Marriage of Lewis

No. 95-131
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
GERALDINE JOY LEWIS,
Petitioner, Respondent and
Cross-Appellant,
and
WILLIAM ISAAC LEWIS,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Joan E. Cook; Law Office of Joan E. Cook,
Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Daniel L. Falcon; Matteucci, Falcon, Squires &
Lester, Great Falls, Montana
Y
Submitted on Briefs: October 19, 1995
Decided: November 21, 1995
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1995 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as
precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result
to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company.
William Isaac Lewis (William) appeals from the December 30,
1994, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Eighth
Judicial District Court, Cascade County, dissolving his marriage to
Geraldine Joy Lewis (Geraldine) and dividing the marital estate.
Geraldine cross-appeals from the court's denial in that decree of
her request for attorney's fees and from the court's subsequent
order amending the decree. We modify the amended 1994 decree and,
thereafter, affirm.
We address the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court err in adopting, nearly verbatim,
Geraldine's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in
distributing the marital estate?
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying
Geraldine attorney's fees?
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by deleting a
finding of fact regarding Geraldine's medical and counseling bills
and modifying the decree accordingly?
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William and Geraldine married on May 22, 1985. No children
were born of the marriage. During the marriage, the parties
operated a business in which they boarded horses (stables
business). The property on which the stables business was
operated, and where William and Geraldine lived, was owned by
William prior to the parties' marriage and substantially improved
during the marriage.
Geraldine petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in June
of 1994 and, on December 30, 1994, the District Court entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Decree. Thereafter,
William timely filed a Rule 59 motion requesting that the District
Court amend the 1994 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree. The District Court amended the decree by adjusting the
distribution of the marital estate to correct the duplication of
certain marital assets, deleting a finding regarding Geraldine's
medical and counseling bills and modifying the decree accordingly.
William appeals from the court's distribution of the marital
estate. Geraldine cross-appeals the court's denial of her request
for attorney's fees and costs and from the court's order amending
the findings and decree regarding her medical and counseling bills.
1. Did the District Court err in adopting, nearly
verbatim, Geraldine's Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree?
William argues on appeal that the District Court's adoption of
Geraldine's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree resulted in a Decree which is not supported by the evidence;
he contends, therefore, that the 1994 decree must be vacated. We
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review the adequacy of findings of fact and conclusions of law to
determine whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent
to the issues to provide a basis for a decision, and whether they
are supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of
Nikolaisen (1993), 257 Mont. 1, 5, 847 P.2d 287, 289 (citing In re
Marriage of Hurley (1986), 222 Mont. 287, 296, 721 P.2d 1279,
1285).
The District Court's findings regarding the marital assets,
the credibility of each party's testimony and Geraldine's
contributions to the marital estate were extensive. In
distributing the marital estate, the court considered each party's
current income and the sources of that income; Geraldine's
education level and work history; the income from the stables
business; Geraldine's contributions as a homemaker and her
contributions to the maintenance of the stables business; and the
commingling of the parties' income. The findings are sufficiently
comprehensive and pertinent in light of the factors enumerated in
5 40-4-202, MCA. In addition, they are supported by substantial
evidence and, except as discussed below, William does not argue
otherwise.
We will not overturn the court's findings and conclusions
simply because they were, in large measure, adopted from those
Geraldine proposed. See In re Marriage of Popp (19831, 206 Mont.
415, 423, 671 P.2d 24, 28. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., provides that
a district court may adopt any of a party's proposed findings or
conclusions so long as they are supported by the evidence and law
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of the case. We hold, therefore, that the District Court did not
err in adopting, nearly verbatim, Geraldine's proposed findings and
conclusions.
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in
distributing the marital estate?
A district court has broad discretion in finally and equitably
apportioning the property and assets of the marital estate between
the parties. Section 40-4-202(l), MCA. We review the distribution
of a marital estate to determine if the court's findings of fact
are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Smith (Mont. 1995), 891
P.2d 522, 525, 52 St.Rep. 174, 175-76. If the findings and decree
are supported by substantial credible evidence, we will not alter
the trial court's decision unless the court abused its discretion.
Marriaqe of Smith, 891 P.2d at 525.
Premarital Assets
William contends that the District Court abused its discretion
by awarding Geraldine a portion of his premarital property and
fifty percent of the entire value of the stables. He also asserts
error in the court's finding that inadequate evidence existed to
trace his premarital investment monies.
A court's distribution of premarital assets is governed, in
the first instance, by statutory criteria. In distributing such
assets, the court is required to consider the contributions of the
other spouse to the marriage--including nonmonetary contributions
and the extent to which such contributions facilitated the
maintenance of the property--and whether or not the property
division serves as an alternative to maintenance. Section 40-4-
5
202(l) (a)-(c), MCA.
A district court must consider the origin of prior-acquired
property in distributing that property. In re Marriage of White
(1985), 218 Mont. 343, 345, 708 P.2d 267, 269 (citation omitted).
Notwithstanding its origin, however, such property is subject to
equitable apportionment between the parties, and equitable
apportionment does not require that the parties be returned to
their premarital status. Marriaae of White, 708 P.2d at 269.
Geraldine testified that she was responsible for the upkeep of
the family home and that she helped feed the animals and helped
with other outside work. She further testified that she assisted
in the purchase of the stables prior to the parties' marriage.
When William was unable to work at the stables because of an
injury, Geraldine took sole responsibility for care of the stables.
Additionally, Geraldine worked at Sperry's Market, a premarital
asset of William's, often without pay. The court determined that
Geraldine made substantial contributions to the value of all of the
marital assets. We conclude that substantial credible evidence
supports the court's findings regarding the premarital property.
William also contends that the District Court erred in finding
that no valid means existed by which to separate the commingled
funds of the parties. However, the record before us contains
substantial credible evidence to support this finding.
The record reflects that William and Geraldine maintained a
joint account to which they both contributed. Deposits into this
joint account included Geraldine's social security benefits, wages
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and inheritance money; William's social security benefits, wages
and income from investments; and income from the stables business.
The parties did not make an effort during the marriage to keep
their money separate. We conclude that substantial credible
evidence supports the court's finding that the parties commingled
their money and that no viable means existed to separate each
party‘s money.
The court's findings are not clearly erroneous and the court
properly considered the statutory factors set forth in 5 40-4-
202(l) (a)-(c), MCA. We hold that William has not established an
abuse of discretion in the distribution of his premarital property.
Valuation of Marital Property
Next, William contends that the District Court erred in
failing to include certain property in Geraldine's share of the
estate and in accepting "guessed" values of property in valuing the
marital estate. He further contends that the court erred in
listing certain assets more than once in distributing the marital
estate.
When valuing marital assets, courts may adopt any valuation
which is supported by the record. In re Marriage of Maedje (1994),
263 Mont. 262, 267, 868 P.2d 580, 584 (citing In re Marriage of
Luisi (1988), 232 Mont. 243, 756 P.2d 456). Here, William and
Geraldine offered different values regarding various marital
assets.
Geraldine offered expert testimony regarding the value of
various assets. Additionally, Geraldine had attended auctions with
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William when certain assets were purchased. The court found that
William's testimony was inconsistent regarding what property
constituted the marital estate and the value of such property. The
court found that the values offered by Geraldine more accurately
reflected the market values of the parties' assets. The District
Court's findings regarding the valuation of the parties' marital
assets are supported by substantial credible evidence and are not
clearly erroneous.
William correctly points out that, in the 1994 decree, the
District Court listed the value of certain assets more than once.
Geraldine does not dispute that the distribution of the marital
estate should be adjusted to correct that mistake. However, since
the District Court corrected this mistake in the order amending the
decree, this issue is moot.
William also correctly points out that the court failed to
distribute the Lincoln Town Car. However, the court did find that
Geraldine was using this vehicle as her means of transportation and
that William had possession of other vehicles. Additionally, the
court recognized that Geraldine requested that the car be awarded
to her. Accordingly, we modify the decree to award the Lincoln
Town Car to Geraldine.
Equalizing the Marital Estate
The District Court awarded Geraldine marital property valued
at $2,271 and awarded William property valued at $159,647.52. In
addition, Geraldine was awarded premarital and gift property valued
at $165, while William was awarded such property valued at $14,883.
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As a result of the disparate distribution of property each party
received, the District Court ordered William to pay Geraldine
$86,047.26 to equalize the marital estate. William contends that
the District Court abused its discretion by doing so.
The court considered the factors contained in § 40-4-202, MCA,
and found that Geraldine made substantial contributions to the
maintenance of the marital estate. We conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion in requiring William to pay Geraldine
monetary compensation to equalize the share of the estate each
party would receive.
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in
denying Geraldine attorney's fees?
Geraldine contends that the District Court abused its
discretion in failing to award her attorney's fees and costs.
Specifically, she argues that the District Court failed to make
findings regarding, or provide its reasons for, the denial of her
request for attorney's fees. She urges this Court to remand this
issue to the District Court for further consideration.
We review a district court's denial of a party's request for
attorney's fees in a dissolution action to determine if the court
abused its discretion. Section 40-4-110, MCA; In re Marriage of
Gingerich (1994), 269 Mont. 161, 167-68, 887 P.2d 714, 718. We
will not disturb the district court's findings in this regard if
they are supported by substantial evidence. Marriase of Ginaerich,
881 P.2d at 718.
The District Court acknowledged Geraldine's request for
attorney's fees and costs in its findings. The court found,
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however, that Geraldine would be receiving a substantial amount of
the marital estate via William's monetary payment to Geraldine to
"equalize the marital estate." The court also found that
Geraldine had paid a portion of her attorney's fees with a cash
advance from a credit card which William subsequently paid upon
receiving the credit card bill. In short, it is clear that the
court considered the financial resources of each party and
concluded that each party should pay his and her own attorney's
fees and costs. Substantial credible evidence supports the court's
findings in this regard and we hold that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Geraldine's request for attorney's
fees and costs.
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by
deleting a finding of fact regarding Geraldine's medical
and counseling bills and modifying the decree
accordingly?
At trial, Geraldine testified without objection regarding
medical bills in the amount of $98.19 incurred during the marriage
resulting from an alleged assault by William. Geraldine attempted
to offer oral and documentary evidence regarding counseling bills
resulting from alleged verbal abuse by William, but the District
Court sustained William's objection to the evidence. As a result,
there is no evidence in the record regarding the amount of
Geraldine's counseling bills.
The District Court found that "[Geraldine] had outstanding
counseling bills of approximately $720 . . . and medical bills of
$98.19 . . .'I In the decree, the court ordered William to pay
Geraldine $818.19 out of his share of the marital estate for her
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medical and counseling bills.
William filed a Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P., motion to amend the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree. Following
consideration of the parties' briefs and oral arguments, the
District Court amended the decree, as noted above, by adjusting the
distribution of the marital estate to correct for its previous
duplication of the values of certain assets. The court also
amended with regard to Geraldine's medical and counseling bills by
deleting the finding set forth above and the portion of the decree
which ordered William to pay Geraldine $818.19 for these bills.
Geraldine contends that the court erred by deleting reference to
her medical and counseling bills and modifying the decree
accordingly.
We review a district court's grant or denial of a Rule 59
motion to determine if the court abused its discretion. See
Hickingbotham v. Duncan (Mont. 1995), 898 P.2d 1215, 1217, 52
St.Rep. 574, 576. We will not overturn amended findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. Hickinsbotham, 898 P.2d at 1217.
Here, substantial evidence supports the original finding
insofar as it addressed Geraldine's medical bills in the amount of
$98.19. The court did not have this part of the transcript before
it when it amended the decree and assumed that, since Geraldine
provided other parts of the transcript but not this portion, the
evidence in support of the original finding did not exist. We
conclude that the court abused its discretion in amending the
findings to delete reference to the $98.19 in medical bills and by
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deleting paragraph four of the decree to the extent it ordered
William to pay that amount.
As stated above, however, there is no evidence of record to
support any amount of counseling bills. William objected to
Geraldine's attempt to testify about those bills and to related
exhibits, and the court sustained the objection. The District
Court's finding insofar as it addressed Geraldine's counseling
bills was not supported by substantial evidence and was clearly
erroneous. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in deleting reference in its findings to the counseling
bills and deleting paragraph four of the decree to the extent it
ordered William to pay Geraldine $720 for those bills.
We modify the amended 1994 decree regarding the Lincoln Town
Car and the medical bills and affirm the amended decree in all
other respects.