City of Helena v. Hofstetter

November 17 2015
DA 15-0048
Case Number: DA 15-0048
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2015 MT 322N
CITY OF HELENA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
COLTON A. HOFSTETTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. CDC-2014-279
Honorable Kathy Seeley, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Carl B. Jensen Jr., Law Office of Carl B. Jensen Jr., LLC; Great Falls,
Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Brenda K. Elias, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Thomas J. Jodoin, Helena City Attorney, Iryna O’Connor, Deputy
City Attorney; Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 9, 2015
Decided: November 17, 2015
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Colton Hofstetter appeals from the order of the Montana First Judicial District
Court, Lewis and Clark County, affirming his Helena Municipal Court judgment finding
him guilty of violating § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA, driving under the influence of alcohol.
We affirm.
¶3 On November 22, 2013, at about 12:30 a.m., Helena police officer Bryan Kern
observed a vehicle parked in an alley near Ewing Street and Sixth Avenue in Helena.
The vehicle’s alarm system was activated, the keys were inserted in the ignition, and the
vehicle’s engine was running. As Officer Kern approached the vehicle he noticed a male
seated in the driver’s seat, apparently unconscious. After some attempt, he awakened the
man, whom he later determined to be Hofstetter. Officer Kern smelled the odor of
alcohol emanating from the vehicle and he testified Hofstetter was rather disoriented.
Officer Kern questioned Hofstetter who admitted to drinking alcohol earlier that evening
but stated he had not been driving. Instead, Hofstetter stated he got into and started his
vehicle in order to stay warm only after he discovered he was locked out of his
apartment. Officer Kern then conducted DUI testing, and subsequently arrested
Hofstetter upon suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. In fact, Hofstetter’s
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later blood alcohol analysis revealed an intoxication of 0.194 g/mL, over twice the legal
limit.
¶4 On June 18, 2014, Hofstetter was tried in a bench trial before the Helena
Municipal Court and found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation
of § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. At trial Hofstetter conceded the evidence of his blood alcohol
results, but asserted the defense of necessity. After his sentencing, Hofstetter properly
appealed his conviction in the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark
County. On January 5, 2015, the District Court affirmed Hofstetter’s conviction.
¶5 On appeal, Hofstetter argues the Helena Municipal Court erred by failing to issue
written findings of fact after it found Hofstetter guilty of driving under the influence of
alcohol. He states without written findings of fact his conviction cannot be supported.
¶6 When reviewing a municipal court decision a district court functions as an
intermediate appellate court. We review a district court’s determination as though
the appeal was originally filed with this Court. State v. Ellison, ¶ 8, 2012 MT 50,
364 Mont. 276, 272 P.3d 646. We examine the record independently of the district
court’s decision. We review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal
conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo. Ellison, ¶ 8.
¶7 The procedural aspects of a criminal case in a municipal court are governed by
statute. Title 46, chapter 17, MCA. Specifically, § 46-17-401, MCA, sets forth, except
as otherwise provided, “the proceedings and practice in municipal court shall be the same
as in district court.” We have previously held a district court in a criminal bench trial is
under no statutory duty to make written findings, except in death penalty cases, which is
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specifically provided by statute. State v. Price, 191 Mont. 1, 10, 622 P.2d 160, 165
(1980); State v. Duncan, 181 Mont. 382, 396, 593 P.2d 1026, 1034 (1979); see
§ 46-18-306, MCA.
¶8 Furthermore, we review a defendant’s conviction for sufficiency of the evidence.
State v. Granby, 283 Mont. 193, 199, 939 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1997). Upon viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution we look to see whether “any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Granby, 283 Mont. at 199, 939 P.2d at 1009. This is the case for
findings of fact made by a jury in a jury trial or by a judge in a bench trial. Granby,
283 Mont. at 199, 939 P.2d at 1010.
¶9 Despite Hofstetter’s assertions to the contrary, it is clear under Montana law, the
municipal court was under no obligation to enter written findings of fact. Thus, the
inquiry can turn to whether the court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous and
whether upon the record there is sufficient evidence to support Hofstetter’s conviction.
¶10 Hofstetter was charged with the violation of § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. In order to
be found guilty of violating this statute one must be 1) under the influence of alcohol and
2) either driving or in actual, physical control of a vehicle upon a state roadway. Section
61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. Despite the conflicting testimony as to whether it was necessary
for Hofstetter to seek shelter inside his running vehicle or find alternative
accommodations, it is undisputed that on the night in question Hofstetter’s blood alcohol
content was above the legal limit, and he was alone, seated inside of a running vehicle,
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parked in a city alleyway. Thus, based on the record, it can be implied that all of these
were findings of fact made by the court, and none of which are clearly erroneous.
¶11 Moreover, it is the duty of the judge, sitting as the trier of fact, to evaluate the
evidence presented for both weight and credibility. As stated, the evidence of whether
Hofstetter was under the influence of alcohol or in control of a vehicle was not in dispute.
It can be inferred by Hofstetter’s conviction itself that the judge then evaluated the
evidence of the remaining issues in dispute and determined the evidence supported
finding Hofstetter guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol. When viewed in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
Hofstetter was both under the influence of alcohol and in actual, physical control of a
vehicle upon a state roadway; thus in violation of the statute. Therefore, based on review
of the record, we conclude the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and there is
sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that Hofstetter was guilty of violating
§ 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA.
¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion
of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear
application of applicable standards of review.
¶13 Affirmed.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
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We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
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