Belanus v. State

10/18/2016
DA 14-0782
Case Number: DA 14-0782
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 262N
DUANE RONALD BELANUS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. BDV-2011-1087
Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Duane Ronald Belanus (Self-Represented), Deer Lodge, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Tammy A. Hinderman,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Leo Gallagher, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 7, 2016
Decided: October 18, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Duane Ronald Belanus appeals from the First Judicial District Court’s denial of
his petition for postconviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
¶3 Belanus has been before this Court multiple times since his June 2009 jury
conviction of numerous offenses including sexual intercourse without consent of his
then-girlfriend. Belanus was sentenced to life in prison without parole. He appealed his
sentence and we affirmed it in State v. Belanus, 2010 MT 204, 357 Mont. 463, 240 P.3d
1021, which provides factual details that will not be repeated here. Belanus subsequently
sued his victim, the county attorney, deputy county attorney, law enforcement
investigator, sheriff, multiple sheriff’s deputies, probation officer, both of his attorneys,
and a judge. He appealed the majority of these cases, without success, to the Montana
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme
Court.
¶4 In the case before us, Belanus, acting pro se, filed a petition for postconviction
relief in November 2011. He alleged at least thirteen trial errors including, but not
limited to, improper admission of evidence, fabrication of evidence, ineffective assistance
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of counsel, and prosecutorial vindictiveness. Before the State filed its response, he
moved to amend his petition to add a fourteenth count. The District Court granted the
motion. Belanus subsequently filed five more motions to amend all of which the District
Court denied citing § 46-21-105, MCA.1 Belanus appealed the court’s interlocutory
denial of his motions to amend and in September 2012 we dismissed the appeal without
prejudice.
¶5 In October 2014, the District Court denied Belanus’s PCR. In the court’s
twenty-nine-page detailed order, it identified and refused to address claims that Belanus
had already raised on appeal. It then addressed Belanus’s numerous claims of ineffective
assistance (IAC) by pretrial, trial, and appellate counsel, concluding that Belanus was
provided effective counsel or was not prejudiced by counsel’s choices and decisions. The
District Court further exercised its discretion and denied Belanus’s request for a hearing
on his petition and appointment of counsel to represent him at the hearing. The court
concluded that Belanus had presented “none of the cornerstones of a prima facie case for
postconviction relief.”
¶6 In his appeal before us, Belanus puts forth eleven allegations of error, many of
which are difficult to understand and are confusing. We acknowledge, however, that the
majority of them pertain to his claims of ineffective assistance and set forth allegations
that the District Court committed reversible error by repeatedly determining that his
claims were without merit. We disagree. It is apparent from the District Court’s order
1
Section 46-21-105(1)(a), MCA, provides in relevant part: “All grounds for relief
claimed by a petitioner under 46-21-101 must be raised in the original or amended original
petition. The original petition may be amended only once. . . .”
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that the District Court carefully reviewed Belanus’s PCR claims, analyzed each claim
under the relevant law, and reached legally supported conclusions. Consequently, the
court neither erred nor abused its broad discretion in denying Belanus’s petition for
postconviction relief on IAC grounds. We note, however, that Belanus asserts that the
District Court, relying on Rosling v. State, 2012 MT 179, ¶ 45, 366 Mont. 50, 285 P.3d
486, denied his petition because he failed “to call an expert to the stand to substantiate his
IAC claims.” While the court references Rosling in its order, it does not base its denial of
Belanus’s PCR on Belanus’s failure to put forth an expert. Rather, the court set out
independent and sufficient grounds for its ruling. Moreover, Rosling does not establish a
universal requirement for expert testimony in every postconviction petition claiming
IAC.
¶7 We acknowledge that Belanus raises issues on appeal that are separate from his
claims of IAC; however, we decline to address each of Belanus’s remaining issues
individually. Rather, having reviewed the issues, the District Court’s order, and
Belanus’s arguments on appeal, we affirm the denial of Belanus’s petition.
¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. In
the opinion of the Court, the District Court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, its
interpretation and application of the law was correct, and its ruling was not an abuse of
discretion.
¶9 Affirmed.
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/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
We Concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ JIM RICE
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