State v. J. Stewart

02/21/2017
DA 15-0398
Case Number: DA 15-0398
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 32STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JAMES MICHAEL STEWART,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 13-635
Honorable Mary Jane Knisely, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Alexander H. Pyle, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Scott D. Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Robert S. Spoja, Deputy
County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 4, 2017
Decided: February 21, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 James Michael Stewart (Stewart) appeals the order entered by the Thirteenth
Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denying his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Speedy Trial. We affirm and restate the issue on appeal.
Did the District Court err by denying Stewart’s speedy trial motion?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 After leading officers on a high-speed chase, Stewart was arrested on August 3,
2013, in Yellowstone County, and charged with Criminal Endangerment, Driving Under
the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, Operation of a Motor Vehicle by a Person with
Alcohol Concentration of 0.08% or more, Fleeing from or Eluding a Peace Officer, and
Driving While Privilege to do so is Suspended or Revoked. He posted bond on August 6,
2013, and was released.
¶3 Nine days later, Stewart was arrested on a warrant issued by Silver Bow County,
where he was charged with Partner or Family Member Assault (PFMA). Stewart could
not obtain bail, and was detained in the Butte-Silver Bow Detention Center during that
proceeding. Thus, Stewart’s Silver Bow County case proceeded simultaneously with his
Yellowstone County case. The timelines of these two cases intersect and, while this
appeal concerns the Yellowstone County case, it is necessary to consider relevant events
from both cases.1 The table below summarizes the key events in both cases leading to his
motion to dismiss his Yellowstone County charges for lack of speedy trial:
1
The record before us includes both the Yellowstone County and Silver Bow County cases.
2
Date County Event/Action
Aug. 3, 2013 Yellowstone Stewart arrested in Yellowstone County
Aug. 6, 2013 Yellowstone Stewart released on bond
Aug. 15, 2013 Yellowstone Stewart arraigned; Plead not guilty; First trial date set for
(9:35 am) Feb. 12, 2014
Aug. 15, 2013 Silver Bow Stewart arrested on Silver Bow County warrant for
(8:12 pm) PFMA
Aug. 15, 2013- Silver Bow Detained in Butte-Silver Bow County Detention Center;
Jan. 8, 2014 Charged; Arraigned; Trial set for Jan. 21, 2014; Denial
of Motion to be Released on Own Recognizance;
Omnibus hearing
Jan. 8, 2014 Silver Bow Letter from Stewart complaining about his public
defender and complementing Yellowstone County on
efficiently handling his case there
Jan. 23, 2014 Silver Bow Stewart enters guilty plea to PFMA (would later move to
withdraw this plea)
Jan. 23, 2014- Silver Bow Before sentencing occurred on Nov. 19, 2015, Stewart
Nov. 19, 2015 filed numerous pleadings regarding withdrawal of his
guilty plea, habeas corpus, and complaints about counsel
Jan. 27, 2014 Yellowstone Stewart files Motion to Continue Trial
Jan. 31, 2014 Yellowstone Stewart files Waiver of Speedy Trial
Jan. 31, 2014 Yellowstone Order Resetting Trial for May 5, 2014
May 6, 2014 Yellowstone Stewart files Motion to Continue Trial
May 16, 2014 Yellowstone Stewart files Waiver of Speedy Trial
May 30, 2014 Yellowstone Order Resetting Trial for Sept. 16, 2014
Sept. 3-5, 2014 Yellowstone State and Stewart file separate Status Reports requesting
a jury not be assembled
Nov. 7, 2014 Yellowstone State files Motion to Transfer Defendant
Nov. 7, 2014 Yellowstone Order Granting State’s Motion to Transfer Defendant
Nov. 13, 2014 Yellowstone Order Resetting Trial for Mar. 2, 2015
Jan. 22, 2015 Yellowstone Stewart files Motion for Substitution of Judge, granted
Mar. 3, 2015 Yellowstone Order Resetting Trial for Apr. 20, 2015
Mar. 12, 2015 Yellowstone Stewart files Speedy Trial motion
Mar. 17, 2015 Yellowstone Stewart writes complaining of counsel; Order Setting
Finley Hearing for Apr. 6, 2015
Mar. 27, 2015 Yellowstone Extension of time granted until Apr. 7, 2015
Mar. 30, 2015 Yellowstone Order Resetting Hearing for Apr. 13, 2015
Apr. 13, 2015 Yellowstone Finley Hearing held; Stewart stated he was satisfied with
counsel
Apr. 17, 2015 Yellowstone Order denying Stewart’s speedy trial motion
Apr. 20-21, 2015 Yellowstone Jury trial; Stewart found guilty of two charges
3
¶4 In response to Stewart’s speedy trial motion, the Yellowstone County District
Court determined that the Yellowstone County proceeding began on August 3, 2013,
when Stewart was arrested, and ended for purposes of the speedy trial clock on April 20,
2015, when Stewart’s Yellowstone County trial commenced. The District Court thus
determined that a total of 6262 days had passed between the two dates, which the District
Court divided and attributed as follows:
Beginning Ending Event, Length Party Responsible for Delay and
Event, Date Date of Delay Reason for Delay
Arrest First trial date 1943 State
Aug. 3, 2013 Feb. 12, 2014 Institutional delay
First trial date Second trial date 82 Defendant
Feb. 12, 2014 May 5, 2014 Waiver of speedy trial
Second trial date Third trial date 134 Defendant
May 5, 2014 Sept. 16, 2014 Waiver of speedy trial
Third trial date Fourth trial date 167 Defendant
Sept. 16, 2014 Mar. 2, 2015 Indicated he would change plea;
Filed Status Report requesting that a
jury not be assembled;
Motion for Substitution of Judge
Fourth trial date Fifth trial date 49 State
Mar. 2, 2015 Apr. 20, 2015 Institutional delay
The District Court found the State responsible for 243 days of delay and Stewart
responsible for 383 days of delay. The District Court determined that Stewart had not
been prejudiced by the delay, and held that Stewart had not been denied his constitutional
right to a speedy trial.
¶5 Stewart appeals.
2
The parties agree the calculation is actually 625 days.
3
The District Court calculated this length to be 194 days; however, it is actually 193 days.
4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 A speedy trial violation presents a question of constitutional law, which we review
de novo to determine whether the court correctly interpreted and applied the law. State
v. Butterfly, 2016 MT 195, ¶ 6, 384 Mont. 287, 377 P.3d 1191 (citing State v.
Zimmerman, 2014 MT 173, ¶ 11, 375 Mont. 374, 328 P.3d 1132). We review the factual
findings underlying a speedy trial analysis for clear error. State v. Morsette, 2013 MT
270, ¶ 12, 372 Mont. 38, 309 P.3d 978 (citing State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶ 119, 338
Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815).
DISCUSSION
¶7 Did the District Court err in denying Stewart’s speedy trial motion?
¶8 The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the
Montana Constitution. Reviewing courts must analyze speedy trial motions by balancing
four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the accused’s
assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the accused as a result of
the delay. Ariegwe, ¶ 20. No single factor is dispositive and each must be considered
under the totality of the relevant circumstances. Ariegwe, ¶ 112. The delay threshold to
trigger a speedy trial analysis is 200 days. Arigewe, ¶ 41. Here the total length of delay
was 625 days, making a speedy trial analysis necessary.
Factor One: The Length of the Delay
¶9 There is no dispute that the length of delay was 625 days. The length of the delay
extended 425 days beyond the 200-day threshold.
5
Factor Two: The Reason for the Delay
¶10 Under Ariegwe’s second factor, the causes of the delay are considered. Ariegwe,
¶ 113. Delays are divided into periods of time and attributed to the appropriate party.
Ariegwe, ¶ 113. Further, we assign weight to the period based on the specific cause and
motive for the delay. Ariegwe, ¶ 67. Because “[t]he prosecution bears the burden of
explaining pretrial delays[,]” Ariegwe, ¶ 113, the longer the delay extends beyond the
200-day threshold, the more weight we assign to the State. Ariegwe, ¶ 49. However, any
added weight assigned to the State does not relieve the defendant from providing
evidence of prejudice. Ariegwe, ¶ 51. Finally, a valid reason for the delay is assigned
less weight than other causes of delay. Ariegwe, ¶ 70.
¶11 Stewart does not contest the District Court’s assignment of the 193 days between
his arrest and the first trial date, and the 49 days between the fourth trial date and his trial
to the State. Additionally, Stewart concedes that the 82 days between the first trial date
and second trial date, and the 134 days between the second trial date and the third trial
date, totaling 216 days, were appropriately assigned to him by the District Court because
he twice sought continuances of these trial dates and waived his right to a speedy trial.
However, Stewart asks that the circumstances contributing to his continuances and
waivers be considered and that less weight be assigned to those 216 days because he
“actively sought his transportation to Billings during this time period but was stymied.”
However, the circumstances giving rise to Stewart’s continuance requests were Stewart’s
decisions for which Yellowstone County bore no responsibility. These periods clearly
weigh heavily against Stewart’s position in the overall analysis.
6
¶12 The parties’ primary disagreement under factor two is the 167-day delay between
the third and fourth trial dates. Stewart argues that, because the State is responsible for
bringing a defendant to trial, it should be assigned these days. During this period, both
Stewart and the State filed Status Reports asking that the District Court “not assemble a
jury.” Stewart’s report further advised the District Court that “a change of plea has
occurred or is scheduled.” He also explained that the “Defendant is in Butte jail on other
charges—Defense and Prosecution are seeking to have Defendant appear via transport or
video for COP [(change of plea)] hearing.” From the record it appears that both sides
were working together to arrange Stewart’s appearance by video to change his plea.
However, these efforts failed. In the order resetting the trial for March 2, 2016, the
District Court cited Stewart’s Status Report as the reason the “trial date of September
16th, 2014[,] had passed with no resolution.”
¶13 Delays during this period were occasioned by Stewart’s representations regarding
an intention to enter a plea and to arrange an appearance. However, the State must not
lose sight of its responsibility to bring a matter to trial, even when an apparently
cooperative defendant seeks delay of the trial for purposes of entering a plea. While
much of the delay in this period is Stewart’s responsibility, the State also bears some
responsibility for allowing time to elapse before filing a motion, in November 2014, to
transfer Stewart. Of course, Stewart then responded, not by entering a plea, but by
moving to substitute the judge, filing complaints against his attorney, and proceeding to
trial. Given Stewart’s actions, he bears primary responsibility for the delay during this
period.
7
Factor Three: The Accused Response to the Delay
¶14 Factor three “serves as an indicator of whether the accused actually wanted a
speedy trial.” Ariegwe, ¶ 84. We take an integrated approach and must evaluate the
“surrounding circumstances” to determine “the accused’s various responses to the
delays.” Ariegwe, ¶ 85. “[C]onduct demonstrating a desire to avoid trial weighs against
the accused in the overall balancing.” Ariegwe, ¶ 85; State v. Reynolds, 2017 MT 25,
¶ 29, 386 Mont. 267, ___ P.3d ___ (under factor three, defendant “deliberately avoided
apprehension and indicated no interest at all in having a speedy trial”).
¶15 Stewart twice waived his right to a speedy trial, filed a status report requesting that
a jury not be assembled, gave assurances of his intent to enter a guilty plea, then moved
for substitution of the judge, and made complaints about his attorney, which resulted in
an unnecessary4 Finley hearing. This factor weighs heavily against Stewart.
Factor Four: Prejudice to the Accused
¶16 Under factor four, we determine if the accused has been prejudiced by the delay.
Ariegwe, ¶ 86. “[T]he speedy trial guarantee ‘does not purport to protect a defendant
from all [of the] effects flowing from a delay before trial.’” Ariegwe, ¶ 86 (emphasis in
original) (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311, 106 S. Ct. 648, 654
(1985)). According to our speedy trial analysis there are three key factors to consider:
(1) the nature of the incarceration; (2) the amount of disruption the incarceration has
caused to the accused’s life; (3) the accused’s ability to present an effective defense.
4
At the April 13, 2015 Finley hearing, Stewart testified that his defense counsel “is fine. I mean
[I] am satisfied with [defense counsel].”
8
Ariegwe, ¶ 113. Of these three factors, the accused’s ability to present an effective
defense is the most important. Ariegwe, ¶ 98.
¶17 Stewart and the State agree that his ability to present an effective defense was not
prejudiced by his incarceration or by the delay. Instead, Stewart argues that his
incarceration was oppressive, due to its length. He also asserts that the pretrial
incarceration in Silver Bow County deprived him of the possibility a concurrent sentence
and was prejudicial. The State responds that Stewart was released on bail on the
Yellowstone County case and, but for his arrest in the Silver Bow case, he would not
have been incarcerated at all. The State cites our holding in Butterfly that incarceration
resulting from “previous felonies unrelated” to the case at issue are not oppressive.
Butterfly, ¶ 38. We agree that Stewart’s Silver Bow County detention is not considered
oppressive for purposes of his Yellowstone County case.
Balancing
¶18 Stewart was responsible for much more of the delay than the State. While the
State bears some responsibility for the 425 days of delay beyond the 200-day threshold,
the primary responsibility for this delay lies with Stewart. Factors two, three, and four
all weigh against Stewart, and the overall balancing, clearly, weighs against his claim.
Thus, we conclude that the District Court correctly denied Stewart’s motion to dismiss
for lack of speedy trial.
¶19 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
9
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
10