Ruhd v. Liberty Northwest Ins.

No. 02-570
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 290N
JEREMY RUHD,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION, and RICHARD BARBER,
d/b/a BARBER HOMES,
Respondents and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: The Workers’ Compensation Court of the State of Montana,
Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge Presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Geoffrey C. Angel, Angel Law Firm, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondents:
Larry W. Jones, Senior Attorney, Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp.,
Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 7, 2002
Decided: December 10, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a
public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Jeremy Ruhd (Ruhd) appeals from the summary judgment entered by the Workers’
Compensation Court in favor of Respondents Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation
(Liberty) and Richard Barber, d/b/a Barber Homes. We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
¶3 Ruhd raises three issues on appeal, which we state as follows:
¶4 1. Did the Workers’ Compensation Court err in determining
that Ruhd, a permanently totally disabled worker, is not entitled
to an impairment award?
¶5 2. Did the Workers’ Compensation Court’s interpretation of
the Workers’ Compensation Act violate constitutional guarantees of
equal protection and full legal redress?
¶6 3. Did the Workers’ Compensation Court err in failing to
grant Ruhd’s motion to amend his petition to maintain a class
action and for joinder of claimants for purposes of common fund
attorney fees?
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BACKGROUND
¶7 Ruhd, while employed for Barber Homes, suffered a traumatic brain injury on
November 23, 1999, when he fell two and a half stories from a scaffolding on which he was
framing a house. He was permanently and totally disabled by his injuries, and his treating
physician determined that Ruhd had a 74 percent whole person impairment rating according
to the AMA Guide to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition.
¶8 Liberty accepted liability for Ruhd’s industrial injuries,
paying medical, wage loss and total disability benefits, but denied
Ruhd’s claim for payment of an impairment award. On January 23,
2002, Ruhd filed a petition with the Workers’ Compensation Court,
seeking a determination that he was entitled to an impairment
award. On June 18, 2002, Ruhd filed a motion to amend his petition
to join similarly situated claimants in a class action, pursuant to
Rule 23, M.R.Civ.P., and for common fund attorney fees pursuant to
this Court’s holding in Murer v. State Fund (1993), 257 Mont. 434,
849 P.2d 1036. Liberty opposed the motion, and moved for summary
judgment, citing the Workers’ Compensation Court’s earlier decision
denying payment of an impairment award for permanently, totally
disabled workers in Fisch, Frost, and Rausch v. State Compensation
Insurance Fund, 2000 MTWCC 56, which was then pending on appeal to
this Court.
¶9 On July 23, 2002, the Workers’ Compensation Court notified the
parties that it would not revisit or overrule its decision in
Rausch, and that it would either stay the proceedings herein
pending the outcome of the appeal in Rausch, or enter judgment
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adverse to Ruhd, at their direction. Both parties requested that
the Workers’ Compensation Court enter judgment against Ruhd. On
August 7, 2002, the Workers’ Compensation Court entered summary
judgment in favor of Liberty based upon its decision in Rausch and
did not address Ruhd’s motion to amend his petition. Ruhd appeals
from that judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 We review the Workers’ Compensation Court’s conclusions of law to determine
whether they are correct. Rausch v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 2002 MT 203, ¶ 14, 311
Mont. 210, ¶ 14, 54 P.3d 25, ¶ 14. In workers’ compensation cases, the law in effect at the
time of the claimant’s injury establishes the claimant’s substantive right to benefits. State
Fund v. McMillan, 2001 MT 168, ¶ 5, 306 Mont. 155, ¶ 5, 31 P.3d 347, ¶ 5.
DISCUSSION
¶11 Issue 1. Did the Workers’ Compensation Court err in determining that Ruhd, a
permanently totally disabled worker, is not entitled to an impairment award?
¶12 On September 5, 2002, this Court decided Rausch v. State
Compensation Ins. Fund, supra. In Rausch, the Court held that
permanently totally disabled workers are entitled to receive
impairment awards under the 1991 and 1997 versions of the Montana
Workers’ Compensation Act, reversing the contrary conclusion
reached by the Workers’ Compensation Court. Rausch, ¶ 30. Ruhd
and Liberty agree that Ruhd’s claim to an impairment award under
the 1999 version of the Act has been resolved by the Court’s
decision in Rausch. Liberty indicates that it will pay Ruhd the
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benefits to which he is entitled, although an issue remains
regarding the proper method of payment of those benefits under §
39-71-741, MCA, which will require further fact-finding and
resolution on remand. Ruhd does not contest this assertion.
Accordingly, we reverse the Workers’ Compensation Court’s denial of
Ruhd’s claim to an impairment award and remand for consideration of
the method of payment. It is unnecessary, therefore, to address
Ruhd’s contention under Issue 2 that the Workers’ Compensation
Court’s statutory interpretation violates constitutional
guarantees.
¶13 Issue 3. Did the Workers’ Compensation Court err in failing
to grant Ruhd’s motion to amend his petition to maintain a class
action and for joinder of claimants for purposes of common fund
attorney fees?
¶14 In granting summary judgment to Liberty on the substantive
issue raised by Ruhd’s petition, the Workers’ Compensation Court
did not address Ruhd’s motion to amend his petition for class
certification and for common fund attorney fees, and thus, these
issues were not resolved by the Workers’ Compensation Court.
¶15 Ruhd requests that we grant the relief he sought in the
Workers’ Compensation Court by entering an order certifying a class
of similarly situated claimants insured by Liberty, which he argues
is distinguished from the claimants at issue in Rausch. He further
requests an order establishing his entitlement to common fund
attorney fees for that class.
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¶16 Liberty asserts that it has contacted legal counsel involved
in the Rausch matter and that they are claiming attorney fees in
Ruhd’s case. Liberty argues that because these issues have not
been addressed by the Workers’ Compensation Court, remand for
consideration is appropriate. We agree. Because we do not have a
record before us on any of the remaining issues, the Workers’
Compensation Court is the appropriate forum for determination of
these matters.
¶17 We reverse the judgment entered herein by the Workers’
Compensation Court and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
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Chief Justice Karla M. Gray, specially concurring.
¶18 I concur in the Court's opinion. I write separately only to state my continued belief
that the Court erred in Rausch, for the reasons
stated in my dissent to that opinion. In my view,
permanently totally disabled workers are not
entitled to receive impairment awards in addition
to their other workers’ compensation benefits.
See Rausch, ¶¶ 59-65 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
The Court having concluded otherwise, however,
I am as bound by that conclusion as are all other
Montanans.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
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