Ryan G. Beamgard v. State of Missouri

In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Western District
RYAN G. BEAMGARD, )
Appellant, ) WD82891
v. )
)
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) FILED: August 11, 2020
Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAFAYETTE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE DENNIS A. ROLF, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION ONE: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, PRESIDING JUDGE,
CYNTHIA L. MARTIN AND THOMAS N. CHAPMAN, JUDGES
Ryan Beamgard appeals the judgment denying his Rule 24.035 motion
without an evidentiary hearing after he pled guilty to six offenses. He contends
the record does not refute his claim that the court’s failure to inform him of the
possibility of consecutive sentences rendered his plea involuntary and not
knowingly made. Because the record does not conclusively refute Beamgard’s
claim, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for an evidentiary
hearing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2016, Beamgard unlawfully entered an apartment in the middle of
the night and assaulted one victim by shooting at him, which resulted in the death
of another victim. Following the assault and murder, Beamgard left the apartment
and unlawfully took a vehicle that had been left running at a nearby convenience
store. He was subsequently indicted for second-degree murder (Count I); armed
criminal action (Count II); first-degree assault (Count III); armed criminal action
(Count IV); first-degree burglary (Count V); and first-degree tampering (Count VI).
Beamgard entered an open guilty plea to these charges in May 2018.
During the guilty plea hearing, Beamgard stated that he understood the charges
filed against him, that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, and that he was
pleading guilty because he was, in fact, guilty. After Beamgard admitted to the
factual basis for each charge, the court asked him if he understood the range of
punishment for each count:
Do you understand the range of punishment on Count I to be
ten to 30 or life; on counts II and IV, not less than three years in the
Department of Corrections and no limit; Count II [sic], five to 15 years
in the Department of Corrections; and Count III is five to 15, as is
Count V; and Count VI is up to seven years in the Department of
Corrections or up to one year in the county jail and/or up to a $5,000
fine?
Beamgard replied that he understood.
After confirming with defense counsel that this was an open plea, the court
and Beamgard had the following exchange:
Q. You understand, sir, that this is an open plea.
A. Yes.
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Q. That means that there is not going to be a plea
agreement reached today?
A. Yes.
Q. That means what we’re going to do is I’m going to
accept your plea of guilty today, and then we are going to
come back at a later date and determine what the punishment
is going to be?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you will be found guilty today. Do you understand
that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which means if you don’t like the ultimate resolution,
you can’t say, Judge, hey, I don’t want to plead guilty
anymore, because that is already going to be done today and
now we are just going to continue it --
A. Yes, sir.
Q. -- to get the information for -- to determine what the
sentence is going to be.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that you could potentially get the
maximum across the board?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I’m not saying that is going to happen, but you need to
be aware that the risk is a possibility?
A. Yes, sir.
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Beamgard denied that defense counsel had made any promises to him with
regard to what the “final outcome” of his case would be. The court explained that
the sentencing decision was up to the court, and the court would not know what
the outcome would be until after it had received the sentencing assessment
report. The court accepted Beamgard’s plea after finding that he voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly entered it.
During the subsequent sentencing hearing in early July 2018, defense
counsel stated that Beamgard was “well aware” that the charges were “very
serious” and carried “some very serious punishments.” Defense counsel also
stated that Beamgard was “well aware” that he would get a “high sentence” even
though he pled guilty. Defense counsel indicated that he knew that concurrent
sentences were the court’s “general policy” for guilty pleas, but he acknowledged
that “this is not your everyday case either.” Defense counsel requested that
Beamgard’s sentences run concurrently and that Beamgard receive a sentence of
“20-something years.” The State asked that Beamgard’s sentences run
consecutively.
On Counts I and II, the court imposed sentences of thirty years on each
count, to run concurrently to each other; fifteen years each on Counts III and IV, to
run concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentences on Counts I and
II; fifteen years on Count V, to run consecutively to the other counts; and seven
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years on Count VI, to run concurrently to the other sentences. As a result,
Beamgard was sentenced to a total of sixty years’ imprisonment.
Beamgard filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion, which was later amended by
appointed counsel. In his amended motion, Beamgard asserted that his plea was
not voluntary and knowingly made because the court did not inform him that his
sentences could run consecutively and, therefore, violated Rule 24.02(b)(1)’s
requirement to advise him of the maximum possible penalty provided by law.
Beamgard alleged that, had he understood that consecutive sentences were a
possibility, he would not have pled guilty.
The motion court entered its judgment denying Beamgard’s Rule 24.035
motion without an evidentiary hearing after finding that the record refuted his
claim. Beamgard appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the denial of a post-conviction motion for clear error. Rule
24.035(k). The motion court’s findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only
if a review of the entire record leaves us with a definite and firm impression that a
mistake was made. Dobbins v. State, 187 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Mo. banc 2006).
ANALYSIS
In his sole point on appeal, Beamgard contends the motion court clearly
erred in denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing. He argues that his
claim that he entered his plea without an understanding that the court could run
his sentences consecutively is not refuted by the record. Beamgard asserts that
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he was prejudiced because, if he had understood that consecutive sentences were
a possibility, he would not have pled guilty but would have proceeded to trial.
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction motion, (1) the
movant must allege facts, not conclusions, warranting relief; (2) the facts alleged
must not be refuted by the record; and (3) the matters complained of must have
prejudiced the movant. Booker v. State, 552 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Mo. banc 2018).
The motion court “can deny an evidentiary hearing if any of the three prongs is
not satisfied.” Jaegers v. State, 310 S.W.3d 313, 314 (Mo. App. 2010).
In his motion, Beamgard claimed that his guilty plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made because the court violated Rule 24.02(b)(1) by not advising him
of the maximum penalty he faced for his offenses. Specifically, he alleged that,
based on the court’s recitation of the range of punishment for each charge during
his guilty plea and the fact that the court did not say it could run his sentences
consecutively to each other, he believed his sentences would run concurrently.
Rule 24.02(b)(1) requires that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court must
address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and
determine that the defendant understands, “[t]he nature of the charge to which
the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and
the maximum possible penalty provided by law.” Our Supreme Court has
addressed whether the court must inform a defendant that his sentences may run
consecutively before accepting a guilty plea. In State v. Bursby, 395 S.W.2d 155,
157 (Mo. 1965), two defendants were charged jointly in one information with two
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burglary counts and one stealing count. At the time, there was a general rule that
“an accused may not be charged, tried and convicted at the same time of two
separate and distinct offenses,” but there was an exception allowing a burglary
charge and a related stealing charge to be joined in one information and tried in
one trial. Id. at 157-58. The defendants declined the appointment of counsel, pled
guilty, and were given three four-year sentences, to run consecutively. Id. at 157.
The defendants sought to vacate their sentences because they thought they were
pleading guilty to only one offense instead of three offenses for which the court
could impose consecutive sentences. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he question here is whether
the defendants had that knowledge and understanding of the consequences of
their plea essential to a valid plea of guilty.” Id. at 159. The Court noted that Rule
25.04, which was the predecessor to our current Rule 24.02, stated, “The court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of
the charge.” Construing the rule, the Court held that, when a defendant is
pleading guilty to more than one charge:
[T]he court should question carefully the accused to determine that
he is fully informed and correctly understands (1) that he is not
charged with only one offense, but that he is charged with more than
one, and, (2) that he may and will be sentenced on each and all and
the minimum and maximum punishment for each, and that the
sentences may run concurrently or consecutively.
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Id. (emphasis added). See also Wiley v. State, 522 S.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Mo. App.
1975).
The State insists that Bursby is “of limited application to modern cases”
because Rule 25.04 uses “substantially different language than the modern” Rule
24.02. Since the enactment of Rule 24.02, however, intermediate appellate courts
have continued to recognize the applicability of Bursby’s requirement that the
court inform the defendant of the possibility that the sentences may run
consecutively in cases where the defendant is pleading guilty to multiple counts.
See, e.g., Stark v. State, 553 S.W.3d 378, 384 n.2 (Mo. App. 2018); Bridgewater v.
State, 458 S.W.3d 430, 433 n.3 (Mo. App. 2015); Holland v. State, 954 S.W.2d 660,
662 (Mo. App. 1997); Payne v. State, 864 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Mo. App. 1993).
Continuing to require the court to inform a defendant of the possibility of
consecutive sentences comports with the plain language of Rule 24.02(b)(1),
which requires the circuit court to inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands, “the maximum possible penalty provided by law.”
Running sentences consecutively rather than concurrently can significantly
increase, and in some cases double or triple, the defendant’s total sentence. See
George v. State, 403 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Mo. App. 2013) (finding that the court failed
to follow Rule 24.02(b)(1)’s requirement of informing the defendant of the
maximum possible penalty when it told the defendant, who was pleading guilty to
three counts of the same offense, only what the maximum punishment was for
one count and not the total for all three). See also Elverum v. State, 232 S.W.3d
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710, 716 (Mo. App. 2007) (finding that the court failed to explain the full range of
punishment where the court never informed the defendant of the minimum
sentence or the that the sentences could run consecutively).1 Here, the court’s
structuring some of Beamgard’s sentences to run consecutively increased his total
sentence from thirty years to sixty years. Thus, in cases where a defendant is
pleading guilty to multiple charges, advising the defendant of only the maximum
sentence for each charge without advising that the sentences could run
consecutively does not inform the defendant of the “maximum possible penalty.”
The State asserts that the plea hearing transcript shows that the circuit
court “implicitly alerted” Beamgard of its discretion to impose consecutive
sentences. The State notes that, after advising Beamgard of the range of
punishment for each of the charges, the court asked him, “Do you understand that
you could potentially get the maximum across the board?” Beamgard replied,
“Yes, sir.” The State argues that, although the court did not use the word
“consecutive,” the phrase “maximum across the board” informed Beamgard that
he could get the “maximum possible sentence” under the open guilty plea. We
disagree. In this context, the phrase “across the board” means “embracing or
affecting all classes or categories.” Across-the-Board, Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/across%20the%20board
1
But see Horton v. State, 779 S.W.2d 701, 702-03 (Mo. App. 1989) (relying only on federal law to
hold that the “failure to advise an accused that his sentences may run consecutively is not a
‘consequence’ of the plea concerning which the court must first address the defendant before
accepting the plea”).
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(last visited August 5, 2020). Thus, while it is clear that the court’s advising
Beamgard that he could get the “maximum across the board” warned him that he
could get the maximum possible sentence on each of his offenses, we fail to see
how it “implicitly alerted” him that the court could run the sentences
consecutively. The plea hearing transcript does not refute Beamgard’s contention
that the court did not inform him that he could receive consecutive sentences.
“An evidentiary hearing may only be denied when the record conclusively shows
that the movant is not entitled to relief.” Roberts v. State, 276 S.W.3d 833, 835
(Mo. banc 2009) (citation omitted).
The court’s failure to comply with the formal requirements of Rule
24.02(b)(1) alone, however, does not entitle Beamgard to relief. Dean v. State, 901
S.W.2d 323, 328 (Mo. App. 1995). Beamgard must demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by that failure. Id. As we explained in Dean, a defendant’s
“constitutional guarantee is not a flawless procedure”; instead, a defendant’s
“constitutional guarantee is that his plea of guilty will not result in a judgment
against him unless the plea is voluntary and knowingly made.” Id.
The State argues that defense counsel’s arguments requesting concurrent
sentences during the sentencing hearing show that, even if the court did not
advise him of the possibility of consecutive sentences, Beamgard understood that
the sentences could run consecutively. The sentencing hearing occurred over a
month after the guilty plea hearing. Defense counsel’s statements during the
sentencing hearing do not conclusively refute Beamgard’s claim as to what his
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understanding was at the time he entered his guilty plea. Elverum, 232 S.W.3d at
716.
Beamgard is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, at which he has the burden
of establishing that the court’s failure to inform him of the possibility of
consecutive sentences rendered his plea involuntary or not knowingly made.
After hearing evidence, the motion court shall prepare findings of fact and
conclusions of law concerning whether the violation of Rule 24.02 rendered
Beamgard’s plea involuntary or not knowingly made and order the appropriate
remedy.
CONCLUSION
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for an evidentiary
hearing.
____________________________________
LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
ALL CONCUR.
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