City of Polson v. v. Lovato

10/03/2017
DA 16-0497
Case Number: DA 16-0497
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 243N
CITY OF POLSON,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
VINCENT C. LOVATO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lake, Cause No. DC 15-161
Honorable Deborah Kim Christopher, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Alexander H. Pyle, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Tammy A. Hinderman,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Joshua C. Morigeau, Polson City Attorney, Polson, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 6, 2017
Decided: October 3, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Vincent Lovato appeals his sentence from the Twentieth Judicial District Court.
He asserts that the sentence was an abuse of discretion and that the District Court violated
his constitutional due process rights when it relied on materially false information. We
affirm.
¶3 After his April 2015 conviction in the Polson City Court for violating the privacy
in communication statute, § 45-8-213(1)(a), MCA, Lovato appealed to the District Court.
Upon trial de novo, a Lake County jury convicted Lovato of violating the statute by
sending threatening e-mails, texts, and voicemails to his former landlord in an effort to
recoup his safety deposit. The District Court sentenced him to six months in jail with all
but thirty days suspended and fined him $500 with all but $100 suspended, plus court
costs. Lovato had a prior disorderly conduct charge, of which the District Court was
aware, arising from an altercation with a police officer. He had received a deferred
imposition of sentence for that offense. The deferral period had expired, and the charge
had been dismissed. The District Court referred to the dismissed charge as a “prior”
during the sentencing hearing and as a “conviction” in the written judgment. Lovato
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appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion and that the
sentence was based on misinformation in violation of his due process rights.
¶4 We review sentences of less than one year of incarceration for legality and abuse
of discretion. State v. Hafner, 2010 MT 233, ¶ 13, 358 Mont. 137, 243 P.3d 435. “A
district court abuses its discretion when it acts ‘arbitrarily without conscientious
judgment’” or when its actions exceed the bounds of reason. State v. Green, 2012 MT
87, ¶ 9, 364 Mont. 515, 276 P.3d 929 (quoting State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341, ¶ 7,
353 Mont. 111, 220 P.3d 25). Due process challenges arising from sentencing present
questions of law, which we review de novo. State v. Simmons, 2011 MT 264, ¶ 9, 362
Mont. 306, 264 P.3d 706.
¶5 A sentencing court “may consider any relevant evidence relating to the
defendant’s character, history and mental condition, and any evidence the court deems
has ‘probative force.’” Simmons, ¶ 11 (quoting State v. Collier, 277 Mont. 46, 63, 919
P.2d 376, 387 (1996)); see also State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 72, 342 Mont. 1, 180
P.3d 1102; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 (1949). A
defendant has a due process right “to explain, argue, and rebut any information which
may lead to a deprivation of life or liberty.” Simmons, ¶ 11. Due process guarantees
against a sentence predicated on misinformation. Simmons, ¶ 11. Misinformation will
justify relief from a sentence only if that sentence was based on “materially false”
assumptions concerning the defendant’s criminal record or on “misinformation of
constitutional magnitude.” Bauer v. State, 1999 MT 185, ¶ 20, 295 Mont. 306, 983 P.2d
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955 (quoting Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 1255 (1948), and
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S. Ct. 589, 592 (1972)).
¶6 Lovato argues on appeal that the District Court erroneously believed that he had a
prior conviction and relied on this belief during sentencing. He points to the court’s
referring to his dismissed charge as a “prior” and as a “conviction.” He emphasizes that
the sentence he received from the District Court on de novo appeal was harsher than the
monetary fine the City Court had imposed.
¶7 Lovato is correct that a charge dismissed pursuant to a deferred imposition of
sentence is not a conviction. See State v. Tomaskie, 2007 MT 103, ¶ 12, 337 Mont. 130,
157 P.3d 691 (“A conviction does not occur until sentence is imposed.”); State v. Gladue,
209 Mont. 235, 240, 679 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1984) (holding that if a “prior, expired and
unrevoked deferred sentence should [have been] dismissed pursuant to § 46-18-204,
MCA, . . . then the defendant has no ‘conviction.’”). Lovato also is correct that the
record establishes that his disorderly conduct charge was dismissed after expiration of the
deferral period. Upon review of the complete sentencing record, however, we conclude
that the District Court did not rely on materially false information in determining his
sentence.
¶8 Although the District Court mischaracterized the dismissed charge as a prior
conviction, all of the factual information the court considered during sentencing was
accurate. When the District Court raised the prior disorderly conduct charge, the
prosecutor informed the court that “[t]here was a deferred imposition of sentence for
disorderly conduct in justice court as part of a plea agreement to wrap up three charges;”
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the prosecutor elaborated that “there was a plea agreement where he pled no contest to
disorderly conduct in exchange for the State dismissing charges for resisting arrest and
obstructing a peace officer.” Lovato’s defense attorney also explained that “[t]he only
criminal history that he has is this disorderly conduct conviction that was dismissed
pursuant to a deferred sentence.” When the court later asked for clarification on whether
the current offense had occurred during the time of the deferral for the disorderly conduct
charge and whether the disorderly conduct charge was in fact dismissed, defense counsel
explained that the deferred sentence had been dismissed from Lovato’s public records,
and the prosecutor informed her that the county was aware of the current prosecution and
had not filed any new charges. The District Court responded, “[v]ery well,” and did not
discuss the issue any further during the hearing.
¶9 As the recitation of the record above shows, all of the factual information
presented to the District Court was accurate, despite any mischaracterization of the
dismissed charges by the court. Further, after the discussions about Lovato’s prior
criminal record, the court went on to explain in detail the reasoning behind the sentence,
which did not include a reference to the dismissed charge. The court focused on the facts
that Lovato had had a long career as a journalist and he knew and understood the
limitations of free speech protections; that he knew how to use the civil legal system to
resolve the dispute and that he in fact successfully pursued a claim against his landlord in
the Small Claims Division of the Lake County Justice Court; that the e-mails, texts, and
voicemails he sent were frightening, especially those regarding his landlord’s mother-
in-law, wife, and daughter; and that Lovato did not seem to understand that his
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threatening words had an impact. In addition, the District Court referenced various
instances of Lovato’s lack of respect for the court throughout trial and during his
testimony. Under these circumstances, the sentence was not based on “materially false”
assumptions concerning Lovato’s criminal record. Bauer, ¶ 20 (quoting Townsend, 334
U.S. at 741, 68 S. Ct. at 1255).
¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal
presents no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent or modify
existing precedent. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Lovato and that the sentence did not violate due process. The District Court’s
judgment is affirmed.
/S/ BETH BAKER
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
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