DocketNumber: No. ED 106154
Citation Numbers: 559 S.W.3d 386
Judges: Mooney
Filed Date: 7/17/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/21/2022
The plaintiff, Lynette Petruska, appeals the summary judgment entered by the Circuit Court of St. Louis County concluding that the defendant, the City of Kinloch, violated Chapter 610 (RSMo. 2016),
The critical question is the City's intent when it violated the Sunshine Law, which is a question of fact. Resolution of Petruska's challenge requires the fact-finder to make credibility determinations and choose among competing inferences, determinations that are not permitted at the summary-judgment stage. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for determination whether the City's violation was either knowing or purposeful, thus subjecting the City to the potential imposition of a civil penalty and attorney's fees.
Factual and Procedural Background
Petruska is an attorney who represented the City's mayor-elect in a municipal charge of misrepresentation of authority and in impeachment proceedings. During an appearance in the City's municipal court, police arrested Petruska for purportedly causing a disturbance.
Petruska then sent numerous requests for records to the City pursuant to Missouri's Sunshine Law. Among her requests sent in early October 2015 was one for the name, length of service, and salary of each employee of the City, other than its police officers. The City responded with a list of employee names, job titles, and length of service along with the municipal ordinance setting forth the pay range for each of 29 job titles. The City, however, did not provide the amount of each employee's actual salary.
Petruska repeated her request for employee salary information in late October 2015 and February 2016. Meanwhile, the City consulted its legal counsel, and twice consulted the Attorney General's Office. The Attorney General's Office responded to the City's first inquiry, stating in relevant part:
The Missouri Sunshine Law states in § 610.021(13), RSMo that a body cannot close the names, positions, salaries or lengths of service of officers and employees of the public agencies. It appears that Ms. Petruska has asked for the City of Kinloch to provide her with *388the salaries [of] its' (sic) employees. The Missouri Sunshine Law does not address the issue of a salary range and simply states that the salaries of employees will be made available.
The Attorney General's Office responded to the City's second inquiry, informing the City that its elected officials must request a formal advisory opinion. The City's board of aldermen voted to request a formal advisory opinion from the Attorney General's Office in March 2016. About three weeks later, Petruska filed suit under the Sunshine Law, never having received specific salary information for the City's employees.
Petruska filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion in part, concluding that the City violated the Sunshine Law by providing only salary ranges instead of actual salaries for its employees.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment allows a trial court to enter judgment for the moving party where the party demonstrates a right to judgment as a matter of law based on facts about which there is no genuine dispute. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp.,
Discussion
In one point on appeal, Petruska claims the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the City when the court concluded that the City did not purposely violate the Sunshine Law.
The predominant purpose of the Sunshine Law is one of open government and transparency. Chasnoff v. Mokwa,
Section 610.021 provides in pertinent part that:
[A] public governmental body is authorized to close meetings, records and *389votes, to the extent they relate to the following:
* * *
(13) Individually identifiable personnel records, performance ratings or records pertaining to employees or applicants for employment, except that this exemption shall not apply to the names, positions, salaries and lengths of service of officers and employees of public agencies once they are employed as such ... [.]
(Emphasis added.) Public records are presumed to be open unless the Sunshine Law otherwise exempts them from being open. Section 610.022.5. The trial court determined that the City violated the Sunshine Law when it failed to provide the requested salaries of its employees. The City does not appeal this determination.
The only question before us is whether the trial court erred when it determined that the City did not knowingly or purposely violate the Sunshine Law. A knowing violation of the Sunshine Law occurs when a public governmental body has actual knowledge that its conduct violates a statutory provision. Laut v. City of Arnold,
If a trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a public governmental body knowingly violated the Sunshine Law, the public governmental body "shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount up to one thousand dollars." Section 610.027.3. The court may also order the public governmental body to pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to the party establishing a violation.
"An issue of statutory interpretation is a question of law, not fact."
On the other hand, whether the conduct of the City comes within the scope of the statutory definitions of "knowing" or "purposeful" conduct is a question of fact.
*390Essex Dev., Inc. v. Cotton Custom Homes, L.L.C. ,
The parties do not dispute the basic facts about what actions the City took or that those actions violated the Sunshine Law. The real dispute lies in the City's intent in taking those actions-in other words, whether the City's actions in violating the Sunshine Law constitute a knowing or purposeful violation of the Sunshine Law or whether the City's violation did not rise to the level of knowing or purposeful conduct. Here, the fact-finder must determine whether the City's conduct was "knowing" or "purposeful," as those terms are defined in section 610.027, when the City declined to release its employees' salary information and instead repeatedly sought advice from the Attorney General's Office.
Resolution of this factual question requires the fact-finder to make credibility determinations and to choose among competing inferences, neither of which is permitted at the summary-judgment stage. Robinson v. Lagenbach ,
Conclusion
We find that the genuine factual dispute regarding the City's state of mind precludes summary judgment on the question of whether the City either knowingly or purposely violated the Sunshine Law. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for determination whether the City's violation was either knowing or purposeful.
COLLEEN DOLAN, P.J. and MARY K. HOFF, J., concur.
All statutory references are to RSMo. (2016).
The City did not appeal this conclusion by the trial court.
The City did not file a motion for summary judgment. Here, as in Stroke v. Robinwood West Community Improvement District, neither party has raised the issue of whether Rule 74.04 permits the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of a non-moving party.
Given our resolution of the appeal, we deny Petruska's motion for attorney's fees on appeal.
The trial court may, in its discretion, allow for further discovery on this question. If the court finds the violation was either knowing or purposeful, the court shall specify which it finds and whether to award a civil penalty and attorney's fees in accordance with section 610,027.