Plouffe v. Knudson

December 23 2014
DA 14-0291
Case Number: DA 14-0291
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2014 MT 341N
DOUGLAS L. PLOUFFE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
GEORGE E. KNUDSON,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Phillips, Cause No. DV 2014-01
Honorable John C. McKeon, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Douglas L. Plouffe, Self-Represented, Chinook, Montana
For Appellee:
Steven T. Potts, PLLC, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 13, 2014
Decided: December 23, 2014
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 In January 2014, Douglas Plouffe, representing himself, sued George Knudson in the
Seventeenth Judicial District Court for Phillips County for conversion alleging that Knudson
had unlawfully acquired and sold property belonging to Plouffe and the Sleeping Buffalo
Hot Springs resort. Plouffe claimed the equipment was worth approximately $142,000.
Knudson responded by filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Complaint failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted. On February 14, 2014, the District Court
denied the motion because Knudson failed to file a brief in support.
¶3 On February 21, Plouffe moved for entry of default judgment asserting that Knudson
did not file a response to Plouffe’s Complaint in a timely manner. On February 27, the
District Court denied this motion stating that no default had been entered against Knudson;
therefore, under M. R. Civ. P. 55, default judgment could not be entered. The court further
determined that Knudson had not failed to file a timely response because his answer was not
due until March 3, 2014. The court extended Knudson’s time to respond until March 17,
2014. Knudson filed a timely response.
¶4 On March 21, Knudson moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plouffe had sued
Knudson in 2012 based upon the same allegations and had sought the identical amount in
damages. The district court in the 2012 case had granted summary judgment to Knudson and
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Plouffe did not appeal that ruling. Knudson argued that res judicata and collateral estoppel
precluded Plouffe’s 2014 case against him. On May 5, the District Court granted Knudson’s
motion and dismissed the claim. Plouffe appeals the court’s orders denying his motion for
default judgment and granting Knudson’s motion for summary judgment. While Plouffe
presents multiple issues on appeal, the dispositive issue is whether the District Court erred in
its disposition of these motions.
¶5 Generally, a court has discretion to grant or deny a party’s application for default
judgment after a party has defaulted. Steyh v. Steyh, 2013 MT 175, ¶ 8, 370 Mont. 494, 305
P.3d 50. In this case, however, the District Court relied upon the rules of civil procedure to
determine whether Knudson had defaulted. This constituted a conclusion of law which we
review for correctness. Additionally, we review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, using the same criteria applied by the district court under M. R. Civ.
P. 56. Estate of Irvine v. Oaas, 2013 MT 271, ¶ 12, 372 Mont. 49, 309 P.3d 986.
¶6 We affirm the District Court’s denial of Plouffe’s motion for entry of a default
judgment. The District Court did not err in determining that the grounds for granting a
default judgment against Knudson had not been satisfied. Moreover, the District Court had
the authority to sua sponte grant an extension of time for Knudson to file his response to
Plouffe’s Complaint. M. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A).
¶7 We also affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Knudson. The
court properly relied on the principles of res judicata and concluded that the subject matter of
the 2012 and 2014 claims were the same, as were the issues and the capacities of the parties.
The court further determined that the doctrine of claim preclusion, which bars relitigation of
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a claim that the party has already had an opportunity to litigate, precluded Plouffe from
presenting his 2014 conversion claim. The District Court expressly noted that Plouffe had
the “opportunity in [the 2012] action to develop and present this [conversion] theory using
appropriate procedural rules” but had “failed to present evidence to show a genuine issue of
material fact relative to his conversion claim.” Consequently, the court did not err in
granting Knudson’s motion and dismissing Plouffe’s action.
¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The issues
in this case are legal and are controlled by settled Montana law which the District Court
correctly interpreted. We therefore affirm the District Court.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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