In Re the Adoption of C.J.L.

02/07/2017
DA 16-0438
Case Number: DA 16-0438
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 19IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF:
C.J.L.,
A minor child.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Hill, Cause No. DA-15-008
Honorable Daniel A. Boucher, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Lindsay A. Lorang, Lorang Law, PC, Havre, Montana
For Appellee:
Thea Bauer, Self-Represented, Havre, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 11, 2017
Decided: February 7, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Dirk M. Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Two would-be adoptive parents (Appellants) petitioned the Montana Twelfth
Judicial District Court in Hill County to terminate the parental rights of C.J.L.’s natural
mother and adopt C.J.L. The District Court determined it lacked “venue jurisdiction” and
dismissed the petition. Appellants timely appealed. We reverse and remand.
ISSUE
¶2 The issue on appeal is: Did the District Court err as a matter of law in dismissing
the petition for lack of “venue jurisdiction”?
BACKGROUND
¶3 C.J.L. was born in Havre, Montana, in 2015. Shortly after C.J.L.’s birth, C.J.L.’s
mother signed an affidavit relinquishing her parental rights and consenting to C.J.L.’s
adoption by Appellants. She also signed a power of attorney granting Appellants the
right to make parenting decisions in her stead. In November 2015, Appellants filed a
consolidated petition to formally terminate the natural mother’s parental rights, gain
temporary legal custody of C.J.L. during the proceedings, and ultimately adopt C.J.L. At
the time, C.J.L. lived with Appellants in Illinois and C.J.L.’s natural mother lived in
Havre. Although the petition was uncontested, the District Court ultimately dismissed
the petition for lack of “venue jurisdiction.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4 A district court’s interpretation and application of a venue statute to pleaded facts
is a conclusion of law that we review for correctness. Yeager v. Morris, 2013 MT 44,
¶ 9, 369 Mont. 90, 296 P.3d 1164. A district court’s determination that it lacks
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jurisdiction over a matter is likewise a conclusion of law that we review for correctness.
In re Support Obligation of McGurran, 2002 MT 144, ¶ 7, 310 Mont. 268, 49 P.3d 626.
DISCUSSION
¶5 Did the District Court err as a matter of law in dismissing the petition for lack of
“venue jurisdiction”?
¶6 The distinction between jurisdiction and venue is well established. Simply put,
jurisdiction refers to the authority of the court to adjudicate a case, whereas venue refers
to the place where a case will be heard. McGurran, ¶¶ 12-13. No agreement of the
parties can confer jurisdiction on a court that would otherwise lack authority to decide a
case. McGurran, ¶ 12. Venue, on the other hand, is a “personal privilege of [a party]
and, thus, may be waived.” McGurran, ¶ 13. We have long recognized that only the
benefitted party may exercise this privilege—a district court may not invoke a venue
statute on the party’s behalf. Putro v. Mannix Elec., 147 Mont. 314, 319, 412 P.2d 410,
412 (1966) (citing State ex rel. Gnose v. Dist. Court, 30 Mont. 188, 75 P. 1109 (1904)).
If the benefitted party does not timely invoke this privilege, it will be deemed waived.
See M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
¶7 Montana’s district courts have broad subject matter jurisdiction, encompassing “all
civil matters and cases at law and in equity.” Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4(1); accord
§ 3-5-302, MCA. Whether a particular district court is the proper place to hear a civil
matter is generally determined by the venue statutes at §§ 25-2-111 through -131, MCA.
These statutes make clear that the “designation of a county in this part as a proper place
of trial is not jurisdictional and does not prohibit the trial of any cause in any court of this
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state having jurisdiction.” Section 25-2-112, MCA. The Legislature has carved out
several exceptions to the general venue guidelines of Title 25, chapter 2, part 1. In those
instances, the proper place for trial will be determined by the more specific statute.
Section 25-2-131, MCA.
¶8 The general venue statutes consistently use the phrase “proper place of trial” rather
than the more technical term “venue,” but this language does not appear in the specific
venue statute at issue here. In dismissing the petition, the District Court cited
§ 42-1-104(1), MCA, which states that “[p]roceedings for adoption must be brought in
the district court of the county where the petitioners reside.” Although the statute is titled
“Venue,” we have long held that “the text of the statute takes precedence over the title in
matters of statutory interpretation.” Orozco v. Day, 281 Mont. 341, 347-48, 934 P.2d
1009, 1012-13 (1997). Because the plain language of the statute imposes a mandatory
filing requirement, we understand why the District Court interpreted § 42-1-104, MCA,
as more than a venue statute.
¶9 This is not the first time we have addressed a venue statute that reads like a
jurisdictional requirement. In McGurran, we considered whether § 2-4-702(2)(a), MCA,
limited a district court’s jurisdiction or simply designated proper venues. That statute
establishes the process for initiating judicial review of a contested administrative case. In
relevant part, the statute provides that a petition for judicial review “must be filed in the
district court for the county where the petitioner resides or has the petitioner’s principal
place of business or where the agency maintains its principal office.” Section
2-4-702(2)(a), MCA. The district court in McGurran interpreted the statute “as a
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requirement that a petition for judicial review must be filed in the correct venue for the
court to obtain jurisdiction.” McGurran, ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
disagreed, concluding that the above-quoted passage from § 2-4-702(2)(a), MCA, was
nothing more than a venue provision, which could not deprive district courts of
jurisdiction. McGurran, ¶ 16.
¶10 Sections 42-1-104(1), and 2-4-702(2)(a), MCA, contain similar mandatory
language: “must be brought” and “must be filed,” respectively. Like the court in
McGurran, the District Court here interpreted the mandatory terms as a jurisdictional
requirement. As in McGurran, we hold that the statute at issue here is essentially a venue
statute. Therefore, the mandatory language of § 42-1-104, MCA, does not deprive the
District Court of jurisdiction.
¶11 In the case of an uncontested adoption, there is no defendant or respondent to
object on the grounds of improper venue. Although the present proceeding in Hill
County is likely inconvenient for Appellants,1 they were not practically in a position to
object to the proceeding on venue grounds. In fact, they affirmatively chose Hill County
as the venue for the petition. The District Court may not invoke the venue statute sua
sponte. We therefore conclude that the District Court erred as a matter of law in
dismissing Appellants’ petition for improper “venue jurisdiction.”
¶12 The statutory framework of the Montana Adoption Act, Title 42, MCA, supports
our conclusion. In cases of direct parental placement, the prospective adoptive parents
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Appellants informed the District Court that they filed their petition in Montana after several
attorneys in their home state of Illinois advised them that Illinois did not have jurisdiction over
the petition.
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must file both a petition to terminate existing parental rights and a petition to adopt the
child who is the subject of the proceedings. Section 42-4-110(1), MCA. The statute
implies both petitions should be filed in the same district court. See § 42-4-110(2), MCA
(requiring petitioners to “request that the court promptly notice the matters” for a timely
hearing (emphasis added)). The venue statute governing petitions to terminate parental
rights provides that they “may be filed in the court in the county in which a petitioner
resides, the child resides, or an office of the agency that is placing the child is located.”
Section 42-2-601, MCA. The residence of an unmarried minor is the residence of the
minor’s parents. Section 1-1-215(4)(a), MCA.
¶13 C.J.L.’s mother was a resident of Hill County when Appellants filed their petition.
Although she had signed an affidavit waiving her parental rights, no court has formally
terminated her rights and status as C.J.L.’s parent. Applying § 1-1-215(4)(a), MCA,
C.J.L. was still a resident of the same county as his mother when the petition was filed,
even though he recently began living with Appellants in Illinois. Pursuant to § 42-2-601,
MCA, Hill County is therefore a proper venue to hear the petition to terminate parental
rights. Because § 42-4-110(2), MCA, contemplates that the same district court would
hear both the petition to terminate parental rights and the petition to adopt, Hill County is
logically the proper venue to hear Appellants’ consolidated petition. To hold otherwise
would force Appellants to initiate two distinct yet inseparably linked proceedings: one to
terminate parental rights and one to adopt C.J.L. The former could be filed in Hill
County, but the latter could not be filed in Montana. The slightest gap in coordinating the
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two proceedings could place C.J.L.’s legal guardianship in limbo, which is decidedly not
the intent of the Montana Adoption Act. See § 42-1-102, MCA.
CONCLUSION
¶14 Despite its mandatory language, the adoption venue statute does not deprive the
District Court of jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ petition to adopt C.J.L. In light of
the purpose and framework of the Montana Adoption Act, we conclude that Hill County
is the proper venue to hear the consolidated petition to terminate the parental rights of
C.J.L.’s mother and adopt C.J.L. Reversed and remanded.
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
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