STATE OF MISSOURI v. JASON RUBIN BRUCE

STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. SD34271
) Filed: December 15, 2016
JASON RUBIN BRUCE, )
)
Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PHELPS COUNTY
Honorable William E. Hickle, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
Jason Rubin Bruce (“Bruce”), appeals the judgment of the trial court following his
convictions for the unclassified felony of first-degree rape, two unclassified felonies of first-degree
sodomy, the class B felony of first-degree burglary, and the class C felony of felonious restraint.
Bruce challenges the judgment of the trial court in two points on appeal. Finding no merit to
Bruce’s first point, but finding merit to Bruce’s second point, we modify and affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural Background
Bruce does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and we
recite only those facts necessary to review his points on appeal. We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the judgment, accepting as true all facts and inferences favorable to the
judgment, and disregarding evidence and inferences to the contrary. State v. Burks, 373 S.W.3d
1, 4 (Mo.App. S.D. 2012). The evidence adduced at trial is recited in accordance with these
principles.
On November 7, 2014, Bruce surreptitiously entered Victim’s residence while Victim was
taking a shower. Bruce tied up Victim with shoestrings, then sexually assaulted her. Bruce untied
Victim and forced her to sign-off of a computer video-chat that, unbeknownst to Bruce, had been
running with Victim’s boyfriend. After Victim complied, Bruce tied her up again, put her in a
closet, and ransacked Victim’s home. Victim asked what Bruce was looking for. When Bruce
said he was looking for Victim’s car keys, Victim offered to help find them. Bruce untied Victim
and they both unsuccessfully searched for the keys. Bruce again tied Victim up, shoving clothing
in her mouth so she could not speak, and shut her in a closet and then a bathroom. Eventually,
Bruce untied Victim. He said that if she told anyone what he had done, he would kill her. Then
Bruce left.
The authorities were notified, and Victim identified Bruce as her attacker. Sergeant Frank
Hawkins (“Sgt. Hawkins”) responded to the scene. After speaking with Victim, Sgt. Hawkins
went across the street to Bruce’s home, where he found Bruce sitting on the hood of his car. Bruce
claimed he did not know Victim, but said he would be willing to talk to a detective at the police
station, and that he would drive himself there.
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At the police station, Detective Adam Meyer (“Detective Meyer”) met Bruce when he
arrived. Detective Meyer introduced himself, and asked if Bruce would accompany him back to
an interview room, which Bruce agreed to do. Bruce initially denied that he had ever spoken with
Victim, and also denied having ever engaged in sexual conduct with Victim.
After Detective Meyer asked Bruce about whether his DNA or hair might be at Victim’s
home, Bruce admitted to meeting Victim. He suggested they had met when Victim was walking
her dog, and that the two had engaged in “some type of sexual relations” in Victim’s apartment.
Detective Meyer asked Bruce why he had not been truthful from the beginning, and Bruce said he
did not want his wife to find out what he had done with Victim. Detective Meyer indicated that
he would not tell Bruce’s wife. Bruce then gave a more detailed account of, by Bruce’s account,
consensual sexual acts he and Victim engaged in at Victim’s apartment. These acts, Bruce alleged,
did not include vaginal sex or oral sex.
Detective Meyer and Bruce took a break so that Detective Meyer could get some water and
Bruce could smoke a cigarette. Detective Meyer went outside with Bruce while he smoked, and
then the two returned to the interview room. Bruce told Detective Meyer that he wanted to leave.
Detective Meyer told Bruce that he could not leave, placed him under arrest, and read him his
Miranda 1 rights. Bruce said he understood his rights, and agreed to speak further with Detective
Meyer. He indicated that he was at Victim’s house in the late evening a few days before the
assault, but denied going to Victim’s house on the day of the assault.
Forensic evidence showed that Victim’s DNA was found on Bruce’s boxer shorts the day
he was interviewed, and that Bruce’s DNA was on Victim’s body the day of the assault.
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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After the close of evidence, instructions, and argument by counsel, the jury found Bruce
guilty of first-degree rape, two counts of first-degree sodomy, first-degree burglary, and felonious
restraint. Having found Bruce to be a prior offender, the trial court sentenced Bruce to three life
sentences on each of the rape and sodomy counts, fifteen years on the burglary count, and seven
years on the felonious restraint count, with all sentences to run consecutively. This appeal
followed.
In two counts on appeal, Bruce asserts:
1. The trial court erred in admitting the statements Bruce made during police
interrogation because they arose out of a custodial interrogation without a Miranda
warning; and
2. The written judgment is in error in that it states that Bruce is sentenced to ninety-
nine years in prison for each of Counts I, II, and III because this conflicts with the
trial court’s oral pronouncement in court that it was sentencing Bruce to life in
prison for each of those counts.
Principles of Review
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is
clearly erroneous. The trial court’s ruling will be deemed clearly erroneous if, after
review of the entire record, this Court is left with the definite and firm impression
that a mistake has been made. This Court defers to the trial court’s factual findings
and credibility determinations and considers all evidence and reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Whether conduct violates the
Fourth or Fifth Amendments is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Mo. banc 2016) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). The entire record, in the context of the review of a court’s suppression ruling, includes
the evidence at both the suppression hearing and at trial. State v. Gaw, 285 S.W.3d 318, 319 (Mo.
banc 2009).
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Analysis
Point I: Bruce Was Not in Custody
In his first point, Bruce claims the trial court erred in admitting statements Bruce made
during his police interrogation because they were obtained in a custodial interrogation without a
Miranda warning.
A criminal suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings to protect his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, but only when the suspect is subjected to a “custodial interrogation.”
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Werner,
9 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Mo. banc 2000). “A custodial interrogation occurs only when the suspect is
formally arrested or is subject to arrest-like restraints.” State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 508–09
(Mo. banc 2004). “In Missouri, ‘custodial interrogation’ is defined as questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 511. “In the absence of arrest or restraint of
freedom of movement, questioning that takes place in a coercive environment does not require
Miranda warnings.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
“Custody is determined by an examination of the totality of the circumstances.” Werner,
9 S.W.3d at 595. The Supreme Court of Missouri noted, “an accused’s freedom to leave the scene
and the purpose, place, and length of an interrogation are factors to be considered in making a
determination of custody.” Id. (quoting United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1348 (8th Cir.
1990)). “In examining the totality of the circumstances, courts may also consider an individual’s
personal background, experience, familiarity with police questioning, maturity, education, and
intelligence.” Id. at 595–96. The supreme court went on to enumerate six additional factors for
courts to take into consideration when determining custody:
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(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning
was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or
that the suspect was not under arrest;
(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during
questioning;
(3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced
to official requests to answer questions;
(4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during
questioning;
(5) whether the atmosphere was police dominated; or
(6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of questioning.
Werner, 9 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349). The presence and absence of these
factors, while not exhaustive, guide courts in accessing the totality of the circumstances. Werner,
9 S.W.3d at 596-97. Indeed, our courts have held that “it is not necessary or even always
appropriate to determine custody by weighing the presence or absence of the six Griffin/Werner
factors in each case. Rather, we look at the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Schneider, 483
S.W.3d 495, 501 (Mo.App. E.D. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). As our supreme
court recently indicated, “[t]he simple fact that investigative questioning takes place in a
potentially coercive environment does not require Miranda warnings.” Lammers, 479 S.W.3d at
632 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
This Court’s inquiry into custody must be resolved based “on the objective circumstances
of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the
person being questioned.” State v. Hill, 247 S.W.3d 34, 46 (Mo.App. E.D. 2008) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). “The objective, reasonable person test is appropriate because it
does not place on the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person
whom they question.” Id. at 47 (internal quotations and citations omitted). With these
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prescriptions in mind, the ultimate question before us is whether a reasonable person would have
felt at liberty to terminate or leave the interrogation. Id. at 48.
Here, Bruce argues he was subject to custodial interrogation because of the following facts:
the interrogation room was difficult to get to; Officer Meyer walked with Bruce when Bruce went
to smoke a cigarette; Bruce acquiesced to a law enforcement request that he talk to detectives at
the police station; Officer Meyer told Bruce that he knew Bruce had some sort of sexual contact
with Victim; the interrogation room was small and of spare décor; and Bruce was arrested at the
termination of the meeting.
After reviewing the entire record, this Court is not left with the definite and firm impression
that a mistake has been made. Bruce voluntarily agreed to meet detectives at the police station,
and drove there by himself. Bruce was questioned in an ordinary interview room, and was not
physically restrained, or told he could not leave. When Bruce wanted to smoke a cigarette, he was
allowed to do so. While Officer Meyer told Bruce that he knew Bruce had some sort of sexual
contact with Victim, it does not follow that a reasonable person would have then deduced that he
was not free to leave. While Bruce was eventually arrested, that act does not impact how a
reasonable person would have viewed his opportunity to leave or terminate the interview
beforehand.
In State v. Sardeson, we found that the suspect was not in custody during his interrogation
where, like here, the suspect voluntarily went to the police station for questioning, suspect was not
physically restrained, police used deceptive strategies and psychological ploys against the suspect,
and suspect was arrested after the interview. 220 S.W.3d 458, 468 (Mo.App. S.D. 2007).
The facts of which Bruce complains are largely incident to almost any serious police
investigation. As our supreme court has indicated, “[t]he simple fact that investigative questioning
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takes place in a potentially coercive environment does not require Miranda warnings.” Lammers,
479 S.W.3d at 632 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The trial court did not err in admitting Bruce’s statements made during his police interview.
Point I is denied.
Point II: Error in Written Judgment
In his second point, Bruce argues that the trial court erred in issuing a written judgment
stating that Bruce had been sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison for Counts I, II, and III because
this conflicts with the trial court’s oral pronouncement at sentencing that it was sentencing Bruce
to life in prison for each of those counts.
“The failure to accurately memorialize the trial court’s judgment as announced in open
court is a clerical error.” State v. Hays, 396 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Mo.App. W.D. 2013) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). “Where there is a material variance between the written judgment
and the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement is controlling.” Lucas v. State, 451 S.W.3d
336, 343 (Mo.App. E.D. 2014).
At the sentencing hearing, the court pronounced it was sentencing Bruce to life sentences
on each of Counts I, II, and III. The written judgment, however, states Bruce was sentenced to
99-year sentences on each of Counts I, II, and III.
We reverse the judgment as to the written sentence of Bruce and remand with instructions
to the trial court to correct the written sentence consistent with the trial court’s oral pronouncement
at sentencing. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J. – OPINION AUTHOR
GARY W. LYNCH, P.J. - CONCURS
DANIEL E. SCOTT, J. - CONCURS
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