366 S.W.3d 504, 509 (Mo.banc 2012) (citing section
237.495.1‘).
ln the absence of fraud, the Connnission‘s findings of fact shall be conclusive and
binding Greel' v. SYSCO Food Servs., 475 S.W.S’d 655, 664 (Mo.banc 2015) (citing section
1 All statutory references are to RSl\/lo (Supp. 2012) unless otherwise indicated
3
287.495.1). We defer to the Coinmission’s determinations with regard to witness credibility and
the weight accorded to conflicting evidence. Io'. However, we review questions of law de novo,
id, and where, as here, the relevant facts are not disputed, the issue of whether an injury arose
out of and in the course of employment becomes a question of law.
Johine, 366 S.W.3d at 509.
Thtls, in addressing MoDOT’s Point I, we review de novo whether there was sufficient
competent and substantial evidence on the whole record to support the Conunission’s
determination that Mantia suffered an occupational disease_liere, a mental injury that "arose out
of and in the course of her employnient."
Point I: Occupational Disease Arisiiig from Meiital Injury
The issue presented here is whether the 2005 amendments to the Missottri Workers’
Compensation statute preclude us from following this Court’s holding in Wil!ianrs v. Depaztl
Heafth Ctr., 996 S.W.Zd 619 (Mo.App.E.D. 1999), that to prove a work-related stress claim, a
claimant must present evidence of the work-related stress encountered by si:ni!ar'ly-st``tzrated
e)np[oj»ees and prove that the work-related stress suffered by the claimant was extraordinary and
unusual specij‘icczlly as conzpo)‘ed to that encountered by those er.=iployees.z To resolve this issue,
we must determine the effect of the 2005 amendments on particular provisions~most
iniportaiitly, section 287. 1208-of the Workers’ Compensation statute.
The Coinmission and Missouri courts have repeatedly held-»~and neither party here
3
disputes-that mental injuries fall within the category of "occupational disease.’ See, e.g.,
2 Wilh``czms' was decided prior to the Missotlri Legislature’s 2005 amendments to the Workers’
Coinpensation statute, and no Missouri court has addressed whether Willio)n.s"s similarly-situated
employee requirement applies under the amended statute. We are mindful that in 2009, in
Scltcgj‘er' v. Litton hitercotr)iect Tecltno]ogy,
274 S.W.3d 597, 602-06 (Mo.App.2009), the Court
applied the sinrilar'ly-sittlated employee requirement; however, the 2005 amendments did not
apply in that case because the employee’s injuries and claim for compensation predated the
passage of the amendments by over two years.
Id. at 599.
4
George v. C.r``!;v of St. Louis, 162 S.W.?)d 26, 32 (Mo.App.E.D. 2005) (considering depression and
post-traumatic stress disorder to be “occupational diseases"). Section 287.067 defines an
"occupational disease" as "an identifiable disease arising with or without liuman fault out of and
in the course of the er)zj)!oynzenf." (emphasis added). Section 287.120.8 establishes the criteria
used to determine whether a mental injury resulting from work-related stress "arose out of and in
the course of the eniployriient.” Specifically, section 287.120.8 provides that "[m]ental injury
resulting from work-related stress does not arise out of and in the course of the employment
unless it is demonstrated that the stress was work related and was extraordinary and unusual.
The amount of work stress shall be measured by objective standards and actual events."
MoDOT contends that pursuant to section 287.120.8 and Wi!lictms, Mantia was still
required to present evidence of the work stress encountered by similarly-situated employees in
order to demonstrate that her stress was extraordinary and unusual as compared to theirs.
Accordingly, MoDOT’s argument concludes that because the Commission neither required
Mantia to present such evidence nor found that her work-related stress was extraordinary and
unusual os' conzpared to that experienced by other ernployees, its finding that Mantia suffered a
compensable occupational disease resulting from work-related stress misapplied the law and was
not supported by sufficient competent and substantial evidence. We disag1'ee.
in light of the 2005 amendments and the liorrific and uncontested evidence of Mantia’s
work-related stress, we cannot convict the Commission of error in awarding Mantia workers’
compensation benefits on her claim of occupational disease.
The Effect of the 2005 Amendments
The Sivitclzj$'o)n Libe/'a! to Strict Corrstrucfion
Prior to the 2005 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation statute, section 287.800
required the statute to be construed "liberally . . . with a view to the public welfare.” § 28].800
(RSMo 2000). Pursuant to section 287.800’3 liberal construction mandate, over the years several
provisions of the Workers’ Cornpensation statute received interpretations by Missouri courts that
were not spelled out literally in the plain language of the statute.
For exarnple, the Missouri Supreine Court held in State ex )‘el. Badcmzi v. Gaerfne)', 630
S.W.Zd 175, 179 (Mo.banc 1982), that the Workers’ Compensation statute’s grant to
"eriiployers" of immunity from civil claims extended to co-employees for their negligence in
performing a non-delegable duty of the ernployer, even though no reference to "co-employees"
or their immunity appeared in the applicable section of the statute. This was a court-created
principle fully sanctioned by the statutory interpretation mandate of section 287.800.
Likewise, in Woodf)ur'n v. May Dr'strib. C0., 815 S.W.Zd 477, 480 (Mo.App.S.D. 1991),
the court ruled that based on the liberal construction mandate, it had jurisdiction to consider an
appeal by the employer from a temporary award of the Commission when the employer disputed
all liability, even though there is no provision in the statute that provides for an appeal from a
temporary or partial-as opposed to a tinal_award of the Commission.
But in 2005, section 287.800 was amended to require that all provisions of the Workers’
Cornpensation statute be construed st1'ictly. Strict construction means that the statute can be
given no broader an application than is warranted by its plain and unambiguous terms.
Pe)rlreivefl v. Hcmnibal Reg’l Ho.s'p., 390 S.W.Sd 919, 923 (Mo.App.E.D. 2013) (citing Sra!e ex
r'el. KCP & L of G)'eafer Mo. Opera!ions C0. v. Cook, 353 S.W.?>d 14, 20 (Mo.App.W.D. 2011)).
The strict construction of a statute presumes nothing that is not expressed. Te)nple)nire v. W &
M We!d:``:?g, Inc.,
433 S.W.3d 371, 381 (Mo.banc 2014).
As a result of the switch to strict construction, l\/lissotiri courts have in various cases held
that particular provisions of the Workers’ Compensation statute must be applied differently than
they were before, or that particular judicially-created doctrines must be abandoned For
example, even though the employer’s immunity under section 287.120 from civil claims had
previously~in Bczdann``, discussed above-been extended to co-employees, in Robi``nsori v.
Hooke)~',
323 S.W.3d 418, 423-24 (Mo.App.W.D. 2010), sulz)erseded by stc:tute, RSMo §
287.120.1 (Supp. 2012), as recognized in Leeper v. Asnzzzs,
440 S.W.3d 478, 480 (Mo.App.W.D.
2014), the court determined that, strictly construed, section 287.120’5 grant to "einpioyers" of
immunity from civil claims no !orzger extended to co-employees. The court reasoned that
"[e]ven though the language of the exclusivity provision was not amended in 2005, the scope of
employer immunity was iiarrowed by the new lens of strict construction."
Hooker, 323 S.W.3d
at 424 (etupliasis added).
And with respect to the Woodbztrn decision noted above that extended appellate
jurisdiction to the review of temporary awards, in Srnalley v. Landrncirk Erecfor.s',
291 S.W.3d
737, 73 8-39 (Mo.App.E.D. 2009), this Court recognized that Wooclbur)i had been overruled by
the holding in Nor)nczn v. Phelps C!y. Reg’l Med. Cfr.,
256 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Mo.App.S.D. 2008)
based on the reasoning that solely as a result of the amended section 287.800’3 switch from
liberal to strict construction of the Workers’ Cornpensatioit statute, "the judicially created
exceptions allowing for appellate review of temporary or partial awards no longer apply."
Sr)za!ley, 291 S.W.3d at 738.
Finally, in Ash v. ll/Iillenrzizmi Restoration & Const.,
408 S.W.3d 257, 258-61
(l\/Io.App.S.D. 2013), the court found that even though section 287.240 was not amended in
2005, in light of the new strict construction requirement, the statute must be interpreted to
require a worker’s spouse’s remarriage benefit to be calculated using his or her entire death
benefit_not just the portion allocated to the spouse. The court reached this conclusion and
tlpheld the trial couit’s award of greater conipensation to the spouse even though under a liberal
construction of section 287.240, courts had consistently calculated the remarriage benefit based
solely on the amount of the benefit allocated to the surviving spouse. Ici. at 260~61.
Clearly, the switch to strict construction directly impacted the court-created extensions of
the particular Workers’ Colnpensation statute provisions at issue in Hooker, Nor))zari, and Ash,
and we observe a siinilar' effect in this case. Here, as in that trio of cases and others, even though
the provision of the Workers’ Conipensation statute to be applied~in this case, section
287.l20_.8-was not amended in 2005 or at any time thereafter to date, its application has
changed as a result of the switch in section 287.800 from liberal to strict construction
Prior to the amendments, in Wz``llicmzs this Court liberally construed section 287.120.8 to
require a claimant bringing a work-related stress occupational disease claim to prove the
extraordinary and unusual nature of the stress by presenting evidence of the work-related stresses
encountered by similarly~situated employees to show that in comparison to the stress
encountered by those employees, claixnant’s stress was extraordinary and unusual. 996 S.W.Zd
at 625-29. At the time that Wilh``a)ns was decided, section 287.120.8 read, as it has since, as
follows: "Mental injury resulting from work-related stress does not arise out of and in the course
of the eniployinent, unless it is demonstrated that the stress is work related and was extraordinary
and unusual. The amount of work stress shall be measured by objective standards and actual
events." 'I``hus, there was no language in the statute that provided that "extraordinary and
unusual" meant "extraordinary and unusual as compared to similarly-situated employees."
in the absence of such language, the Wr``lh'a)ns court looked to case law from other states
to determine what sort of objective standards should be used to discern the extraordinary and
unusual nature of an employee’s work-related stress.
Id. at 627-29. After considering other
states’ standards-some of which required comparison to the stresses encountered by siinilarly-
situated employees, others to the stresses of the average employeewthe Willia)ns court was
persuaded that the proper coniparison for purposes of section 287.120.8 was to the stresses
encountered by siinilarly-situated employees, regardless of ernployer, with a focus on the stresses
of those with the same employer.
Id. at 623. The court chose this standard not because it was
expressed plainly by the statute, but specifically because it was flexible enough to “allow[]
consideration of the employment conditions of others in the industry when an employer is too
small to have other similarly situated employees or when the stress levels of a particular
employer are liigli," and because, unlike the average-employee standard, it permitted an
employee to rely on more readily-available evidence of an employee’s employer
Id. at 628-29.
In adopting this reasoning»mand, more broadly, in interpreting section 287.120.8 this way~the
Wil!iar))s court cited its former duty to liberally construe the Workers’ Compensation statute
"with a view to the public welfare." § 287.800 (RSl\/Io 2000).
Today, however, under the strict construction mandate of the amended section 287.800_
which the parties agree applies here-section 287.120.8 must no longer be interpreted to require
evidence of the stress encountered by similarly-situated employees, since that requirement is not
expressed by the statute’s plain and unambiguous terms. Notably, it was in Wz'fliclms, the very
case on which MoDOT bases its argument for the continued application of the siinilarly-situated
employee requirement, that the court concluded that "[section 287.120.8] does not clear'ly set
forth what ‘objective standards’ should be used to discern the ‘extraordinary and unusual’ nature
of an eniployee's work-related
stress." 996 S.W.2d at 627 (einphasis added). Indeed, at the very
least, we note that section 287.120.8 does not unambiguously provide that employees can prove
the "extraordiiiary and unusual" nature of their work-related stress according to "objective
standards" only by presenting evidence of the stress encountered by sirnilarly-sittrated
employees The Wz``llz``cznrs court established such a requirement only by looking beyond the text
of the Workers’ Compensation statute to "case law in other jurisdictions . . . to determine an
objective standard for [iiieasuring extraordinary and unusual work-related stress]."
Id. Such
reliance on outside authority in this particular context may have been proper then, but now the
2005 aniendiiieiit to section 287.800 forbids us from giving particular provisions of the Workers’
Co1npensation statute a broader application than is warranted or expressed by their plain and
tinarnbigtious terins. Accordingly, because this Court previously held in Wz'llia:ns that section
287.120.8 did not clearly set forth what "objective standards" should be used to discern the
"extraordiiiary and unusual" nature of an ernployee’s work-related stress, we decline to supply a
standard, as we did in Wilh``cmts by looking to cases from other states, that is not plainly
expressed or warranted by the statute.
The Rejection and Abrogofior? of Particular Cases Inclzrdi.=zg Williains
Moreover, there is a second, independent reason we find that Willz``anzs’s similarly-
situated employee requirement no longer applies under the amended statute: the 2005
ainendineitts specifically "reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of
or definition of . . . ‘occupational disease’, ‘arising out of’, and ‘in the course of the employinent’
. . . and all cases citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases." § 287.020.10. Thus,
the ainendinent to section 287.020.10 rejects and abrogates Williams’s and its progeny’s
definition of "inental injury . . . aris[z``ng] out of or in the course of ernploynzerrf"_a form of
10