State Dept. of Rev. v. Wilson

No. 80-369
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL REHABILITIVE SERVICES,
et al.,
Petitioners and Appellants,
vs .
ALFRED J. WILSON,
Respondent and Respondent.
No. 80-423
STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION
SERVICES, et al.,
Petitioners and Appellants,
VS .
ROBERT JAMES FATZ,
Respondent and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade.
Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
James, Gray & McCafferty, Great Falls, Montana
Fausto Turrin argued, Great Falls, Montana
Asselstine & Cruikshank, Great Falls, Montana
Brett C. Asselstine argued, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted: June 10, 1981
Decided: August 11-, 1981
Filed: AU6 1 1 19W
Clerk
H o n o r a b l e Mark P . S u l l i v a n , District Judge, delivered the
Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from j u d g m e n t s g r a n t e d r e s p o n d e n t s
by the District Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l District in
p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t them by t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f
Revenue and the Department of Social and Rehabilitation
S e r v i c e s (SRS) .
R e s p o n d e n t s had moved for judgments contending that
the statute of limitations on the determination of
paternity, section 40-6-108, MCA, had run at the time
appellants filed the petitions. I n g r a n t i n g t h e motions,
the District Court dismissed the petitions filed by the
State. Appellants allege the statute of limitations is
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s h o u l d be s t r u c k down.
A m a l e c h i l d was b o r n o u t o f wedlock t o E.F.L.R. on
March 2 2 , 1 9 7 6 . A t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same t i m e , t h e mother
applied to the state for public assistance, including
support for the child, and g a v e SRS s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n
which would be enough t o s t a r t a p a t e r n i t y action against
A l f r e d J . W i l s o n 11. The S t a t e a l s o o b t a i n e d an a s s i g n m e n t
of the mother's claim for s u p p o r t from t h e p u t a t i v e f a t h e r
when t h e baby was b o r n . The S t a t e b r o u g h t action against
Wilson on May 22, 1979, more than three years after the
b i r t h of t h e c h i l d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e a c t i o n
on m o t i o n o f t h e p u t a t i v e f a t h e r .
On A u g u s t 11, 1 9 7 2 , M.L. g a v e b i r t h t o a male c h i l d .
Sometime t h e r e a f t e r t h e S t a t e of Montana became a n inter-
ested party because the mother assigned her rights to
support t o SRS. On A u g u s t 4 , 1980, e i g h t y e a r s a f t e r the
child's birth, SRS filed a petition against Robert James
F a t z t o e s t a b l i s h p a t e r n i t y and o b t a i n s u p p o r t moneys.
Thereafter, on August 27, 1980, counsel for Robert
James F a t z f i l e d a m o t i o n t o q u a s h t h e o r d e r t o show c a u s e
r e q u i r i n g b l o o d t e s t s and a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t h e p e t i t i o n .
On September 5, 1980, oral arguments were heard by the
Honorable J o e l G. Roth and on S e p t e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e c o u r t
g r a n t e d r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s .
The i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t is w h e t h e r t h e t h r e e - y e a r
statute of limitations on the determination of paternity
i n s e c t i o n 40-6-108(3), MCA, violates the equal protection
p r o v i s i o n of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment o f t h e United S t a t e s
Constitution and Article 11, Section 4 of the Montana
Constitution.
An e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n i s s u e i s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e .
A p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t c h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock, as a
c l a s s , a r e t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y from c h i l d r e n born i n wedlock
because the first class loses rights during infancy for
determination of paternity and child support. In
p a r t i c u l a r , t h e c h i l d b o r n o u t o f wedlock may n o t m a i n t a i n a
support action against the paternal parent a f t e r three years
from t h e d a t e o f b i r t h of the child. S e c t i o n 40-6-108(3),
MCA. C h i l d r e n born i n wedlock, whose paternal parent is
p r e s u m e d , do n o t f a c e a s t a t u t e t h a t b a r s s u c h a c t i o n s .
C h i l d r e n b o r n o u t o f wedlock a r e n o t t h e s o l e p a r t i e s
t h a t concern t h i s Court. W e a l s o m u s t c o n s i d e r t h e power o f
the State through its agencies to bring actions of
p a t e r n i t y under s e c t i o n 40-6-107, MCA. S t a t e agencies derive
their power to bring paternity actions by way of this
statute.
The Montana Constitution provides that all persons
a r e g u a r a n t e e d t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws. Art. 11,
Sec. 4, 1972 Mont. Const.
Children Born Out Of Wedlock
As to children born out of wedlock, we find that
section 40-6-108, MCA, does create an unfair burden and
unfairly discriminates against these children. The statute
of limitations, as applied, is unconstitutional with respect
to children born out of wedlock. The statute prevents any
guardian, guardian ad litem or next friend of the child from
maintaining an action for support from the paternal parent
three years after birth of the child.
Classifications of this nature are invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, if
they are not substantially related to a permissible state
interest. Mathews v. Lucas (1976), 427 U.S. 495, 96 S. Ct.
2755, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651. The limitations statute constitutes
an overly-broad restriction on the rights of children born
out of wedlock.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed this
same issue recently in County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v.
Johnson (1980), 46 N.C.App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816. The
court's statement has application here:
"In the case sub judice, defendant argues
that [the statute] bears a substantial
relationship to the State's interest in
preventing the litigation of stale or
fraudulent claims. We disagree. As we
stated previously, a child is entitled to
support from its father throughout its
minority. Therefore, a child's claim for
such support at any time during its minority
can never be said to be stale. Nor is [the
statute] substantially related to the State's
interest in preventing the litigation of
fraudulent claims. We have no reason to
believe that the mere passage of time bears a
direct relation to the truth of the claim
asserted. Moreover, the need of a child to
r e c e i v e adequate support m a n i f e s t l y outweighs
t h e r e l a t i o n t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s may
have t o t h e p r e v e n t i o n of f r a u d u l e n t c l a i m s .
. . . " 264 S.E.2d a t 8 2 1 .
The rights of the child cannot be so compromised
during its infancy. The c h i l d b o r n o u t o f wedlock c a n n o t be
b a r r e d a c c e s s t o our c o u r t s d u r i n g i n f a n c y . Art. 11, S e c .
1 3 , 1 9 7 2 Mont. C o n s t .
Recently, we examined the scientific advances in
b l o o d t e s t i n g i n d e t e r m i n i n g p a t e r n i t y and t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y
power of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Rose v . D i s t . Court of Eighth
Judicial Dist. (1981), - Mont. , 628 P.2d 662, 38
St.Rep. 830. The newly-developed, greater percentage of
accuracy in determining p a t e r n i t y allows greater protections
f o r t h e a l l e g e d f a t h e r from f r a u d u l e n t c l a i m s . I n l i g h t of
t h e s e advances, t h e s t a n d a r d of proof r e q u i r e d i n p a t e r n i t y
a c t i o n s and t h e d i s c r e t i o n g r a n t e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n
pretrial hearings, it is concluded that the purpose of
s e c t i o n 40-6-108(3), MCA, a s applied t o t h e child through a
guardian ad litem or other representative, is minimal or
nonexistent compared to the interest of the child in
o b t a i n i n g s u p p o r t from h i s p a t e r n a l p a r e n t .
S t a t e Aqencies
T h i s C o u r t d o e s uphold t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a s
a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e where a s t a t e a g e n c y , s u c h a s t h e D e p a r t -
ment o f Revenue o r t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a -
t i o n S e r v i c e s , d e r i v e s a r i g h t from t h e m o t h e r o f t h e c h i l d
b o r n o u t o f wedlock t o b r i n g a c l a i m f o r r e i m b u r s e m e n t f o r
child support through p a t e r n i t y actions. The i n t e r e s t o f
t h e S t a t e i n t h e s e m a t t e r s i s e c o n o m i c , and t h e power o f t h e
State to continually threaten its citizens in paternity
actions must always be thoroughly examined and not taken
1i g h t l y .
The S t a t e is n o t a c h i l d . In r e a l i t y , it cares not
s o much a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f f a t h e r and c h i l d b u t more
a b o u t economic r e i m b u r s e m e n t f o r w e l f a r e and o t h e r d e p e n d e n t
aid. The r i g h t s g i v e n t o t h e S t a t e a r e n o t e q u a l to the
rights and interests of the child or the reasons or
necessity for finding the child's father. The s t a t u t e o f
limitations, therefore, provides a protection against the
inadvertence and delay of the State in actions for
paternity. The p a t e r n a l p a r e n t p r o t e c t i o n offered by the
s t a t u t e a s against the S t a t e has a s u b s t a n t i a l r e l a t i o n t o
t h e intended purpose and, t h e r e f o r e , is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
W note t h a t the t o l l i n g s t a t u t e ,
e s e c t i o n 25-1-102,
MCA, by i t s t e r m s , h a s n o t been made a p p l i c a b l e t o Uniform
Parentage Act cases. The matter of providing a proper
tolling statute for minors, at least, is called to the
a t t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e f o r f u t u r e a c t i o n .
The j u d g m e n t s o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a s t o t h e s t a t e
agencies are affirmed.
D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n
p l a c e o f Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C .
Harr i s o n
W concur:
e
Justices
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Haswell, d i s s e n t i n g :
I would r e v e r s e .
I a g r e e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s is u n c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l as t o a n i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d f o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d by t h e
majority. I n my v i e w i t i s e q u a l l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a g a i n s t t h e
S t a t e whose claims a r e d e r i v e d t h r o u g h and e q u a l to t h o s e of t h e
i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d t o whom it h a s f u r n i s h e d s u p p o r t .
The s t a t u t e s o f t h i s S t a t e p r o v i d e :
"40-5-109. Remedies o f s t a t e - p o l i t i c a l -
or sub-
d i v i s i o n furnishing support. If a state o r a
p o l i t i c a l subdivision furnishes support t o an
i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e , it h a s t h e same r i g h t to
i n i t i a t e a proceeding under t h i s p a r t as t h e
i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e f o r t h e purpose of s e c u r i n g
r e i m b u r s e m e n t f o r s u p p o r t f u r n i s h e d and of
obtaining continuing support ."
Here t h e S t a t e t o o k a n a s s i g n m e n t o f t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e
c h i l d ' s claim a g a i n s t h i s a l l e g e d f a t h e r . T h i s Court s t a t e d
a l m o s t 50 y e a r s a g o :
" ... The r u l e i s e l e m e n t a r y t h a t a n a s s i g n -
ment t r a n s f e r s t o t h e a s s i g n e e a l l t h e r i g h t ,
t i t l e and i n t e r e s t o f t h e a s s i g n o r i n t h e p r o -
p e r t y assigned
782.
. . ." 9 1 Mont. 493, 506, 11 P.2d
The same p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s t o s u b r o g a t i o n which i s s i m p l y
a d e v i c e o f e q u i t y t o compel u l t i m a t e payment o f a d e b t by o n e
who i n j u s t i c e and good c o n s c i e n c e s h o u l d pay i t .
S k a u g e v. M o u n t a i n S t a t e s T e l . & T e l . Co. (1977), Mont . I
5 6 5 P.2d 628, 34 St.Rep. 450. A c c o r d i n g l y , a l l t h e r i g h t s and
r e m e d i e s o f t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d were t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e S t a t e .
W h e r e , as h e r e , t h e r i g h t s of t h e S t a t e and t h e i l l e g i t i -
m a t e c h i l d a r e i d e n t i c a l , how c a n t h e b a r o f t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i -
t a t i o n s d e f e a t t h e S t a t e ' s claim b u t n o t t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e
child Is?
Chief J u s t i c e