State of Missouri v. Vincent L. Jones

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED107425
)
Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of St. Louis County
vs. )
) Hon. John D. Warner, Jr.
VINCENT L. JONES, )
) Filed:
Appellant. ) February 25, 2020
Vincent Jones (“Defendant”) appeals from the judgment entered on his convictions
after a jury trial for abuse of a child resulting in death and second-degree felony-murder
predicated on the child abuse. We affirm.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not in dispute. Defendant lived with his girlfriend
(“Mom”) and her four young children. On the morning of July 27, 2017, Mom left for
work at approximately 7:20 a.m. When she left, her 21-month old son “Buddy” was sitting
up in the bed where he had slept the night before with her and Defendant. He was whining
and crying as he commonly did when Mom left. At 8:37 a.m., Defendant called 911 to
report that Buddy was unresponsive and barely breathing. Buddy was taken to the
emergency room, but died shortly thereafter at 11:00 a.m. The autopsy showed significant
bruising over much of Buddy’s 30-pound body: he had eight bruises above his right ear
and three above his left ear; there were multiple bruises across his forehead; the back of his
head was bruised, as was the inside and outside of his mouth; there were bruises covering
both thighs, on his sternum, abdomen and back. Buddy’s abdomen was full of a large
quantity of blood, much of which came from his torn liver and lacerated intestines. There
was significant other internal damage as well, including to his pancreas, adrenal glands and
diaphragm. He had massive bleeding around his testicles, in and around his brain and the
spinal cord.
These injuries were caused by multiple instances of blunt force trauma, which was
determined to be the cause of Buddy’s death. The injuries all happened at the same time
and could not have been inflicted more than two hours before Buddy died. He would have
remained conscious for twenty or thirty minutes after being so severely beaten, during
which time he would have been experiencing pain and crying. These injuries could not
have been inflicted by Buddy’s young siblings, nor caused by a fall or spanking; they were
consistent with an adult punching this child with a fist or kicking him. In other words, the
beating happened at the hands of an adult that morning. The only adult with Buddy after
Mom left for work was Defendant. Defendant denied doing anything to hurt Buddy and
claimed he did not know who beat him.
Buddy’s brother, D.W., was interviewed at the Children’s Advocacy Center the
afternoon of Buddy’s death. D.W. was five and half years old at the time. During the
interview, while listing who he lived with, D.W. volunteered that Buddy was in the hospital
because he was not breathing. When asked what happened to him, D.W. said he did not
know. D.W. said that after Mom went to work he could hear Buddy crying in the other
room “and [Defendant] keep on hitting him.” Upon additional questions, D.W. explained
that he did not see Defendant hitting Buddy, but did hear Defendant “thump” Buddy. D.W.
said he heard Defendant tell Buddy to be quiet, but Buddy cried and cried “100 times.”
2
After a pre-trial hearing pursuant to Section 491.075, the trial court determined that D.W.’s
statements contained sufficient indicia of reliability such that the videotape of the interview
could be admitted at trial.
At the close of evidence, the jury was instructed on abuse of child, second-degree
felony-murder and involuntary manslaughter. The child abuse verdict-director instructed
that if the jury found Defendant had knowingly caused injury to Buddy by beating him and
Buddy died as a result of that injury, then it must find him guilty of child abuse. On the
second-degree felony-murder count, the jury was instructed that if it found Defendant
guilty of child abuse and Buddy was killed as a result of that child abuse, then it must find
him guilty of murder in the second degree. The jury was also instructed that if it did not
find Defendant guilty of second-degree murder, it must consider involuntary manslaughter.
The jury found Defendant guilty of child abuse and second-degree murder. The court
sentenced him as a prior and persistent offender to twenty years in prison on the child abuse
causing death count and life imprisonment on the second-degree felony-murder count, to
be served consecutively. This appeal follows.
In his first point on appeal, Defendant alleges the court erred by admitting the
videotaped interview of five-year-old D.W., arguing that the statements made therein did
not contain sufficient indicia of reliability and were not admissible under Section 491.075.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit a child’s statements under Section 491.075 for
abuse of discretion. State v. Ragland, 494 S.W.3d 613, 622–23 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). We
find no abuse of discretion here.
The out-of-court statements of a child are admissible in a criminal trial under
Section 491.075.1 as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted if,
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among other things, the court finds after a hearing that “the time, content and circumstances
of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.” Section 491.075.1(1). The
reliability of a child’s statement is determined by looking at the totality of the
circumstances as set out in the evidence presented at the 491 hearing. Id. at 623. Several
non-exclusive factors aid the analysis: (1) whether the statements were made spontaneously
and consistently repeated; (2) the mental state of the child; (3) whether the child had a
motive to fabricate; (4) whether the child’s knowledge of the subject matter is unexpected
at that age; (5) the amount of time between when the acts occurred and when the statements
are made; and (6) the technique employed by the interviewer. Id. All of these factors are
designed to assess whether the child “was particularly likely to be telling the truth when
the statement was made.” Id. Defendant argues D.W.’s statements were not sufficiently
reliable based primarily on the first and second factors: D.W.’s mental state and
inconsistencies during his interview.
As to D.W.’s mental state, the interviewer testified at the 491 hearing that D.W.
seemed to understand her questions and his responses to her indicated his receptive
language was developmentally normal for his age. She said D.W. was responsive to most
of her questions, was polite and friendly and “very contained” for a five-year-old. The
interviewer testified that D.W. stayed in his seat most of the time and kept on task for the
almost 45-minute interview; when he occasionally deviated to play with the toys in the
room, she said it was easy to bring him back on topic. Defendant asserts that the videotape
belies this testimony and shows D.W. was focused more on playing with the toys in the
interview room than on the questions. But, as the interviewer explained, young children
need something to engage them during an interview because they are not able to just sit at
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a table and have a conversation like an adult might. The mere fact that D.W. was playing
with toys while answering questions does not demonstrate a lack of attention or
understanding. Defendant also cites several examples of supposedly non-responsive
answers from D.W., but young children do not always speak in the same linear and direct
way as an adult might when answering questions. The mere fact that D.W. interspersed
some of his answers with comments that were not directly responsive—either about the
toys he was playing with or about a related but slightly different matter than the question
addressed—does not indicate that he did not understand the question or was not paying
sufficient attention. Even if he misunderstood or missed a few questions, overall D.W. was
generally attentive and gave appropriately responsive answers. Defendant has not
established that D.W.’s mental state shows that he was less likely to be telling the truth
when he made these statements.
As to the spontaneity and consistency factor, Defendant concedes that D.W.’s
statements about Defendant hitting Buddy were made spontaneously and does not claim
that D.W. was ever inconsistent about this most salient fact. But he asserts that D.W. was
“very inconsistent” about other matters, which he claims renders the entirety of the
interview unreliable. Defendant points out that early in the interview when asked where
Buddy was sleeping and where Buddy was when he was crying, D.W. said in Mom’s room
and that, at later points in the interview, when asked where Buddy was eating his breakfast
or where he was sleeping or where he was crying, D.W. said Buddy was in D.W.’s room.
But, as the interviewer explained at the 491 hearing, these statements are not necessarily
inconsistent:
A: I don’t know if he was inconsistent or if I was just unclear. I was—I
had a little bit of confusion, and I think he clarified it, [D.W.] sharing with
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me about the sleeping arrangement. Because at one point, it sounded like
he was saying the child was, his brother Buddy was, in Mom’s bed. And
then later he was saying Buddy was in his bed, in [D.W.’s] and his sister’s
bed. And as I sought clarification of that, I thought it was an inconsistency,
but it may, in fact, be that the child was moved.
Q: So basically the location of Buddy at times changed?
A: Yes. And so I wasn’t sure if his statement was changing or if this
[victim’s] actual location changed.
Q: And would that confusion pair with his inability to describe time at
certain points?
A: I think the confusion was mine more than it was his. I think it was my
confusion. 1
In fact, D.W. expressly stated at one point in the interview that Buddy left one of the
bedrooms and went into the other room. It was not inconsistent for D.W. to have stated
that Buddy was crying and sleeping in both rooms at various points that morning.
Defendant also points out that D.W. said his sister was asleep and then, shortly after,
indicated they were all awake and that D.W. said he ate his waffles in his room and then
immediately changed his answer to say he ate in the kitchen. In both of these instances,
D.W. appears to be correcting himself, not giving inconsistent versions of the morning’s
events. 2 Defendant has failed to demonstrate that any of the supposed inconsistencies in
D.W.’s statements indicate he was less likely to be telling the truth.
1
Defendant suggests that the interviewer’s confusion is itself an indication that the statements should not
have been admitted under Section 491.075. We fail to see how this has anything to do with the ultimate issue
on this point: whether the child was likely to be telling the truth. To the extent anything in this interview
was unclear, that goes to the weight the jury was tasked with giving this evidence, not to its admissibility
under Section 491.075.
2
Defendant also argues that D.W.’s supposed inability to keep track of time called the reliability of his
statements into question. He points to D.W.’s statement in the interview that Mom left for work when it was
dark, which Defendant states was inconsistent with the evidence at trial showing she had actually left at 7:00
or 7:30 that summer morning when it was already light out. But when assessing the factors of reliability and
whether the court abused its discretion in admitting this interview, we can consider only the evidence
presented at the 491 hearing, not the evidence presented at trial. See Ragland, 494 S.W.3d 623.
6
Defendant’s arguments regarding the other factors are also without merit. He
acknowledges that the child had no motive to lie, but claims the child was motivated to
please the interviewer and was suggestible, citing the time the child exclaimed “ta da”
when he finished a drawing and the moment the child supposedly mimicked the interviewer
saying “finally” right after she did when the air conditioning turned off. As the interviewer
pointed out at the 491 hearing, it was not clear whether the child was mimicking her or was
also just pleased that the air conditioning had “finally” turned off because he was also cold.
Even if the child had a desire to please this interviewer, Defendant has failed to articulate
how such a desire made it more likely that he was not telling the truth. In other words,
there is no reason to believe the child was willing to lie about the events of the morning or
anything else to please the interviewer. Defendant also points out that the interviewer
admitted at the 491 hearing that she could have asked one of the questions during the
interview in a more open-ended way. That a single question could have been phrased more
artfully does not establish that the interviewer’s techniques were problematic or
undermined the reliability of D.W.’s statements.
Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in determining
that D.W.’s statements were, under the totality of the circumstances, reliable and
admissible under Section 491.075. Point I is denied.
In his remaining three points, Defendant argues that felony-murder cannot be
predicated on child abuse resulting in death because that underlying felony is the act that
itself caused the death. He contends that prosecution, conviction and sentencing for both
of these crimes is prohibited by the felony-murder statute, the merger doctrine and his
7
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. None of these claims were raised in
the trial court, and Defendant seeks plain error review. We find no error, plain or otherwise.
The felony-murder rule is traceable to the late 1790s and is premised on the idea
that proving the defendant intended to commit a felony raises a conclusive presumption
that he possessed the necessary intent to support a murder conviction for a death resulting
from perpetration of that underlying felony. See State v. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Mo.
App. W.D. 1999). At common law, there were no degrees of murder; all homicides were
either murder or manslaughter. By the late 1800s, the legislature had codified and imposed
different degrees of homicides and incorporated the felony-murder rule into the statutes.
Thus, in 1878, the statute for first degree murder criminalized not only deliberate killings
but also provided that “[e]very murder . . . committed in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed murder in
the first degree.” Id. at 135 (quoting Wagner’s Stat. (1872) c. 42, art. 2, s.1, p. 445). “All
other kinds of murder at common law” were murder in the second-degree, and there were
separate provisions for manslaughter and justifiable homicide. Id. at 135, n.3 (quoting
Wagner’s Stat. (1872) c. 42, art. 2, s.2, p. 445). The Supreme Court of Missouri expressed
concern that this first-degree felony-murder statute would consume all other degrees of
homicide if there were not limits on the “other” felonies that could be used to predicate
felony-murder. State v. Shock, 1878 WL 9686 at *4-5 (Mo. 1878). Thus, the Court
construed “other felony” to mean “some collateral felony” and not to mean “acts of
personal violence to the deceased” that were “necessary and constituent elements of the
homicide itself, and are, therefore, merged in it.” Id. at *5. This became known as the
merger doctrine and it was applied sporadically over the years as the criminal statutes
8
evolved. See Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 135-38 and State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 109-15
(Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (discussing legislative history and development of merger doctrine
since Shock). 3
In 1984, the legislature removed felony-murder from the first-degree murder statute
and rewrote the second-degree murder statute to its present form:
1. A person commits the offense of murder in the second degree if he or
she:
(1) Knowingly causes the death of another person or, with the purpose of
causing serious physical injury to another person, causes the death of
another person; or
(2) Commits or attempts to commit any felony, and, in the perpetration or
the attempted perpetration of such felony or in the flight from the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony, another person is
killed as a result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such
felony or immediate flight from the perpetration of such felony or
attempted perpetration of such felony.
2. The offense of murder in the second degree is a class A felony, and the
punishment for second degree murder shall be in addition to the
punishment for commission of a related felony or attempted felony,
other than murder or manslaughter. 4
Section 565.021 (emphasis added). 5 It is widely-recognized that the plain and ordinary
meaning of the phrase “any felony” in Section 575.021.1(2) is expansive and indicates the
3
Bouser was handed down in December of 1999, but was not final due to pending motions for rehearing and
transfer until May of 2000. Meanwhile, Williams was handed down in April of 2000 and, though certainly
aware of its earlier decision in Bouser, the court does not mention it, presumably because it was not yet final.
4
Because this section, Section 565.021.1(2), expressly permits cumulative punishment for all crimes other
than murder or manslaughter, Defendant’s double jeopardy argument necessarily fails and has been rejected
by numerous courts as follows: Where, as here, the issue is multiple punishments imposed following a single
trial, the double jeopardy analysis is “limited to determining whether multiple punishments were intended by
the legislature.” State v. Barker, 410 S.W.3d 225, 236 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). “Inasmuch as our felony-
murder statute expressly intends multiple punishments for both second degree felony murder and the
underlying felony, such punishments when imposed in a single trial do not constitute double jeopardy.” Id;
see also State v. Coody, 867 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993); State v. Mendoza, 115 S.W.3d 873, 876
(Mo. App. W.D. 2003); Johnson v. State, 477 S.W.3d 2, 8 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).
5
Between its enactment in 1984 and today, there have been only minor changes to this statute and affecting
the substantive language addressed here.
9
legislature’s intent that every felony can serve as an underlying felony for purposes of
felony-murder. See Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 138-39; State v. Harding, 528 S.W.3d 362, 368-
69 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017); State v. Tuttle, 519 S.W.3d 443, 447-49 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016).
If the legislature had wanted to exclude from the otherwise all-encompassing “any felony”
language in Section 565.021.1(2) specific felonies or types of felonies—as it had done in
prior iterations of the felony-murder rule in earlier versions of the statutes—it certainly
could have used less expansive language than “any felony.” The only limitation on what
felonies can predicate felony-murder—as the Western and Southern Districts have found—
is set out in Section 565.021.2, which expressly permits the punishment for felony-murder
to be cumulative to punishment for an underlying felony “other than murder or
manslaughter.” See Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 134-40; see also Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 109-
15; State v. Gheen, 41 S.W.3d 598, 605 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001); State v. Simino, 397
S.W.3d 11, 25 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Sisco, 458
S.W.3d 304 (Mo. banc 2015). Relying on the statutory interpretation maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another), those
courts concluded that the express mention of a limitation on cumulative punishment for
“murder” and “manslaughter” implied a legislative intent that there be no other limitations
on which felonies can predicate felony-murder, including by way of applying the merger
doctrine to exclude felonies that were themselves the very act that caused the death. See
Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 117. The Bouser court found there was no longer a need for the
merger doctrine because this express statutory exclusion of murder and manslaughter
alleviated the Shock court’s concern that the felony-murder rule might consume those other
degrees of homicide. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 140.
10
While there is no case in the Eastern District explicitly holding that the merger
doctrine is no longer viable under the current statute, we have acknowledged that “modern
precedent” such as Williams “suggests that the merger doctrine has been abrogated.” State
v. Gray, 347 S.W.3d 490, 508 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). We did not have occasion to address
the viability of the doctrine in Gray because it was a conventional second-degree murder
case to which the merger doctrine did not apply. Id. The issue is squarely before us now.
We find the Western and Southern Districts’ analyses well-reasoned and persuasive and
conclude that the merger doctrine is no longer viable under the current felony-murder
statute. 6 The language of that statute indicates the legislative intent to allow every felony
except murder or manslaughter to serve as a predicate for felony-murder.
Defendant argues that “murder or manslaughter” ought to be construed more
liberally in his favor to include all homicides. He reasons that because murder and
manslaughter were the only homicides at the time Section 565.021 was enacted in 1984,
the reference to “murder” and “manslaughter” was intended to refer to all homicides.
Defendant points out that, although in 1984 the child abuse statute did not contemplate the
death of the child and therefore did not constitute a homicide, since 1997 the crime of child
abuse rises to a class A felony when the abuse causes death. See Section 568.060.5(2).
Defendant argues that child abuse causing death and all other crimes that include death as
an element should be treated like the homicides of “murder” and “manslaughter” for
6
Defendant suggests that we need not follow these other districts’ cases and can instead continue to rely on
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Shock because it was not overturned by those intermediate appellate courts
and is still “good law” providing authority for the merger doctrine. He also contends that our Eastern District
opinion in State v. Hanes, 729 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987), also never overturned, likewise supports
continued application of the merger doctrine in this district. We disagree. Hanes involved a crime committed
before the 1984 amendments to the felony-murder statute, and thus like Shock, was decided in a totally
different legal context under very different criminal statutes. These outdated cases are of little value to our
discussion here, particularly given that we have available to us a much more instructive analysis of the merger
doctrine under the current statutory scheme in the Western and Southern District cases.
11
purposes of the felony-murder statute. To construe the statute otherwise, Defendant
contends, renders the prohibition on cumulative punishment in Section 565.021.2
meaningless because the State can simply premise felony-murder on a crime that is not in
name “murder” or “manslaughter” but in reality is the type of homicidal crime the
legislature intended not to be cumulatively punished. Defendant claims that his case
illustrates the problem: Assuming he is guilty of causing Buddy’s death, then Defendant
is in reality guilty of some degree or type of either murder or manslaughter because the
death was either caused knowingly with deliberation (murder in the first degree),
knowingly without deliberation (conventional murder in the second degree), recklessly
(involuntary manslaughter in the first degree) or with criminal negligence (involuntary
manslaughter in the second degree). See generally Sections 565.020 to 565.027. None of
those crimes can serve as the underlying felony for felony-murder. But the State can side-
step that limitation by charging the crime as child abuse causing death, which it can use to
predicate felony-murder, subjecting Defendant to cumulative punishments he would not
otherwise have faced if the crime was charged as a murder or manslaughter. Defendant
argues that under this scenario the felony-murder rule swallows the legislature’s gradation
system for homicides, which is the very harm the merger doctrine sought to address.
Contrary to Bouser’s conclusion, he asserts, the statute does not alleviate this concern
unless we construe the language “murder or manslaughter” to mean “all homicides” or
continue applying the merger doctrine so that the State cannot predicate felony-murder on
a felony that is itself the very act causing death.
Whatever merit there may be to the policies underlying Defendant’s argument for
imposing these limitations on the types of felonies that can predicate felony-murder—lest
12
the felon-murder rule be stretched beyond its logical bounds—we are simply not at liberty
to apply any such limitation on felony-murder that is not already written in the statute. See
Williams, 24 S.W.3d 117. “The legislature, not the courts, makes law and it may limit or
abolish the felony-murder rule as it sees fit. It is not for the courts to assume this legislative
function.” Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 140. If in 1984 the legislature did, as Defendant contends,
mean to refer in Section 565.021.2 generally to all homicides, then surely it would have
used the general term “homicides” and not the terms “murder” and “manslaughter” that
refer to particular homicides. If the legislature had at any point thereafter wanted to include
additional homicides, it could have done so. But it has not, even after the child abuse
statute was amended to include a death element and after the courts held that child abuse
causing death is a permissible predicate felony under the statutory language. See Bouser,
17 S.W.3d at 139-40; see also Mendoza, 115 S.W.3d at 875 n.3. We are obligated to follow
the statute as it is written. The statute as written indicates that the legislature intended
every felony to qualify as a predicate to felony-murder and did not intend for there to be
any merger or other limitation except for the specific crimes of murder and manslaughter.
“[I]t is not within this court’s province to rule contrary to our legislature’s intent.” Bouser,
17 S.W.3d at 140.
In sum, abuse of a child resulting in death is a felony and it is not “murder” or
“manslaughter.” Therefore, it is a felony on which felony-murder may be predicated under
Section 565.021, and punishment for felony-murder may be imposed in addition to the
punishment for child abuse without violating that statute or the double jeopardy clause.
The court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in instructing the jury to find felony-murder
based on the predicate crime of child abuse causing death, in entering the conviction for
13
felony-murder or in sentencing Defendant for that crime in addition to the child abuse
sentence. Points II, III and IV are denied.
The judgment is affirmed.
ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., Judge
Robert M. Clayton III, P.J. and
Roy L. Richter, J., concur.
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