Hetland v. Magnum Petroleum

No. 86-321
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1987
RONALD S. HETLAND,
Claimant and Appellant,
-vs-
MAGNUM PETROLEUM, Employer,
and
STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable
Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
John L. McKeon, Anaconda, Montana
For Respondent:
Allen B. Chronister, Assistant Attorney General,
Agency Legal Services, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Nov. 13, 1986
Decided: February 23, 1987
Filed:
8
z2zL *
Clerk
/L
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Ronald S. Hetland appeals a Workers' Compensation Court
ruling that Hetland was not acting within the course and
scope of his employment at the time of his automobile
accident and therefore was not eligible for workers'
compensation benefits. The issue on appeal is whether there
is substantial evidence to support the Workers' Compensation
Court's ruling. We affirm.
In January 1982, Hetland was hired by Magnum Petroleum
as a convenience store clerk in Anaconda, Montana. The store
manager instructed Hetland that his duties included cleaning
the store, stocking shelves, logging the gasoline and making
night deposits. The store clerks took turns working morning
shifts on the weekends. The clerk working this shift was
responsible for getting the keys and money from the clerk who
closed the store the previous night. The manager left the
details of the transfer to the clerks involved; the morning
clerk could come to the store at closing time (10:OO p.m.) to
retrieve the keys and money from the night clerk or the night
clerk could bring the keys and money to the morning clerk's
home after closing the store, or to the store the next
morning. The clerks were not given any compensation for
undertaking this transfer and the store furnished no
vehicles.
Hetland was scheduled to work a morning weekend shift
on January 16, 1983. Hetland stopped by the store the night
before to tell the clerk of his out-of-town entertainment
plans for the evening, and that he would return to pick up
the keys and money at 10:OO p.m., which was closing time.
Hetland and his wife then departed for a nightclub in Rocker,
Montana, a town approximately twenty-five miles east of
Anaconda, where they met Hetland's mother-in-law. As closing
time for the store approached, Hetland borrowed his
mother-in-law's new car, drove back to Anaconda, picked up
the keys and money at the store and took them to his
apartment located ten to twelve blocks from the store.
Hetland then drove to Fairmont Hot Springs since his wife and
mother-in-law had indicated that they might move to that
location. Hetland did not find his wife or mother-in-law at
Fairmont and was returning to Rocker when he had an
automobile accident at the Gregson interchange on Interstate
90.
Hetland testified that he felt the keys and money
pickup was part of the job but further testified that once
the keys and money had been accounted for, he was back on his
own personal time. The Workers' Compensation Court held that
at the time of the accident, Hetland was not acting within
the course and scope of his employment and therefore was not
eligible for workers' compensation benefits.
The applicable standard for determining whether an
employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits is
stated in 5 39-71-407, MCA:
Every insurer is liable for the payment
of compensation ... to an employee of
an employer it insures who receives an
injury arising out of and in the course
of his employment or, in the case of his
death from such injury, to his
beneficiaries, if any.
"Our function in reviewing a decision of the Workers'
Compensation Court is to determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions
of that court." Steffes v. 93 Leasing Co., Inc. (1978), 177
Mont. 83, 86, 580 P.2d 450, 452-53. Hetland argues that at
the time of his automobile accident he was on the last leg of
a "special assignment" or "special errand" on behalf of the
employer.
The Steffes case, 580 P.2d at 453, addresses the going
and coming rule, and its exceptions:
Generally, an injury sustained in going
to or coming from work does not arise out
of and in the course of employment within
the meaning of the Workers' Compensation
Act. Hagerman v. Galen State Hospital
(1977), Mont., 5 n P.2d 893, 34 St.Rep.
1150. However in Hagerman this Court
recognized two exceptions to the rule:
(1) where employee travel pay was covered
under the employment contract, and (2)
where the travel was for the special
benefit of the employer.
The second exception stated above is the basis of
Hetland's argument and was recently discussed by this Court:
"[tlhis exception applies where an employee is required to
travel away from home on his employer's business." Correa v.
Rexroat Tile (Mont. 1985), 703 P.2d 160, 163, 42 St.Rep.
1075, 1078.
We agree with the Workers' Compensation Court that
Hetland was not acting within the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident and therefore is not
eligible for compensation benefits. Three reasons support
our conclusion. First, Hetland testified at least three
times that after the keys and money were secured from the
night clerk, he was free to resume his activities for the
evening. Hetland based his understanding in part on what the
'manager had told him. Therefore when the keys and money
arrived at Hetland's apartment, Hetland's subsequent actions
no longer served any business purpose of his employer.
Second, the employer was not exerting a right of control over
Hetland at the time of his accident. The right to control
may exist if the employee is acting for the benefit of the
employer. Courser v. Darby School Dist. No. 1 (Mont. 1984) ,
692 P.2d 417, 420, 41 St.Rep. 2283, 2287. The clerks were
responsible for carrying out the transfer. Hetland chose to
drive back from Rocker that evening instead of requesting the
night clerk to bring the keys and money to the store the next
morning. The travel Hetland undertook, save for the ten to
twelve block ride from the store to his apartment with the
keys and money, cannot be said to have been for the special
benefit of the employer under Steffes.
Third, public policy precludes a finding of injury
within the course and scope of employment in this case. The
employer is not an insurer of his employees at all times
during the period of employment, Griffin v. Industrial
Accident Fund (1940), 111 Mont. 110, 117, 106 P.2d 346, 348,
but only during the time the employees are discharging
business responsibilities on his behalf.
As the Griffin Court noted:
[Claimant's] employment did not require
him to be at the place where he sustained
the injuries. Those injuries did not
arise out of and in the course of his
employment. To hold that claimant is
entitled to compensation here we would be
obliged to say that the employer was an
insurer against accident for the full
twenty-four hours of a day, no matter
what the employee may have been doing
during the ...hours when his regular
services were at an end.
Accordingly, we find substantial evidence to support
the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court.
Affirmed.
We concur: ,A
Justices
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissenting:
I dissent.
When employee Hetland left his job after completion of
his regular hours, he was still under a duty to perform a
service for his employer. In the performance of that duty,
he suffered severe injuries. I would reverse the Workers'
Compensation Court.