Garrett v. Willmarth

12/13/2016
DA 16-0142
Case Number: DA 16-0142
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 327N
IN RE THE PARENTING OF:
B.W. and G.W.,
KAYLA GARRETT,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
CHRISTOPHER WILLMARTH,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. DDR 11-410
Honorable Dirk M. Sandefur, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Eric D. Mills, Sutton, DuBois & Mills, PLLC, Great Falls, Montana
For Appellee:
Jeffrey S. Ferguson, Jeffrey S. Ferguson Law Office, PLLC, Great Falls,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 12, 2016
Decided: November 13, 2016
Filed:
/S/ ED SMITH
Clerk
Justice Patricia Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Kayla Garrett appeals from the Order and Judgment after Hearing Regarding
Respondent’s Objection to Standing Master’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order Amending Parenting Plan issued by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade
County, on February 4, 2016, reinstating the Stipulated Amended Parenting Plan entered
into by the parties on August 12, 2013. We affirm.
¶3 Garrett and Christopher Willmarth married in 2007 and have two biological
children, B.W., born in 2008, and G.W., born in 2005. The parties divorced in December
2011 and subsequently entered into a Stipulated Final Parenting Plan. This first parenting
plan split custody equally between the parties. In December 2012, Garrett filed a Notice
of Intent to Move and related Proposed Amended Parenting Plan informing the District
Court that she was choosing to move to the area of San Antonio, Texas, to pursue
educational opportunities. Garrett’s proposed parenting plan required that B.W. and
G.W. live with her in Texas during the school year, and that they would spend the
summer months with Willmarth in Montana.
¶4 In August 2013, the parties entered into a Stipulated Amended Parenting Plan
(2013 Plan) which required that B.W. and G.W. reside with Willmarth in Montana during
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the school year and live in Texas with Garrett during the summer months. Shortly after
the implementation of the 2013 Plan, communication between the parties deteriorated.
Garrett filed a Motion to Enforce the Stipulated Amended Parenting Plan in January
2014, arguing that Willmarth had violated the communication provisions in the 2013
Plan. Subsequently, Garrett filed a Motion to Amend Parenting Plan and Brief in Support
in May 2015.
¶5 A Standing Master held a bench trial in August 2015, hearing testimony from both
parties. On November 19, 2015, the Standing Master issued a Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order Amending Parenting Plan (Standing Master’s Report)
adopting a Second Amended Final Parenting Plan (2015 Plan) altering custody of B.W.
and G.W. Specifically, the 2015 Plan required that B.W. and G.W. live in Texas with
Garrett during the school year and live in Montana with Willmarth during the summer
months. Willmarth filed objections to the Standing Master’s Report. In January 2016,
the District Court held an extensive hearing on Willmarth’s objections. After a detailed
review of the evidence presented and the Standing Master’s Report, the District Court
vacated the Standing Master’s order adopting the 2015 Plan, and reinstated the 2013
Plan. Specifically, the District Court determined that certain findings of fact and
conclusions of law stated by the Standing Master were speculative and arbitrary
conclusions not supported by the record, and constituted an abuse of discretion. The
District Court noted that additional findings of fact relied on by the Standing Master must
be given limited weight in order to be consistent with other determinations contained in
the Standing Master’s Report. Further, the District Court held that the Standing Master
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abused its discretion in weighing certain factors in favor of Garrett’s proposed parenting
plan. In light of those determinations, the District Court concluded that the Standing
Master abused its discretion in adopting Garrett’s proposed parenting plan, and concluded
that the 2013 Plan should govern.
¶6 We review a district court’s decision de novo to determine whether it applied the
correct standard of review to a master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Patton v.
Patton, 2015 MT 7, ¶ 17, 378 Mont. 22, 340 P.3d 1242 (citation omitted). A district
court reviews a master’s conclusions of law for correctness. Patton, ¶ 43. A district
court must review a master’s findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly
erroneous. In re G.J.A., 2014 MT 215, ¶ 21, 376 Mont. 212, 331 P.3d 835. “A finding is
clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the Master
misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if its review of the record convinces the
reviewing court that the Master made a mistake.” In re G.J.A., ¶ 21 (citation omitted).
Further, if the master’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and its conclusions of
law are correct, a district court may review the master’s determination for an abuse of
discretion in child custody cases. Patton, ¶ 26. An abuse of discretion exists where the
master acted arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the
bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. Albrecht v. Albrecht, 2002 MT 227,
¶ 7, 311 Mont. 412, 56 P.3d 339 (citation omitted).
¶7 Pertinent in Patton and here, the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade
County, issued an Amended Charter Order in re District Standing Master Establishment
& Procedure, which clarified the procedure regarding the standing master position
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created by the Judicial District in 2010, and under which the Standing Master was
appointed in this case. Amended Charter Order in re District Standing Master
Establishment & Procedure, In re the Est. of a Dist. Standing Master for all Dep’t of the
Dist. Ct. (Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. April 28, 2015) (Amended Charter Order); see Charter Or.
Establishing Dist. Standing Master, In re the Est. of a Dist. Standing Master for all Dep’t
of the Dist. Ct. (Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. June 25, 2010). The Amended Charter Order
explicitly provides that the above mentioned standard of review, as cited in Patton, is to
be applied by the District Court to reports issued by Standing Masters. Amended Charter
Order at 12-16. The District Court expressly relied upon both our case law and the
Amended Charter Order in reaching its decision in this case.
¶8 Garrett argues the District Court applied the incorrect standard of review to the
Standing Master’s Report, maintaining that the District Court erred by reviewing relevant
and pertinent factual findings for correctness instead of for clear error. In stating its
rationale from the bench, the District Court thoroughly delineated the standard of review
it was applying to the Standing Master’s determinations in the instant case. The District
Court noted that a master’s conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and that the
District Court could only reverse findings of fact if they were clearly erroneous. The
District Court went on to articulate the three avenues through which a finding of fact may
be clearly erroneous: the finding is not supported by substantial credible evidence; the
master misapprehended the effect of the evidence; the reviewing court has a definite and
firm conviction that the master was mistaken in its assessment of the evidence. Further,
the District Court noted that the Eighth Judicial District Court’s Amended Charter Order
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governing the appointment of Standing Masters permits the District Court to reverse a
master’s determination, even if the findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and the
conclusions of law are correct, if the master abused his or her discretion. Amended
Charter Order at 14-15; accord Patton, ¶¶ 21-26. Finally, the District Court noted that, in
order to find that a master abused his or her discretion, the reviewing court must
determine that the master acted arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious
judgment or acted in such a way that exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial
injustice. We conclude that the District Court applied the correct standard of review to
the Standing Master’s Report.
¶9 Further, Garrett argues that the District Court abused its discretion by considering
issues beyond the scope of Willmarth’s objections to the Standing Master’s Report.
Specifically, Garrett cites this Court’s decision in In re Marriage of McMichael, 2006
MT 237, ¶¶ 15-16, 333 Mont. 517, 143 P.3d 439, for the premise that the District Court
commits reversible error when it considers findings of fact and conclusions of law that
were not specifically objected to by either party. However, our decision in McMichael
concerned whether or not a District Court could “modify findings or conclusions not
specifically objected to by either party,” McMichael, ¶ 15, not whether a District Court
could consider findings of fact and conclusions of law that were not objected to when
making its final determination. We conclude that the District Court did not err in
considering findings of fact and conclusions of law not specifically objected to when
making its final determination regarding the Standing Master’s Report.
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¶10 Finally, Garrett argues that the District Court abused its discretion by substituting
its judgment for that of the Standing Master. We disagree. The District Court engaged in
a thorough review of the Standing Master’s Report, continually and correctly reiterating
the standard of review it was applying. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the
District Court did not err in vacating the 2015 Plan and reinstating the 2013 Plan.
¶11 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion
of this Court, this case presents a question controlled by settled law.
¶12 Affirmed.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JIM RICE
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