Estate of Peltomaa

No. 80-418
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
I N THE PUTTER O F THE ESTATE OF
JACK LYLE PELTOMAA, D e c e a s e d .
A p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of S i l v e r B o w , T h e H o n o r a b l e
A r n o l d O l s e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For Appellant:
W. D. M u r r a y , J r . , B u t t e , Montana
For R e s p o n d e n t :
N e i l J. L y n c h , Butte, Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s ; A p r i l 22, 1981
Decided : f l H 1 7 18
99
Filed; 3UN 1 1 198ii
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This appeal arises from an order of the Silver Bow
County District Court, the Honorable Arnold Olsen presiding,
wherein the court dismissed appellant's petition for formal
intestacy proceedings, after finding that appellant was not
the common-law wife of the deceased, Jack Lyle Peltomaa, and
had no interest in his estate.
Jack L. Peltomaa died intestate on June 11, 1979.
Decedent's brother, respondent herein, filed an application
for informal appointment of personal representative on
August 1, 1979. On the same day, letters were issued
appointing respondent personal representative.
Upon learning of the application and appointment,
appellant, Debbie Guardipee, on March 19, 1980, filed a
petition for formal determination of intestacy,
determination of heirs, for supervised administration, and
appointment of personal representative. In filing the
petition for formal proceedings, appellant sought to have
her self determined to be the surviving common-law spouse
and, therefore, heir and to have herself appointed personal
representative under a supervised administration of the
estate.
Respondent filed objections to the petition and
brought to the court's attention an agreement signed by both
appellant and respondent. The agreement was dated June 15,
1979, and provided:
'I.. . in view of the renunciation by DEBBIE
GARDIPEE [sic] [appellant] in the Estate of
JACK1E LYLE PELTOMAA, the PELTOMAA FAMILY
conveys to DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] all of the
household and personal property that may be
in the possession of the PELTOMAA FAMILY
because of the death of JACKIE LYLE PELTOMAA.
"The PELTOMAA FAMILY will pay for any
outstanding debts that DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic]
may have at the present time."
After a hearing, the District Court denied all of
appellant's contentions concerning her status as the
surviving common-law spouse and dismissed her formal
petition, granting respondent the right to continue an
informal administration of the estate as personal
representative.
The main issue before this Court is whether the
District Court erred in failing to find appellant the
decedent's common-law wife. In this regard, appellant
alleges that the existence of a marital relationship between
her and the decedent is supported by the following evidence
and testimony presented to the District Court during the
hearing on the petition:
(1) Appellant testified that she had lived with the
decedent from February 1976 until his death and that she
considered herself married to him. Appellant further
testified that the decedent represented to others that
appellant was his wife; that the decedent's aunt introduced
her to some friends as Debbie Peltomaa; and that title to
her car was in both appellant's and the decedent's name (the
actual title was never produced at trial).
(2) Respondent testified that various debts paid in
behalf of appellant, in accordance with the June 15, 1979,
agreement, represented monies owed by both appellant and the
decedent. In particular, respondent testified that a
Household Finance bill represented monies obtained by
appellant and the decedent to pay for the purchase of a
television and to pay for their moving expenses. Appellant
also points to testimony by respondent that he and his
f a m i l y have p a i d a p p e l l a n t $1,000, p a r t i a l l y o b t a i n e d from
t h e s e l l i n g of the trailer d e c e d e n t was l i v i n g in a t the
time of h i s d e a t h . ( A p p e l l a n t a d m i t t e d , however, t h a t t i t l e
t o t h e t r a i l e r was i n d e c e d e n t ' s name, although the rented
s p a c e was in both their names. Respondent contends the
title was not in appellant's name or in the decedent's
name. )
( 3 ) A p e r i o d i c s t a t e m e n t from M o u n t a i n B e l l F e d e r a l
Credit Union was submitted i n d i c a t i n g p a y m e n t s made on a
l o a n g i v e n t o a p p e l l a n t u n d e r t h e name D e b b i e K . P e l t o m a a .
( 4 ) Appellant introduced a hospital b i l l dated April
24, 1 9 7 9 , which l i s t s a p p e l l a n t ' s name a s Mrs. Debbie K.
(Guardipee) Peltomaa and which indicates t h a t Jack L.
P e l t o m a a is h e r h u s b a n d . Appellant contends the b i l l a l s o
shows that the decedent maintained a medical insurance
p o l i c y on h e r a s h i s w i f e . (Upon e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e b i l l ,
h o w e v e r , we s h o u l d n o t e i t m e r e l y l i s t s J a c k P e l t o m a a a s t h e
"responsible party or n e x t of kin" and states: "doesn' t
know what kind" of insurance is a v a i l a b l e . There i s no
i n d i c a t i o n on t h e b i l l t h a t a p p e l l a n t was a c t u a l l y c o v e r e d
by a n i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y a s t h e d e c e d e n t ' s w i f e . )
( 5 ) Appellant also introduced a 1978 f e d e r a l income
tax return filed jointly by decedent and appellant as
h u s b a n d and w i f e .
Respondent claims that in light of all the above
evidence, appellant has still failed to establish the
e x i s t e n c e of a common-law m a r r i a g e .
I n support of h i s p o s i t i o n , respondent contends t h a t
h i s b r o t h e r n e v e r c o n s i d e r e d h i m s e l f m a r r i e d and was m e r e l y
living with appellant. Respondent further argues that
appellant only represented herself a s Mrs. P e l t o m a a when i t
was t o h e r f i n a n c i a l b e n e f i t ( i . e . , i n b o r r o w i n g money o r i n
filing a joint tax return) and points out that the only
t e s t i m o n y used i n support of appellant's position a r e her
own s e l f - s e r v i n g statements. If a p p e l l a n t had b e e n l i v i n g
w i t h t h e d e c e d e n t a s h u s b a n d and w i f e f o r o v e r t h r e e y e a r s ,
why was s h e u n a b l e t o p r o d u c e a n o t h e r w i t n e s s t o c o r r o b o r a t e
her allegations?
Respondent also notes testimony to the effect that
a p p e l l a n t was n o t l i v i n g w i t h t h e d e c e d e n t a t t h e time o f
h i s death; that a f t e r being informed of decedent's death,
appellant indicated that their r e l a t i o n s h i p was a l r e a d y a t
an end; that appellant did nothing about the funeral
arrangements and that she signed the June 15 agreement,
renouncing any i n t e r e s t i n d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e w i t h t h e name
Debbie G u a r d i p e e , n o t Debbie Peltomaa.
To e s t a b l i s h a common-law m a r r i a g e i t h a s been h e l d
t h a t t h e proponent must prove:
". . . t h a t t h e p a r t i e s were c a p a b l e of
c o n s e n t i n g t o t h e m a r r i a g e and t h e r e was
m u t u a l and p u b l i c a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l
relation. The m a r r i a g e m u s t t a k e i m m e d i a t e l y
and i t c a n n o t be c r e a t e d p i e c e m e a l . I t comes
i n s t a n t l y i n t o b e i n g , o r i t d o e s n o t come a t
a l l ; and i t s p a r t i e s must e n t e r i n t o a c o u r s e
of conduct t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r e p u t e a s hus-
band and w i f e . " I n Re M c C l e l l a n d ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8
Mont. 1 6 0 , 164-165, 5 4 1 P.2d 780, 783.
See a l s o Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont.
210, 448 P.2d 148; Elliot v. Industrial Accident Board
( 1 9 3 6 ) , 1 0 1 Mont. 246, 53 P.2d 451.
I n considering the t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d
i n t h i s m a t t e r , we n o t e t h a t t h e f a c t s u s e d t o s u p p o r t t h e
existence of a common-law marriage are mere isolated
instances i n which a p p e l l a n t allegedly represented herself
a s decedent's wife. The facts fail to show any s p e c i f i c
agreement between appellant and the decedent concerning
marriage; they do not estabish a continuous marital
r e l a t i o n s h i p and a r e i n c o n f l i c t w i t h t e s t i m o n y p r e s e n t e d by
respondent.
T h i s Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held that the evidence
p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t m u s t be viewed by u s i n a l i g h t
most favorable to the prevailing party. If there is
credible evidence consistent with the findings of the
District Court, those findings will not be disturbed on
appeal. See Olson v. Westfork P r o p e r t i e s , I n c . ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 171
Mont. 154, 557 P.2d 821; C i t y of M i s s o u l a v. Rose (1974),
164 Mont. 9 0 , 519 P.2d 1 4 6 . I n s o reviewing t h e proceedings
of t h e lower c o u r t h e r e , w e f i n d no e r r o r in the District
Court's conclusion that appellant and the decedent never
consummated, either formally or informally, a marital
relationship.
Appellant has raised a second issue on appeal in
contending that the District Court was in error for
dismissing her petition for formal proceedings. In
rejecting appellant's argument, we need only note that
appellant's alleged interest i n t h e e s t a t e of t h e decedent
is based s o l e l y on h e r contention t h a t she is a surviving
spouse. Having already determined that appellant and
decedent never consummated a marital relationship, and in
further acknowledging the existence of appellant's signed
renunciation agreement, this Court must agree with the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a s no interest
in the estate and find that the petition was properly
dismissed.
The order of dismissal as entered by the District
Court is a f f i r m e d .
Justice
We concur: