State v. Rytky

No. 05-444
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 134STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
WILBUR ESKILL RYTKY,
Defendant and Appellant
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC-04-197(A)
Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Mark R. Sullivan, Attorney at Law, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Joslyn M. Hunt,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Edward J. Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 17, 2006
Decided: June 20, 2006
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Wilbur Eskill Rytky (Rytky) appeals from the judgment entered by the Eleventh
Judicial District Court, Flathead County, on his conviction and sentence for the felony
offense of deviate sexual conduct. The issue raised by Rytky is whether the application of §
45-5-505, MCA, in this case violates his right to equal protection of the laws under the
United States and Montana Constitutions. We conclude, however, that we first must
determine whether that issue is properly before us. For the reasons discussed below, we
conclude it is not and remand with instructions.
¶2 The dispositive issue is whether Rytky’s constitutional equal protection issue is
properly before this Court.
BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 19, 2004, the State of Montana (State) filed an information charging Rytky
with the offense of deviate sexual conduct, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-505, MCA, based
on an incident which allegedly occurred between Rytky and a 16-year-old male. The State
also filed its notice of intent to seek a persistent felony offender designation. Rytky pled not
guilty and subsequently moved to dismiss the charge against him, asserting that the
application of § 45-5-505, MCA, under the facts of this case violated his constitutional right
to equal protection of the laws. The State filed a brief opposing the motion.
¶4 Prior to a ruling on the motion to dismiss, Rytky and the State entered into a written
plea agreement whereby Rytky agreed to plead guilty to the charged offense. In exchange,
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the State agreed not to pursue the persistent felony offender designation and to recommend
that the District Court sentence Rytky to a five-year term of imprisonment in the Montana
State Prison (MSP). During the change of plea hearing, the parties modified the written plea
agreement by agreeing that, if the District Court followed the five-year sentencing
recommendation, Rytky waived his right to appeal. However, if the District Court refused to
follow the plea agreement and sentenced Rytky to more than five years, Rytky reserved his
right to appeal the constitutional equal protection issue.
¶5 The District Court accepted Rytky’s guilty plea to the charged offense, scheduled a
sentencing hearing, and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report and a
psychosexual evaluation. At the close of the sentencing hearing, the District Court sentenced
Rytky to a 10-year term of incarceration in the MSP, ordered that he be ineligible for parole
until he completed all phases of the MSP’s sexual offender treatment program and specified
various conditions to be imposed should Rytky be paroled. The District Court entered
judgment on the conviction and sentence. Rytky appeals, raising the equal protection issue.
DISCUSSION
¶6 Is Rytky’s constitutional equal protection issue properly before this Court?
¶7 It is well-established that, generally, a criminal defendant who enters a knowing and
voluntary plea of guilty to an offense waives the right to appeal any nonjurisdictional defects
and defenses which occurred prior to entry of the plea. See, e.g., State v. Samples, 2005 MT
210, ¶ 11, 328 Mont. 242, ¶ 11, 119 P.3d 1191, ¶ 11 (citing Ellenburg v. Chase, 2004 MT 66,
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¶ 21, 320 Mont. 315, ¶ 21, 87 P.3d 473, ¶ 21). Notwithstanding this general waiver of the
right to appeal, § 46-12-204(3), MCA, provides that
[w]ith the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecutor, a defendant
may enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving the right, on appeal
from the judgment, to review the adverse determination of any specified
pretrial motion.
¶8 Here, Rytky filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the charged offense based on
constitutional equal protection grounds. The District Court did not rule on the motion.
Rather, Rytky and the State entered into a plea agreement, Rytky pled guilty and was
sentenced, and the District Court entered judgment. Although Rytky and the State agreed—
and the District Court implicitly approved—that Rytky reserved his right to appeal his
conviction on the basis of his constitutional argument if he were sentenced to a term in
excess of five years, the District Court did not adversely determine any specified pretrial
motion. As a result, Rytky’s reservation of his right to appeal the constitutional issue does
not meet the requirements of § 46-12-204(3), MCA. We conclude, therefore, that Rytky’s
conditional plea of guilty is invalid since the State was not authorized to consent to it and the
District Court was not authorized to approve it.
¶9 We observe that, had the District Court denied Rytky’s motion to dismiss and Rytky
reserved his right to appeal the denial, we would have plenary review over the constitutional
equal protection issue. See, e.g., State v. Thaut, 2004 MT 359, ¶ 12, 324 Mont. 460, ¶ 12,
103 P.3d 1012, ¶ 12. In that regard, judicial economy might suggest that we address the issue
raised by Rytky notwithstanding the lack of a ruling by the District Court. Indeed, this might
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be a valid argument in some circumstances. Here, however, the State consented to—and the
District Court accepted—Rytky’s conditional guilty plea without legal authority. It is
important to correct this situation, thereby hopefully preventing it from arising again.
¶10 Remanded with instructions that the District Court vacate the entry of Rytky’s guilty
plea and sentence, and the judgment entered thereon, and for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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