Estate of Woody Ex Rel. Woody v. Big Horn County

07/26/2016
DA 16-0010
Case Number: DA 16-0010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 180
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH R.
WOODY IV, Deceased, by and through his personal representative
KENNETH R. WOODY, and LORRAINE WOODY,
personal representative, on behalf of the heirs of
KENNETH R. WOODY IV,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
BIG HORN COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the
State of Montana, and the BIG HORN COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Defendants and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,
In and For the County of Big Horn, Cause No. DV 15-9
Honorable Blair Jones, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Gregory Paul Johnson, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Appellees:
Calvin J. Stacey, Bryan M. Kautz, Stacey, Funyak & Kautz,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 1, 2016
Decided: July 26, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Kenneth R. Woody and Lorraine Woody, as co-personal representatives of the
Estate of Kenneth R. Woody IV, and on behalf of his heirs (the Estate), appeal the order
of the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn County, granting Big Horn
County’s and Big Horn County Sheriff’s Office’s (collectively, the County) motion to
dismiss. The Estate raises the following issue on appeal:
Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Estate’s complaint was
barred by the statute of limitations.
¶2 We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Kenneth R. Woody IV was killed on December 16, 2011, after the vehicle in
which he was a passenger crashed near Hardin, Montana, following a high-speed chase
by a Big Horn County Sheriff’s deputy.
¶4 On September 11, 2014, the Estate submitted a claim letter to the County, seeking
$750,000 from the County for wrongful death and survivorship damages related to
Woody’s death. The claim letter informed the County that it had 120 days from the date
of the letter to resolve the claim “without the necessity of litigation.” The County Board
of Commissioners acknowledged receipt of the letter on September 15, 2014, but never
responded.
¶5 On March 3, 2015, the Estate filed a complaint against the County in the District
Court asserting negligence, survivorship, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. On March 18, 2015, the County filed a motion to dismiss under M. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, asserting that the Estate’s claims were barred
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by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. The Estate objected to the motion,
averring that its claim letter to the County had tolled the statute of limitations in
accordance with §§ 2-9-301, 2-9-302 and 27-2-209(3), MCA.
¶6 The District Court held a hearing on the County’s motion to dismiss on
October 19, 2015. The parties argued opposing interpretations of the effect and
applicability of §§ 2-9-301 and 27-2-209(3), MCA. The Estate relied primarily on Rouse
v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, 250 Mont. 1, 817 P.2d 690 (1991), overruled in part by
Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 276 Mont. 67, 915 P.2d 175 (1996). The County relied
primarily on Stratemeyer. On December 10, 2015, the court granted the County’s motion
to dismiss, concluding that the Estate’s claims were time barred “in accordance with the
Stratemeyer holding.” The Estate appeals.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶7 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under M. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Cowan v. Cowan, 2004 MT 97, ¶ 10, 321 Mont. 13, 89 P.3d 6.
Whether a district court correctly applied the statute of limitations is a question of law,
also reviewed for correctness. Momsen v. Momsen, 2006 MT 233, ¶ 7, 333 Mont. 463,
143 P.3d 450.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Estate’s complaint was
barred by the statute of limitations.
¶9 The statute of limitations for claims of negligence, wrongful death, survivorship,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress is three years. Section 27-2-204, MCA.
Generally, a claim accrues and the limitation period begins to run when all elements of
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the claim “exist or have occurred.” Section 27-2-102, MCA. The parties do not dispute
the three-year limitations period and agree that this action accrued on December 16,
2011. An action commences upon the filing of the complaint. Section 27-2-102(1)(b),
MCA. “All civil actions must be commenced within the periods prescribed in [Title 27,
Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA,] except when another statute specifically provides a different
limitation.” Section 27-2-105, MCA. Claims against the State or a political subdivision
are “subject to the limitation of actions provided by law.” Section 2-9-302, MCA.
¶10 Section 2-9-301, MCA, sets forth administrative claim requirements for actions
against the State and political subdivisions. The County is a political subdivision as
defined under § 2-9-101(5), MCA. A plaintiff making a claim against the State must first
present the claim to the Montana Department of Administration before filing a complaint
in a district court. Section 2-9-301(2), MCA. “Upon the department’s receipt of the
claim, the statute of limitations is tolled for 120 days.” Section 2-9-301(2), MCA.
Section 2-9-301, MCA, contains no tolling provision for claims against political
subdivisions, but still requires that plaintiffs present and file such claims with the clerk or
secretary of the political subdivision. Section 2-9-301(3), MCA. “Actions for claims
against a county that have been rejected by the county commissioners must be
commenced within 6 months after the first rejection.” Section 27-2-209(3), MCA.
¶11 The District Court interpreted and analyzed §§ 2-9-301 and 27-2-209(3), MCA,
and our decisions in Rouse and Stratemeyer to conclude that the Estate’s claim letter to
the County “did not toll the limitations period for the claims asserted in the Estate’s
[Complaint].” With respect to § 2-9-301, MCA, the court noted that subsection (3)
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contains no requirement that a claim against a political subdivision be “first presented” to
the government or that it be acted upon before a complaint can be filed. “Rather,
§ 2-9-301(3), MCA, merely requires that a claim be filed.” The court noted further that
unlike § 2-9-301(2), MCA—which tolls the statute of limitations upon timely filing of a
claim against the State—subsection (3) of this statute “contains no such tolling provision
related to claims made against political subdivisions.” Similarly, with respect to
§ 27-2-209(3), MCA, the court found “no indication in the statute that [the applicable]
subsection lengthens the limitations period further than the general limitation period for a
claim against a county.” The court concluded further, “Rather than lengthening the
limitation period, subsection (3) actually shortens the period . . . under appropriate
circumstances.” In any event, the court concluded, § 27-2-209(3), MCA, is not
applicable to the facts of this case because “the County never denied the Estate’s claim.”
¶12 The court noted that the Estate’s theory with respect to §§ 2-9-301 and
27-2-209(3), MCA, “mirrors” this Court’s analysis in Rouse. The court acknowledged
that “[u]nder the Rouse analysis, because the County never denied the Estate’s claim, the
Estate’s [Complaint] would be timely filed.” The court concluded, however, that in
Stratemeyer, this Court “acknowledged that its statutory interpretation in Rouse was not
correct.” According to the District Court, Rouse “was the product of the Montana
Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of § 2-9-301(3), MCA, which in turn resulted in the
court finding an inherent unfairness in the statutory scheme—an unfairness that does not
exist under a correct reading of the statute.” The court concluded further that because
“the Estate was free to commence the instant action in district court on the same day it
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presented its claim to the County, or even prior,” the September 11, 2014 letter “did not
toll the limitations period.”
¶13 The Estate argues that the District Court erred in its interpretation and analysis of
the applicable statutes and case law. The Estate contends that the decision in Rouse
remains good law insofar as it held that under §§ 2-9-302 and 27-2-209(3), MCA, “the
initial period for claims against a county is tolled upon timely filing of the claim and the
six month period of limitation for filing an action in district court does not begin to run
until the claimant received notice of the county board’s first denial of the claim.” Rouse,
250 Mont. at 6, 817 P.2d at 693. The Estate argues that “[t]he only inconsistency”
between Rouse and Stratemeyer “is that Section 2-9-301(3), MCA, does not require a
claim against a county to be ‘first presented’ or that it be acted upon before a complaint
can be filed.” Therefore, according to the Estate, because it “timely filed its claim with
the [County]” and because the County “never denied the claim,” the limitations period for
the Estate’s claims against the County “was tolled and the six month period of limitation
for filing an action in district court did not begin to run because the Estate never received
notice of the County’s denial of the claim.” The Estate claims that by first filing its claim
with the County before filing a complaint, it acted in accordance with Rouse, the
“legislative mandate of Section 2-9-301(3), MCA,” and in “furtherance of the public
policy to prevent needless litigation and to save unnecessary litigation expenses by
affording an opportunity to amicably adjust and settle all claims before suit is brought.”
¶14 The County argues that the plain language of §§ 2-9-301(3) and 27-2-209(3),
MCA, establish that “no tolling of a statute of limitations exists when a claim is being
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made against a county.” The County points out that while § 2-9-301(2), MCA, contains a
specific tolling provision for claims against the State, § 2-9-301(3), MCA, contains no
such provision for claims against a political subdivision. The County contends further
that § 27-2-209(3), MCA, “actually shortens the time frame in which to file a lawsuit
against a county, if the county denies the claim.” For example, according to the County,
where a county receives a negligence claim after “one year of the statute running, and the
county immediately denies the claim, instead of having two years left in which to file the
lawsuit, the plaintiff would have only 6 months left” to file the complaint in district court.
“[T]he biggest difference between Rouse, Stratemeyer, and the case at hand,” according
to the County, “is that in both cited cases, the plaintiff filed their lawsuit within the
applicable period of limitations. . . . In the instant case, those facts do not exist.” Finally,
the County contends that the Estate’s public policy argument is not enough to reverse the
District Court because “there exist[ ] clearly established statutes of limitation that must be
adhered to when filing a lawsuit.”
¶15 In Rouse, we analyzed the application of §§ 2-9-302 and 27-2-209(3), MCA, with
respect to Rouse’s claim against the county for assault and malicious prosecution. Rouse,
250 Mont. at 4-6, 817 P.2d at 692-93. Rouse had filed his claim with the county
approximately twenty-two months after the incident giving rise to his claims and the
county never responded. Rouse, 250 Mont. at 4, 817 P.2d at 692. Rouse then filed a
complaint in the district court nearly three years after the incident. The district court held
that Rouse’s claims were time-barred by a two-year statute of limitations. On appeal
Rouse argued that under § 27-2-209(3), MCA, “because the county ha[d] yet to reject his
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claims, the six month statute ha[d] not begun to run against him.” Rouse, 250 Mont. at 3,
817 P.2d at 691. We reversed the district court’s holding, noting that “after Rouse filed
his timely claim with the County, the County had notice of pending claims against it and
also controlled the commencement of the six month limitation period.” Rouse, 250 Mont.
at 6, 817 P.2d at 693. We concluded, “It would be inherently unfair to require Rouse to
file a timely claim against the County before filing an action in District Court and then to
penalize him for the County’s failure to act, or stalling on the claim.” Rouse, 250 Mont.
at 6, 817 P.2d at 693. We held that Rouse’s claims against the county were not barred
because:
under §§ 2-9-302 and 27-2-209(3), MCA, the initial period of limitation for
claims against a county is tolled upon timely filing of the claim and the six
month period of limitation for filing an action in district court does not
begin to run until the claimant receives notice of the county board’s first
denial of the claim.
Rouse, 250 Mont. at 6, 817 P.2d at 693.
¶16 In Stratemeyer, an officer with a county sheriff’s department filed a tort claim in a
district court against the county for failure to train, counsel, or debrief him after he
witnessed the aftermath of a suicide while on the job. Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 70, 915
P.2d at 176. The district court dismissed the officer’s tort claim, determining that
although he had filed the complaint within the three-year statute of limitations, his claim
was barred because he failed to first file it with the county “as required by § 2-9-301,
MCA.” Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 71, 915 P.2d at 177. On appeal, the county relied on
Rouse to assert that § 2-9-301(3), MCA, required a plaintiff to first file a claim against
the entity before proceeding in district court. Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 73, 915 P.2d at
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178. We noted that the language in Rouse on which the county relied “is dicta” but also
acknowledged that in Rouse we had “inexplicably read the ‘first file’ requirement” into
§ 2-9-301(3), MCA, which “violates . . . our rules for statutory construction.”
Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 73, 915 P.2d at 178. Thus, we rejected “our broad statement in
Rouse which would require a claimant to ‘first file’ his claim with the political
subdivision before proceeding in district court.” Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 73, 915 P.2d
at 178-79. We concluded instead that § 2-9-301(3), MCA, “merely requires that a claim
be filed, it does not require that it be ‘first presented’ or that it be acted upon before a
complaint can be filed.” Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 74, 915 P.2d at 179. Consequently,
we reversed the district court and overruled Rouse “to the extent that [it] expresses an
opinion inconsistent with our analysis in the instant case.” Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 74,
915 P.2d at 179.
¶17 The Estate’s reading of Rouse and Stratemeyer is accurate. Stratemeyer overruled
Rouse only with respect to interpretation of § 2-9-301(3), MCA. Stratemeyer, 276 Mont.
at 73-74, 915 P.2d at 178-79. Section 27-2-209(3), MCA, which contains the language
held in Rouse to toll the limitations period, was not applicable in Stratemeyer and was
never analyzed, discussed, or even mentioned in that case. We stated explicitly in
Stratemeyer that the overruled statement in Rouse was “dicta” and was “not related to our
holding in Rouse.” Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 73, 915 P.2d at 178. Accordingly,
Stratemeyer overruled Rouse only to the extent that it required a plaintiff to first file a
claim with a political subdivision before proceeding in district court under § 2-9-301(3),
MCA. The rest of the Rouse decision, therefore, remained good law after Stratemeyer.
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¶18 Rouse establishes that under §§ 2-9-302 and 27-2-209(3), MCA, when a plaintiff
timely files a claim against a county, the period of limitations is tolled and the six month
limitation period for filing in district court does not begin to run until the claimant
receives notice of the county’s denial of the claim. Rouse, 250 Mont. at 6, 817 P.2d at
693. As noted, claims against political subdivisions are subject to the limitation of
actions provided by law. Section 2-9-302, MCA. We are reluctant to conclude, absent
plain language in the statutes, see Bates v. Neva, 2014 MT 336, ¶ 26, 377 Mont. 350, 339
P.3d 1265, that the six-month period under § 27-2-209(3), MCA, may shorten the
original limitations period but not lengthen it. Among other things, “statutes of limitation
serve the purpose of ensuring ‘basic fairness’ to parties.” Burley v. Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2012 MT 28, ¶ 16, 364 Mont. 77, 273 P.3d 825. We observed in Rouse
that such an application of the six-month provision “does not unduly lengthen” the
limitation period, particularly because the political subdivision retains control against
stale claims by responding to a plaintiff’s administrative filing. Rouse, 250 Mont. at 6,
817 P.2d at 692 (citing Gutter v. Seamandel, 308 N.W.2d 403, 414 (Wis. 1981)).
¶19 Rouse is squarely on point with the facts in this case and it was reasonable for the
Estate to rely on it. The original three-year limitations period for the Estate’s claim
would have run on December 16, 2014. On September 11, 2014, the Estate presented its
claim with the County pursuant to § 2-9-301(3), MCA. The County acknowledged that it
received the claim; it thus “had notice of pending claims against it and also controlled the
commencement of the six month limitation period.” Rouse, 250 Mont. at 6, 817 P.2d at
693. Under Rouse, upon the filing of the claim the period of limitations was tolled until
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the Estate received notice of the County’s denial of the claim, at which point the Estate
would have had six months from the date of denial to file a complaint. Rouse, 250 Mont.
at 6, 817 P.2d at 693. Like in Rouse, the County never denied or responded otherwise to
the Estate’s claim. Therefore, the original limitation period was tolled and the six-month
limitation period never began. Rouse, 250 Mont. at 6, 817 P.2d at 693. The Estate’s
complaint was timely filed. Indeed, the Estate commenced its action within six months
of the date it presented its claim to the County. The District Court erred in concluding
that the Estate failed to file its complaint within the applicable limitations period.
¶20 As a final matter, we decline to revisit Rouse in this case. The principal of stare
decisis applies strongly when interpreting statutes; once the Court has placed a
construction on statutory language, the Court prefers to “leav[e] it to the legislature to
amend the law should a change be deemed necessary.” Bottomly v. Ford, 117 Mont. 160,
168, 157 P.2d 108, 112 (1945). The Legislature has let stand this Court’s initial
construction of § 27-2-209(3), MCA, and it has become the law. Musselshell Ranch Co.
v. Seidel-Joukova, 2011 MT 217, ¶ 14, 362 Mont. 1, 261 P.3d 570. As such, we defer to
the Legislature to clarify the statute if the Court’s interpretation of its language is not
what the Legislature intends. Bottomly, 117 Mont. at 168, 157 P.2d at 112.
CONCLUSION
¶21 For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing
the Estate’s complaint on the basis that it was time-barred. We reverse the court’s order
granting the County’s motion to dismiss and remand the case for further proceedings.
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/S/ BETH BAKER
We concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ JIM RICE
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