is DENIED.
Movant now appeals.
Points Relied On
In Point I, Movant argues the motion court clearly erred when it denied his motion for post-conviction relief due to a conflict of interest in which abandonment resulted, without an abandonment hearing because a review of the record leaves a definite and firm impression that Movant was in fact abandoned at the hearing stage of his post-conviction relief proceeding as a result of a conflict of interest between Movant and post-conviction counsel, who deprived Movant of a meaningful review of claims he actually was granted a hearing on. In Point II, Movant argues the motion court abused its discretion and/or erred when it denied his motion for change of judge due to an inherent conflict of interest and/or meeting of the minds between the judge and post-conviction counsel.
Discussion
Point I-Abandonment
In Point I, Movant argues the motion court clearly erred when it denied his motion for post-conviction relief due to a conflict of interest in which abandonment resulted, without an abandonment hearing *533because a review of the record leaves a definite and firm impression that Movant was in fact abandoned at the hearing stage of his post-conviction relief proceeding as a result of a conflict of interest between Movant and post-conviction counsel, who deprived Movant of a meaningful review of claims he actually was granted a hearing on.
A. Standard of Review
Appellate court review of the motion court's action on a Rule 29.15 motion "shall be limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous." Rule 29.15(k); see also Joyner v. State ,
B. Analysis
Rule 29.15 proceedings for post-conviction relief are governed by the rules of civil procedure. Rule 29.15(a); Edgington v. State ,
Abandonment by post-conviction counsel occurs when counsel takes no action on a movant's behalf with respect to filing an amended motion, and, as such, the record shows the movant is thereby deprived of a meaningful review of his claims; or when counsel is aware of the need to file an amended motion and fails to do so in a timely manner. Taylor v. State ,
If counsel determines that no amended motion shall be filed, counsel shall file a statement setting out facts demonstrating what actions were taken to ensure that (1) all facts supporting the claims are asserted in the pro se motion and (2) all claims known to the movant are alleged in the pro se motion. The statement shall be presented to the movant prior to filing.
When counsel files a proper statement in lieu of an amended motion, the motion court is not required to make a sua sponte inquiry into the parties' performances. Pennell ,
First, in arguing there was a conflict of interest between Movant and post-conviction counsel, which resulted in *534abandonment, Movant fails to allege any facts demonstrating the existence of a conflict of interest. An argument should advise the appellate court how principles of law and the facts of the case interact. Rule 84.04(e); Washington v. Zinn ,
Second, even if a conflict of interest existed, there is no evidence that the conflict would constitute "abandonment," as defined by our appellate courts. The record conclusively establishes that post-conviction counsel timely filed a statement in lieu of filing an amended motion, as permitted by Rule 29.15(e). On April 5, 2005, post-conviction counsel entered her appearance and requested additional time to file an amended motion. One month later, post-conviction counsel timely filed the statement in lieu of filing an amended motion. The statement provided, in relevant part:
Undersigned counsel has reviewed the record in St. Louis City Cause Number 021-2396, including the transcript and legal file, as well as information supplied by Movant;
Undersigned counsel has investigated all allegations raised by Movant, in addition to those in Movant's pro se motion, and concluded, prior to the date that Movant's amended motion would be due, that there are no additional cognizable grounds to raise before this Court;
Undersigned counsel has consulted Movant, and Movant wishes to proceed on his pro se motion[.]
The statement included Movant's signature, indicating counsel presented it to Movant prior to filing. Because post-conviction counsel reviewed the record in the underlying case, investigated all allegations raised by Movant, determined there were no additional grounds to be raised, and presented the statement to Movant prior to filing, counsel complied with the requirements of Rule 29.15(e) and provided a meaningful review of Movant's claims. See Pennell ,
Movant contends post-conviction counsel "fraudulently" waived the claims for which he was granted an evidentiary hearing, and such actions were due to the alleged conflict between Movant and counsel. However, there is no recognized constitutional right to counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, and, as a result, "a post-conviction movant has no right to effective assistance of counsel." Winfield v. State ,
*535Appellate courts must review claims of abandonment carefully to ensure the true claim is one of abandonment and not one of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Middleton v. State ,
Accordingly, we find the motion court did not err in denying Movant's motion for post-conviction relief due to abandonment because Movant failed to allege any facts supporting his argument that a conflict of interest existed between Movant and post-conviction counsel, in violation of Rule 84.04(e). Furthermore, the record conclusively refutes that post-conviction counsel failed to comply with Rule 29.15(e), and, thus, Movant was not abandoned. Point I is denied.
Point II-Motion for Change of Judge
At the outset, we find Movant's Point II is deficient as it fails to comply with the mandatory briefing requirements of Rule 84.04. This Court holds pro se appellants to the same standards as attorneys. Green v. Green ,
Movant's Point II violates Rule 84.04(e) because it fails to set forth the applicable standard of review, presents no legal argument, and contains no citations to relevant legal authority. Movant's argument does not provide the applicable standard of review for the denial of a motion for change of judge as required by Rule 84.04(e). Nor does the argument "explain why, in the context of the case, the law supports the claim of reversible error." In re Marriage of Fritz ,
Moreover, Movant's point contains no citations to relevant legal authority. "Failure to cite relevant authority supporting the point or to explain the failure to do so preserves nothing for review." Thornton v. City of Kirkwood ,
Conclusion
We affirm the motion court's judgment as to Point I. We dismiss Point II for failure to comply with the mandatory briefing requirements of Rule 84.04.
Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., P.J., and Robert M. Clayton III, J. concur.
All rule references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2016) unless otherwise indicated.
All further statutory references are to RSMo (2000), unless otherwise indicated.
The motion court "detect[ed]" eighteen claims of error, noting they were not "always easily deciphered."
Although not in his appellate brief, Movant alleged in his motion for post-conviction relief that counsel's actions were motivated by "[m]aybe hatred of movant, numerous disagreements, the fact that [post-conviction counsel] didn't want to be on movant's case anymore, and even counsel's desire to leave the state." However, again, this is merely a bare, speculative conclusion, which is unsupported by any specific evidence or testimony in the record. See Washington , 286 S.W.3d at 821.