City of Billings v. D. Barth

03/14/2017
DA 16-0183
Case Number: DA 16-0183
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 56CITY OF BILLINGS,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
DANIEL BARTH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 15-1013
Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Moses Okeyo, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Madison L. Mattioli,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Teague J. Westrope, Billings Deputy City Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 8, 2017
Decided: March 14, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Defendant Daniel Barth appeals the order and decision of the Thirteenth Judicial
District Court, Yellowstone County, affirming alcohol-related conditions included in
Barth’s sentence by the City of Billings Municipal Court. We address the following
issue:
Whether the Municipal Court erred in imposing alcohol-related conditions on the
defendant’s sentence.
¶2 We affirm.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On January 29, 2015, Daniel Barth ran a stop sign while driving a Chevrolet
Avalanche and collided with a Dodge Caravan at an intersection in Billings, Montana.
Barth was identified as the driver of the Avalanche by a license plate recovered at the
scene and by the testimony of an eyewitness who picked him out of a photo lineup. The
occupants of the Caravan, a young mother and her eight-month-old child, suffered several
serious injuries, requiring medical treatment. Instead of remaining at the scene to check
on the well-being of the victims and to alert authorities of the accident, Barth fled. The
next day, Barth called police to report that his Avalanche had been stolen the night
before.
¶4 Barth was charged with: (1) negligent endangerment in violation of § 45-5-208,
MCA; (2) leaving the scene of an injury accident in violation of § 61-7-103, MCA; and
(3) failing to give notice of an accident in violation of § 61-7-108, MCA. On
September 4, 2015, a jury found Barth guilty of all charges. At the sentencing hearing,
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the City introduced evidence of Barth’s criminal record, including seven convictions for
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), and other traffic violations. Barth’s most
recent alcohol-related conviction was a DUI in 2007. The City contended that it was
impossible to tell if alcohol was a factor in Barth’s accident in this case because he fled
the scene.
¶5 Citing concerns about Barth’s history with alcohol, the Municipal Court included
six conditions to Barth’s suspended sentence for negligent endangerment, four of which
pertained to alcohol use:
3. Defendant shall be subject to random urinalysis and breath testing;
4. Defendant shall not enter any place where alcohol is the primary
item of sale including bars and casinos;
5. Defendant shall not consume any alcohol, drugs, or mood-altering
substances;
6. Defendant shall complete a chemical dependency evaluation and
shall follow all recommendations made by the licensed addictions
counselor.
The Municipal Court specifically concluded that Barth was a danger to society because of
his history of DUIs.
¶6 Barth filed a timely appeal to the District Court regarding the four alcohol-related
conditions of his sentence. Barth did not appeal his convictions or the non-alcohol
related conditions of his sentence. Barth argued that the Municipal Court did not
establish a sufficient nexus between his criminal history and the conditions imposed on
his sentence that related to alcohol. On January 27, 2016, the District Court issued an
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order and decision affirming the Municipal Court’s conditions. Barth timely appeals the
District Court’s order.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶7 On an appeal from a municipal court, district courts function as an intermediate
appellate court. City of Bozeman v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40, ¶ 10, 369 Mont. 81, 296 P.3d
461. When the district court is subsequently appealed, we review the case as if the appeal
had originally been filed in this Court, and apply the appropriate standard of review.
Cantu, ¶ 10.
¶8 Sentencing conditions are reviewed first for the condition’s legality, and then for
abuse of discretion. Cantu, ¶ 11. A condition is illegal when there exists no statutory
authority to impose it, where the condition exceeds the limits of the relevant sentencing
statute, or where the court fails to “adhere to the affirmative mandates of the applicable
sentencing statutes.” State v. Heddings, 2008 MT 402, ¶ 11, 347 Mont. 169, 198 P.3d
242. If the condition is legal, we then determine if the condition is a “reasonable
restriction, or condition considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the
victim or society.” Section 46-18-201(4)(q), MCA; Heddings, ¶ 14.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Whether the Municipal Court erred in imposing alcohol-related conditions on the
defendant’s sentence.
¶10 In order for a sentencing court to impose a condition on a defendant’s suspended
sentence, the court must find a nexus between the condition and the underlying offense or
the offender’s history. State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83, ¶ 15, 342 Mont. 187, 179 P.3d 1164.
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Offender-related conditions are appropriate only when the “history or pattern of conduct
to be restricted is recent, and significant or chronic.” Ashby, ¶ 15. A condition will be
invalidated where the nexus is absent altogether, or is “exceedingly tenuous.” State v.
Melton, 2012 MT 84, ¶ 18, 364 Mont. 482, 276 P.3d 900 (citing State v. Zimmerman,
2010 MT 44, ¶ 17, 355 Mont. 286, 228 P.3d 1109).
¶11 Section 46-18-201(4)(q), MCA, gives sentencing courts the legal authority to
impose any reasonable conditions on suspended sentences. At the sentencing hearing, the
Municipal Court made clear that the conditions imposed were designed to protect society
from Barth’s criminal behavior and alcohol abuse. As there exists clear statutory
authority for the Municipal Court’s actions, the conditions imposed on Barth’s suspended
sentence were legal.
¶12 We next determine if the condition is reasonable. In that regard, we assess
whether the “history or pattern of conduct to be restricted is recent, and significant or
chronic.” Ashby, ¶ 15. Barth does not dispute that his seven DUI convictions constitute
a significant and chronic problem; rather, he contends his alcohol abuse is not recent.
Barth argues that because his last DUI prior to the hit-and-run was eight years old, the
DUI is both remote and stale under Ashby. We disagree.
¶13 We have previously held that a history of chemical dependency, despite no
evidence of alcohol abuse in sixteen years prior to arrest, was a sufficient nexus to the
offender to support a condition prohibiting alcohol use. State v. Winkel, 2008 MT 89,
¶¶ 15-16, 342 Mont. 267, 182 P.3d 54. In Winkel, the concern was that alcohol would
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hinder Winkel’s rehabilitation in light of his extensive history with chemical dependency.
Similarly, Barth has developed a lengthy and substantial history of driving under the
influence, as well as reckless and careless driving over the last thirty years. As in Winkel,
Barth’s history suggests that alcohol presents a barrier to his rehabilitation and makes
him a danger to society. Barth’s eight-year-old DUI is decidedly more recent than the
sixteen-year gap in Winkel, and is sufficient to meet the recency requirement set forth in
Ashby. The Municipal Court’s alcohol-related conditions were both legal and reasonable,
and have a sufficient nexus to Barth’s history of alcohol abuse and reckless driving.
¶14 It is unfortunate for Barth that any evidence that his hit-and-run was not
alcohol-related evaporated when he chose to flee the scene. On that score, however,
Barth is the author of his own misfortune. More to the point, even if we were to give
Barth the benefit of the doubt that he was merely callous, rather than intoxicated, when
he fled the scene of an accident in which he seriously injured a mother and her
eight-month-old infant, his extensive DUI history, and obvious chemical dependency
issues, justified the alcohol-related conditions imposed by the Municipal Court.
CONCLUSION
¶15 We affirm the District Court’s order upholding the Municipal Court’s
alcohol-related conditions on Barth’s sentence.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
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We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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