DocketNumber: ED 106000
Citation Numbers: 563 S.W.3d 745
Judges: Gaertner
Filed Date: 5/9/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/21/2022
Introduction
Paul Eaton (Appellant) appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing with prejudice his petition for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction against two unnamed police officers to prevent them from testifying in support of an arrest warrant for Appellant. Due to the absence of a case or controversy that would give Appellant standing to seek injunctive relief, we affirm the trial court's dismissal without prejudice.
Background
Appellant's petition alleged the following. Appellant was arrested without a warrant on August 5, 2017 by two unnamed defendants, referred to in the petition as John Doe and James Doe (Defendants). A warrant did not issue within 24 hours of Appellant's arrest. Appellant alleged that Defendants' refusal to apply for a warrant within 24 hours violated Missouri State Statute Section 544.170 and was intended to defeat the purpose of the statute by allowing the police to conduct an investigatory arrest. Appellant additionally alleged that he would be irreparably harmed if Defendants testified against him in support of a future application for a warrant or in a criminal proceeding. Appellant further *747sought a temporary restraining order and an injunction to bar Defendants from offering testimony in support of a future arrest warrant for Appellant.
Defendants moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Appellant's petition lacked the specificity required by Rule 92.02 and failed to state a claim for injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed Appellant's petition with prejudice. This appeal follows.
Discussion
Though the parties do not raise it, we must as an initial matter determine our authority to render a judgment in this particular case. See Schweich v. Nixon,
Generally, regarding standing, "[t]he issue is whether [the] plaintiff has a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue and subject to immediate or prospective consequential relief." Schweich,
The United States Supreme Court has analyzed standing in the similar context of a suit for injunctive relief against police officers failing to seek probable cause determinations after warrantless arrests in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
In Riverside, the plaintiff (McLaughlin) had filed a suit for injunctive relief on behalf of himself and a class of all others similarly situated.
Conversely, here, Appellant did not allege that he was currently incarcerated. He alleged the officers failed to seek a warrant within 24 hours as required by Section 544.170, RSMo., which states as follows:
All persons arrested and confined ... without warrant or other process ... shall be discharged from said custody within twenty-four hours from the time of such arrest, unless they shall be charged with a criminal offense by the oath of some credible person, and be held by warrant to answer to such offense.
Section 544.170.1, RSMo. Under this statute, Appellant should have been discharged from custody after 24 hours if Appellant was not charged with a crime, and Appellant did not allege he was not discharged. Thus, Appellant failed to allege a direct and ongoing injury that an injunction would have remedied.
Appellant's case is more analogous to City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
Similarly, here, Appellant has failed to establish there is a likelihood that he will again be arrested without a warrant, much less that he will at any point be held in custody without a prompt probable cause determination. In fact, there is nothing in Appellant's petition to suggest that Appellant was not released from custody within 24 hours in accordance with Section 544.170.1, RSMo.
Appellant argues that he will suffer future harm regardless of whether he remained incarcerated because Defendants never sought a probable cause determination for his warrantless arrest. He argues therefore that any future attempt to seek a warrant to arrest him is tainted by information gained during this initial warrantless arrest that was never promptly presented for judicial review to determine probable cause. We find Appellant's conclusions are speculative and do not constitute an imminent threat of future injury to Appellant. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
*749and it "must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." (internal quotations omitted) ). He makes no allegation that he has been or will be re-arrested without a warrant for the same offense.
Moreover, Appellant's argument that the requirement to seek a warrant applies even after he is released from custody is unpersuasive. Relying on Riverside, where the United States Supreme Court held that a probable cause determination "within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement," Appellant concludes because he has alleged Defendants failed to apply for a warrant, he suffers continuing harm from the lack of a probable cause determination regardless of whether he is currently incarcerated. However, the Riverside court was explicit that the promptness requirement applies regarding "an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest."
Warrantless felony arrests often occur in Missouri when a police officer observes a crime take place or after a police officer arrives on a crime scene. The police officer books the suspect, and jail personnel release the suspect within 24 hours if the prosecuting attorney does not file criminal charges.
To the extent Appellant argues that he suffered harm for the 24-hour period of his warrantless detention, Appellant claims a past harm, rather than an ongoing harm. As we have said, there is no allegation he is currently in custody and the threat of a future arrest without a warrant is speculative at best.
Under the circumstances, we find Appellant does not have standing to seek *750equitable relief. The trial court properly dismissed his petition as the court was without authority to render a judgment in this particular case. See Schweich,
Conclusion
The trial court properly dismissed Appellant's petition. However, because we have concluded the dismissal is due to a lack of standing, we modify the dismissal to be without prejudice, rather than with prejudice. See Friends of San Luis, Inc. v. Archdiocese of St. Louis,
Robert M. Clayton III, J., concur.
Angela T. Quigless, J., concur.
The Supreme Court did not define extended, but certainly 24 hours cannot be extended where 48 hours is "prompt."
We note the procedure is slightly different for felony and misdemeanor offenses. Appellant's petition failed to include any facts regarding the circumstances of his arrest or the offense(s) for which he was arrested. At oral argument, Appellant's counsel stated that Appellant was arrested for a felony drug offense.
Moreover, Appellant's petition is overbroad in that it seeks to enjoin testimony in favor of probable cause for any future arrest of Appellant, whether or not it is related to the original arrest.
We note Lyons' dicta that states are free to "permit their courts to use injunctions to oversee the conduct of law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis,"