Michelle R. Leavitt, and Kevin T. Winkler v. Gus and Fatmira Kakadiaris, Defendants/Respondents.

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION TWO
MICHELLE R. LEAVITT, ) No. ED101040
and )
KEVIN T. WINKLER, )
)
Petitioners/Appellants, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Franklin County
vs. ) 09AB-CC00368
)
GUS and FATMIRA KAKADIARIS, ) Honorable David L. Hoven
)
Defendants/Respondents. ) FILED: December 23, 2014
OPINION
Michelle R. Leavitt (Leavitt) and Kevin T. Winkler (Winkler) (collectively referred to as
Buyers) appeal from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Gus and Fatmira
Kakadiaris (collectively referred to as Sellers) on Buyers’ claims related to the purchase of a
house (the House). We reverse and remand.
Factual and Procedural Background
In November 2004, Buyers and Sellers entered into a contract (the Contract) for the sale
of the newly-constructed House for the purchase price of $275,000. The Contract included a
subsection entitled “INSPECTIONS, DISCLAIMERS, AND WARRANTIES” that stated,
“Failure by Buyer to have an inspection within [the inspection period] shall constitute a waiver
and acceptance of any conditions an inspection would have disclosed.” Buyers did not have a
home inspection performed. The Contract also included a subsection entitled “SPECIAL
AGREEMENTS,” which referred to an attached exhibit, Exhibit A. Exhibit A provided in part
that Sellers would provide Buyers with $6,000 of credits toward the purchase of landscaping and
appliances, would “initiate and follow through with the repair of a water leak located in the area
of the basement below the garage,” and would “provide a 1 year builders warranty beginning on
the date of closing.”
In December 2004, prior to closing on the sale of the House, Buyers conducted a “walk
through” of the House. Buyers noticed a leak from the garage was causing water to puddle in the
basement below the garage. The Buyers could see streak marks on the walls indicating that the
water had run down the walls. Buyers and Sellers specifically addressed the leak in an
amendment to the Contract:
Seller[s] will have leak repaired after closing. Work will be done no later than
April 1, 2005. Attempt to repair leak from inside garage will be done first. If first
attempt is unsuccessful[,] Seller will attempt a fix from outside replacing entire
section(s) of concrete pad(s) closest to garage if damaged.
A second amendment to the Contract provided:
Seller[s] will no longer give a credit for landscaping $5,000 and appliances
$1,000. Seller[s] to give credit at closing to Buyers of $6,000 for closing
costs/pre paids, etc.
Buyers and Sellers agreed that the credit at closing would be used to address “some of the issues
[Buyers] had pointed out from [their] walk through.” Buyers and Sellers signed the amendments
to the Contract and closed the sale of the House on December 30, 2004.
In February 2005, Buyers moved into the House. Leavitt came to the conclusion that the
House was a “lemon” because it had a lot of “issues, including structural issues.” Buyers had
difficulty “trying to reach [Sellers] to get things taken care of,” so Buyers made a video of the
House to document the problems. Buyers noticed numerous defects to the House that were
unrelated to the leak from the garage into the basement. The alleged defects included: water
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flooding from the street into the front and side yard of the House instead of flowing into the
storm drain; an improperly constructed and sinking sidewalk to the House; cracks in the drywall
corners of the interior of the House; improperly installed and leaking plumbing in the main floor
half bath; an improperly installed countertop and backsplash that pulled away from the wall; an
incorrectly anchored kitchen wall that moved in a “floating manner”; improperly mounted and
installed cabinets; an improperly installed electrical system with incorrect, lighter-gauge wiring
and reversed polarity in some parts of the House; and an improperly constructed basement or
foundation such that large cracks developed in the basement floor and caused mold to form.
Buyers asked Sellers to correct the problems, but Sellers did not repair the leak from the garage
into the basement or correct any of the other defects.
On December 31, 2009, Buyers filed their eight-count petition against Sellers alleging
that Sellers had breached the implied warranty of a new home to be fit for its intended purpose;
had committed negligence per se; had breached the implied warranties of habitability and
construction in a skillful and workmanlike manner; had breached their express agreement to
repair the leak from the garage into the basement; had fraudulently misrepresented, negligently
misrepresented, and failed to disclose the defects in the House with the intent to deceive,
defraud, and induce Buyers to purchase the House; and had violated the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act. Buyers requested the court to award damages or rescind the sale of the House.
Sellers initially filed a motion to dismiss Buyers’ petition on the ground that the petition
failed to state a cause of action. Following argument, the trial court denied Sellers’ motion to
dismiss, finding that the petition, on its face, stated a cause of action. The trial court further
found that it would consider whether Buyers’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations if
Sellers filed a motion for summary judgment asserting such an argument.
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Sellers subsequently filed their motion for summary judgment, memorandum of law in
support of the motion, and statement of uncontroverted material facts. Sellers alleged that they
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Buyers did not have a home inspection
performed and, under the terms, of the Contract, waived and accepted any conditions an
inspection would have disclosed. Sellers also alleged that they were entitled to summary
judgment because the statute of limitations governing Buyers’ claims had run given that Buyers
“were put on notice of possible defects with the construction on or before December 30, 2004,”
which was the closing date of the Contract, but Buyers did not file their petition until December
31, 2009, more than five years after Buyers’ cause of action accrued.
Buyers thereafter filed their response and memorandum in opposition to Sellers’ motion
for summary judgment. Buyers argued that their claims were not barred by the statute of
limitations because (1) the amendment to the Contract expressly stated that Sellers would fix the
leak from the garage into the basement by no later than April 1, 2005, so the statute of limitations
on that claim did not begin to run until that date; and (2) the other unrelated defects in the House
were latent defects that could not have been ascertained prior to living in the House for a period
of time. Buyers argued that their claims regarding the latent defects in the House were not
waived under the terms of the Contract due to the Buyers’ failure to perform an inspection
because a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether an inspection would have disclosed the
defects and Sellers had not provided an expert opinion in support of their motion for summary
judgment indicating that the defects would have been disclosed. Leavitt’s affidavit was attached
to Buyers’ memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Leavitt attested
that she had personal knowledge of the defects to the House that would not have been noticed
upon an inspection of the House and that Sellers breached the amendment to the Contract
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regarding repairing the leak from the garage into the basement by failing to repair the leak no
later than April 1, 2005.
The trial court called and heard Sellers’ motion for summary judgment and took the
matter under advisement. The trial court later entered summary judgment in favor of Sellers,
finding that Buyers’ response opposing Seller’s motion for summary judgment failed to comply
with Rule 74.04(c) because it cited no evidence in the record and included only Leavitt’s
affidavit, which failed “to rely on information that is either not hearsay or which is within
affiant’s personal knowledge, and[,] therefore, is incompetent to refute the allegations of fact
made by [Sellers].” The trial court further found that all facts contained in Sellers’ statement of
uncontroverted material facts were deemed true, that there existed no genuine issue of material
fact, and that summary judgment in favor of Sellers was proper. The trial court found that
Buyers knew the leak from the garage into the basement was a problem, that the Contract
contained a provision granting Buyers the right to have an inspection performed but they did not
have an inspection performed, that the Contract stated the failure to have an inspection
performed constituted a waiver of the defects the inspection would have disclosed, and that
Buyers knowingly signed the Contract and expressly waived all warranties, express or implied.
The trial court concluded that all counts of Buyers’ petition were barred by the statute of
limitations, Section 516.120 1, which requires a plaintiff to commence an action within five years
after the cause of action accrued, because the petition was filed one day late.
This appeal followed.
1
All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, as amended, unless otherwise indicated.
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Standard of Review
Whether the trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper is a question of law that
we review de novo. Todd v. Missouri United School Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo.
banc 2007); ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371,
376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is proper when the movant establishes that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule
74.04(c); Todd, 223 S.W.3d at 160. This Court will affirm a summary judgment under any
theory supported by the record; however, where it is unclear from the summary judgment record
that a basis exists for the grant of summary judgment, this Court will reverse. Jordan v. Peet,
409 S.W.3d 553, 557 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). “An abundance of caution must be exercised in
granting a motion for summary judgment because it is an extreme and drastic remedy that
borders on the denial of due process because the opposing party is denied its day in court.”
Jordan, 409 S.W.3d at 557 (internal quotations omitted).
Where the defending party is the movant, it may establish a right to judgment by showing
one or more of the following: (1) facts negating any one of the non-movant’s elements facts; (2)
that the non-movant, after an adequate period of discovery, has not been able and will not be able
to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one of the
non-movant’s elements; or (3) that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of each of the
facts necessary to support the movant's properly-pleaded affirmative defense. ITT, 854 S.W.2d
at 381. The movant bears the burden of establishing a legal right to judgment flowing from facts
about which there is no genuine dispute; however, we review the record in the light most
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Id. at 376; State ex rel.
Mahn v. J.H. Berra Const. Co., Inc., 255 S.W.3d 543, 545-46 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). We take as
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true the facts set forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of the moving party's motion unless
contradicted by the non-moving party’s response. Ehrhardt v. Herschend, 294 S.W.3d 58, 59
(Mo. App. S.D. 2009). We accord the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences
from the record. Id., 294 S.W.3d at 59. Furthermore, where competent materials in the record
show there are two plausible but contradictory accounts of the necessary facts, there exists a
genuine issue for trial. Risher v. Farmers Ins., 200 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006).
Analysis
For ease of reading and clarity of analysis, we have addressed Buyers’ points on appeal
out of the order in which they were presented and have combined some of the points and
arguments on appeal.
Leavitt’s Affidavit Supporting Buyers’ Response Opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment
In their fifth point, Buyers claim the trial court erred in striking Leavitt’s affidavit in
support of Buyers’ opposition to Sellers’ statement of uncontroverted fact on the ground that it
was based on Leavitt’s personal knowledge. Buyers argue that the only evidence Sellers relied
on in their motion for summary judgment also was Leavitt’s knowledge. Buyers further argue
that Leavitt’s affidavit “fully responds to [Sellers’] Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts,”
as required by Rule 74.04.
Sellers counter argue that Buyers’ response improperly relied upon Leavitt’s affidavit
because the affidavit did not contain information to which Leavitt would have been competent to
testify at trial or that was within Leavitt’s personal knowledge and relied on hearsay.
A motion for summary judgment must be supported by an attached statement of
uncontroverted material facts that states with particularity in separately numbered paragraphs
each material fact as to which the movant claims there is no genuine issue, with specific
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references to the pleadings, discovery, exhibits or affidavits that demonstrate the lack of a
genuine issue as to such facts. Rule 74.04(c)(1). Attached to the statement shall be a copy of all
discovery, exhibits or affidavits on which the motion relies. Id.
A response to the motion for summary judgment shall set forth each statement of fact in
its original paragraph number and immediately thereunder admit or deny each of movant's
factual statements. Rule 74.04(c)(2). A denial may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of the party’s pleading. Id. Rather, the response shall support each denial with specific
references to the discovery, exhibits or affidavits that demonstrate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. “A response that does not comply with Rule 74.04(c)(2)’s
requirements with respect to any numbered paragraph in movant’s statement is an admission of
the truth of that numbered paragraph.” Jordan, 409 S.W.3d at 558.
Here, Sellers’ statement of uncontroverted material facts recounted that Buyers had filed
their petition alleging eight counts against Sellers related to the purchase of the House. Sellers’
statement of uncontroverted facts also asserted that: (1) Buyers conducted a “walk-through” of
the House prior to closing the Contract; (2) Buyers’ discovered that the room in the basement
underneath the garage had a leak that allowed in large amounts of water; (3) Buyers had stated it
would be obvious to anyone who entered the room that there was a problem; (4) Buyers had first
viewed the House in October or November of 2004, and the pillars on the front porch were of the
same size and condition as they were at the time the motion for summary judgment was filed; (5)
Buyers’ had signed the Contract, which provided them the right to have a home inspection
performed within a specific timeframe; (6) Buyers never had a home inspection performed; (7)
the language of the Contract provided that the failure to have an inspection performed constituted
a waiver of the defects that the inspection would have disclosed; (8) Buyers closed the Contract
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for the sale of the Home on December 30, 2004, with full knowledge of the issue with the room
in the basement; and (9) the Contract signed by Buyers expressly waived all warranties, express
or implied. In the remaining paragraphs numbered 25 through 32 of Sellers’ statement of
uncontroverted facts, Sellers argued that each of the eight counts in Buyers’ petition failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted because each claim was barred by the statute of
limitations, Section 516.120. To support their statement of uncontroverted facts, Sellers attached
Buyers’ petition, the depositions of Leavitt and Winkler, a copy of the Contract, a copy of the
HUD Settlement Statement issued at the closing of the Contract, and a copy of the video Buyers
had made to document the defects to the House.
Buyers subsequently filed their opposition to Sellers’ statement of uncontroverted facts
specifically admitting or denying Sellers’ assertions of fact in the corresponding original
paragraph number. In paragraph 25, which corresponded to paragraph 25 of Sellers’ statement
of uncontroverted facts regarding the statute of limitations, Buyers stated:
This assertion is one of law, but to the extent a response is required,
[Buyers] deny same. This cause was tolled under [Section] 516.100 in that when
there is more than one item of damage, the action is tolled until the last item of
damage is sustained so that all damages may be recovered. Here, numerous
issues have come to light over the period in which [Buyers] have occupied the
[House].
Paragraph 25 included 10 sub-paragraphs specifically describing the defects in the House.
Paragraph 25 cited Leavitt’s affidavit for support. Paragraphs 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, and 32 stated,
“[s]ee response to para. 25.” Paragraph 28 stated:
See response to para. 25. Further, [Sellers] agreed as follows:
Seller will have leak repaired after closing. Work will be done no later than April
1, 2005. Attempt to repair leak from inside of garage will be done first. If first
attempt is unsuccessful Seller[s] will attempt to fix from outside replacing entire
sections(s) of concrete pads(s) closest to garage if damaged.
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Paragraph 28 cited Sellers’ exhibit containing the amendment to the Contract and Leavitt’s
affidavit for support.
Although Sellers argue that Buyers’ responses were inadequate, even if we were to find
that Buyers failed to properly respond to Sellers’ motion for summary judgment and all of
Sellers’ factual assertions should be deemed admitted, the motion for summary judgment still
must be denied if Sellers’ factual assertions were not sufficient to entitle them to judgment as a
matter of law. See Jordan, 409 S.W.3d at 558. In their statement of uncontroverted material
facts, paragraphs 25 through 32 asserted that all eight counts of Buyers’ petition failed
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, in that the sale of the home was
finalized on December 30, 2004, but the Petition was not filed until December 31, 2009.
As such, [Buyers’] cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations contained in Mo.
Rev. Stat. [Section] 516.120, which requires a plaintiff to commence an action within
five (5) years after the cause of action accrued. Said Petition was filed one (1) day late,
and therefore is barred.
However, Sellers’ specific references to evidence from the summary judgment record to support
their presumption that the statute of limitations had run before Buyers’ filed their petition was
insufficient. Seller’s presumption regarding the statute of limitations was a legal conclusion, not
an assertion of fact, and was not binding on Buyers or the trial court. See Jordan, 409 S.W.3d at
560. “A conclusion must be supported by factual allegations that provide the basis for that
conclusion, that is, facts that demonstrate how or why the conclusion is reached.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted). These “uncontroverted facts” do not on their face require the legal
conclusion that the statute of limitations had run. It was Sellers’ obligation to demonstrate their
entitlement to summary judgment, yet their motion failed to specifically address how or why the
statute of limitations began to run on December 30, 2004, in spite of the amendment to the
Contract that expressly stated Sellers would repair the leak from the garage to the basement by
April 1, 2005. In particular, Paragraph 11 of Seller’s statement of uncontroverted facts
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referenced their Exhibit A, which revealed that the Contract was signed by the parties on
December 30, 2004, but also contained the amendment to the Contract that states Seller would
repair the leak from the garage into the basement by April 1, 2005. The trial court could not
have found as a matter of law that the statute of limitations began to run from December 30,
2004, given these inconsistent “facts.” Therefore, even if Buyers’ response to Sellers’ motion
was inadequate, Sellers were not entitled to summary judgment because they failed to
demonstrate their right to judgment as a matter of law. Point granted.
Sellers’ Affirmative Defenses
In their sixth point, Buyers claim the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in
favor of Sellers because Sellers did not carry their burden of proving each element of their
affirmative defenses raising statute of limitations and waiver of warranties.
In Missouri, all actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied,
except those mentioned in Section 516.110, and except upon judgments or decrees of a court of
record, and except where a different time is herein limited, must be brought within five years.
Section 516.120(1).
Statute of limitations and waiver are affirmative defenses that must be raised in a party’s
responsive pleading. Rule 55.08; Section 509.090. A pleading that sets forth an affirmative
defense shall contain a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled
to the defense. Rule 55.08.
“A party who moves for summary judgment on the basis of a statute of limitations bears
the burden of showing that the statute bars the plaintiff’s claims.” State ex rel. Mahn v. J.H.
Berra Const. Co., Inc., 255 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008), quoting White v. Zubres,
222 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Mo. banc 2007). “Once the defending party establishes ‘the plaintiff’s
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claim would be barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that
he [or she] comes within an exception in the statute so as to avoid the application of the
limitations period to the claim.’” J.H. Berra Const., 255 S.W.3d at 546, quoting White, 222
S.W.3d at 274.
In Sellers’ motion for summary judgment, Sellers asserted that Buyers’ claims accrued on
the date of the closing of the Contract: December 30, 2004. Sellers argued that “the alleged
damage was sustained and ascertainable when the home was delivered in its defective condition
at the closing” of the Contract. Sellers also argued that Buyers had waived any claimed defects
that a home inspection would have disclosed by not exercising their option to have a home
inspection performed within the inspection period pursuant to the terms of the Contract.
Here, Sellers did not meet their burden of showing that statute of limitations or waiver
barred Buyers’ claims in their motion for summary judgment. First, the undisputed facts
established that Sellers signed the Contract containing the amendment stating that Sellers would
repair the leak from the garage into the basement no later than April 1, 2005, but Sellers did not
make the repairs. We note this would have required Sellers to have drawn a legal conclusion that
the waivers under the Contract overrode the amendment to the Contract for purposes of statute of
limitations. Furthermore, Sellers failed to provide any evidence establishing that the other
defects would have been discovered during a home inspection. Thus, under the circumstances of
this case, Sellers failed to make adequate factual assertions to sufficiently support their
affirmative defenses of statute of limitations and waiver as a matter of law. “Since summary
judgment is a drastic remedy, it is inappropriate unless the prevailing party has shown by
unassailable proof, from which no genuine issue of material fact or any controlling issue exists,
that as a matter of law judgment should be entered in his favor.” Jordan, 409 S.W.3d at 561,
12
quoting Bakewell v. Missouri State Employees’ Retirement System, 668 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Mo.
App. W.D. 1984). Point granted.
Statute of Limitations and Waiver of Warranties
In their first, second, third, and fourth points on appeal, Buyers argue the trial court erred
in entering summary judgment in favor of Sellers on the ground that all counts of Buyers’
petition were barred by the statute of limitations because (1) Buyers were unable to ascertain the
nature of the House’s defects prior to moving in given that the defects were latent; (2) the statute
of limitations was tolled under Section 516.100 in that multiple items of damage existed but
were not ascertainable until after Buyers moved into the House; (3) given the terms of the
amendment to the Contract, the statute of limitations did not run until after Buyers’ petition was
filed; and (4) given that Sellers did not present any evidence of what defects an inspection might
have found, Buyers did not knowingly waive any warranties, Buyers and Sellers did not have a
meeting of the minds regarding a waiver of any warranties, and the Contract was ambiguous.
Given our analysis and conclusion to reverse the grant of summary judgment, we need
not address these points.
Conclusion
The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed and remanded.
_________________________________
Mary K. Hoff, Judge
Sherri B. Sullivan, Presiding Judge and Philip M. Hess, Judge, concur.
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