City of Kalispell v. Omyer Athy

March 15 2016
DA 14-0511
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 63
CITY OF KALISPELL,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
TYLER OMYER, CALVIN ATHY and
GLORIA FERRARI,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause Nos. DC-13-326A, 13-263A
and 13-264A
Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Natalie Wicklund, Assistant
Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana
For Appellees:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss,
Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Charles A. Harball, Kalispell City Attorney, Emily Von Jentzen,
Assistant City Attorney; Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 27, 2016
Decided: March 15, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Gloria Ferrari, Calvin Athy, and Tyler Omyer (jointly Appellants) were convicted
in the City of Kalispell Municipal Court of various traffic violations including driving
with a suspended license. They appealed their convictions to the Eleventh Judicial
District Court, Flathead County. After the District Court affirmed the convictions, they
appealed separately to this Court. While the factual backgrounds differ slightly, the legal
issue and analysis are identical; therefore we have consolidated these cases for the
purpose of appeal and this Opinion. Attorney Greg Rapkoch represented each of the
Appellants in the Municipal and District Courts. Assistant Appellate Defender Natalie
Wicklund represented all of the Appellants before this Court. We affirm.
ISSUES
1. Did the District Court err in failing to determine whether § 61-5-212, MCA,
imposed absolute liability on each of the Appellants?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by holding that the evidentiary
“letters of suspension” were admissible as “certified copies of public records”
under M. R. Evid. 904 (Rule 904)?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gloria Ferrari
¶2 On June 20, 2010, Gloria Ferrari was cited by Kalispell Police Officer A.J.
McDonnell for various traffic violations including driving with a suspended license. The
Kalispell Municipal Court conducted a bench trial on May 30, 2013. Ferrari was
represented by appointed counsel Rapkoch but was not in attendance. McDonnell
presented Ferrari’s “Certified Driver Record” generated by the State of Montana
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Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division (MVD), as well as six letters from MVD
to Ferrari informing her that her license was suspended. Counsel objected to the
suspension letters as hearsay and in violation of Ferrari’s United States and Montana
constitutional rights to confrontation. The Municipal Court admitted the evidence over
counsel’s objection. Ferrari was found guilty and sentenced to 180 days in jail with 178
suspended and fined $325.00. She appealed to the District Court.
Calvin Athy
¶3 On September 10, 2012, Calvin Athy was cited by Officer Stan Ottosen of the
Kalispell Police Department for multiple traffic violations including driving with a
suspended license. At the May 30, 2013 Municipal Court bench trial, Athy was
represented by Rapkoch but Athy did not attend the trial. Ottosen testified at Athy’s trial
and presented Athy’s “Certified Driver Record” as well as three letters from MVD to
Athy notifying him that his license was suspended. Counsel objected to the letters on
hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds but the Municipal Court admitted the evidence
and found Athy guilty. Athy was sentenced to a 180-day jail sentence with 178 days
suspended and fined $325.00. On June 11, 2013, Athy appealed his judgment to the
District Court.
Tyler Omyer
¶4 On December 8, 2012, Tyler Omyer was cited by Sargent Allen Bardwell of the
Kalispell Police Department for multiple traffic violations including driving a motor
vehicle with a suspended license. The Kalispell Municipal Court conducted a bench trial
on June 27, 2013, at which Omyer was present and represented by Rapkoch. Bardwell
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presented Omyer’s “Certified Driver Record” as well as six letters sent by MVD to
Omyer notifying him that his driver’s license was suspended for reasons stated in the
letters. Omyer objected to the admission of the MVD suspension letters on hearsay and
Confrontation Clause grounds. The Municipal Court admitted the evidence, convicted
Omyer of all offenses, and sentenced him to 180 days in jail with 178 suspended. The
court allowed him to serve his time at the community car wash or the animal shelter.
Additionally, he was fined $325.00. On July 25, 2013, Omyer appealed to the District
Court.
¶5 The three cases were consolidated by the District Court for purposes of appeal.
Counsel for the Appellants had not objected to, nor did he appeal, the Municipal Court’s
admission of the “Certified Driving Record” for each defendant as each record
unequivocally established that the license for each driver was suspended at the time of the
traffic stops and of citations to each. Rather, counsel argued that conviction of the
offense of driving with a suspended license required the City to prove that each defendant
had a culpable mental state, i.e., that they “knew” their licenses were suspended at the
time of their offenses. Counsel claimed that the only evidence presented of the
Appellants’ knowledge of their suspensions were the MVD suspension letters. Counsel
asserted that these letters were inadmissible because they contained “testimonial hearsay”
subject to the protections of the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Montana
Constitutions. The certificate of mailing language stamped onto the bottom of each
notification letter and challenged by the Appellants read:
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The undersigned hereby testifies that on the date below, he or she, as an
officer or employee of the motor vehicle division, deposited in the United
States mail at Helena, Montana, a copy of the paper to which this is affixed,
in an envelope with the postage prepaid, addressed to the person named in
the paper at his or her last address as shown by the records of the
Department.
________________________________________________
Date Officer or Employee of Department
Counsel argued that this language constituted testimony and was included in letters that
were “prepared in anticipation of use at trial to prove historical facts relevant to
prosecution.” Counsel claimed that had the evidence been properly excluded, there
would have been no evidence presented at trial establishing a “knowing” culpable mental
state and Appellants could not have been convicted under § 61-5-212, MCA.
¶6 The City of Kalispell responded that the MVD letters were properly admitted as
self-authenticating business records under § 61-11-102, MCA, and Rule 902(4) of the
Montana Rules of Evidence. The City further argued that the challenged letters did not
constitute testimonial evidence triggering the Confrontation Clause and were admissible
under Rule 803(8), M. R. Evid. Lastly, the City countered that under § 26-1-602(24),
MCA, it is presumed that a correctly addressed and mailed letter is received by the
intended recipient and none of the Appellants rebutted this presumption at trial.
¶7 The District Court determined that the stamped certificates of mailing included in
each suspension letter did not constitute testimonial hearsay; rather, the letters were
certified copies of public records and were admissible under Rules 902(4) and 803(8) of
the Montana Rules of Evidence. The court also concluded that Appellants had not
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rebutted the statutory presumption that they had received the suspension letters; therefore,
the court presumed receipt.
¶8 Appellants filed timely appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 Section 3-6-110, MCA, governing a district court’s review of a municipal court’s
ruling, confines the district court’s review to the record and questions of law. Section
3-6-110(1), MCA. In turn, when this Court reviews the district court, we undertake an
independent examination of the record apart from the district court’s decision and will
“affirm the district court when it reaches the right result, even if it reaches the right result
for the wrong reason.” State v. Gai, 2012 MT 235, ¶ 11, 366 Mont. 408, 288 P.3d 164.
Based upon our review of the trial court’s record, we review the trial court’s factual
findings under the clearly erroneous standard, its discretionary rulings for an abuse of
discretion, and its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Ellison, 2012 MT 50, ¶ 8,
364 Mont. 276, 272 P.3d 646.
DISCUSSION
¶10 Each of the Appellants was convicted under § 61-5-212, MCA, which provides, in
relevant part:
(1)(a) A person commits the offense of driving a motor vehicle without a
valid license or without statutory exemption or during a suspension or
revocation period if the person drives:
(i) a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at a time when the
person’s privilege to drive or apply for and be issued a driver’s license is
suspended or revoked in this state or any other state . . . .
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¶11 Appellants assert on appeal that the District Court abused its discretion by
admitting testimonial hearsay evidence at trial in violation of the Confrontation Clauses
of the Montana and the United States Constitutions. They claim that testimonial hearsay
is “an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and where the
declarant spoke in a manner as to create evidence.” They explain that in this case
“unknown government agents purport to testify in writing that [defendant] should have
had notice and knowledge of her [or his] suspended license.” Appellants claim that
testimonial hearsay is only permissible if a court determines a declarant is unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. They argue this did not
occur. They request that we reverse and remand for new trials with instructions that the
trial court reject admission of the suspension letters.
¶12 The State counters that the suspension letters were not testimonial hearsay but
were contemporaneous business records created for the administration of the MVD’s
operations and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial. As such
the letters were admissible. Additionally, the State asserts that even if the letters were
erroneously admitted, the error was harmless because “driving with a suspended license”
is an absolute liability offense that does not require knowledge of the suspension.
¶13 1. Did the District Court err in failing to determine whether § 61-5-212, MCA,
imposed absolute liability on each of the Appellants?
¶14 We first address the State’s assertion that § 61-5-212, MCA, establishes that
driving with a suspended license is an absolute liability offense which does not require
proof of a mental state. Notably, we have not decided previously whether this offense
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requires proof of a mental state or is an absolute liability offense. To determine whether
the legislature intended an offense to be an absolute liability offense we look to
the language of the statute and the statute’s apparent purpose. State v. Huebner,
252 Mont. 184, 827 P.2d 1260 (1992).
¶15 In Huebner, we concluded that § 87-3-102, MCA, prohibiting someone from
killing a game animal and abandoning the meat, or removing only the parts suitable for
trophy mounting, was an absolute liability statute based upon the State’s responsibility
for protecting public wildlife resources. Huebner, 252 Mont. at 188, 827 Mont. at 1263.
We relied upon § 45-2-104, MCA, which currently provides that “A person may be guilty
of an offense without having, as to each element of the offense, one of the mental states
of knowingly, negligently, or purposely only if the offense is punishable by a fine not
exceeding $500 or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose
to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.” Huebner, 252 Mont. at 188,
827 Mont. at 1263. Applying a previous, but similar, version of § 45-2-104, MCA
(1991), the Huebner Court determined that the language of the statute indicated a
legislative purpose to impose absolute liability.
¶16 Turning to § 61-5-212, MCA, the statute does not contain any reference to a
mental state, such as knowingly or purposely. It is clear based upon the many statutes in
which the Legislature requires a specific mental state, for example, §§ 45-5-102,
45-5-201, 45-5-202, and 45-6-204, MCA, that had the Legislature intended to require one
for this statute, it would have done so. Additionally, the legislative purpose of the statute
is not difficult to discern. The State has a compelling interest in keeping unsafe drivers
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off the road, especially drivers whose privileges have been suspended for various reasons
such as unsafe driving, driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or driving
without liability insurance. State v. Pyette, 2007 MT 119, ¶ 27, 337 Mont. 265,
159 0P.3d 232.
¶17 Furthermore, while we note that § 45-2-104, MCA, is written in the disjunctive
and requires only that the statutory penalty not exceed $500 or that the statute clearly
indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability, in this case both requirements
are met in that § 61-5-212(1)(b)(i), MCA, provides with some exceptions, that a person
convicted of driving during a period of license suspension may be fined “not more than
$500.” For these reasons, we conclude that the statute clearly indicates a legislative
purpose to impose absolute liability and that conviction under this statute does not require
a culpable mental state.
¶18 The elements of driving while suspended include driving “a motor vehicle on any
public highway” when the driver’s “privilege to drive . . . is suspended.” The evidence
presented in each of the Appellant’s trials through admission of their Certified Driver
Records established that they drove vehicles upon the public roads of this State while
their licenses were suspended. As these were the only requirements necessary for
conviction under § 61-5-212, MCA, the Municipal Court did not err in convicting the
Appellants nor did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court. As we
indicated above, we will not overturn a district court when it reaches the right result, even
if it reaches the right result for a different or a wrong reason. Gai, ¶ 11.
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¶19 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by holding that the evidentiary
“letters of suspension” were admissible as “certified copies of public records”
under M. R. Evid. 904 (Rule 904)?
¶20 We next address the Appellants’ assertion that the letters notifying them of their
suspensions contained “testimonial hearsay” and should not have been admitted or used
to support their convictions. As indicated above, the District Court affirmed the
Municipal Court’s admission of the suspension letters, finding them to be certified copies
of public records under Rule 902(4). The court further determined they were not
testimonial in nature and were appropriately admitted under the public records hearsay
exception set forth in Rule 803.
¶21 Rule 803(8), M. R. Evid. provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
. . .
(8) Public records and reports. To the extent not otherwise provided in this
paragraph, records, reports, statements, or data compilations in any form of
a public office or agency setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly
recorded activities, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law
and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings resulting
from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. The
following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule: (i) investigative
reports by police and other law enforcement personnel; (ii) investigative
reports prepared by or for a government, a public office, or an agency when
offered by it in a case in which it is a party; (iii) factual findings offered by
the government in criminal cases; (iv) factual findings resulting from
special investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident; and (v) any
matter as to which the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trust worthiness.
Rule 902(4), M. R. Evid. provides:
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility
is not required with respect to the following:
. . .
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(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or report
or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed
and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations
in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized
to make the certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2),
or (3) or complying with any law of the United States or of this state.
¶22 In Billings v. Lindell, 236 Mont. 519, 771 P.2d 134 (1989), we addressed the
self-authenticating nature of the MVD’s driving records. We explained that the MVD
has the duty to maintain records of license convictions and that it would be unreasonable
for a custodian of the department to be present in court each time a record was necessary
for a trial. Billings, 236 Mont. at 521, 771 P.2d at 136. We discussed some of the
various methods developed by the Legislature through which authenticity is taken as
established for purposes of admissibility. Two such methods were Rules 803(8) and
902(4), M. R. Evid. Billings, 236 Mont. at 521-22, 771 P.2d at 136. Based upon the
plain language of these rules, the statutorily-mandated purpose of MVD’s
record-keeping, and our analysis in Billings, we conclude the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in holding that the suspension letters were admissible under Rules 803 and
904.
¶23 Lastly, we note that our ruling is consistent with multiple U. S. Supreme Court
decisions. That Court distinguishes between testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay, but
has repeatedly declined to offer an exhaustive or comprehensive definition of
“testimonial.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004).
See also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006).
However, in Davis, the U. S. Supreme Court declared that statements are testimonial
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when their “primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
Subsequently, in Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), the
Court further elaborated that “[b]usiness and public records are generally admissible
absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but
because—having been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324, 129 S. Ct. at 2539-40.
¶24 In the case at bar, as in Melendez-Diaz, the primary purpose of the MVD’s
suspension letters is not to provide evidence in future criminal prosecutions but rather to
notify drivers of a license suspension and to create a statutorily-mandated database of
driver’s license records. It is realistic to presume that the vast majority of suspension
letters, and other MVD documentation, exist within the agency’s database and printed
copies are never generated for purposes of criminal prosecutions. This analysis supports
our conclusion that driver’s records are created for the administration of the MVD’s
affairs and not for the purpose of proving a fact at trial.
CONCLUSION
¶25 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the District Court neither erred nor abused
its discretion in affirming the Municipal Court’s convictions and judgments of the
Appellants.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
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We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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