Rice v. State

No. 02-295
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 267DARREN RICE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Department of Labor and Industry,
Unemployment Insurance Division,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lincoln,
The Honorable Michael C. Prezeau, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Charles K. Hail, Montana Department of Labor & Industry, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
( No Respondent’s Brief Filed )
Submitted on Briefs: August 8, 2002
Decided: November 26, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 The Respondent, Darren Rice, appealed the Montana Board of
Labor and Appeals’ October 11, 2001, decision which denied him
unemployment benefits to the District Court for the Nineteenth
Judicial District in Lincoln County. The District Court reversed
the Board of Labor and Appeals’ decision and awarded Rice
retroactive unemployment benefits. The State of Montana appeals
the District Court’s decision. We affirm the Order of the District
Court.
¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether § 39-51-2302, MCA, barred
Rice’s claim for unemployment benefits as a matter of law.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 The facts in this case are undisputed. Rice was diagnosed
with, and began treatment for, bi-polar disorder on September 21,
1998. On October 14, 1999, he was hired by Interstate Transfer and
Storage (Interstate Transfer), as a full time long haul truck
driver. As a long haul truck driver, Rice was required to travel
long distances and remain on the road for extended periods of time.
When he was hired, his bi-polar condition was being successfully
treated through medication and he was fully qualified as a
commercial truck driver pursuant to state and federal regulations.
¶4 On or around June 8, 2001, Rice suffered from a blackout while
visiting his home in Libby, Montana. Following the blackout, he
sought medical advice about his condition at the Libby Prompt Care
walk-in clinic. After consulting with an emergency room doctor, a
Licensed Practitioner Nurse (LPN) authorized Rice to take four days
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off work, advised him to refrain from driving, and advised him to
seek further assistance from his regular doctor, Dr. Gregory
Winter. Rice informed Interstate Transfer that he would not be
returning to work as scheduled and that he would contact them when
he had more information concerning his condition. He was unable to
immediately contact Dr. Winter at the Fort Harris VA hospital.
However, the two VA counselors he talked to concurred with the
LPN’s opinion that he should not return to work as a trucker.
¶5 Based on the advice he received from the LPN and the two VA
counselors, on June 12, 2001, Rice notified Interstate Transport
that he would not be returning to work. At that same time he filed
a claim for unemployment benefits retroactive to June 10, 2001. On
June 22, 2001, Dr. Winter concluded that Rice should not drive a
motor vehicle and completed the necessary Department of Labor and
Industry (Department) form to document that opinion.
¶6 The Department conducted a hearing on August 13, 2001, and
issued its decision to deny benefits on August 17, 2001. The
Department held that Rice was not qualified to receive benefits
because he had not received the advice of a licenced practicing
physician before resigning from his employment on June 12. Rice
appealed the Department’s decision to the Board of Labor and
Appeals (Board) which held an additional hearing on September 7,
2001. The Board affirmed the Department’s decision to deny
benefits on September 11, 2001.
¶7 Rice appealed the Board’s decision in the Nineteenth Judicial
District Court pursuant to § 39-51-2410, MCA. The District Court’s
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review was limited to issues of law pursuant to § 39-51-2410(5),
MCA. It concluded that the Department and the Board misinterpreted
§ 39-51-2302, MCA, and that Rice qualified for unemployment
benefits because he demonstrated that he left work for “good
cause.” The State appeals the District Court’s conclusions of law.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Does § 39-51-2302, MCA, bar Rice’s claim for unemployment
benefits?
¶9 Interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of
law which we review to determine whether the district court’s
conclusions are correct. State v. Price, 2002 MT 150, ¶ 15, 310
Mont. 320, ¶ 15, 50 P.3d 530, ¶ 15 (citation omitted). Construction of
a statute requires this Court “simply to ascertain and declare what is in the terms or substance
contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted.”
Section 1-2-101, MCA.
¶10 The State contends that the District Court’s interpretation of
§ 39-51-2302, MCA, is incorrect and that Rice is not eligible for
unemployment because he failed to obtain a licensed and practicing
physician’s opinion before he resigned from his employment with
Interstate Transfer. Rice did not file a Respondent’s Brief.
¶11 Section 39-51-2302, MCA, provides in part:
(1) An individual must be disqualified for benefits if
the individual has left work without good cause
attributable to the individual’s employment.
(2) The individual may not be disqualified if the
individual leaves:
(a) employment because of personal illness or injury
not associated with misconduct upon the advice of a
licenced and practicing physician and, after
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recovering from the illness or injury when recovery
is certified by a licensed and practicing
physician, the individual returned to and offered
service to the individual’s employer and the
individual’s regular or comparable suitable work
was not available, as determined by the department,
provided the individual is otherwise eligible; or .
. . .
¶12 The Board interpreted § 39-51-2302, MCA, to require advice
from a licenced and practicing physician before an individual can
resign from his job because of personal illness. The District
Court found that the Board’s interpretation of the statute was too
narrow and concluded that the advice of a licensed and practicing
physician was not the exclusive method of showing “good cause” for
leaving work. We conclude that the District Court was correct.
¶13 Section 39-51-2302(1), MCA, disqualifies an employee for
unemployment benefits if he voluntarily quits his job without good
cause attributable to his job. Rules 24.11.457(1)(a) and (2)(a),
ARM, equate “good cause” with “undue risk” arising from the work
environment. Section 39-51-2302(2)(a), MCA, provides that an
employee may not be disqualified from receiving benefits when the
claimant quits his job based upon a doctor’s recommendation and
similar suitable work is unavailable when he is able to return to
work. This later section protects a person’s right to receive
benefits when the medical condition that caused the claimant to
leave work no longer exists, yet the claimant cannot return to work
because his or her job no longer exists. The requirements of the
two provisions are independent.
¶14 The State argues that because subsection 2(a) requires the
medical advice that prompts a claimant to leave work to come from a
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licensed physician prior to resigning, Rice is prohibited from
receiving benefits because he did not receive advice from a
“licensed and practicing physician” until after he resigned. The
District Court concluded that while prior advice from a physician
is an example of “good cause” specifically provided by statute,
there is nothing in the language of the statute to suggest that
there may not be other good causes for leaving employment. We
agree with the District Court that to interpret the statute so
narrowly would undermine the humane purpose for which unemployment
insurance is provided.
¶15 In this case, after experiencing blackouts, Rice resigned from
his employment based upon the advice of an LPN who conferred with a
licensed and practicing doctor. To do otherwise would have been
detrimental to his employer, the public and himself. Following a
short delay, Rice’s physician, Dr. Winter, concurred with the
recommendation of the LPN and VA counselors and completed the
required medical documentation, which indicated Rice was not to
operate a motor vehicle. There is no question that Rice’s
blackouts prevent him from continuing his employment as a long haul
truck driver. Accordingly, we hold that § 39-51-2302(1), MCA, does
not require an employee to obtain a physician’s advice prior to
resigning from employment under these circumstances and Rice
resigned from his job with “good cause.”
¶16 For these reasons, we affirm the Order of the District Court.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
We Concur:
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/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE
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