James Dye, DDS v. Missouri Department of Social Services, Missouri Medicaid Audit and Compliance Unit

In
I the
Misssouri Court
C off Appeaals
Westeern Disttrict
JAMES
S DYE, DDS, ET AL.,, )
)
App
pellants, ) D78352
WD
)
v. ) OPIINION FIL
LED: Deceember 8, 2015
)
MISSOURI DEPA
ARTMENT T OF )
L SERVIC
SOCIAL CES, MISSOURI )
MEDIC
CAID AUDIT AND )
COMPLLIANCE UNIT,
U )
)
Resp
pondent. )
App
peal from thhe Circuit Court of C
Cole Countty, Missourri
Thee Honorablee Jon E. Beeetem, Judgee
Before Division One:
O Anthon
ny Rex Gab
bbert, Presidding Judge,, Victor C. Howard, Juudge
and Cynthiia L. Martinn, Judge
Jaames Dye, DDS ("Dy
ye") and Brrenda Herrm
man, DDS ("Herrmann") (collectively
gment in favor of the Missoouri Mediccaid Audit and
"Appellaants") appeal a judg
Compliaance Unit ("MMAC"). Appellantts argue thaat the trial ccourt lackedd jurisdictioon to
enter thee judgment because theey filed a motion
m to vooluntarily diismiss theirr case beforre the
judgmen
nt was enterred, renderiing the judg
gment a nulllity. Findinng no error,, we affirm..
Factual and Procedural History
In May 2013, the MMAC informed Dye that it would be conducting an audit of
Medicaid claims Dye and his dentist office, All About Smiles, LLC, had filed with the
MMAC. In June 2013, the MMAC informed Dye that it was sanctioning Dye by
requiring him to file Medicaid claim forms by mail, rather than electronically, permitting
the MMAC to review all claims prior to payment ("Sanction"). Dye and All About
Smiles, LLC appealed this administrative decision by filing a petition for review with the
Administrative Hearing Commission.
On June 25, 2013, Dye and All About Smiles, LLC separately filed a petition in
the Greene County Circuit Court. The petition sought a temporary restraining order to
prevent the MMAC from enforcing the Sanction "until such time as the Administrative
Hearing Commission can conduct a review of" the MMAC's decision. The petition
alleged, among other things, that Dye's due process rights had been violated by the
imposition of the Sanction without prior notice and a hearing. The lawsuit was
transferred to the Circuit Court of Cole County on July 3, 2013, based on a change of
venue.
The docket sheet reflects that an amended petition was filed on July 26, 2013,
again seeking a temporary restraining order, and that a second amended petition seeking a
temporary restraining order was filed on August 21, 2013.
A hearing was conducted on September 5, 2013, regarding Dye's request for a
temporary restraining order. During the hearing, the parties argued about whether Dye
had administrative remedies available, whether Dye's amended petition properly invoked
2
the trial court's authority to conduct judicial review of a noncontested agency decision
under section 536.150,1 and whether the amended petition properly sought a temporary
restraining order pursuant to Rule 92.2 The trial court expressed reservations about
whether Dye's petition was sufficient to request judicial review pursuant to section
536.150. A September 5, 2013 docket entry indicates that the trial court denied Dye's
request for a temporary restraining order "without prejudice," and dismissed Dye's
petition "with leave granted to file an amended pleading within the next twenty (20) days
and failing to do so, the cause will be dismissed."
On September 17, 2013, the docket sheet indicates that Dye filed an "amended
petition for judicial review and preliminary injunction." The amended petition is not
included in the record on appeal. According to the docket sheet, MMAC filed a motion
to dismiss the amended petition with respect to All About Smiles, LLC, suggesting that
All About Smiles, LLC was also named as a plaintiff in the amended petition.3 MMAC
also filed a motion opposing the request for preliminary injunctive relief.
On September 24, 2013, the parties appeared for a hearing, presumably to address
MMAC's pending motions. The docket sheet indicates that on October 2, 2013, the trial
court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the petition for preliminary
injunction and dismissing the amended petition as to plaintiff All About Smiles, LLC. A
copy of the trial court's written order addressing these rulings has not been made a part of
1
All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 as supplemented unless otherwise indicated.
2
All citations to the Rules are to Missouri Court Rules Volume I--State (2015).
3
Because Herrman is an Appellant, we assume she was also named as a plaintiff in the amended petition.
There had been discussion during the September 5, 2013 hearing about whether Herrman was properly before the
court as a plaintiff since she was not named in the caption of the several petitions filed by Dye before the September
5, 2013 trial court order dismissing his petition with leave to refile.
3
the record on appeal. And no transcript from the September 24, 2013 hearing has been
provided. We thus cannot discern from the record on appeal the extent to which evidence
was taken at the hearing to support the trial court's subsequent entry of a preliminary
injunction--primary relief sought by the Appellant's amended petition.4
According to the docket sheet, on January 7, 2014, Appellants sought leave to file
a second amended petition. MMAC opposed the motion. According to the docket sheet,
on January 23, 2014, MMAC filed a motion to amend the trial court's October 2, 2013
preliminary injunction order.
The trial court conducted a hearing on January 23, 2014, the transcript for which
has been made a part of the record on appeal. The trial court addressed MMAC's motion
to amend the preliminary injunction. The docket sheet indicates that an amended order
granting and denying in part Appellants' petition for preliminary injunction was entered
on January 23, 2014. A copy of this order is not included in the record on appeal.
During the same hearing the parties also discussed the remaining matters to be
determined as framed by Dye and Hermann's amended petition and the best way to
resolve those matters. Appellants' counsel advised the trial court that he "think[s] we
should just set it for trial." The parties agreed on a trial date of April 18, 2014.
4
Because we otherwise conclude that the Appellants had no right to voluntarily dismiss their lawsuit
without prejudice without an order from the trial court, we need not resolve whether the introduction of evidence to
secure a preliminary injunction constitutes the submission of evidence at trial pursuant to Rule 67.02(a) when a
preliminary (and not a permanent) injunction is the principle relief sought by a petition. Cf. Cook v. McElwain, 432
S.W.3d 286, 290 (Mo. banc 2014) (noting that "[g]enerally, a preliminary injunction hearing is not . . . considered a
'trial',' meaning a trial on the merits," in a case where a permanent injunction was sought by the petition) (citation
omitted).
4
On April 18, 2014, the parties appeared for trial. At that time, Appellants' counsel
advised the trial court that because of developments in proceedings before the
Administrative Hearing Commission, he no longer needed the trial court to review
documentation involving claims that remained subject to the Sanction and only needed
the court to determine whether his due process rights had been violated by the denial of a
pre-deprivation hearing before imposition of the Sanction. Appellants' counsel advised
the trial court that he had "a trial brief and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [and]
associated exhibits, that I would like to offer to the court." [Tr. 91] Counsel then advised
the court that "[t]he only thing that I intend to put on today is evidence with regard to the
question of notice, what notice and what opportunity to be heard, the due process issue,
that is all I intend to put on." [Tr. 92] The pleadings and exhibits submitted by the
Appellants to the trial court have not been included in the record on appeal.
After receiving the materials submitted by the Appellants, and hearing argument
from both parties regarding the Appellants' due process claim, the trial court reiterated
that it would only be deciding whether the Appellants' due process rights were violated
and then stated: "I'll show the cause submitted on that basis." Docket entries for April 18,
2014, show that evidence was taken and that the cause was taken under advisement.
On July 9, 2014, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss their lawsuit without
prejudice. The motion made no reference to Rule 67.02(a) and instead argued that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the due process issue submitted to it for
decision. MMAC opposed the motion. The trial court did not rule on the motion.
5
On December 31, 2014, the trial court entered a judgment ("Judgment") ruling that
the Appellants' due process rights were not violated by imposition of the Sanction.
The Appellants timely appeal.
Analysis
In their sole point on appeal, the Appellants argue that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the Judgment because they filed a motion to dismiss their case
without prejudice pursuant to Rule 67.02(a) before the Judgment was entered, rendering
any subsequent action by the trial court a nullity.
Rule 67.02(a) provides that "a civil action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of the court anytime . . . [i]n cases tried without a jury, prior to the
introduction of evidence at the trial." "A voluntary dismissal is effective on the date it is
filed with the court." State ex rel. Frets v. Moore, 291 S.W.3d 805, 812 (Mo. App. S.D.
2009) (internal citation omitted). "Consequently, a trial court loses jurisdiction to enter
any subsequent orders regarding the dismissed action." Id. "The circuit court may take
no further steps as to the dismissed action, and any step attempted is viewed a nullity."
Id. Thus, the dispositive question presented in this case is whether the Appellants'
motion to dismiss was filed "prior to the introduction of evidence at the trial." We
conclude that it was not.
We note at the outset that the motion to dismiss without prejudice filed by the
Appellants did not purport to be based on Rule 67.02(a) but instead argued a substantive
basis for dismissal--that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the due process
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issue submitted to it for decision on April 18, 2014. We are not persuaded, therefore, that
the Appellants ever attempted to exercise their rights pursuant to Rule 67.02(a).5
Even if we view the motion to dismiss without prejudice as having been filed
pursuant to Rule 67.02(a), the Appellants' claims not already resolved by the grant of a
preliminary injunction were set for trial at the Appellants' request on April 18, 2014. The
parties appeared on that date prepared to proceed to trial. The Appellants' announced that
given intervening developments before the Administrative Hearing Commission, the
Appellants were withdrawing all remaining issues framed by their petition except
whether imposition of the Sanction without prior notice and a hearing violated their due
process rights. The Appellants submitted the materials they deemed essential to the trial
court's determination of this issue. Those materials included a trial brief, a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, and related exhibits. The trial court's docket entries reflect
that "evidence" was taken on April 18, 2014, and that the case was taken under
advisement. This was a trial.
The Appellants argue that no "evidence" was submitted to the court, and that no
trial occurred on April 18, 2014, because the trial court needed only resolve an issue on
the pleadings. The limited record on appeal we have been provided refutes both
assertions.6 The case was set for trial on April 18, 2014. The docket sheet states that
5
During oral argument, the Appellants took the position that they are alternatively claiming error on appeal
because the Judgment is legally erroneous, as the trial court had no legal authority to determine the due process issue
framed by the Appellants' amended petition, and submitted to the trial court for decision on April 18, 2014.
Appellants' point on appeal does not raise this claim of error, and no such claim of error is preserved for our review.
6
We are aided in our conclusion that the record refutes the Appellants' contentions by what the Appellants
have failed to include in the record on appeal. The Appellants have not provided us with the version of their petition
giving rise to the Judgment; with preliminary injunction orders affording the Appellants the primary relief sought in
their lawsuit; or with the pleadings and exhibits submitted to the trial court on April 18, 2014. Rule 81.12(a)
7
evidencee was taken
n on April 18, 2014. The transccript reflectts that Apppellants' couunsel
offered exhibits
e to the
t trial cou
urt on Aprill 18, 2014, and that Apppellants' ccounsel inteended
o the due process issue. Howevver narrow
to offer evidence on w the remainning issue tto be
determin d set for trial and prrovided thee trial court with
ned, the parrties appearred on the date
all the information
n they deem
med necessaary to perm
mit the triall court to ffully and finnally
determin
ne the substtantive righ
hts and liabiilities of thee parties. SSee Washinggton Univ. M
Med.
Ctr. Red
developmen
nt Corp. v. Komen,
K 637 S.W.2d 551, 53 (Moo. App. E.D
D. 1982) ("O
Once
evidencee is submittted at the trrial on the merits
m the ssubstantive rights and liabilities oof the
parties are ve of court is requiredd for dismisssal.").
a at stake. Beyond this point leav
Because
B the Appellantss filed theirr voluntary dismissal aafter evidennce was enttered
at trial, they weree not entitleed to voluntarily dism
miss their lawsuit wiithout prejuudice
without leave of the
t trial court. The trial
t court retained its jurisdiction to enterr the
Judgmen
nt.
Point
P one is denied.
Co
onclusion
We
W affirm th
he Judgmen
nt of the triaal court.
_____________________________
_________
Cynthia L. Martin, Juudge
All conccur.
requires th
he record on app peal to "contaiin all of the reccord, proceedinngs and evidence necessary too the determinaation
of all questtions to be pressented, by either appellant orr respondent, too the appellate court for decission." Where
pleadings, transcripts, or exhibits are no ot made a part of the record oon appeal, suchh "omissions w will be taken as
favorable to
t the trial courrt's ruling and unfavorable
u to the appellant." Saturn of Tifffany Springs vv. McDaris, 331
S.W.3d 704, 712 (Mo. Ap pp. W.D. 2011 1) (citation omiitted).
8