State v. Eisenzimer

August 5 2014
DA 12-0720
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2014 MT 208STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RYAN WILLIAM EISENZIMER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Pondera, Cause No. DC 11-16
Honorable Laurie McKinnon, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender; Jacob Johnson, Assistant
Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Brenda K. Elias, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Mary Ann Ries, Pondera County Attorney; Conrad, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 25, 2014
Decided: August 5, 2014
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Ryan William Eisenzimer appeals his conviction from the Ninth Judicial District
Court, Pondera County, for obstructing a peace officer, a misdemeanor, in violation of
§ 45-7-302, MCA. We affirm.
ISSUE
¶2 Whether the District Court erred when it denied Eisenzimer’s motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence to convict him of the charge of obstructing a peace officer.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On March 11, 2011, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Conrad City Police Officer Scott
Holbrook stopped a pickup truck for a traffic violation in downtown Conrad. As Holbrook
was running the pickup driver’s information, Eisenzimer approached Holbrook’s patrol car.
As Eisenzimer approached, the patrol car’s red and blue flashing top lights were activated,
the occupied pickup truck was parked in front of Holbrook’s car, and Holbrook was sitting in
his patrol car running the pickup driver’s information. Seeing Eisenzimer approach,
Holbrook motioned with his hand for him to keep moving. Eisenzimer, who was visibly
intoxicated, asked Holbrook for a ride home. Holbrook repeatedly told Eisenzimer to “keep
walking” and to “get out of here.” When Eisenzimer persisted in asking for a ride, Holbrook
told him he was busy and stated, “You want to be arrested? Keep walking. I’ll do it. Get
out of here.” After several warnings, Holbrook arrested Eisenzimer for obstructing a peace
officer. After placing Eisenzimer in custody, Holbrook completed his traffic stop of the
pickup driver.
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¶4 On September 7, 2011, Eisenzimer was found guilty in Conrad City Court of
obstructing a peace officer pursuant to § 45-7-302, MCA. He appealed his conviction to the
District Court, which conducted a trial de novo. At trial in the District Court, Eisenzimer
moved at the close of the State’s case-in-chief to dismiss the charge for insufficient
evidence.1 His motion was denied. On September 17, 2012, a jury found Eisenzimer guilty
of obstructing a peace officer. On October 15, 2012, the District Court sentenced Eisenzimer
to submit to a chemical dependency evaluation at his own expense, and to pay court costs
totaling $654.25. Eisenzimer appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5 We review the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence de novo. State
v. Kirn, 2012 MT 69, ¶ 8, 364 Mont. 356, 274 P.3d 746. “We review a question on the
sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Booth, 2012 MT 40, ¶
7, 364 Mont. 190, 272 P.3d 89.
DISCUSSION
¶6 Whether the District Court erred when it denied Eisenzimer’s motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence to convict him of the charge of obstructing a peace officer.
¶7 “A person commits the offense of obstructing a peace officer or public servant if the
person knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the enforcement of the criminal law.”
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Eisenzimer moved for a directed verdict in favor of acquittal at the close of the State’s case-in-chief.
However, his motion is treated as a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. State v. Rosling,
2008 MT 62, ¶ 21 n.2, 342 Mont. 1, 180 P.3d 1102.
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Section 45-7-302(1), MCA. “[A]n individual obstructing a peace officer must engage in
conduct under circumstances that make him or her aware that it is highly probable that such
conduct will impede the performance of a peace officer’s lawful duty.” City of Kalispell v.
Cameron, 2002 MT 78, ¶ 11, 309 Mont. 248, 46 P.3d 46 (interpreting the statutory definition
of “knowingly” under § 45-2-101(35), MCA, in the context of § 45-7-302(1), MCA.)
¶8 Eisenzimer argues that he neither hindered Holbrook’s enforcement of the law, nor
was he aware that his conduct was “highly probable” to impede the performance of
Holbrook’s work. Eisenzimer argues that his situation is similar to Cameron, in which we
reversed the defendant’s conviction for obstructing a peace officer because we concluded
that “the City did not and could not prove the elements of § 45-7-302(1), MCA.” Cameron,
¶ 13. Eisenzimer’s reliance on Cameron is misplaced.
¶9 In Cameron, two police officers observed the vehicle in which defendant Cameron
was a passenger driving erratically as it pulled into a restaurant’s parking lot. As the officers
approached the vehicle, both Cameron and the driver had already exited and Cameron was
walking into the restaurant. While the first officer was investigating the driver, the second
officer instructed Cameron to get back into the vehicle. Cameron refused, stating that he was
going to get something to eat. After Cameron refused the officer’s instruction a second time,
he was arrested and charged with obstructing a peace officer.
¶10 At trial, the officer who had arrested the driver “testified that his ability to arrest the
driver had not been hindered in any way by Cameron and that Cameron did nothing to delay
or threaten him.” Cameron, ¶ 6. This Court reversed Cameron’s conviction after concluding
that Cameron did not obstruct the officers in the performance of their duties, the officer had
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no reason to arrest Cameron, and Cameron had no reason to know why he was being
investigated or arrested. Cameron, ¶ 12.
¶11 In contrast to Cameron, there was ample evidence presented in Eisenzimer’s case
from which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of obstructing a
peace officer beyond a reasonable doubt. Holbrook was obviously in the middle of a traffic
stop when Eisenzimer approached him. The top lights on Holbrook’s patrol car were
flashing as Eisenzimer approached, and the lights continued to flash as Eisenzimer
repeatedly asked for a ride. Holbrook told Eisenzimer he was busy and repeatedly instructed
Eisenzimer to “keep walking” and advised him that he would be arrested if he continued to
ask for a ride. Holbrook was only able to complete his traffic stop after he arrested
Eisenzimer. Prior to arresting Eisenzimer, Holbrook’s attention to the performance of his
duties – i.e., the traffic stop – was diverted by responding to Eisenzimer’s repeated requests
for a ride. Although Holbrook acknowledged at trial that he did not think Eisenzimer
intended to impede his work, Eisenzimer’s subjective intent is not the issue. The issue is
whether Eisenzimer engaged in conduct that impeded the performance of Holbrook’s lawful
duties under circumstances that made Eisenzimer aware it was highly probable his conduct
would impede the performance of those duties. Reviewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have made such a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶12 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court’s order denying
Eisenzimer’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
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/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
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