Colton Groom v. Director of Revenue

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern
District
DIVISION TWO
COLTON GROOM, ) No. ED107869
)
Appellant, )
) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) St. Louis County
v. ) 18SL-AC25554
)
DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, ) Honorable John R. Lasater
)
Respondent. ) Filed: June 2, 2020
OPINION
Colton Groom (“Groom”) appeals the trial court’s judgment suspending his driving
privileges. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On April 19, 2018, St. Louis County Police Officer Zachary Shaw (“Officer Shaw”)
stopped 18-year old Groom after his stationary radar clocked him driving 70 miles per hour in a
55-mile-per-hour zone. When he approached Groom, Officer Shaw observed his eyes were
bloodshot, glassy, staring, and dilated; his breath emanated a strong odor of alcohol; he was
stuttering and mumbling his speech; and his mood swiftly changed from calm to yelling and
using profanity. A search of the vehicle revealed open and closed containers of alcohol. Officer
Shaw administered a portable breath test, which was positive for alcohol. He further observed
multiple signs of impairment when conducting field sobriety tests. As a result, Groom was
placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”). At the police station, Groom was
given another breath test, which indicated his blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was 0.079%.
Thereafter, Groom’s privileges to drive a motor vehicle were suspended. Following
administrative review of the order, the suspension was sustained. Subsequently, Groom filed his
petition for a trial de novo, which was held on April 30, 2019. The Director of Revenue
(“Director”) offered Exhibit A into evidence which contained documents related to the
investigation and arrest of Groom. Exhibit A included, among other records, the notice of
suspension, the alcohol influence report, the police narrative and arrest report, the BAC results,
and citations for operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition and speeding.
Neither party called witnesses. Groom objected to the admission of any radar evidence related to
the speed of his vehicle. The objection was overruled. On May 7, 2019, the trial court issued its
order and judgment sustaining the suspension of Groom’s driving privileges.
This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
Groom asserts two separate issues in his sole point on appeal.1 Groom argues the trial
court erroneously applied the law and abused its discretion when it overruled Groom’s
foundation objections to the admission of the radar evidence, and relied on that evidence to find
there was probable cause to stop Groom’s vehicle for speeding.
Standard of Review
Our court will affirm the trial court’s judgment in a driver’s license suspension case
1
“A point on appeal that challenges more than one trial court ruling or action is multifarious and preserves nothing
for appeal.” Waters v. Dir. of Revenue, 588 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). However, we exercise our
discretion to review Groom’s complaints ex gratia. Id.
2
“unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or
the court erroneously declared or applied the law.” Tweedy v. Dir. of Revenue, 412 S.W.3d 389,
394 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
Groom alleges the trial court misapplied the law by relying on radar evidence to find that
there was probable cause to stop him for speeding. Statutory interpretation is a question of law
that is reviewed de novo. Bender v. Dir. of Revenue, 320 S.W.3d 167, 169 (Mo. App. E.D.
2010). However, the trial court’s decision as to the admission of the radar evidence is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Vanderpool v. Dir. of Revenue, 226 S.W.3d 108, 109 (Mo. banc 2007).
Analysis
Groom asserts there is a “special safe guard” within Section 302.505.1,2 which provides:
The department shall suspend or revoke the license of any person upon its
determination that the person was arrested upon probable cause to believe such
person was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in the person's
blood, breath, or urine was eight-hundredths of one percent or more by weight,
based on the definition of alcohol concentration in section 302.500, or where such
person was less than twenty-one years of age when stopped and was stopped
upon probable cause to believe such person was driving while intoxicated in
violation of section 577.010, or driving with excessive blood alcohol content in
violation of section 577.012, or upon probable cause to believe such person
violated a state, county or municipal traffic offense and such person was driving
with a blood alcohol content of two-hundredths of one percent or more by
weight.
(emphasis added).
Specifically, Groom attempts to carve out an exception requiring the Director to prove
there is probable cause to merit the suspension or revocation of a person’s license when the
driver is less than twenty-one with a BAC between .02% and 0.08% . Groom relies on Baldwin
v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 401 (Mo. banc 2001) to support his argument. In analyzing
2
All statutory references are to RSMo (2016), unless otherwise indicated.
3
Section 302.505.1, the Missouri Supreme Court found there are two separate clauses at issue.
The first provides for the suspension of the license of “any person” arrested upon
probable cause to believe that the driver operated a vehicle with a blood alcohol [of]
.10% or more.3 The second applies the same sanction to persons under twenty-one years
of age stopped on probable cause to believe such person was committing any state or
local traffic offense and whose BAC is .02% or more.
Id. at 405. While applying the first clause to the appellant because his BAC exceeded .10%, the
Court discussed, but did not decide, that the second clause could include a “special safeguard,”
such that probable cause for the stop “may have come into play.” Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
The Court cited Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Mo. banc 1999) for the
proposition that “under [an] Equal Protection analysis, the state could grant special safeguards to
younger drivers who are subject to special sanctions that are not applicable to adult drivers.” Id.
at 406 (emphasis added). However, like Baldwin, the driver in Richie was subject to the first
clause. Thus, it was clear the first clause applied to any person with a BAC over the statutory
limit, but the Court ultimately left the effect of the second clause for another day.
That day arrived when Barrett v. Dir. of Revenue, 286 S.W.3d 840 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)
presented specific facts which required an analysis of the second clause. In Barrett, an officer
stopped a 19-year old motorist for failure to display two lighted headlamps. Id. at 841. After the
trooper stopped the motorist, he observed a moderate odor of intoxicants coming from inside the
vehicle and from his breath, and noticed the driver’s eyes were bloodshot. Id. After conducting
several sobriety tests, the driver was arrested. A breath sample was taken at the police station
showing the motorist’s BAC was .06%. Id. Our court held “a person less than twenty-one years
of age can also be subject to suspension or revocation under section 302.505.1 if that person was
stopped upon probable cause to believe such person was driving while intoxicated in violation of
3
The statute was subsequently amended to require a BAC of 0.8% or more.
4
section 577.010 RSMo.” Id. 842. Therefore, “[p]robable cause exists if an officer observes the
illegal operation of a motor vehicle and also observes indicia of intoxication when he comes in
contact with the driver.” Id. at 842.
Similar to Barrett, here, probable cause arose after Officer Shaw stopped Groom for the
illegal operation of a motor vehicle and observed several indicia of intoxication during their
subsequent interaction. See id.; see also Riche, 987 S.W.2d at 335–36 (finding neither the statute
providing for the suspension and revocation of driver’s licenses for DWI nor constitutional
provisions proscribing unlawful searches require a showing that arresting officer’s initial stop of
motorist be based on probable cause); Peters v. Dir. of Revenue, 35 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Mo. App.
S.D. 2001) (“We note that probable cause for the initial stop is not required to suspend the
license of a motorist who is at least twenty-one years of age.”); Duncan v. Dir. of Revenue, 16
S.W.3d 745, 746 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) (“Director does not have the burden of showing the
lawfulness of or probable cause for a stop in order to revoke or suspend driving privileges under
section 302.500–302.540”). As such, the Director met the burden of proof necessary to suspend
Groom’s driving privileges.
Section 302.505 creates “an administrative process designed to remove drunken drivers
from Missouri’s roads and highways as quickly as possible.” Riche, 987 S.W.2d at 334. This is
particularly true for drivers under the age of twenty-one. Adopting Groom’s argument would
produce an absurd and unreasonable result by creating a “special safeguard” for these same
drivers in direct contravention of the statute’s purpose and plain language. See State v. Slavens,
375 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012) (stating a court is to presume a logical result, as
opposed to an absurd or unreasonable one, and avoid statutory interpretations that are unjust,
absurd, or unreasonable). Thus, we do not accept Groom’s argument.
5
Groom further contends the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his foundation
objection to the admission of the radar evidence related to the speed of Groom’s vehicle. The
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Vanderpool, 226 S.W.3d at 109. We will find the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on
admission of evidence only when its ruling is “clearly against the logic of the circumstances, is
so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice, and shows a lack of careful
consideration.” Manzella v. Dir. of Revenue, 363 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).
In its judgment, the trial court noted that Officer Shaw stopped Groom for driving 70
miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone. The radar evidence, along with other related details
described in the police report was sufficient for Officer Shaw to believe Groom violated a state
traffic offense. The validity of the speeding offense was not an issue because, as discussed
above, “probable cause to arrest for an alcohol-related traffic violation which supports an
administrative license suspension may be developed after the officer stops the motorist,
regardless of whether the officer had probable cause for the stop.” Peters, 35 S.W.3d at 895. As
such, the extensive foundation for the radar evidence demanded by Groom was not necessary for
a probable cause determination to suspend Groom’s driving privileges under Section 302.505.1.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the radar evidence.
Point denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
_______________________________
Lisa P. Page, Judge
6
Philip M. Hess, P.J. and Kurt S. Odenwald, J., concur.
7