DocketNumber: No. 8362.
Citation Numbers: 139 P.2d 518, 115 Mont. 102
Judges: MR. JUSTICE ADAIR delivered the opinion of the court.
Filed Date: 7/2/1943
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
I dissent. The sole question for determination in this action is the interpretation of the written contract between the plaintiff and the school board. The majority decision converts the written contract of the parties into a scrap of paper and flies in the face of the elementary law of contracts. It is not debatable that a written contract supersedes all oral understandings and negotiations; that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible (secs. 7529, 7530, Rev. Codes), unless through fraud, mistake or accident it fails to express that intention (sec. 7531), and that the courts have no power to make new contracts for the parties. No fraud, mistake or accident is alleged nor proved.
While a teacher's employment is sometimes spoken of as an office, it is purely contractual and the present suit is solely in *Page 118 contract. After a teacher is elected or chosen by the board of trustees, a contract in writing is required to be made and executed by section 1015, Revised Codes. His re-employment or re-election, either actual, or by default under section 1075, can effect nothing but a renewal of the contract under which he is serving.
It is my view that the intention of the parties to a contract must be determined from the language employed in the contract, and from that source alone, except where the language is indefinite or ambiguous; that resort to extrinsic evidence to discover such intention, by way of looking to the interpretation the parties themselves have given to the contract, can never be allowed if the terms of the contract are set out in clear, simple, and explicit language.
All of plaintiff's contentions and arguments are grounded on evidence aliunde the contract, and by that means he attempts by parol evidence to vary or contradict a clear provision of a valid written contract in violation of section 7569, Revised Codes. (See, also, Kinsman v. Stanhope,
"There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the writing itself, except in the following cases: * * *." (Sec. 10516, Rev. Codes.) Five exceptions are specified by the section, none of which apply here, thus making the statute absolute in the case at bar. (See Wilson v. Davis,
"This Agreement, Made and entered into this 12th day of April, 1939, between J.R. Smith, party of the first part, and the Board of Trustees of School district No. 18, of Pondera County, Montana, parties of the second part,
"Witnesseth, That the said J.R. Smith, who holds a legal valid certificate for said county, hereby agrees for the consideration hereinafter stated, to teach in said school district for the period *Page 119 of 9 months, commencing on the 2nd day of September, 1939, and said J.R. Smith agrees to enforce the rules and regulations prescribed by the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the County Superintendent of Schools.
"And The Parties of the Second Part hereby agree to pay the said J.R. Smith One Hundred and Forty Five Dollars for each and every month of twenty school days, in the manner following, to-wit: By drawing their order upon the county treasurer of said county to be paid out of the school moneys in the county treasury to the credit of said school district."
The contract is in plain and simple language and entirely free from ambiguity. After teaching in the Valier schools for several years the plaintiff was assigned to a rural school in the same district, and at the same salary. He refused to accept the assignment on two grounds: (1) Lack of living facilities for himself and family; and, (2) his lack of qualifications to teach in the lower grades. This last objection was in direct conflict with the teacher's certificate by virtue of which he was employed.
The function of the court is to construe the contract the parties have made themselves, not attempt to make a new contract for them. Whether the plaintiff "made a good or a bad bargain is not for the courts to determine. Rather it becomes the duty of the courts to enforce such contracts (Best Mfg. Co. v.Hutton,
"Resort to interpreattion [of a contract] is never to be had where the meaning is free from doubt. It is to be availed of only when, without its aid, the meaning or effect of the contract would be doubtful or uncertain." (Ming v. Pratt,
It is contended that, the plaintiff having been assigned by the school board to teach in the Valier schools and retained in that position for a number of years, such a state of facts clearly shows the construction the parties to the contract have placed thereon, citing Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Beyer,
"A court is not at liberty to revise an agreement whileprofessing to construe it. Nor does it have the right to make acontract for the parties * * *. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal construction justifies the creation of a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one party to a contract of an obligation not assumed. Courts cannot make for the parties better agreementsthan they themselves have been satisfied to make or rewritecontracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to oneof the parties. If the parties to a contract adopt a provision which contravenes no principle of public policy and contains no element of ambiguity, the courts have no right, by a process of interpretation, to relieve one of them from disadvantageous terms which he has actually made.
"There is no right to interpret the agreement as meaningsomething different from what the parties intended as expressedby the language they saw fit to employ. The court is not atliberty, either to disregard words used by the parties,descriptive of the subject matter or of any material incident, orto insert words which the parties have not made use of." (12 Am.Jur., Contracts, sec. 228, page 750.)
"A written instrument must ordinarily be interpreted to mean what on its face it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words used should be understood in a different sense. Words are to receive their plain and literal meaning even though the intention of the party drawing the contract may have been different from that expressed. It is said that the agreement of the parties is to be ascertained from the plain language used by them, no matter what the intention may have been. Presumptively, the intent of the parties to a contract is expressed by the natural and ordinary meaning of their *Page 122 language referable to it, and such meaning cannot be perverted or destroyed by the courts through construction. * * *
"Where the terms of a writing are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, since the only office of judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty. In such a case the courts have no right to make new contracts for the parties or ignore those already made by them, simply to avoid seeming hardships." (12 Am. Jur., Contracts, sec. 229, page 751 et seq.)
In State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney,
The cases following have been cited to sustain the contentions of the plaintiff, but have no application to such a contract as that before us for the reasons stated as to each case.
In the case of In re Womer (Appeal of Osceola BoroughSchool Dist.),
"At the time appellee first entered the District's employ, she held a college provisional certificate, qualifying her to teach certain High School subjects. Her application for the position distinctly showed that she had no certificate to be a teacher-librarian. Despite the knowledge that she was not so qualified, the Directors of the School District on May 19, 1936, unanimously adopted a resolution electing her `to the position of Teacher-Librarian in the High School at a salary of $130.00 per school month.' The following day, the Board entered into a written contract with appellee, employing her as a `Teacher' for the *Page 123 school year 1936-37, and continued her employment for the subsequent year by the contract of May 6, 1937.
"Under the terms of her contract appellee was not required to possess a certificate as teacher-librarian, nor was it essential to the performance of the duties actually designated for her by the Board. * * *
"Appellee's failure to hold a teacher-librarian certificate for the school year 1938-39 was no valid reason for her dismissal. She never occupied the position of librarian. She was never asked to teach library science. Her provisional college certificate, upon the basis of which she was hired, fully qualified her to perform all the duties to which she was assigned, and her competency and efficiency as a teacher have never been questioned. The condition upon which the Board based its action in terminating her contract was one of which the members were fully aware when she was employed. * * *"
In the case of Williams v. School District No. 189,
In the case of Jackson v. Independent School District,
In State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education of Duluth
(Minn.),
In the case of People ex rel. Callahan v. Board ofEducation,
In the case of State ex rel. Bass v. Vernon Parish SchoolBoard, (La.App.),
The case of Le Clair v. School District No. 28,
In McBride v. School District No. 2, Silver Bow County,
The judgment should be affirmed.
State v. Vernon Parish School Board , 194 So. 74 ( 1940 )
State Ex Rel. Ging v. Board of Education , 213 Minn. 550 ( 1942 )
Linn v. French , 97 Mont. 292 ( 1934 )
Viers v. Webb , 76 Mont. 38 ( 1926 )
Swan v. Le Clair , 77 Mont. 422 ( 1926 )
Le Clair v. School Dist. No. 28 , 74 Mont. 385 ( 1925 )
Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Beyer , 107 Mont. 1 ( 1938 )
Day v. School District No. 21 , 98 Mont. 207 ( 1934 )
Biering v. Ringling , 78 Mont. 145 ( 1927 )
Best Manufacturing Co. v. Hutton , 49 Mont. 78 ( 1914 )
McBride v. School District No. 2 , 88 Mont. 110 ( 1930 )
State Ex Rel. Normile v. Cooney , 100 Mont. 391 ( 1935 )
People Ex Rel. Callahan v. . Bd. Education , 174 N.Y. 169 ( 1903 )