Soelter v. St. Vincent Hospital

No. 83-345
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1984
FAYE SOELTER,
Claimant and Respondent,
-vs-
ST. VINCENT 13OSPITAL, Employer,
and
AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY CO.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy
Reardon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones; Richard F.
Cebull, Billings, 1-lontana
For Respondent :
William T. Kelly, Billings, Montana
Patrick L. Prindle, Billings,Montana
Halverson & Sheehy, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Griefs: May 17, 1984
Decided: June 27, 1984
Filed:
3llhk 2 ; igH4
-
Clerk
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
St. Vincent Hospital (Hospital) and its insurer appeal
the judgment of the Workers ' Compen.sa
tion Court granting
permanent total disability benefits to Faye Soelter. The
Workers' Compensation Court concluded that liberal
interpretation of the Act allowed it to resolve a conflict in
medical testimony by finding as facts only those medical
opinions which substantiated the claim. We reverse the
judgment of the Court.
The uncontested facts are that claimant was injured in
an industrial accident in December 1977 in the course of her
employment by the Hospital. The claim was accepted and
compensation benefits were paid from November 16, 1978 to
November 20, 1980. At the time of trial, claimant was a 48
year old divorced woman with an eighth grade education. Her
work experience consisted of working as a nurses' aide for
the preceding twelve years. While lifting a patient into a
wheelchair on December 26, 1977, claimant suffered the
injury.
The findings of fact of the court regarding medical
evidence can be summarized as showing that Dr. Nelson made
extensive examinations; that Dr. Snider performed a
laminectomv; that claimant had complained of severe lower
back pain; that the laminectomy was aimed at relieving that
pain; that claimant continued to complain of lower back pain;
that by October 7, 1980 claimant had recovered as much as the
permanent character of her injuries would permit; that
subsequent to October 7, 1980, claimant has continued to
complain of lower back pain to the four different doctors who
examined her; that claimant has not been malingering; that
based on Dr. Nelson's deposition, claimant's condition may he
summarized as a chronic hack disorder; that claimant is
obese; and that her obesity is not the cause of her chronic
back disorder.
Regarding psychological evidence, the court further
found that claimant had a hypochondriacal personality, which
her doctor defined as one who tends to be preoccupied with
physical illness or symptoms which she may have and which she
interprets as being a physical illness of some kind; that the
chronic pain from the industrial accident and surgeries
aggravated claimant's pre-existing psychological condition;
that psychological counseling or psychotherapy would not cure
claimant's hypochondria, but could relieve her from
depression, agitation and anxiety; that claimant has not been
receptive to receiving psychological counseling; and that
claimant does not believe she has a psychological problem.
The court further found that claimant has chronic lower
back pain and that pain prevents her from doing some of the
housework she previously had done; that claimant cannot
return to work as a nurses' aide; that claimant cannot work
at a job requiring repetitious bending, lifting or stooping;
and that claimant is physically capable of doing sedentary or
other undemanding work.
After making these and other findings, the Workers'
Compensation Court conclud.ed that claimant's physical healing
is complete and that, as a result of her industrial accident,
claimant has been permanently totally disabled since October
7, 1980. The issues presented by the Hospital are:
(1) Does the Workers' Compensation Act require
liberal construction of the expert medical
testimony so tha-tonly testimony which supports the
claim is taken as fact and adverse testimony is
disregarded?
(2) Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in
finding claimant to be permanently totally disabled
because she could not return to her occupation as a
nurses' aide?
The first issue arises from the following conclusions of
the Workers' Compensation Court:
"The medical testimony cannot in this case be
harmonized. Because this testimony was before this
Court in the form of depositions, it was not in a
position to observe the demeanor of the physicians
or judge their credibility. But even if they had
personally appeared before this Court, how on the
basis of the credibility of the witnesses is this
Court to resolve Dr. Smith's conclusion that the
Claimant can return to work as a nurse's aide ...
and Dr. Snider's conclusion that she cannot? . ..
Dr. Smith is a n-eurological surgeon and Dr. Snider
is an orthopedic surgeon; . . .
There are many
other instances in the record where conclusions of
the medical experts fall short of unanimity
regarding her physical and mental conditions,
their cause and their influence on her ability to
work. ...
". . . In resolving
conflicts of this nature, the
approach that is most consistent with the
legislative directive that this Court interpret the
provisions of the Act liberally and with the
Supreme Court's recognition that this directive is
intended to carry out the humane purposes of the
Act is to resolve - conflict - - deposition
the in- the
testimonFof medical experts 9 finding as facts
those exKrt
L
medical o~inions thaf- will
L
substantiate a claimant's claim for compensation
...Why should this Court penalize a claimant
because the experts in an inexact science disagree?
"Applying the above method of conflict resolution
to the deposition testimony of the medical experts,
this Court has found that the claimant injured her
lower back in her industrial accident and . . .
that she cannot return to work as a nurse's aide."
(emphasis supplied)
We can understand the difficulty of analyzing the
medical testimony of four different attending physicians
whose conclusions differ. We can also understand the
frustration in seeking to evaluate depositions without the
opportunity to hear the medical testimony. Notwithstanding
these difficulties, the claimant must prove her case by a
preponderance of the probative credible evidence and the
court must weigh all the evidence presented to it.
In Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Const. Co. (1979)I 183 Monte
190, 201, 598 P.2d 1099, 1105, this Court stated:
"Not only must claimant prove her case by a
preponderance of the evidence, she must do so by a
preponderance of the probative credible evidence."
Section 39-71-104, MCA provides: "Whenever this chapter or
any part or section thereof is interpreted by a court, it
shall be liberally construed by such court." In applying
this rule of liberal construction, the Court has stated:
"Any doubt after all the evidence has been
considered should be construed for the compensation
claimant when the weight of evidence is in favor of
the worker." Hert v. J.J. Newberry Co. (1978), 178
Mont. 355, 365, 584 P.2d 656, 662.
This rule of liberal construction does not relieve the
court of its duty to carefully consider all of the evidence
before determining whether the weight of the evidence
presented supports the worker's claim. As we noted in Ness
v. Diamond Asphalt Co. (1964), 143 Mont. 560, 565, 393 ~ . 2 d
"Whenever physical ailments are involved, there is
almost always some doubt present. We feel the
doubt remaining after - - evidence - -
all the had been
considered should be construed for the workman or
his family when the weight of the evidence is in
favor of the workman." (emphasis supplied)
The conclusion of law of the Workers' Compensation Court
suggests that the court disregarded the medical evidence
unfavorable to the claimant and based its conclusion only
upon the medical evidence favorable to claimant. That the
court is not allowed to do. The court is required to
consider all of the evidence submitted by the parties without
bias or favor toward or against any party. Though it may be
simpler to disregard a portion of the medical evidence
because it contradicts other medical evidence, the court is
not permitted to do so.
Our function in reviewing a decision of the Workers'
Compensation Court is to determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the findings of fact and
conclusions of that court. Small v. Transportation Insurance
Co. (Mont. 19841, P.2d , 41 St.Rep. 776, 781. We
are unable to discharge that responsibility where the lower
court has used an improper standard in weighing the medical
evidence submitted to it. While it might be possible in
other cases for us to review the medical evidence which is
submitted in deposition form, in this case there is oral
testimony on the part of the claimant and others, which must
also be balanced by the lower court.
We conclude that the Workers' Compensation Court may not
arbitrarily reject medical evidence because it does not
substantiate a claim for compensation. Liberal construction
of the Act does not allow the court to disregard some portion
of the medical evidence before it.
I1
Did the Court err in finding claimant permanently
totally disabled because she could not return to her former
occupation as a nurses' aide?
Because of the position taken by the court regarding the
medical evidence, we are not able to review the conclusion of
the court. It appears that the Workers' Compensation Court
may have erroneously excluded evidence from its con.sideration
in reaching the conclusion that claimant could not return to
her former occupation as a nurses' aide. We therefore
require a redetermination of this question.
The judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court is
reversed and the cause is remanded to the court for its
redetermination of facts, conclusions of law and judgment in
a manner consistent with this opinion.
We concur:
n
-
Hod. Henry Loble XYtting for
t
Justice John C. Sh ehy
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. respectfully dissents as
follows:
The majority places undue emphasis upon the thought
processes of the Workers' Compensation Judge as reflected in
the conclusions quoted in the majority opinion. Specifically
the majority reverses because of the following language:
11 I . . .
In resolving conflicts of this nature, the
approach that is most consistent with the
legislative directive that this Court interpret the
provisions of the Act liberally and with the
Supreme Court's recognition that this directive is
intended to carry out the humane purposes of the
Act is to resolve the conflict in the deposition
testimony of medical experts by finding as facts
those expert medical opinions that will
substantiate a claimant's claim for compensation
... Why should this Court penalize a claimant
because the experts in an inexact science
disagree?'"
The majority reads that language to mean the Workers'
Compensation Court would always resolve conflicts in the
medical evidence in favor of the claimant. I do not think
that is a proper construction of the above-quoted language. I
believe the Workers' Compensation Court is simply saying
that, if after reading all of the medical depositions, the
Workers' Compensation Court is unable to resolve the
conflicts, then liberal construction the Act tips the
balance in favor of the claimant. I find it unnecessary to
determine whether this is a proper approach.
The testimony to which the Workers' Compensation Court
referred was deposition testimony from medical experts. The
only evidence offered to support position of appellant was
d.eposition testimony from physicians. Under our scope of
review this Court is entitled to evaluate the credibility of
deposition testimony for the reason that the trial court did
not observe the demeanor of the witnesses. This Court is in
as good a position to evaluate credibility of deposition
testimony as is the trial court.
In this case the medical testimony clearly preponderates
in favor of the claimant. Therefore, the findings of the
Workers' Compensation Court find ample support in the record.
Any confusion on the part of the lower court about resolving
conflicts in the evidence is harmless error.
Since this is a dissent, I will volunteer that the
Workers' Compensation Court may well have applied a proper
standard. At times it seems very difficult for a lay person
to resolve conflicting testimony between two equally well
qualified physicians. At this point, if the trier of fact
resolved the conflict by invoking the liberal construction
spirit of the Act, I can see no harm. This does not mean
that the defendant's medical testimony is always disregarded
in favor of that offered by claimant. It simply means that
where the trier of fact reaches a point where resolution of
conflict is not otherwise possible, the spirit of the Act is
invoked. It is apparent from the detailed findings of the
Workers' Compensation Court that all evidence was thoroughly
analyzed and weighed. Under these circumstances it seems to
me the trial court fostered the spirit of the Act in
resolving the conflict in the way it did. A remand seems a
futile exercise and worse, it further delays justice for this
injured worker.
Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell, dissenting.
It seems to me that the majority have become hyper-
technical in reversing the judgment of the Workers'
Compensation Court. In so doing they have invaded the
province of the fact finder under the guise of interpreting
legal standards concerning weighing evidence.
Here two highly qualified medical specialists reached
cpposite and contradictory conclusions on whether claimant
was able to return to work. The Workers' Compensation Judge
resolved this factual issue in favor of claimant because of
"the Legislative directive that this Court interpret the
provisions of the Act liberally and with the Supreme Court's
recognition that this directive is intended to carry out the
humane purposes of the Act." The majority have reversed the
Judge's factual determination that claimant is not able to
return to work because they say his reasoning is wrong. What
rule of 1a.w empowers this Court to probe the mental processes
of a judge or jury in resolving a factual controversy?
The Supreme Court on appeal is bound by the Workers'
Compensation Court's decision on the facts if there is
substantial credible evidence in the record to support that
decision. Catteyson v. Falls Mobile Home Center, Inc., et
al. (1979), 183 Mont. 284, 599 P.2d 341; McGee v. Bechtel
Corporation (1979), 182 Mont. 149, 595 P.2d 1156; Smith v.
Pierce Packing Co. (1978), 177 Mont. 267, 581 P.2d 834;
Robins v. Anaconda Aluminum Co. (1978), 175 Mont. 514, 575
P.2d 67; Bond v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1977), 174 Mont. 417,
571 P.2d 372.
Here the testimony of Dr. Snvder furnishes substantial
credible evidence to support the factual finding that
claimant is not able to return to work. I would affirm.
Chief Justice
w*,
,