Robaks v. Ravalli County

May 7 2015
DA 14-0618
Case Number: DA 14-0618
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2015 MT 126N
TOM ROBAK and CHARLOTTE ROBAK,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
RAVALLI COUNTY,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DV 2008-472
Honorable James A. Haynes, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Arthur V. Wittich, Michael L. Rabb, Wittich Ogburn, P.C.,
Bozeman, Montana
For Appellee:
Bill Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Howard F. Recht, Deputy County
Attorney, Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 1, 2015
Decided: May 7, 2015
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by unpublished opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Tom and Charlotte Robak appeal from the District Court’s order of September 15,
2014, dismissing their complaint, and particularly the prior order of July 17, 2014,
denying their motion for sanctions under Rule 11, M. R. Civ. P. and denying their motion
for attorney fees under § 27-8-313, MCA. We affirm.
¶3 This case arises out of a dispute between Robaks and Ravalli County over whether
a home they constructed along the Bitterroot River was within the area of floodplain
regulation, §§ 76-5-101 through -406, MCA. In 2008 the Robaks sued the County raising
a number of claims and seeking judicial relief from the County’s contention that their
residence had been built within the regulated floodplain. In 2010 the District Court
entered an order setting out extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
granting and denying motions for summary judgment. That order also assessed sanctions
against Robaks under Rule 11, M. R. Civ. P., for failing to disclose information about fill
material placed on their property. Subsequently the parties entered a “Stipulation for
Declaratory Judgment” in July 2013 agreeing that 11 of 12 claims in Robaks’ complaint
had been resolved by settlement or by court order pursuant to motions by the parties.
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¶4 The 2013 stipulation also stated that its purpose was to “address and resolve the
regulatory issues raised in Robaks’ tenth cause of action.” The tenth cause of action, pled
as a claim for declaratory relief, sought a declaration that Robaks’ construction could be
completed and that it was in compliance with floodplain requirements. It was the last
unresolved issue in the case. The stipulation resolved the floodplain regulatory issues
through various agreements, some of which required future permits and compliance. In
its order filed August 5, 2013, the District Court approved the settlement pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgments Act, § 27-8-201 et seq., MCA. The order recited the primary
agreements concerning the delineation of the floodplain elevation on Robaks’ property
and the installation of their replacement septic system. The order required the parties to
file a stipulation or report identifying any issues that remain unresolved.
¶5 The parties did not file a stipulation or report concerning any unresolved matters
until March 2014. The County filed a report stating that the parties had been unable to
agree upon final dismissal of the action, but that from the County’s perspective all
substantive issues had been resolved. Robaks appeared through new counsel, asserting
that the case was not ripe for dismissal, and that they needed additional time to review the
case. The District Court convened a status conference in June 2014 at which Robaks
stated that the remaining issues were damages and attorney fees arising from the tenth
cause of action, and their intent to seek Rule 11 sanctions against the County. Robaks
subsequently filed a motion and brief for Rule 11 sanctions against the County arising
from the County’s successfully seeking Rule 11 sanctions against them in 2010.
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According to Robaks, the County’s counterclaims filed in 2008 and its filings in support
of Rule 11 sanctions in 2010 contained “deceitful representations.”
¶6 The District Court considered the parties’ positions in its Opinion and Order filed
July 17, 2014, concluding that the 2013 Stipulation for Declaratory Judgment settled the
issues in Robaks’ tenth claim for declaratory relief. Therefore, the Robaks’ argument
that they were still entitled to pursue damages and attorney fees as part of their tenth
cause of action for a declaratory judgment was only an attempt to “circumvent the
stipulated settlement.” The District Court determined that the clear intent of the
stipulation was to dispose of the regulatory issues upon which the claim for declaratory
judgment rested. The District Court determined that the parties settled the tenth claim of
the complaint, and that they did not reserve determination of any claims to damages or
attorney fees.
¶7 In addition, the District Court was “entirely unable” to find that the Robaks’
behaviors involved in the litigation had been “necessary and proper” or that there were
any equities justifying an award of attorney fees to them under § 27-8-313, MCA. An
award of fees in a declaratory judgment action is discretionary and initially depends upon
a determination that the equities favor the claimant. Trustees of Indiana University v.
Buxbaum, 2003 MT 97, ¶ 42, 315 Mont. 210, 69 P.3d 663; Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic,
2009 MT 426, ¶¶ 44-45, 354 Mont. 50, 221 P.3d 1230.
¶8 As to Robaks’ claim for Rule 11 sanctions against the County, the District Court
determined that the same arguments had been “thoroughly addressed” in 2010 and
amounted to a “poorly disguised motion for reconsideration of the Court’s 2010 Opinions
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and Orders.” The District Court therefore properly declined to re-visit the Rule 11
sanctions issues that had been decided in 2010.
¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for unpublished opinions. In the opinion of
the Court, the District Court properly exercised its discretion and there was not an abuse
of discretion. The District Court properly applied settled Montana law to resolve the
issues.
¶10 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ BETH BAKER
Justice James Jeremiah Shea, dissenting.
¶11 I concur with the Court’s resolution of the Rule 11 issue. I dissent, however, as to
the Court’s resolution of the Robaks’ possible entitlement to supplemental relief under
§ 27-8-313, MCA. Section 27-8-313, MCA, provides:
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted
whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition
to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be
deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse
party whose rights have been adjudicated by a declaratory judgment or
decree to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
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¶12 A judgment—albeit a stipulated judgment—was entered by the District Court,
resolving at least some of the matters that were the subject of the declaratory judgment
action in the Robaks’ favor. The Order that included this judgment recognized that there
may be some issues left unresolved, and required the parties to identify any such issues.
Among the issues which the Robaks identified at the June 2014 status conference was
whether they were entitled to further relief on the declaratory judgment action. Section
27-8-313, MCA, allows them to petition for such further relief. The District Court may
well determine for various reasons that the Robaks are not entitled to damages or attorney
fees under § 27-8-313, MCA. Indeed, as the majority notes at ¶ 7, the District Court’s
July 17, 2014 Order concluded it was “entirely unable” to find that the Robaks conduct
was necessary and proper or that the equities justified an award of attorney fees under
§ 27-8-313, MCA. That being noted, since the statute allowed for the Robaks to petition
the Court for such relief after entry of the judgment, I believe due process would require
that the Robaks be afforded the opportunity to seek supplemental damages and attorney
fees pursuant to the procedures outlined in the statute. The District Court foreclosed that
possibility before the Robaks could avail themselves of that procedure. For that reason, I
would reverse and remand on this issue.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
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