State of Missouri v. Christina Halter

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION TWO
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED105698
)
Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) St. Francois County
vs. )
) Honorable Sandra Martinez
CHRISTINA HALTER, )
)
Appellant. ) Filed: February 13, 2019
Before Philip M. Hess, P.J., Robert G. Dowd, Jr., J. and Mary K. Hoff, J.
PER CURIAM
Introduction
Defendant/Appellant Christina Halter (“Halter”) appeals judgment entered upon her
conviction of financial exploitation of a disabled person and Medicaid fraud.1 Halter raises six (6)
points on appeal. Points I, II, and III raise allegations of instructional error and Points V and VI
raise allegations of unauthorized civil penalties or restitution to the State. On these points, no
jurisprudential purpose would be served by written opinion; accordingly, these points have been
disposed of by summary order under Rule 30.25.2
1
Halter does not raise any points on appeal related to her simultaneous conviction for tax fraud.
2
All rule citations are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2011) unless otherwise indicated.
On Point IV, Halter argues the trial court erred in sentencing her to concurrent terms of
imprisonment for thirty years on two counts of financial exploitation of a disabled person and
exceeded its authority in also ordering her to pay restitution to the Victim.
On Point IV, we agree with Halter the trial court erred in entering an unauthorized
disposition sentencing her to imprisonment and restitution, and remand for resentencing. The
judgment is affirmed in all other respects under Rule 30.25, with a separate written memorandum
accompanying this order only for the use of the parties setting forth the reasons for the decision on
the Points I, II, III, V, and VI.
Factual Background
At all relevant times from 2011 to 2013, Halter owned and managed Park Hills Manor
LLC, a residential care facility caring for mentally disabled individuals. One such resident
individual, J.B., was a veteran diagnosed with schizoaffective and bipolar disorders. On September
18, 2012, Halter agreed to be appointed fiduciary of J.B.'s Veterans Administration funds. Halter
affirmed she would, among other things: maintain a client trust account; deposit the individual's
funds in a separate account; not commingle funds; disburse rent or mortgage money on a monthly
basis; and disburse only for just expenses, including pocket money.
Around November 16, 2012, J.B. approached a volunteer worker for Park Hills Manor and
indicated he was to receive a large sum, $209,000, from the V.A. and wanted to pay for his rent in
advance out of fear of becoming homeless. Around this time, Halter deposited the $209,000 to an
operating account for her business rather than to a client trust account. She did not report the
transaction. On November 19, 2012 and again on December 5, 2012, Halter signed contracts with
J.B. for non-refundable year-long rental contracts totaling $115,000. She did not report the
transactions. Halter purchased three vehicles with the V.A. funds – one jointly titled to Halter and
2
J.B., and the other two solely titled to Halter and her husband. By January 15, 2013, every dollar
of the $209,000 fund had been spent.
For the two transactions for the pre-payment of rent, the State charged Halter with two
counts of financial exploitation of a disabled person, under section 570.145 RSMo3, class A
felonies. The jury found Halter guilty on these charges and recommended terms of imprisonment
for thirty (30) years for each of the financial exploitation charges.
At her sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered her thirty year sentences on the financial
exploitation convictions to run concurrently without possibility of probation. The State asked the
trial court to order $115,000 in restitution to J.B., the victim. Halter’s trial counsel did not
specifically object to imposition of the term of imprisonment and the restitution but called the
felonies “probationable offenses” with “no provision for restitution.”
Preservation and Standard of Review
Halter argues the trial court was constrained by then-applicable statutes and plainly erred
when it exceeded its authority sentencing her to concurrent sentences of imprisonment for thirty
years on two counts of financial exploitation of a disabled person, without possibility of probation,
and also ordering her to pay $115,000 in restitution.4 The State opposes review procedurally by
this Court on what it describes as invited error. The State also contends Section 557.011.5 RSMo
permits a court to make any appropriate order exercising the authority conferred by law to decree,
as part of a sentence, a forfeiture of property or impose any other civil penalty. The State argues
this would necessarily include restitution, even under then-applicable Section 557.011 RSMo.
3
All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2000, as updated by the 2013 Cumulative Supplement,
unless otherwise indicated.
4
In 2012, Sections 559.021 and 559.100.2 RSMo authorized restitution as conditions of probation and parole
respectively.
3
The State argues this Court need not address Halter’s concerns at all on the basis of invited
error. See State v. Nenninger, 188 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. 1945); State v. Johnson, 479 S.W.3d 762, 766
(Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (“If a party gets what he requests from the trial court, he should not be able
to convict it of error, plain or otherwise, for complying with his request.”). The State claims Halter
acquiesced to the allegedly improper sentence by requesting a term of years of imprisonment
which would allow her to pay restitution while still of a working age. A fair reading of the trial
transcript, however, confirms Halter refers to restitution only in the context of the possibility of
parole or probation. Halter never explicitly or implicitly expresses acquiescence to restitution in
any other context, but instead describes the “probationable offenses” as containing “no provision
for restitution.”
We review for plain error. We review claims of plain error under a two-prong test. State v.
Robinson, 541 S.W.3d 21, 27 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018). In the first prong, we determine whether there
is, indeed, plain error, which is error that is evident, obvious, and clear.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). If we find an “evident, obvious, and clear” error, then we look to the second prong, where
we consider whether “manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has resulted from the trial court
error.” State v. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d 900, 904 (Mo. banc 2018). “Relief under the plain error rule is
granted only when the alleged error so substantially affects the rights of the accused that a manifest
injustice or miscarriage of justice inexorably results if left uncorrected.” Id. A sentence passed on
the basis of a materially false foundation lacks due process of law and entitles the defendant to a
reconsideration of the question of punishment in the light of the true facts, regardless of the
eventual outcome. Id. The Supreme Court of Missouri indicates the appropriate remedy when the
record shows the circuit court imposed sentence based on its mistaken belief is to vacate a sentence
and remand the case to the circuit court for resentencing. Id.
4
Halter complains Missouri does not permit a disposition of restitution alongside a sentence
of imprisonment under the plain language of the then-applicable authorized disposition statute,
Section 557.011 RSMo. Halter relies upon case law in Missouri to assert the trial court plainly
erred in ordering restitution alongside imprisonment. See State v. Roddy, 998 S.W.2d 562 (Mo.
App. S.D. 1999); State v. Schnelle, 398 S.W.3d 37, 47 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing Zarhouni v.
State, 313 S.W.3d 713, 715 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010); Bellamy v. State, 525 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2017).
We agree. Our colleagues in both the Western and Southern Districts have long held a
sentence of imprisonment and restitution was not an authorized disposition of a criminal case under
Missouri law in 2012, absent statutory authorization. We see no reason to differ. When Halter
committed her crimes involving J.B., Sections 559.021 RSMo and 559.100.2 RSMo authorized
restitution only as conditions of probation and parole respectively. 5 The authorized disposition
statute, however, did not authorize a sentence of imprisonment alongside restitution without
specific statutory authorization. State v. Schnelle, 398 S.W.3d 37, 47 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). 6
What is more, the trial court knew of this “prohibition against requiring a prisoner both to serve a
prison term and to pay restitution.” State ex rel. Strauser v. Martinez, 416 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Mo.
banc 2014) (Fischer, J., concurring).
Accordingly, where the trial court sentenced Halter to punishment that included
imprisonment and restitution for her actions taken in 2012, the sentences were premised upon a
faulty foundation; prejudice is to be assumed and must be corrected. State v. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d
5
The General Assembly amended Section 559.105.1 effective August 28, 2013. Section 559.105.1 now provides
“[a]ny person who has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to an offense may be ordered by the court to make
restitution.” The State does not assert this new statutory provision applies to Halter.
6
See also Spier v. State, 174 S.W.3d 539, 542 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005) (holding General Assembly in amending criminal
code adopted Model Penal Code and its comments); cf. State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 167, 623 A.2d 1355, 1359
(1993) (extended discussion of historical interaction between criminal and civil restitution, fines, adoption of the
Model Penal Code, and legislative intent).
5
900, 904 (Mo. banc 2018). The Supreme Court of Missouri has indicated it is appropriate to require
resentencing rather than modification. State v. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d 900, 905 (Mo. banc 2018)
(citing Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo. banc 1977)).
Point IV is granted.
CONCLUSION
We must vacate the sentences for the two counts of financial exploitation of a disabled
person and remand to the trial court for a resentencing on these counts7 consistent with our opinion.
The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
7
The parties’ briefs number these with reference to the verdict directors as Counts III and IV. For sake of clarity, we
identify them with reference to the indictment, written sentence, and judgment as Counts VIII and X.
6