Lane Williams v. Director of Revenue

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION THREE
LANE WILLIAMS, ) No. ED100862
)
Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Gasconade County
vs. )
) Hon. John B. Berkemeyer
DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, )
) Filed:
Appellant. ) October 21, 2014
Lane Williams had her driver’s license suspended after being arrested for driving while
intoxicated. After a trial de novo, the trial court reinstated Williams’s license, and the Director
of Revenue appeals.
The trooper who arrested Williams was the only witness at trial. He testified that
Williams said she had been driving on a “private driveway” when she ran off the road, crashed
into a tree and overturned the car into a ditch. According to the trooper, there was no indication
that Williams had been on the public roadway; the nearest public road was approximately one
hundred feet from the private driveway. Williams was driving a Ford Escape, which the trooper
testified was a car capable of being operated on the highways. The trial court found that because
Williams was not operating a motor vehicle on a “public roadway or highway,” the statute
authorizing suspension of her license, Section 302.505, was not applicable. The court set aside
the suspension. On appeal, the Director argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that the motor vehicle must be operated on a “highway” for the statute to apply.
Williams has filed no responsive brief. We review this question of law, about which there are no
contested facts, de novo. See White v. Director of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 307-09 (Mo. banc
2010); see also Mitchell v. Director of Revenue, 255 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008).
Section 302.505 provides for administrative suspension of a driver’s license when the
driver has been arrested for “driving a motor vehicle” while intoxicated. Section 302.505.1.
There is nothing in this provision specifying that the person must be driving the motor vehicle on
the highway or anywhere in particular. Rather, the word “highway” is only found in the
definition of “vehicle.” A “vehicle” is “any mechanical device on wheels, designed primarily for
use, or used on highways”; a “motor vehicle” is “any self-propelled vehicle not operated
exclusively upon track.” Section 302.010 (10) and (25) (emphasis added). Thus, there are two
categories of vehicles within the purview of the suspension statute: those designed for use on the
highway and those which, despite not being designed for such use, are actually used on the
highways at the time of the culpable event. Because these categories are stated in the
disjunctive—“designed primarily for use, or used on highways”—it is clear that the vehicle need
not be both designed for and used on the highway for the statute to apply. In this case, there was
no dispute at trial that Williams’s car fit in the first category: it is a self-propelled mechanical
device on wheels designed for use on the highways. Thus, it was not necessary in this case to
prove that, in addition to being designed for use on highways, Williams’s car was also actually
being used on a highway at the time of the incident.
The case on which the trial court relied is not on point. There the vehicle we were
considering was a golf cart, which fell into the second category of vehicles: one that was not
designed for use on the highway, but was being used on the highway at the time of the arrest.
Covert v. Fisher, 151 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004). Covert, and other cases discussing
when drivers of non-traditional vehicles are subject to the suspension statute, do not apply to
cases like this involving a car or other traditional vehicle that is designed for use on the highway.
2
Persons driving traditional motor vehicles while intoxicated are subject to suspension under the
statute whether the driving occurs on a highway or not.
Case law interpreting Section 577.010—which makes “driving while intoxicated” a
crime—are in accord. “The corpus delicti of driving while intoxicated consists of evidence that
someone operated a motor vehicle while they were intoxicated,” and “[t]here is no requirement
that it be either alleged or proved that the vehicle was operated by the accused on a public road
or highway.” State v. Hill, 812 S.W.2d 204, 209 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991) (driver found behind
wheel of truck with motor running in driveway).
Because the trial court’s judgment erroneously declares and applies the law, it must be
reversed. The judgment did not include any findings or conclusions regarding the indicia of
intoxication about which the trooper had testified and was cross-examined.1 Because the court
made no findings as to the trooper’s credibility on these issues—which the Director had
specifically requested at the outset of trial—we must remand. On remand, the trial court is free
to disbelieve any, all or none of the evidence that was presented by the Director to determine
whether the burden of persuasion regarding Williams’s intoxication has been met. See Lara v.
Director of Revenue, 411 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). No additional evidence
should be necessary for the trial court to make that determination.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., Judge
Kurt S. Odenwald, P.J. and
Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J., concur.
1
The trooper testified regarding the various indicia of intoxication he observed about Williams, the clues of
intoxication he found after administering field sobriety tests, the circumstances surrounding the chemical breath test
that indicated Williams’s BAC was .107% and statements she made regarding her consumption of alcohol and self-
perceived level of intoxication that day.
3