Richard Wesley Williams v. State of Missouri

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
RICHARD WESLEY WILLIAMS, )
Appellant, )
v. ) WD78881
)
STATE OF MISSOURI, )
Respondent. ) FILED: November 8, 2016
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY
THE HONORABLE DANIEL F. KELLOGG, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION THREE: VICTOR C. HOWARD, PRESIDING JUDGE,
LISA WHITE HARDWICK AND EDWARD R. ARDINI, JR., JUDGES
Richard Williams appeals the judgment denying his Rule 29.15 motion for
post-conviction relief after he was convicted of first-degree murder and armed
criminal action. He contends the motion court erred in denying his request for
post-conviction relief without first determining the timeliness of his amended
motion. He also argues the court erred in denying one of his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. Because we find that Williams's amended motion was untimely
and the motion court did not adjudicate all of the claims raised in his pro se and
amended motions, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the motion
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2010, Williams stabbed and killed John Joslin. After a jury convicted
Williams of first-degree murder and armed criminal action, he was sentenced to
consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder
conviction and 30 years in prison for the armed criminal action conviction. We
affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal in State v. Williams, 386
S.W.3d 925 (Mo. App. 2012).
On March 11, 2013, Williams timely filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion
alleging 23 claims. On March 13, 2013, the motion court appointed the Office of
the Public Defender ("PCR counsel") to represent him. Ninety-one days later, on
June 13, 2013, PCR counsel filed an amended Rule 29.15 motion that raised five
new claims and incorporated nine of Williams's claims from his pro se motion.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law denying the claims raised and incorporated in Williams's
amended Rule 29.15 motion. Williams appeals.
ANALYSIS
In Point I, Williams contends the motion court erred in denying his request
for post-conviction relief without first determining the timeliness of his amended
motion. He argues that, if the court had considered the timeliness of the amended
motion, it would have found that the motion was untimely and that he was
abandoned by PCR counsel. Williams requests that we reverse the motion court's
judgment and remand the case to the motion court to conduct an independent
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inquiry as to whether he was abandoned by PCR counsel. The State agrees that
Williams's amended motion was untimely and that the judgment should be reversed
and remanded to the motion court to determine the issue of abandonment.
Looking first at the issue of the timeliness of the amended motion, Rule
29.15(g) provides the time limits for the filing of an amended motion after the
judgment was directly appealed:
[T]he amended motion shall be filed within sixty days of the earlier of:
(1) the date both the mandate of the appellate court is issued and
counsel is appointed or (2) the date both the mandate of the appellate
court is issued and an entry of appearance is filed by any counsel that
is not appointed but enters an appearance on behalf of movant. The
court may extend the time for filing the amended motion for one
additional period not to exceed thirty days.
In this case, we issued our mandate in the direct appeal on January 9,
2013, and the motion court appointed PCR counsel on March 13, 2013.
Sixty calendar days following appointment of PCR counsel was Sunday, May
12, 2013. Because this date fell on a weekend, the amended motion was
due on the next business day, which was Monday, May 13, 2013. At PCR
counsel's request, the motion court granted a 30-day extension to file an
amended motion. With this extension, Williams's amended motion was due
on or before June 12, 2013.1 PCR counsel filed the amended motion on
1
In the order granting PCR counsel's request for an extension, the motion court erroneously stated
that PCR counsel had until June 13, 2013, to file an amended motion. The motion court had no
authority to extend the deadline for filing an amended motion beyond the single 30-day extension
allowed in Rule 29.15(g). See Riley v. State, 945 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo. App. 1997).
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Thursday, June 13, 2013. Therefore, Williams's amended motion was
untimely.
An untimely amended motion creates a presumption that PCR counsel
abandoned movant. See Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Mo. banc
2015). Accordingly, "the motion court has a duty to undertake an
'independent inquiry . . . ' to determine if abandonment occurred." Id. at
825 (quoting Vogl v. State, 437 S.W.3d 218, 228-29 (Mo. banc 2014)).
While it is our responsibility to enforce the mandatory timelines in post-
conviction rules, "the motion court is the appropriate forum to conduct [an
abandonment] inquiry." Id. at 826. The motion court in this case did not
conduct an independent inquiry into whether PCR counsel abandoned
Williams.
If the amended motion was untimely and the motion court did not
make an independent inquiry into whether post-conviction counsel
abandoned movant, we should remand the case to the motion court to
conduct such an inquiry. Childers v. State, 462 S.W.3d 825, 827 (Mo. App.
2015). An exception to this rule is where a remand would be unnecessary.
Id. at 828. A remand is unnecessary where the motion court has
adjudicated all of the claims raised in both the pro se and amended motions.
Id. This is because the remedy where abandonment is found is to permit the
untimely filing of the amended motion and review the claims therein;
conversely, where no abandonment is found, review is limited to only the
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claims raised in the pro se motion. Id. If the motion court adjudicated all of
the claims raised in both the pro se and amended motions with written
findings of fact and conclusions of law, a remand would be pointless,
because the movant has "received all the process to which he is entitled."
Id. See also Bustamante v. State, 478 S.W.3d 431, 435 n.2 (Mo. App.
2015).
Here, the motion court did not adjudicate all of the claims in Williams's
pro se motion. While the court denied relief for the nine claims from the pro
se motion that were incorporated into the amended motion, the court did not
address the remaining 14 claims that Williams raised in his pro se motion.
The remaining 14 claims from the pro se motion were distinct from those
raised or incorporated in the amended motion.2 Accordingly, it is possible
that the motion court considered the wrong motion, and a remand is
necessary to resolve the abandonment question. Frazee v. State, 480
S.W.3d 442, 446 (Mo. App. 2016). Point I is granted.
2
While the claims raised or incorporated in the amended motion alleged ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, the remaining 14 claims from the pro se motion alleged prosecutorial misconduct, trial
court error, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
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CONCLUSION
The motion court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to
allow the motion court to conduct an independent inquiry into whether
Williams was abandoned by PCR counsel.3
____________________________________
LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
ALL CONCUR.
3
Because we are reversing the motion court's judgment and remanding for an independent inquiry
into abandonment, we do not consider the merits of Williams's claim in Point II. See Moore, 458
S.W.3d at 826 n.4.
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