State of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent v. Claude Dale Brooks

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION FOUR
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED99427
)
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) St. Charles County
vs. )
) Honorable Jon A. Cunningham
CLAUDE DALE BROOKS, )
)
Defendant/Appellant. ) Filed: February 18, 2014
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Claude D. Brooks was convicted in a court-tried case in the Circuit
Court of St. Charles County of robbery in the second degree, section 569.030, R.S.Mo.
(2000). On appeal, Brooks argues that the trial court erred by overruling his motion for
judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence and imposing judgment and sentence
against him for robbery in the second degree, because the State did not prove that he used
or threatened to immediately use physical force against the bank teller, as required by
section 569.010, R.S.Mo. (2000).
We vacate Brooks’s conviction for robbery in the second degree and enter a
conviction for stealing, section 570.030, pursuant to State v. O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212,
220 (Mo. banc 1993). We remand this matter to the trial court for re-sentencing
consistent with this opinion. See State v. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Mo. banc 2001).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate review in a court-tried criminal case is the same as in a jury-tried
criminal case. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 27.01(b); State v. Cooper, 108 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2003). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court’s role is
limited to a determination of whether the state presented sufficient evidence from which a
trier of fact could have reasonably found the defendant guilty.” State v. Vandevere, 175
S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. banc 2005). “The evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence
and inferences contrary to the verdict.” State v. Belton, 153 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc
2005). However, this “Court may ‘not supply missing evidence, or give the [State] the
benefit of unreasonable, speculative, or forced inferences.’” State v. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d
181, 184 (Mo. banc 2001) (quoting Bauby v. Lake, 995 S.W.2d 10, 13 n.1 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1999)).
FACTS
On August 25, 2011, Brooks entered a Regions Bank in St. Charles County
wearing bulky clothing, a long-haired wig, baseball cap, and sunglasses. He approached
teller A.E. and handed her a note which read: “Fifties, hundreds, no bait money, and
bottom drawer.” When A.E. began to walk away from her station to retrieve the money,
Brooks slammed his hand down hard on the counter, telling her to “get back here.” After
explaining to Brooks that the money was elsewhere, A.E. retrieved the money and placed
it on the counter in front of Brooks. He then put the money into a bag and left the bank.
Soon thereafter, police arrested Brooks on a nearby street. Officers found the stolen
money in a bag on Brooks’s person, and the wig and cap in a storm drain not far away.
2
The State charged Brooks with robbery in the second degree. At his bench trial,
Brooks admitted he stole money from the bank, but argued that he did not commit
robbery in the second degree by using or threatening to immediately use physical force.
At the close of evidence, Brooks moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of second-degree robbery, because he did not use or
threaten the use of physical force. The trial court denied the motion, stating Brooks’s
unusual knowledge of bank procedure and gesture of slamming his hand down on the
bank counter “show[ed] an actual, immediate threat of physical force.” The trial court
found Brooks guilty of robbery in the second degree and sentenced him to 25 years’
imprisonment. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
In his sole point, Brooks argues the trial court erred by overruling his motion for
judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence, because there was insufficient evidence to
prove that he used or threatened to immediately use physical force in the act of stealing as
required by section 569.010. The State claims there was sufficient evidence in the trial
record to prove that Brooks threatened the immediate use of physical force.
Section 569.030 provides in pertinent part that “[a] person commits the crime of
robbery in the second degree when he forcibly steals property.” The term “forcibly
steals” is defined under section 569.010(1), in pertinent part, as follows: “[A] person
‘forcibly steals’ . . . when, in the course of stealing . . . he uses or threatens the immediate
use of physical force upon another person” either to defeat resistance to the theft or to
compel the surrender of the property.” (emphasis added).
3
As authority for his argument that the evidence in the record does not support a
conviction of second-degree robbery, Brooks directs this Court to Patterson v. State, 110
S.W.3d 896 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003), for a discussion of the meaning of the term “forcibly
steals.” There, the Western District granted the defendant’s motion for post-conviction
relief and reversed his conviction for forcible stealing, because the defendant’s attorney
was ineffective in submitting to the jury an improperly worded lesser offense instruction
for stealing. Id. at 900-01. The court noted the lesser offense of “stealing is transformed
into the greater offense of second degree robbery when the stealing is accomplished
‘forcibly.’” Id at 901 (quoting State v. Ide, 933 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)).
The court then summarized the type of factual scenarios in which Missouri courts have
found that the defendant threatened the immediate use of physical force:
[t]he requisite threat of physical force may be implied from the fact that
the defendant displayed a weapon, engaged in behavior that gave the
appearance that he was armed, or used of phrases like, “This is a holdup,”
or that it is a “stickup.” Furthermore, it does not matter whether the
defendant is capable of inflicting the physical harm threatened upon the
victim. For example, it is enough that the robber flourishes a harmless
imitation pistol or falsely pretends to be pointing a pistol supposedly
concealed in his pocket.1
Id. at 904-905 (internal citations omitted). Brooks argues that none of these scenarios is
present in the instant case.
Brooks also cites State v. Tivis, 884 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994), and
State v Carter, 967 S.W.2d 308 (Mo App. E.D. 1998) in support of his argument. In
Tivis, 884 S.W.2d at 30, the Western District found that the defendant did not forcibly
steal by yanking a purse from the victim’s shoulder, because the defendant did not make
1
Contrary to the dissent’s contention, the court in Patterson does not suggest—nor do we suggest
infra—that this list is exclusive or exhaustive of all fact scenarios in which courts could reasonably find
that the defendant made an implied threat of immediate physical force.
4
explicit threats or physically struggle with the victim. The State argued the fact that the
defendant put the victim in fear was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant
committed robbery. Id. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the statute “requires
the use or threatened use of physical force,” and evidence of the defendant’s purse
snatching alone did not meet that standard. Id.
Similarly, in Carter, 967 S.W.2d at 309, this Court reversed and remanded the
defendant’s conviction for second degree robbery where the defendant demanded that the
victim give him her purse and then reached into her pocket to take it. Carter held that
there was insufficient evidence to find that the defendant used or threatened the
immediate use of physical force, because the “evidence presented at trial showed that
Defendant never threatened or hit Victim and Defendant did not display a weapon.” Id.
In response to Brooks’s argument that there is insufficient evidence to support a
finding that he threatened the immediate use of physical force, the State cites State v.
Rounds, 796 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990), and State v. Duggar, 710 S.W.2d 921,
922 (Mo. App. S.D. 1986). In Rounds, 796 S.W.2d at 86, this Court held there was
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of using or threatening the immediate use of
physical force, because the “defendant had his hand in his pocket, implying he was armed
with a weapon . . . . warned victim ‘not to be a hero . . . or [defendant] was going to blow
[victim’s] head off’’ . . . . [and v]ictim felt ‘pretty nervous.’” (third and fourth alterations
in original). In Duggar, 710 S.W.2d at 922, the Southern District held that there was
sufficient evidence of threatening physical force, because the defendant “had a firm
purpose, an unusual knowledge of the internal security system in the cash register, and a
hand concealed in his jacket,” giving the appearance that he had a gun.
5
In addition, the State argues that Brooks’s conduct raised the inference of a threat
of immediate harm because he put the victim in fear. The State cites to State v. Jolly, 820
S.W.2d 734, 736 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991), State v. Lybarger, 165 S.W.3d 180, 186-87 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2005), and State v. Applewhite, 771 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Mo. App., E.D. 1989),
in support of this proposition. In Jolly, 820 S.W.2d at 736, this Court found that no
substantial evidence existed to support a jury instruction for stealing rather than second-
degree robbery, because the evidence showed that the defendant struggled with the
victim, causing the victim’s fingernail to be ripped off. In Lybarger, 165 S.W.3d at 186-
87, the Western District held that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction
for second-degree robbery, because the defendant told the victim, “This is a holdup,” and
kept his hand in his pocket as if he had a gun. In Applewhite, 771 S.W.2d at 868, this
Court held that there was sufficient force to support the charge of second-degree robbery,
where the defendant pushed a store manager, knocking him up against the exit as he fled.
We believe that each of the cases cited by the State is factually distinguishable
from the instant case. In Duggar, 710 S.W.2d at 922, the defendant had his hand in his
pocket while demanding money, presumably suggesting the presence of a weapon. In
Rounds, 796 S.W.2d at 86, the “defendant had his hand in his pocket, implying he was
armed with a weapon . . . . [and threatened] to blow [victim’s] head off.’” (third alteration
in original). Similarly, in Lybarger, 165 S.W.3d at 186-87, the defendant held his hand in
his pocket as if he had a gun, and explicitly told the victim, “This is a holdup.” Here, we
have no evidence of a hand in a pocket or explicit threats of physical force. Finally, in
Jolly, 820 S.W.2d at 736, the defendant physically struggled with the victim, and in
6
Applewhite, 771 S.W.2d at 868, the defendant knocked the victim aside as he fled. Here,
in contrast, Brooks did not touch or struggle with the victim.
We believe that the Western District in Patterson best summarized the
circumstances in which we may find an implicit threat of force. Though not an exhaustive
list, Patterson, 110 S.W.3d at 904, explained that a threat of force “may be implied from
the fact that the defendant displayed a weapon, engaged in behavior that gave the
appearance that he was armed, or used [a] phrase[] like, ‘This is a holdup.’”
With these guidelines in mind, we now move to the facts of the instant case. Here,
the record shows that Brooks spoke to A.E. in a low tone throughout the encounter, never
raised his voice, and did not verbally threaten A.E. with physical force. She testified that
Brooks never tried to touch or strike her, never indicated or implied that he had a weapon
by actions such as putting a hand in his pocket, grabbing his waistband, or reaching
inside his clothing, and that Brooks kept his hands on the counter throughout the incident.
Based on this evidence, a trier of fact could not reasonably have found that
Brooks “use[d] or threaten[ed] the immediate use of physical force upon another person,”
as required by the statute for robbery in the second-degree, section 569.030. None of the
circumstances described in Patterson are present in the instant case. There is no evidence
that Brooks: displayed a weapon, gave the appearance that he possessed a weapon, or
used a phrase like “this is a holdup.” Moreover, our search of Missouri jurisprudence
reveals no case in which a defendant was convicted of second degree robbery because of
a disguise, a hand slap on a counter, or the fact that the incident occurred during business
hours at a bank.2 Instead, we believe that there must be some affirmative conduct on the
2
The dissent suggests that we should follow the reasoning of United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d
398, 402 (6th Cir. 2002), and hold that “a demand for money in th[e] context [of a bank robbery] is an
7
part of the Brooks, beyond the mere act of stealing, which communicates that the he will
“immediately” employ “physical force” if the victim “resist[s] . . . the taking of the
property.” § 569.010 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we vacate Brooks’s conviction for
robbery in the second degree, section 569.030, because a trier of fact could not have
reasonably found that Brooks “forcibly” stole money from the bank within the meaning
of section 569.010.
As a final matter, the State asks that we enter a conviction for stealing, section
570.030, in the event that we overturn Brooks’s conviction. Pursuant to O’Brien, 857
S.W.2d at 220:
[w]here a conviction of a greater offense has been overturned for
insufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court may enter a conviction
for a lesser offense if the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find each
of the elements and the jury was required to find those elements to enter
the ill-fated conviction on the greater offense.
Id. Here, in order for the trial court to have found that Brooks committed the crime of
robbery in the second degree, the court must necessarily have found that Brooks also
committed the crime of stealing.3 Thus, the undisputed evidence was sufficient for a fact-
implicit threat of harm in and of itself.” But Gilmore’s reasoning is inapposite. Gilmore dealt with
application of the federal “Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2013), which
specifically criminalizes stealing from a bank by means of intimidation. Id. § 2113(a). To determine if the
defendant used “intimidation,” federal courts ask “whether an ordinary person in the [bank] teller’s position
could reasonably infer a threat of bodily harm from the defendant’s acts.” Gilmore, 282 F.3d at 402. On the
other hand, Missouri, which has no specialized bank robbery statute, requires us to determine whether an
implied threat of immediate physical force exists based on the defendant’s actions, see section 569.010,
rather than the reaction of a putative victim, such as the teller in the instant case.
3
As noted supra, “[a] person commits the crime of robbery in the second degree when he forcibly
steals property.” § 569.030. “[A] person ‘forcibly steals,’ and thereby commits robbery, when in the course
of stealing, as defined in section 570.030, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon
another person . . . .” § 569.010. Thus, the elements of stealing are by definition a part of the crime of
robbery.
Furthermore, the undisputed facts show that Brooks entered a bank, demanded money that was not
his own, received that money, and fled. In fact, Brooks counsel conceded in closing arguments that there
were very few issues in this case, not whether it was Mr. Brooks, not whether there was money taken, not
how much money was taken, was there a crime, etc. The only issue was [whether] this in fact [was] a
robbery second degree . . . due to forcible theft rather than a stealing.
8
finder to find that Brooks committed the crime of stealing by “appropriat[ing]
property . . . of another with the purpose to deprive him or her thereof, either without his
or her consent or by means of deceit or coercion.” § 570.030.1. Accordingly, we enter a
conviction for the lesser offense of stealing, section 570.030.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Brooks’s conviction for robbery in the
second degree, section 569.030, and enter a conviction for the lesser offense of stealing,
section 570.030, pursuant to O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d at 220. We remand this matter to the
trial court for re-sentencing consistent with this opinion. See Whalen, 49 S.W.3d at 189.
______________________________
Lisa S. Van Amburg, Presiding Judge
Patricia L. Cohen, Judge, concurs
Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., Judge, dissents in separate opinion.
9
In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION FOUR
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED99427
)
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) St. Charles County
vs. )
) Honorable Jon A. Cunningham
CLAUDE DALE BROOKS, )
)
Defendant/Appellant. ) Filed: February 18, 2014
DISSENT
I respectfully dissent. Because I believe the element of force is present when
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, I would affirm.
Specifically at issue is whether there was sufficient evidence that Brooks “use[d]
or threaten[ed] the immediate use of physical force” upon the teller, as required by the
definition of forcible stealing in Section 569.010(1), RSMo. (2000). The statute goes on
to provide that such force or threat of force will qualify as forcible stealing when it is
used to: “prevent[] or overcom[e] resistance to the taking of the property . . . or [to]
compel[] the [victim] to deliver up the property.” Section 569.010(1)(a)-(b). Regarding
a threat of force, the requisite threat may be actual or implied. E.g., Patterson v.
State,110 S.W.3d 896, 904 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003).